Pub Date : 2020-07-09DOI: 10.24187/ecostat.2020.514t.2013
Adrien Papuchon
[eng] The 2008 economic crisis, which has had a significant impact on young adults’entry into the labour market, may have changed their opinions on social policies and expenditure. Data from the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP, 2006, 2016) allow analysis and comparison of these opinions and their evolution in 12 European countries, as well as in the United States and New Zealand. We also examine the differences between the opinions of young adults and other adults and their evolution over time. In order to take into account differences in national contexts, we use the standard typology of welfare state regimes. Young adults’ support for public intervention in social issues increased between 2006 and 2016, except in the Scandinavian countries. Differences of opinion with their elders have increased in liberal countries and decreased in conservative countries, while the desire for increased social welfare remains high in countries where social welfare was least developed.
{"title":"Have Young Adults’ Opinions on the Social Role of the State Changed since the 2008 Economic Crisis?","authors":"Adrien Papuchon","doi":"10.24187/ecostat.2020.514t.2013","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.24187/ecostat.2020.514t.2013","url":null,"abstract":"[eng] The 2008 economic crisis, which has had a significant impact on young adults’entry into the labour market, may have changed their opinions on social policies and expenditure. Data from the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP, 2006, 2016) allow analysis and comparison of these opinions and their evolution in 12 European countries, as well as in the United States and New Zealand. We also examine the differences between the opinions of young adults and other adults and their evolution over time. In order to take into account differences in national contexts, we use the standard typology of welfare state regimes. Young adults’ support for public intervention in social issues increased between 2006 and 2016, except in the Scandinavian countries. Differences of opinion with their elders have increased in liberal countries and decreased in conservative countries, while the desire for increased social welfare remains high in countries where social welfare was least developed.","PeriodicalId":170831,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice: Analysis of Collective Decision-Making eJournal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123548662","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article proposes that two major trends - the failure of political institutions and the globalization of minority rights - present major challenges for public administration. These changes mean that public administrators must now perform roles that were previously the realm of elected officials in relation to the broader public. Specific concerns related to the public’s ability to evaluate programs and the enhanced role and limits on representative bureaucracy are discussed.
{"title":"Political Failure, Citizen Feedback, and Representative Bureaucracy: The Interplay of Politics, Public Management and Governance","authors":"K. Meier","doi":"10.52372/kjps35201","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.52372/kjps35201","url":null,"abstract":"This article proposes that two major trends - the failure of political institutions and the globalization of minority rights - present major challenges for public administration. These changes mean that public administrators must now perform roles that were previously the realm of elected officials in relation to the broader public. Specific concerns related to the public’s ability to evaluate programs and the enhanced role and limits on representative bureaucracy are discussed.","PeriodicalId":170831,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice: Analysis of Collective Decision-Making eJournal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121773577","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
D. Kritas, S. Tzagkarakis, Zoi Atsipoulianaki, Symeon Sidiropoulos
The spread of the Covid-19 brought global institutions, societies, states and economies in a critical position as they encounter a new worldwide multilevel crisis. At the same time, states have had to handle this crisis acquiring an interventionist role, protecting the social and economic cohesion, providing better health care services for their citizens and investing in scientific research, as a means to restrict this new pandemic. In order to handle that situation and its consequences, the use of all the available resources became necessary as well as the improvement of the cooperation between the private and the public sector. In Greece private sector has shown an unprecedented willingness for Greece’s CSR tradition, to contribute government’s efforts.
{"title":"The Contribution of CSR during the COVID-19 Period in Greece: A Step Forward","authors":"D. Kritas, S. Tzagkarakis, Zoi Atsipoulianaki, Symeon Sidiropoulos","doi":"10.12681/hapscpbs.24971","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.12681/hapscpbs.24971","url":null,"abstract":"The spread of the Covid-19 brought global institutions, societies, states and economies in a critical position as they encounter a new worldwide multilevel crisis. At the same time, states have had to handle this crisis acquiring an interventionist role, protecting the social and economic cohesion, providing better health care services for their citizens and investing in scientific research, as a means to restrict this new pandemic. In order to handle that situation and its consequences, the use of all the available resources became necessary as well as the improvement of the cooperation between the private and the public sector. In Greece private sector has shown an unprecedented willingness for Greece’s CSR tradition, to contribute government’s efforts.","PeriodicalId":170831,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice: Analysis of Collective Decision-Making eJournal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-06-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134249552","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In most democracies, members of parliament are either elected over a party list or by a district. We use a discontinuity in the German parliamentary system to investigate the causal effect of a district-election on an MP’s conformity with her party-line. A district-election does not affect roll call voting behavior causally, possibly due to overall high adherence to party voting. Analyzing the parliamentary speeches of each MP allows us to overcome the high party discipline with regard to parliamentary voting. Using textual analysis and machine learning techniques, we create two measures of closeness of an MP’s speeches to her party. We find that district-elected members of parliament do not differ, in terms of speeches, from those of their party-peers who have been elected through closed party lists. However, both speeches and voting correlate with district characteristics suggesting that district-elections allow districts to select more similar politicians.
{"title":"Does a District-Vote Matter for the Behavior of Politicians? A Textual Analysis of Parliamentary Speeches","authors":"Andreas Born, Aljoscha Janssen","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3644358","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3644358","url":null,"abstract":"In most democracies, members of parliament are either elected over a party list or by a district. We use a discontinuity in the German parliamentary system to investigate the causal effect of a district-election on an MP’s conformity with her party-line. A district-election does not affect roll call voting behavior causally, possibly due to overall high adherence to party voting. Analyzing the parliamentary speeches of each MP allows us to overcome the high party discipline with regard to parliamentary voting. Using textual analysis and machine learning techniques, we create two measures of closeness of an MP’s speeches to her party. We find that district-elected members of parliament do not differ, in terms of speeches, from those of their party-peers who have been elected through closed party lists. However, both speeches and voting correlate with district characteristics suggesting that district-elections allow districts to select more similar politicians.","PeriodicalId":170831,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice: Analysis of Collective Decision-Making eJournal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-06-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127388907","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
I. Filippou, A. Gozluklu, My T. Nguyen, Mark P. Taylor
We develop a novel measure of U.S. populist rhetoric. Aggregate Populist Rhetoric (APR) Index spikes around populist events. We decompose the APR Index into sub-indices. We show that APR Index and International Relations sub-index are negatively priced in the cross-section of currency excess returns. Currencies that perform well (badly) when U.S. populist rhetoric is high yield low (high) expected excess returns. Investors require high risk premium for holding currencies which underperform in times of rising U.S. populist rhetoric, especially in the post-crisis period. A long-short strategy that buys (sells) currencies with high (low) exposure to U.S. populism offers strong diversification benefits.
{"title":"U.S. Populist Rhetoric and Currency Returns","authors":"I. Filippou, A. Gozluklu, My T. Nguyen, Mark P. Taylor","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3610518","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3610518","url":null,"abstract":"We develop a novel measure of U.S. populist rhetoric. Aggregate Populist Rhetoric (APR) Index spikes around populist events. We decompose the APR Index into sub-indices. We show that APR Index and International Relations sub-index are negatively priced in the cross-section of currency excess returns. Currencies that perform well (badly) when U.S. populist rhetoric is high yield low (high) expected excess returns. Investors require high risk premium for holding currencies which underperform in times of rising U.S. populist rhetoric, especially in the post-crisis period. A long-short strategy that buys (sells) currencies with high (low) exposure to U.S. populism offers strong diversification benefits.","PeriodicalId":170831,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice: Analysis of Collective Decision-Making eJournal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-05-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114298573","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Democratic elections increasingly involve political intermediaries (e.g. grassroots organizations or political brokers). We develop a model of electoral competition in which candidates must decide between brokers (patronage) and grassroots organizations. Our model shows that patronage is more likely when public offices are relatively more “valuable” for brokers. Moreover, setups that constrain candidates from funding grassroots campaigns and weaken ties between politicians and citizens make patronage more likely. We show that patronage negatively affects citizens’ welfare, as winning brokers turned civil servants undermine the quality of governments. Finally, our model explores the role of policy deliberation in curbing patronage politics.
{"title":"Electoral Intermediaries","authors":"Jorge Gallego, Christopher Li, Léonard Wantchékon","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3611346","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3611346","url":null,"abstract":"Democratic elections increasingly involve political intermediaries (e.g. grassroots organizations or political brokers). We develop a model of electoral competition in which candidates must decide between brokers (patronage) and grassroots organizations. Our model shows that patronage is more likely when public offices are relatively more “valuable” for brokers. Moreover, setups that constrain candidates from funding grassroots campaigns and weaken ties between politicians and citizens make patronage more likely. We show that patronage negatively affects citizens’ welfare, as winning brokers turned civil servants undermine the quality of governments. Finally, our model explores the role of policy deliberation in curbing patronage politics.","PeriodicalId":170831,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice: Analysis of Collective Decision-Making eJournal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-05-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114596291","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We develop a computational framework to support the planning and evaluation of development strategies towards the 2030 Agenda. The methodology takes into account the complexities of the political economy underpinning the policymaking process, for example, the multidimensionality of development, the interlinkages between these dimensions, the inefficiencies of implementing policy interventions, as well as the institutional factors that promote or disencourage these inefficiencies. The framework is scalable and usable with publicly-available development-indicator data, and it can be further refined as more data becomes available, for example, on public expenditure. We demonstrate its usage through an application for the Mexican federal government. For this, we infer historical policy priorities, i.e. non-observable allocations of transformative resources that generate changes in development indicators. We also show how to use the tool to assess the feasibility of development goals, to measure policy coherence, and to identify accelerators. Overall, the tool provides a systemic framework that allows policymakers and other stakeholders to embrace a complexity view to tackle the challenges of the Sustainable Development Goals.
{"title":"Policy Priority Inference: A Computational Method for the Analysis of Sustainable Development","authors":"Omar A. Guerrero, Gonzalo Castañeda Ramos","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3604041","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3604041","url":null,"abstract":"We develop a computational framework to support the planning and evaluation of development strategies towards the 2030 Agenda. The methodology takes into account the complexities of the political economy underpinning the policymaking process, for example, the multidimensionality of development, the interlinkages between these dimensions, the inefficiencies of implementing policy interventions, as well as the institutional factors that promote or disencourage these inefficiencies. The framework is scalable and usable with publicly-available development-indicator data, and it can be further refined as more data becomes available, for example, on public expenditure. We demonstrate its usage through an application for the Mexican federal government. For this, we infer historical policy priorities, i.e. non-observable allocations of transformative resources that generate changes in development indicators. We also show how to use the tool to assess the feasibility of development goals, to measure policy coherence, and to identify accelerators. Overall, the tool provides a systemic framework that allows policymakers and other stakeholders to embrace a complexity view to tackle the challenges of the Sustainable Development Goals.","PeriodicalId":170831,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice: Analysis of Collective Decision-Making eJournal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-05-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121185199","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper analyzes the political economy of government debt when elected politicians decide about the distribution of public funds between a clean and a polluting public good. When provision of the polluting good creates a stock of climate externalities, strategic incentives for the incumbent government arise from both a budget and emission interaction. In this framework, reelection uncertainty leads to inefficiently low public savings (or even debt) which are attenuated by the emission interaction, while first period pollution decreases regardless of the future government's identity. If the incumbent government competes for office against an environmentalists' party, the total welfare loss from emissions also decreases as a direct result of reelection uncertainty.
{"title":"Environmental Pollution & the Political Economy of Public Debt","authors":"Maximilian Kellner","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3592355","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3592355","url":null,"abstract":"This paper analyzes the political economy of government debt when elected politicians decide about the distribution of public funds between a clean and a polluting public good. When provision of the polluting good creates a stock of climate externalities, strategic incentives for the incumbent government arise from both a budget and emission interaction. In this framework, reelection uncertainty leads to inefficiently low public savings (or even debt) which are attenuated by the emission interaction, while first period pollution decreases regardless of the future government's identity. If the incumbent government competes for office against an environmentalists' party, the total welfare loss from emissions also decreases as a direct result of reelection uncertainty.","PeriodicalId":170831,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice: Analysis of Collective Decision-Making eJournal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-05-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129009552","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We extend Harsanyi's (1955) utilitarianism theorem to an infinite-horizon multi-generation setting: Under some additional assumptions, the Pareto condition is equivalent to utilitarian aggregation and the utilitarian weights are unique. Our results facilitate analysis of the properties of utilitarian weights, such as the limiting behavior of utilitarian weights for distant future generations, and the comparative statics of utilitarian weights as the social discount factor or the social risk attitude changes. Among other findings, we show that a higher social discount rate is associated with a more unequal assignment of utilitarian weights across generations.
{"title":"Countably Infinite Utilitarian Aggregation","authors":"Tangren Feng, Shaowei Ke, A. McMillan","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3633541","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3633541","url":null,"abstract":"We extend Harsanyi's (1955) utilitarianism theorem to an infinite-horizon multi-generation setting: Under some additional assumptions, the Pareto condition is equivalent to utilitarian aggregation and the utilitarian weights are unique. Our results facilitate analysis of the properties of utilitarian weights, such as the limiting behavior of utilitarian weights for distant future generations, and the comparative statics of utilitarian weights as the social discount factor or the social risk attitude changes. Among other findings, we show that a higher social discount rate is associated with a more unequal assignment of utilitarian weights across generations.","PeriodicalId":170831,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice: Analysis of Collective Decision-Making eJournal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-05-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129536951","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
New technologies make it easier for charismatic individuals to influence others. This paper studies the political impact of the first populist radio personality in American history. Father Charles Coughlin blended populist demagoguery, anti-Semitism, and fascist sympathies to create a hugely popular radio program that attracted tens of millions of listeners throughout the 1930s. I evaluate the short- and long-term impacts of exposure to Father Coughlin's radio program. Exploiting variation in the radio signal strength as a result of topographic factors, I find that a one standard deviation increase in exposure to Coughlin's anti-FDR broadcast reduced FDR's vote share by about two percentage points in the 1936 presidential election. Effects were larger in counties with more Catholics and persisted after Father Coughlin left the air. An alternative difference-in-differences strategy exploiting Coughlin's switch in attitude towards FDR during 1932-1936 confirms the results. Moreover, I find that places more exposed to Coughlin’s broadcast in the late 1930s were more likely to form a local branch of the pro-Nazi German-American Bund, sell fewer war bonds during WWII, and harbor more negative feelings towards Jews in the long run.
{"title":"Media, Pulpit, and Populist Persuasion: Evidence from Father Coughlin","authors":"Tianyi Wang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3583114","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3583114","url":null,"abstract":"New technologies make it easier for charismatic individuals to influence others. This paper studies the political impact of the first populist radio personality in American history. Father Charles Coughlin blended populist demagoguery, anti-Semitism, and fascist sympathies to create a hugely popular radio program that attracted tens of millions of listeners throughout the 1930s. I evaluate the short- and long-term impacts of exposure to Father Coughlin's radio program. Exploiting variation in the radio signal strength as a result of topographic factors, I find that a one standard deviation increase in exposure to Coughlin's anti-FDR broadcast reduced FDR's vote share by about two percentage points in the 1936 presidential election. Effects were larger in counties with more Catholics and persisted after Father Coughlin left the air. An alternative difference-in-differences strategy exploiting Coughlin's switch in attitude towards FDR during 1932-1936 confirms the results. Moreover, I find that places more exposed to Coughlin’s broadcast in the late 1930s were more likely to form a local branch of the pro-Nazi German-American Bund, sell fewer war bonds during WWII, and harbor more negative feelings towards Jews in the long run.","PeriodicalId":170831,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice: Analysis of Collective Decision-Making eJournal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-04-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129800690","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：