Jonas Hjort, Diana B. Moreira, Gautam Rao, J. Santini
Can research findings change political leaders’ beliefs and policies? We use experiments with 2,150 Brazilian municipalities to measure mayors’ demand for and response to research information. In one experiment, we find that mayors are willing to pay to learn the results of evaluation studies, and update their beliefs when informed of the findings. They value larger-sample studies more, while not distinguishing between studies in rich and poor countries. In a second experiment, we find that informing mayors about research on a simple and effective policy, taxpayer reminder letters, increases the probability the policy is implemented by 10 percentage points. (JEL D72, D78, D83, O17, O18)
{"title":"How Research Affects Policy: Experimental Evidence from 2,150 Brazilian Municipalities","authors":"Jonas Hjort, Diana B. Moreira, Gautam Rao, J. Santini","doi":"10.1257/AER.20190830","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/AER.20190830","url":null,"abstract":"Can research findings change political leaders’ beliefs and policies? We use experiments with 2,150 Brazilian municipalities to measure mayors’ demand for and response to research information. In one experiment, we find that mayors are willing to pay to learn the results of evaluation studies, and update their beliefs when informed of the findings. They value larger-sample studies more, while not distinguishing between studies in rich and poor countries. In a second experiment, we find that informing mayors about research on a simple and effective policy, taxpayer reminder letters, increases the probability the policy is implemented by 10 percentage points. (JEL D72, D78, D83, O17, O18)","PeriodicalId":170831,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice: Analysis of Collective Decision-Making eJournal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117150440","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this article, we empirically study the survival of the ruling party in parliamentary democracies using a hazard rate model. We define survival of a crisis as being successful in a critical vote in the parliament. We develop a general probabilistic model of political crises and test it empirically. We find that during crises, parties in the parliament are likely to vote independently of each other. Thus, we receive as an empirical result what the previous voting power literature assumed.
{"title":"Voting Power and Survival: The Case of a Ruling Party","authors":"Artyom Jelnov, Pavel Jelnov","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3401122","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3401122","url":null,"abstract":"In this article, we empirically study the survival of the ruling party in parliamentary democracies using a hazard rate model. We define survival of a crisis as being successful in a critical vote in the parliament. We develop a general probabilistic model of political crises and test it empirically. We find that during crises, parties in the parliament are likely to vote independently of each other. Thus, we receive as an empirical result what the previous voting power literature assumed.","PeriodicalId":170831,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice: Analysis of Collective Decision-Making eJournal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123407367","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper studies how politicians and voters respond to new information on the threats of climate change. Using data on the universe of federal disaster declarations between 1989 and 2014, we document that congress members from districts hit by a hurricane are more likely to support bills promoting more environmental regulation and control in the year after the disaster. The response to hurricanes does not seem to be driven by logrolling behavior or lobbysts' pressure. The change in legislative agenda is persistent over time, and it is associated with an electoral penalty in the following elections. The response is mainly promoted by representatives in safe districts, those with more experience, and those with strong pro-environment records. Our evidence thus reveals that natural disasters may trigger a permanent change in politicians' beliefs, but only those with a sufficient electoral strength or with strong ideologies are willing to engage in promoting policies with short-run costs and long-run benefits.
{"title":"Hurricanes, Climate Change Policies and Electoral Accountability","authors":"Stefano Gagliarducci, Daniele Paserman, Eleonora Patacchini","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3389876","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3389876","url":null,"abstract":"This paper studies how politicians and voters respond to new information on the threats of climate change. Using data on the universe of federal disaster declarations between 1989 and 2014, we document that congress members from districts hit by a hurricane are more likely to support bills promoting more environmental regulation and control in the year after the disaster. The response to hurricanes does not seem to be driven by logrolling behavior or lobbysts' pressure. The change in legislative agenda is persistent over time, and it is associated with an electoral penalty in the following elections. The response is mainly promoted by representatives in safe districts, those with more experience, and those with strong pro-environment records. Our evidence thus reveals that natural disasters may trigger a permanent change in politicians' beliefs, but only those with a sufficient electoral strength or with strong ideologies are willing to engage in promoting policies with short-run costs and long-run benefits.","PeriodicalId":170831,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice: Analysis of Collective Decision-Making eJournal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129501293","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The paper examines some of the most important criteria and indicators for social efficiency. Fundamental ideas of the Bulgarian and foreign economic science for the specifics of social efficiency in the activity of the subjects of institutional governance, including the bodies of state power are discussed. The paper applies a comprehensive (interdisciplinary) approach suggesting integration of sociological, theoretical and management, socio-economic and other aspects of the study is related to the system analysis. The social governance is seen from the perspective of a system method, being the regulation of the relations between the subject and object of management as a purposeful impact on the social system in order to bring its operation and development in accordance with socially significant goals .
{"title":"Efficiency and Assessment of Social Technology","authors":"V. Terziev","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3384113","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3384113","url":null,"abstract":"The paper examines some of the most important criteria and indicators for social efficiency. Fundamental ideas of the Bulgarian and foreign economic science for the specifics of social efficiency in the activity of the subjects of institutional governance, including the bodies of state power are discussed. The paper applies a comprehensive (interdisciplinary) approach suggesting integration of sociological, theoretical and management, socio-economic and other aspects of the study is related to the system analysis. The social governance is seen from the perspective of a system method, being the regulation of the relations between the subject and object of management as a purposeful impact on the social system in order to bring its operation and development in accordance with socially significant goals .","PeriodicalId":170831,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice: Analysis of Collective Decision-Making eJournal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-04-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127305846","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Aurora García-Gallego, Nikos Georgantzis, T. Jaber-López, G. Michailidou
We report results from an experimental set up in which two firms compete in an auction to win the license for a public project, submitting sealed offers regarding the project’s quality and a bribe to the public official deciding. We study the role of an agent (citizen) who is either a mere observer or is passively affected by the quality of the winning project. Experimental data reveal that the existence of a citizen affected by the winning project significantly reduces bribes, while a citizen who only observes the auction results in higher pro-social behaviour from public officials.
{"title":"Audience and Other-Regarding Effects in an Experimental Auction With Bribery","authors":"Aurora García-Gallego, Nikos Georgantzis, T. Jaber-López, G. Michailidou","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3376728","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3376728","url":null,"abstract":"We report results from an experimental set up in which two firms compete in an auction to win the license for a public project, submitting sealed offers regarding the project’s quality and a bribe to the public official deciding. We study the role of an agent (citizen) who is either a mere observer or is passively affected by the quality of the winning project. Experimental data reveal that the existence of a citizen affected by the winning project significantly reduces bribes, while a citizen who only observes the auction results in higher pro-social behaviour from public officials.","PeriodicalId":170831,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice: Analysis of Collective Decision-Making eJournal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-04-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114337977","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
There is almost a universal agreement on the significance of ensuring good governance for private sector development and the overall economic development of states. The lack of good governance affects the performance of a state in executing its core functions and its ability in meeting its major economic and social goals. Corrupt practices in public institutions, lack of transparency, accountability and responsiveness of public institutions to the demands of the private sector continue to have a significant impact on the operation and development of the private sector in Ethiopia. The National Business Agenda (NBA) report 2017of Ethiopia clearly indicates that lack of good governance, among other issues, is one of the most outstanding challenges which continues to significantly constrain the growth potential and the contribution of the private sector to the national economy of Ethiopia.
While it is true that good governance includes broader issues related with the operations of government and the private sector, the research identifies crucial aspects of good governance in public sector that should form the focus of the study. Accordingly, the study on governance in public sector and its implications on private sector development in Ethiopia will focus on specific thematic issues and indicators of good governance that have particular relevance to private sector development in Ethiopia.
{"title":"Governance in Public Sector: Implications on Private Sector Development in Ethiopia","authors":"Mesenbet Assefa Tadeg, S. Teshale","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3375994","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3375994","url":null,"abstract":"There is almost a universal agreement on the significance of ensuring good governance for private sector development and the overall economic development of states. The lack of good governance affects the performance of a state in executing its core functions and its ability in meeting its major economic and social goals. Corrupt practices in public institutions, lack of transparency, accountability and responsiveness of public institutions to the demands of the private sector continue to have a significant impact on the operation and development of the private sector in Ethiopia. The National Business Agenda (NBA) report 2017of Ethiopia clearly indicates that lack of good governance, among other issues, is one of the most outstanding challenges which continues to significantly constrain the growth potential and the contribution of the private sector to the national economy of Ethiopia. <br><br>While it is true that good governance includes broader issues related with the operations of government and the private sector, the research identifies crucial aspects of good governance in public sector that should form the focus of the study. Accordingly, the study on governance in public sector and its implications on private sector development in Ethiopia will focus on specific thematic issues and indicators of good governance that have particular relevance to private sector development in Ethiopia.","PeriodicalId":170831,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice: Analysis of Collective Decision-Making eJournal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-04-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115716152","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The future transformation of the energy system is a contentious topic, involving a variety of conflicting opinions and interests. In order to structure and evaluate these opinions, we develop a group decision-making process with professional stakeholders and energy experts. The aim of this process is to develop a common objective system for the energy transition and to evaluate four possible energy transition alternatives for Germany until 2030. The stakeholders are involved in every step of the decision-making process – the development of the alternatives, the definition of the objective system, and the final evaluation of the alternatives. We apply Value-Focused Thinking (VFT) to define and structure the objectives of the stakeholders and use Multi-Attribute Utility Theory (MAUT) to evaluate the preferences of the stakeholders towards these objectives. The results show that a majority of the stakeholders prefers the energy transition alternative, which has the highest ambitions to limit climate change. A minority prefers the pan-European alternative where Germany’s power system is further integrated into the European energy system.
{"title":"Using Value-Focused Thinking and Multi-Criteria Group Decision-Making to Evaluate Energy Transition Alternatives","authors":"T. Höfer, Ruediger von Nitzsch, R. Madlener","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3501616","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3501616","url":null,"abstract":"The future transformation of the energy system is a contentious topic, involving a variety of conflicting opinions and interests. In order to structure and evaluate these opinions, we develop a group decision-making process with professional stakeholders and energy experts. The aim of this process is to develop a common objective system for the energy transition and to evaluate four possible energy transition alternatives for Germany until 2030. The stakeholders are involved in every step of the decision-making process – the development of the alternatives, the definition of the objective system, and the final evaluation of the alternatives. We apply Value-Focused Thinking (VFT) to define and structure the objectives of the stakeholders and use Multi-Attribute Utility Theory (MAUT) to evaluate the preferences of the stakeholders towards these objectives. The results show that a majority of the stakeholders prefers the energy transition alternative, which has the highest ambitions to limit climate change. A minority prefers the pan-European alternative where Germany’s power system is further integrated into the European energy system.","PeriodicalId":170831,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice: Analysis of Collective Decision-Making eJournal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121652245","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We consider the voting behavior of Supreme Court Justices, finding evidence of co-dependencies in their votes. Coincident with changes in the party imbalance of the Court over time, sharp discontinuities in these dependencies are evident. Overall, the patterns suggest a tradeoff between co-dependencies around political affiliations and individual ideologies, with more-equal party representation on the Court encouraging greater party awareness in Justice voting, and less-equal party representation allowing Justices across party lines but with similar ideologies to inform each other's votes.
{"title":"Vote Influence in Group Decision-Making: The Changing Role of Justices' Peers on the Supreme Court","authors":"Max Mindock, G. Waddell","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3390306","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3390306","url":null,"abstract":"We consider the voting behavior of Supreme Court Justices, finding evidence of co-dependencies in their votes. Coincident with changes in the party imbalance of the Court over time, sharp discontinuities in these dependencies are evident. Overall, the patterns suggest a tradeoff between co-dependencies around political affiliations and individual ideologies, with more-equal party representation on the Court encouraging greater party awareness in Justice voting, and less-equal party representation allowing Justices across party lines but with similar ideologies to inform each other's votes.","PeriodicalId":170831,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice: Analysis of Collective Decision-Making eJournal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115678855","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Objective: To investigate whether companies that donate to winning electoral campaigns are more aggressive in terms of tax planning than companies that do not make these contributions. The relationship between politicians and companies may be signaled by political connections in which companies try to get political benefits in exchange for providing politicians with campaign financing. Our hypothesis is that a quid pro quo occurs in which these companies benefit from favorable tax treatment that reduces their relative tax burden. Methodology: The focus of this study is donations which were made in the presidential elections of 2010 and 2014. The sample covers the period between 2010 and 2016 for companies listed on the B3, using proxies for tax aggressiveness computed based on Value Added Reporting. Through linear regressions we have tested whether the companies that made these campaign contributions tend to have a lower tax burden. Results: The proposed hypothesis was confirmed, revealing that a political connection between campaign donations reduces the tax burden for donating companies during the years following the election. These donations appear to depict an environment characterized by an exchange of favors, in which these donating companies exhibit greater tax aggressiveness as compared to non-donating companies. Originality/Value: The current study deals with a subject that has not yet been examined empirically in Brazil, and reinforces the position adopted by the Supreme Court in prohibiting campaign donations to inhibit quid pro quo practices. The study offers additional arguments for the criminalization of the so-called “second set of books” used to record electoral campaign contributions.
{"title":"Corporate Electoral Donations and Tax Aggressiveness","authors":"Antonio Martinez, Hettore Sias Telles","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3361766","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3361766","url":null,"abstract":"Objective: To investigate whether companies that donate to winning electoral campaigns are more aggressive in terms of tax planning than companies that do not make these contributions. The relationship between politicians and companies may be signaled by political connections in which companies try to get political benefits in exchange for providing politicians with campaign financing. Our hypothesis is that a quid pro quo occurs in which these companies benefit from favorable tax treatment that reduces their relative tax burden. \u0000 \u0000Methodology: The focus of this study is donations which were made in the presidential elections of 2010 and 2014. The sample covers the period between 2010 and 2016 for companies listed on the B3, using proxies for tax aggressiveness computed based on Value Added Reporting. Through linear regressions we have tested whether the companies that made these campaign contributions tend to have a lower tax burden. \u0000 \u0000Results: The proposed hypothesis was confirmed, revealing that a political connection between campaign donations reduces the tax burden for donating companies during the years following the election. These donations appear to depict an environment characterized by an exchange of favors, in which these donating companies exhibit greater tax aggressiveness as compared to non-donating companies. \u0000 \u0000Originality/Value: The current study deals with a subject that has not yet been examined empirically in Brazil, and reinforces the position adopted by the Supreme Court in prohibiting campaign donations to inhibit quid pro quo practices. The study offers additional arguments for the criminalization of the so-called “second set of books” used to record electoral campaign contributions.","PeriodicalId":170831,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice: Analysis of Collective Decision-Making eJournal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-03-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122144992","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this paper, we argue that a difference in district magnitude—the number of seats per district—causes variation in electoral competition. We show that in the Single-Member District with Plurality voting (SMDP) system, voters may cast their ballots using the candidate’s “visual cues�?—this is particularly notable when voters cannot rely on party labels. We quantify the candidate’s smile in a replicable form by using automated facial recognition technology. Using data from local assembly elections in an urban area in Japan, we showed how a candidate’s smile, the proxy of the candidate’s visual, is effective in gathering floating votes in SMDP, but it does not increase the vote share in Multi-Member Districts with Single Non-Transferable Voting (MMDs/SNTV) system.
{"title":"Show Your Flag or Be Everyone's Friend?: The Effects of District Magnitude on Vote-Securing Strategies","authors":"Kosuke Nakamura, Junichiro Wada","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3345557","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3345557","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, we argue that a difference in district magnitude—the number of seats per district—causes variation in electoral competition. We show that in the Single-Member District with Plurality voting (SMDP) system, voters may cast their ballots using the candidate’s “visual cues�?—this is particularly notable when voters cannot rely on party labels. We quantify the candidate’s smile in a replicable form by using automated facial recognition technology. Using data from local assembly elections in an urban area in Japan, we showed how a candidate’s smile, the proxy of the candidate’s visual, is effective in gathering floating votes in SMDP, but it does not increase the vote share in Multi-Member Districts with Single Non-Transferable Voting (MMDs/SNTV) system.","PeriodicalId":170831,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice: Analysis of Collective Decision-Making eJournal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-03-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124830973","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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