This chapter focuses on the inner rationale and consequences of four different archetypal positions regarding how ethical and political values are tackled in welfare economics. Welfare economics is standardly associated with the welfarist framework, for which social welfare is based on individual utility only. Beyond this, we distinguish the value-neutrality claimfor which ethical values should be and are out of the scope of welfare economics-, the value confinement idealfor which ethical values are acceptable if they are minimal and consensual-, the transparency requirementfor which any ethical values may be acceptable in the welfare economics framework if explicit and formalized-, and the entanglement claimwhich challenges the very possibility of demarcation between facts and values.
{"title":"Values in Welfare Economics","authors":"Gate Working Paper Series, Antoinette Baujard","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3857750","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3857750","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter focuses on the inner rationale and consequences of four different archetypal positions regarding how ethical and political values are tackled in welfare economics. Welfare economics is standardly associated with the welfarist framework, for which social welfare is based on individual utility only. Beyond this, we distinguish the value-neutrality claimfor which ethical values should be and are out of the scope of welfare economics-, the value confinement idealfor which ethical values are acceptable if they are minimal and consensual-, the transparency requirementfor which any ethical values may be acceptable in the welfare economics framework if explicit and formalized-, and the entanglement claimwhich challenges the very possibility of demarcation between facts and values.","PeriodicalId":170831,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice: Analysis of Collective Decision-Making eJournal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131818739","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The COVID-19 pandemic has reignited interest in trust in public institutions as the efficacy of public health interventions is predicated on trust in the institutions (different levels of government and health authorities). Using a unique micro-level dataset, I assess trust of Canadians in public institutions and whether it might contribute to containment of the COVID-19 pandemic. I find that on average Canadians trust their public institutions and this trust is primarily driven by social trust. However, trust in institutions is not uniform. It is strongly positively related to level of education, age, and sex. More educated, older, female Canadians are more likely to trust public institutions. However, there are significant differences across provinces as well. I provide positive evidence relating trust and flattening of the COVID-19 incidence curve. I also find that higher level of trust in public institutions significantly increases the likelihood of taking vaccines when they become available. This initial assessment of trust in containing COVID-19 indicates that policymakers should take the initiative to maintain and enhance trust to effectively implement public initiatives to curb future waves of this and other pandemics, which have significant consequences for the Canadian economy.
{"title":"Trust, Public Institutions, and Pandemic Management: Some Evidence from the COVID-19 Pandemic in Canada","authors":"Ashraf Al Zaman","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3856352","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3856352","url":null,"abstract":"The COVID-19 pandemic has reignited interest in trust in public institutions as the efficacy of public health interventions is predicated on trust in the institutions (different levels of government and health authorities). Using a unique micro-level dataset, I assess trust of Canadians in public institutions and whether it might contribute to containment of the COVID-19 pandemic. I find that on average Canadians trust their public institutions and this trust is primarily driven by social trust. However, trust in institutions is not uniform. It is strongly positively related to level of education, age, and sex. More educated, older, female Canadians are more likely to trust public institutions. However, there are significant differences across provinces as well. I provide positive evidence relating trust and flattening of the COVID-19 incidence curve. I also find that higher level of trust in public institutions significantly increases the likelihood of taking vaccines when they become available. This initial assessment of trust in containing COVID-19 indicates that policymakers should take the initiative to maintain and enhance trust to effectively implement public initiatives to curb future waves of this and other pandemics, which have significant consequences for the Canadian economy.","PeriodicalId":170831,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice: Analysis of Collective Decision-Making eJournal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129974531","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We introduce a democratic procedure with voting-based proposals called ”Pendular Voting”. It works as follows: An agenda-setter chooses a proposal meant to replace a given status quo. In the first stage, a random sample of the population votes on the proposal. The result is made public, which may reveal information about the distribution of preferences in the electorate. Depending on the outcome, a third option (next to the proposal and the status quo) is added: This option is either closer to or more distant from the status quo than the original proposal. Then, in a second stage the entire electorate expresses pairwise social preferences over the status quo, the initial proposal, and the third option. We investigate the manipulability and exploitation of this voting procedure and its welfare effects. We show that manipulation is limited or absent and that exploitation can be avoided. Regardless of whether the agenda-setter is altruistic or selfish, Pendular Voting leads to welfare gains in expectation.
{"title":"Pendular Voting","authors":"V. Britz, H. Gersbach","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3856921","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3856921","url":null,"abstract":"We introduce a democratic procedure with voting-based proposals called ”Pendular Voting”. It works as follows: An agenda-setter chooses a proposal meant to replace a given status quo. In the first stage, a random sample of the population votes on the proposal. The result is made public, which may reveal information about the distribution of preferences in the electorate. Depending on the outcome, a third option (next to the proposal and the status quo) is added: This option is either closer to or more distant from the status quo than the original proposal. Then, in a second stage the entire electorate expresses pairwise social preferences over the status quo, the initial proposal, and the third option. We investigate the manipulability and exploitation of this voting procedure and its welfare effects. We show that manipulation is limited or absent and that exploitation can be avoided. Regardless of whether the agenda-setter is altruistic or selfish, Pendular Voting leads to welfare gains in expectation.","PeriodicalId":170831,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice: Analysis of Collective Decision-Making eJournal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130448148","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this paper, we study dynamic team contests. In the framework of a Tullock contest between two teams generating impacts according to the Cobb-Douglas effort aggregation function, we examine how equilibrium efforts and winning probabilities depend on the timing of the actions. We show that in contrast to synchronous contests, asynchronous contests with publicly observable actions do not result in the same equilibrium outcome as the one-stage contest; they are strategically unbalancing, leading to more lopsided contests. The results have implications about the design of team contests with complementary efforts.
{"title":"Dynamic Team Contests with Complementary Efforts","authors":"Maria N. Arbatskaya, Hideo Konishi","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3837688","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3837688","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, we study dynamic team contests. In the framework of a Tullock contest between two teams generating impacts according to the Cobb-Douglas effort aggregation function, we examine how equilibrium efforts and winning probabilities depend on the timing of the actions. We show that in contrast to synchronous contests, asynchronous contests with publicly observable actions do not result in the same equilibrium outcome as the one-stage contest; they are strategically unbalancing, leading to more lopsided contests. The results have implications about the design of team contests with complementary efforts.","PeriodicalId":170831,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice: Analysis of Collective Decision-Making eJournal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-04-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126581504","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Questioning the government by the elected representatives on the floor of the house, irrespective of political ideology, is a fundamental feature of parliamentary democracy. In this paper, using data from the 15th and 16th Lok Sabha (LS), we study the performance of Member of Parliaments (MPs) from two major political alliances: United Progressive Alliance (UPA) and the National Democratic Alliance (NDA), in terms of attendance and the number of questions asked on the floor of the house. With respect to attendance, we find that in the 15th LS, when NDA was in the opposition and the UPA formed the government, then MPs from NDA and the UPA had similar attendance (76.6% for UPA vs. 75.2% for NDA). However, in the 16th Lok Sabha when NDA formed the government and the UPA was in the opposition, then MPs from the UPA were significantly less likely to attend the parliament as compared to MPs from the NDA (75% for UPA vs. 85% for NDA). In terms of questions asked: the NDA MPs in the opposition in 15th LS asked on an average 326 questions, which was significantly higher than the average number of questions asked by MPs of the ruling alliance, the UPA, at 240. However, in the subsequent 16th LS when NDA was the ruling alliance and the UPA was in the opposition, then MPs from NDA asked on an average 266 questions, while MPs from the UPA asked on an average 293 questions, and this difference was insignificant at the 95% confidence interval. Similar analysis has been performed at the level of the political parties
{"title":"Performance of Members of Parliament: An Exploratory Analysis of the 15th and 16th Lok Sabha","authors":"M. Kapoor, S. Ravi","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3904715","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3904715","url":null,"abstract":"Questioning the government by the elected representatives on the floor of the house, irrespective of political ideology, is a fundamental feature of parliamentary democracy. In this paper, using data from the 15th and 16th Lok Sabha (LS), we study the performance of Member of Parliaments (MPs) from two major political alliances: United Progressive Alliance (UPA) and the National Democratic Alliance (NDA), in terms of attendance and the number of questions asked on the floor of the house. With respect to attendance, we find that in the 15th LS, when NDA was in the opposition and the UPA formed the government, then MPs from NDA and the UPA had similar attendance (76.6% for UPA vs. 75.2% for NDA). However, in the 16th Lok Sabha when NDA formed the government and the UPA was in the opposition, then MPs from the UPA were significantly less likely to attend the parliament as compared to MPs from the NDA (75% for UPA vs. 85% for NDA). In terms of questions asked: the NDA MPs in the opposition in 15th LS asked on an average 326 questions, which was significantly higher than the average number of questions asked by MPs of the ruling alliance, the UPA, at 240. However, in the subsequent 16th LS when NDA was the ruling alliance and the UPA was in the opposition, then MPs from NDA asked on an average 266 questions, while MPs from the UPA asked on an average 293 questions, and this difference was insignificant at the 95% confidence interval. Similar analysis has been performed at the level of the political parties","PeriodicalId":170831,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice: Analysis of Collective Decision-Making eJournal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-03-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129709385","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this paper, I provide the first empirical analysis on peer effects in corruption using observational data. In specifications including fixed effects to control for differences across cities and colleges, and using an instrumental variable approach, I find that hometown and college ties with other officials who have been investigated for corruption are associated with significant reductions in investigation probability. Evidence supports the explanation that when anti-corruption efforts are high, being connected to a corrupt official makes one less willing to engage in corruption for fear of being implicated. Such act of ``drawing the line against the `problematic' politicians'' is deeply rooted in contemporary Chinese political culture. I structurally estimate a networked game-theoretic model, and the estimates also indicate that such spillover of investigations is the major mechanism at play. Counterfactual analysis implies that corruption decreases as the network becomes denser, and as the level of corruption detection or punishment increases.
{"title":"Peer Effects, Social Ties, and Corruption: Evidence From China","authors":"Xiangyun Shi","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3680738","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3680738","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, I provide the first empirical analysis on peer effects in corruption using observational data. In specifications including fixed effects to control for differences across cities and colleges, and using an instrumental variable approach, I find that hometown and college ties with other officials who have been investigated for corruption are associated with significant reductions in investigation probability. Evidence supports the explanation that when anti-corruption efforts are high, being connected to a corrupt official makes one less willing to engage in corruption for fear of being implicated. Such act of ``drawing the line against the `problematic' politicians'' is deeply rooted in contemporary Chinese political culture. I structurally estimate a networked game-theoretic model, and the estimates also indicate that such spillover of investigations is the major mechanism at play. Counterfactual analysis implies that corruption decreases as the network becomes denser, and as the level of corruption detection or punishment increases.","PeriodicalId":170831,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice: Analysis of Collective Decision-Making eJournal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-03-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122169624","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The United States Supreme Court 2010 decision in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission led to a major de-regulation of election campaign finance law. A new political action committee emerged from this case, known as the Super PAC, with a relatively unfettered ability to raise and spend money in elections. How were campaign spending and electoral outcomes affected? I characterize the influence of Super PACs on U.S. Congressional general and primary elections by estimating an election contest model. I exploit variation in donor finances, background information on candidates, and the dynamic model structure to deal with candidate unobservables. Results indicate that Super PACs do not have significant influence on voting outcomes but did increase election spending between 2010-2016. They affect behavior of other committees, with differences across political party and incumbency status. Finally, Super PACs have modest effects on candidate platforms and entry.
{"title":"Campaign Finance in the Age of Super PACs","authors":"Christian Cox","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3794817","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3794817","url":null,"abstract":"The United States Supreme Court 2010 decision in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission led to a major de-regulation of election campaign finance law. A new political action committee emerged from this case, known as the Super PAC, with a relatively unfettered ability to raise and spend money in elections. How were campaign spending and electoral outcomes affected? I characterize the influence of Super PACs on U.S. Congressional general and primary elections by estimating an election contest model. I exploit variation in donor finances, background information on candidates, and the dynamic model structure to deal with candidate unobservables. Results indicate that Super PACs do not have significant influence on voting outcomes but did increase election spending between 2010-2016. They affect behavior of other committees, with differences across political party and incumbency status. Finally, Super PACs have modest effects on candidate platforms and entry.","PeriodicalId":170831,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice: Analysis of Collective Decision-Making eJournal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-02-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127654964","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Studies of local governance in China often point to nimble experimentation but problematic implementation. To reconcile these competing images, it is useful to clarify the concepts of experimentation and implementation and see how they unfolded in one policy area. The history of China’s Open Government Information (OGI) initiative shows that the experimentation stage sometimes proceeds well and produces new policy options, but may falter if local leaders are unwilling to carry out an experiment. And the implementation stage often poses challenges, but may improve if the Center initiates new, small-scale experiments and encourages local innovation. This suggests that the experimentation and implementation stages are not so different when officials in Beijing and the localities have diverging interests and the Center is more supportive of a measure than local officials. The ups and downs of OGI, and also village elections, can be traced to the policy goal of monitoring local cadres, the central-local divide, and the pattern of support and opposition within the state.
{"title":"Understanding Experimentation and Implementation: A Case Study of China’s Government Transparency Policy","authors":"Jieun Kim, K. O’Brien","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3790199","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3790199","url":null,"abstract":"Studies of local governance in China often point to nimble experimentation but problematic implementation. To reconcile these competing images, it is useful to clarify the concepts of experimentation and implementation and see how they unfolded in one policy area. The history of China’s Open Government Information (OGI) initiative shows that the experimentation stage sometimes proceeds well and produces new policy options, but may falter if local leaders are unwilling to carry out an experiment. And the implementation stage often poses challenges, but may improve if the Center initiates new, small-scale experiments and encourages local innovation. This suggests that the experimentation and implementation stages are not so different when officials in Beijing and the localities have diverging interests and the Center is more supportive of a measure than local officials. The ups and downs of OGI, and also village elections, can be traced to the policy goal of monitoring local cadres, the central-local divide, and the pattern of support and opposition within the state.","PeriodicalId":170831,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice: Analysis of Collective Decision-Making eJournal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-02-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134215837","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Relying on the merit goods concept developed by Richard A. Musgrave, this paper introduces the notion of quasi-merit good. The criteria of eligibility for merit goods are vague. Quasi-merit good constitutes a special case where government protection and sponsorship are obtained via public choice influenced by special interests or a misconception. I claim that private bank deposits are a quasi-merit good meant to satisfy the public want of bank stability and uninterrupted supply of household savings into the financial system. Bank stakeholders join with other social and political groups to demand government intervention. It becomes institutionalized in the shape of a government-backed deposit protection scheme that ‘nudges’ depositors to act in a desirable way. Government assumes an implicit liability under deposit guarantee, but may be required to inject public funds to keep the scheme running. Deposit protection has distributional effects: welfare is redistributed in favor of special interests. Its premature enactment generates massive moral hazard among depositors and bankers.
本文在Richard A. Musgrave提出的价值商品概念的基础上，引入了准价值商品的概念。优质商品的资格标准是模糊的。准价值商品是在特殊利益或误解的影响下，通过公共选择获得政府保护和赞助的特殊情况。我声称，私人银行存款是一种准功绩商品，旨在满足公众对银行稳定和不间断地向金融体系提供家庭储蓄的需求。银行利益相关者联合其他社会和政治团体要求政府干预。它以政府支持的存款保护计划的形式变得制度化，该计划“推动”储户以可取的方式行事。政府在存款担保下承担隐性责任，但可能需要注入公共资金以维持该计划的运行。存款保护具有分配效应:福利被重新分配，有利于特殊利益群体。它的过早颁布在存款人和银行家中造成了巨大的道德风险。
{"title":"Quasi-Merit Goods: The Concept and a Case Study of Private Bank Deposits","authors":"A. Vernikov","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3786494","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3786494","url":null,"abstract":"Relying on the merit goods concept developed by Richard A. Musgrave, this paper introduces the notion of quasi-merit good. The criteria of eligibility for merit goods are vague. Quasi-merit good constitutes a special case where government protection and sponsorship are obtained via public choice influenced by special interests or a misconception. I claim that private bank deposits are a quasi-merit good meant to satisfy the public want of bank stability and uninterrupted supply of household savings into the financial system. Bank stakeholders join with other social and political groups to demand government intervention. It becomes institutionalized in the shape of a government-backed deposit protection scheme that ‘nudges’ depositors to act in a desirable way. Government assumes an implicit liability under deposit guarantee, but may be required to inject public funds to keep the scheme running. Deposit protection has distributional effects: welfare is redistributed in favor of special interests. Its premature enactment generates massive moral hazard among depositors and bankers.","PeriodicalId":170831,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice: Analysis of Collective Decision-Making eJournal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-02-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129586210","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Proceeds from illicit activities percolate into the legal economy through several channels. We exploit international regulations targeting money laundering via the financial sector to identify the flows of “dirty money” into legitimate establishments: business-based money laundering (BBML). Our variant of the monopolistic competition model embeds a drug cartel that channels illicit proceeds into an offshore financial investment and into BBML. Tighter regulations in one channel increase the flow in the other. We use a research design that links U.S. county business activity to the evolution of anti-money-laundering regulations in Caribbean jurisdictions to provide the first empirical evidence of the phenomenon.
{"title":"Hiding Filthy Lucre in Plain Sight: Theory and Identification of Business-Based Money Laundering","authors":"K. Maskus, Alessandro Peri, A. Rubinchik","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3782703","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3782703","url":null,"abstract":"Proceeds from illicit activities percolate into the legal economy through several channels. We exploit international regulations targeting money laundering via the financial sector to identify the flows of “dirty money” into legitimate establishments: business-based money laundering (BBML). Our variant of the monopolistic competition model embeds a drug cartel that channels illicit proceeds into an offshore financial investment and into BBML. Tighter regulations in one channel increase the flow in the other. We use a research design that links U.S. county business activity to the evolution of anti-money-laundering regulations in Caribbean jurisdictions to provide the first empirical evidence of the phenomenon.","PeriodicalId":170831,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice: Analysis of Collective Decision-Making eJournal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-02-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131712123","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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