Pierluigi Balduzzi, Emanuele Brancati, M. Brianti, F. Schiantarelli
We study the effects on financial markets and real economic activity of changes in risk related to political events and policy announcements in Italy during the 2013-2019 period that saw the rise to power of populist parties. We focus on events that have implications for budgetary policy, debt sustainability and for Euro membership. We use changes in the Credit Default Swaps (CDS) spreads on governments bonds around those dates as an instrument for shocks to policy and institutional risk – political risk for short – in the context of Local Projections - IV. We show that shocks associated with the rise of populist forces or their policies have adverse and sizable effects on financial markets. These negative effects were moderated by the European institutions and domestic constitutional constraints. In addition, Italian political developments generate international spillover effects on the spreads of other eurozone countries. Finally, political risk shocks have a negative impact on the real economy, although the accommodating stance of monetary policy helped in cushioning them.
{"title":"Populism, Political Risk and the Economy: Lessons from Italy","authors":"Pierluigi Balduzzi, Emanuele Brancati, M. Brianti, F. Schiantarelli","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3534477","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3534477","url":null,"abstract":"We study the effects on financial markets and real economic activity of changes in risk related to political events and policy announcements in Italy during the 2013-2019 period that saw the rise to power of populist parties. We focus on events that have implications for budgetary policy, debt sustainability and for Euro membership. We use changes in the Credit Default Swaps (CDS) spreads on governments bonds around those dates as an instrument for shocks to policy and institutional risk – political risk for short – in the context of Local Projections - IV. We show that shocks associated with the rise of populist forces or their policies have adverse and sizable effects on financial markets. These negative effects were moderated by the European institutions and domestic constitutional constraints. In addition, Italian political developments generate international spillover effects on the spreads of other eurozone countries. Finally, political risk shocks have a negative impact on the real economy, although the accommodating stance of monetary policy helped in cushioning them.","PeriodicalId":170831,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice: Analysis of Collective Decision-Making eJournal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121626836","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Electoral participation is an integral component of democracy and can be an effective tool in the battle against corruption. However, encouraging participation in areas with highly corrupt governments is difficult. In this paper, I explore the role of transparency in voter turnout. I exploit plausibly exogenous variation in the municipal implementation of Brazil’s 2011 Access to Public Information (ATI) law on voter turnout in mayoral elections. I find that municipal ATI laws increase broad participation overall but are most effective when coupled with a commitment to accountability. These results are robust to an in-time placebo test and numerous alternative specifications. These findings suggest that increased transparency can lead to increased voter participation and democratic accountability within a country that suffers from corruption.
{"title":"Access to Information Laws and Voter Behavior: Does Transparency Increase Participation?","authors":"Jamie Bologna Pavlik","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3448770","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3448770","url":null,"abstract":"Electoral participation is an integral component of democracy and can be an effective tool in the battle against corruption. However, encouraging participation in areas with highly corrupt governments is difficult. In this paper, I explore the role of transparency in voter turnout. I exploit plausibly exogenous variation in the municipal implementation of Brazil’s 2011 Access to Public Information (ATI) law on voter turnout in mayoral elections. I find that municipal ATI laws increase broad participation overall but are most effective when coupled with a commitment to accountability. These results are robust to an in-time placebo test and numerous alternative specifications. These findings suggest that increased transparency can lead to increased voter participation and democratic accountability within a country that suffers from corruption.<br>","PeriodicalId":170831,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice: Analysis of Collective Decision-Making eJournal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133646329","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Existing political economy models have tended to examine how more information influences either electoral accountability or on turnout. Our evidence and theoretical reasoning, however, suggests that information should influence both margins of voter behavior. One contribution of this paper is to provide a model which identifies the conditions under which information increases electoral accountability when turnout is endogenous. We consider an economic environment in which a sub-population of ethical voters face a cost of voting but may still choose to vote in order to maximize group welfare. We assume that these voters favor politicians whom they expect to perform better, where performance is measured along the lines framed by the report cards. More precise information about incumbent performance increases the expected benefits from voting for the preferred candidate and, therefore, typically increases turnout and reduces vote buying. More precise performance and qualification signals also boost the vote share of better performing incumbents under reasonable conditions. Finally, how turnout varies with incumbent performance depends on voters’ priors.
{"title":"‘Voting Behavior’ to Make Better Choice With Reference to Delhi NCR","authors":"Amit K. Gupta, Dr. Mohit Sharma","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3514384","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3514384","url":null,"abstract":"Existing political economy models have tended to examine how more information influences either electoral accountability or on turnout. Our evidence and theoretical reasoning, however, suggests that information should influence both margins of voter behavior. One contribution of this paper is to provide a model which identifies the conditions under which information increases electoral accountability when turnout is endogenous. We consider an economic environment in which a sub-population of ethical voters face a cost of voting but may still choose to vote in order to maximize group welfare. We assume that these voters favor politicians whom they expect to perform better, where performance is measured along the lines framed by the report cards. More precise information about incumbent performance increases the expected benefits from voting for the preferred candidate and, therefore, typically increases turnout and reduces vote buying. More precise performance and qualification signals also boost the vote share of better performing incumbents under reasonable conditions. Finally, how turnout varies with incumbent performance depends on voters’ priors.","PeriodicalId":170831,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice: Analysis of Collective Decision-Making eJournal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115127983","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this study, we investigate the impact of political uncertainty on Bitcoin. Introducing the U.S. federal election cycle as a proxy for political uncertainty, we find that (i) an increase in political uncertainty leads to a decrease in Bitcoin return, (ii) political uncertainty has the strongest impact on Bitcoin six and three months prior the election and decreases as the election date approaches, and (iii) the effect is more pronounced in the left and right tail of the distribution. The results shed a new light on the property of Bitcoin being a safe haven asset and provide important information for investors and policymakers.
{"title":"Bitcoin and Global Political Uncertainty - Evidence from the U.S. Election Cycle","authors":"Tobias Burggraf","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3514522","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3514522","url":null,"abstract":"In this study, we investigate the impact of political uncertainty on Bitcoin. Introducing the U.S. federal election cycle as a proxy for political uncertainty, we find that (i) an increase in political uncertainty leads to a decrease in Bitcoin return, (ii) political uncertainty has the strongest impact on Bitcoin six and three months prior the election and decreases as the election date approaches, and (iii) the effect is more pronounced in the left and right tail of the distribution. The results shed a new light on the property of Bitcoin being a safe haven asset and provide important information for investors and policymakers.","PeriodicalId":170831,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice: Analysis of Collective Decision-Making eJournal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121531021","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Many situations in the social and economic life are characterized by rivalry and conflict between two or more competing groups. Warfare, socio-political conflicts, political elections, lobbying, and R&D competitions are all examples of inter-group conflicts in which groups spend scarce and costly resources to gain an advantage over other groups. Here, we report on an experiment that investigates the impact of political institutions within groups on the development of conflict between groups. We find that relative to the case in which group members can decide individually on their level of conflict engagement, conflict significantly intensifies when investments are determined democratically by voting or when a single group member (the dictator) can decide on behalf of the group. These results hold for both symmetric and asymmetric contests, as well as for situations in which institutions are adopted exogenously or endogenously. Our findings thus suggest that giving people the possibility to vote is not the main reason for why democracies seem to engage in less wars than autocracies. Nevertheless, when giving participants the possibility to choose which institution to adopt, we find that the voting institution is the by far most popular one as it combines the desirable features of autonomy and equality
{"title":"Governance and Group Conflict","authors":"Felix Kölle","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3532465","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3532465","url":null,"abstract":"Many situations in the social and economic life are characterized by rivalry and conflict between two or more competing groups. Warfare, socio-political conflicts, political elections, lobbying, and R&D competitions are all examples of inter-group conflicts in which groups spend scarce and costly resources to gain an advantage over other groups. Here, we report on an experiment that investigates the impact of political institutions within groups on the development of conflict between groups. We find that relative to the case in which group members can decide individually on their level of conflict engagement, conflict significantly intensifies when investments are determined democratically by voting or when a single group member (the dictator) can decide on behalf of the group. These results hold for both symmetric and asymmetric contests, as well as for situations in which institutions are adopted exogenously or endogenously. Our findings thus suggest that giving people the possibility to vote is not the main reason for why democracies seem to engage in less wars than autocracies. Nevertheless, when giving participants the possibility to choose which institution to adopt, we find that the voting institution is the by far most popular one as it combines the desirable features of autonomy and equality","PeriodicalId":170831,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice: Analysis of Collective Decision-Making eJournal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129850299","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-01-01DOI: 10.5089/9781513526010.001
G. Fayad, Chengyu Huang, Y. Shibuya, Peng Zhao
This paper applies state-of-the-art deep learning techniques to develop the first sentiment index measuring member countries’ reception of IMF policy advice at the time of Article IV Consultations. This paper finds that while authorities of member countries largely agree with Fund advice, there is variation across country size, external openness, policy sectors and their assessed riskiness, political systems, and commodity export intensity. The paper also looks at how sentiment changes during and after a financial arrangement or program with the Fund, as well as when a country receives IMF technical assistance. The results shed light on key aspects on Fund surveillance while redefining how the IMF can view its relevance, value added, and traction with its member countries.
{"title":"How Do Member Countries Receive IMF Policy Advice: Results from a State-of-the-Art Sentiment Index","authors":"G. Fayad, Chengyu Huang, Y. Shibuya, Peng Zhao","doi":"10.5089/9781513526010.001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5089/9781513526010.001","url":null,"abstract":"This paper applies state-of-the-art deep learning techniques to develop the first sentiment index measuring member countries’ reception of IMF policy advice at the time of Article IV Consultations. This paper finds that while authorities of member countries largely agree with Fund advice, there is variation across country size, external openness, policy sectors and their assessed riskiness, political systems, and commodity export intensity. The paper also looks at how sentiment changes during and after a financial arrangement or program with the Fund, as well as when a country receives IMF technical assistance. The results shed light on key aspects on Fund surveillance while redefining how the IMF can view its relevance, value added, and traction with its member countries.","PeriodicalId":170831,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice: Analysis of Collective Decision-Making eJournal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126961242","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We provide an axiomatic characterization of Approval Voting without the approval balloting assumption. The dichotomous structure of the informational basis of Approval voting as well as its aggregative rationale are jointly derived from a set of normative conditions on the voting procedure. The first one is the well-known social-theoretic principle of consistency; the second one, ballot richness, requires voters to be able to express a sufficiently rich set of opinions; the last one, dubbed no single-voter overrides, demands that the addition of a voter to an electorate cannot radically change the outcome of the election. Such result is promising insofar it suggests that the informational basis of voting may have a normative relevance that deserves formal treatment.
{"title":"A Characterization of Approval Voting Without the Approval Balloting Assumption","authors":"Federica Ceron, Stéphane Gonzalez","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3519847","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3519847","url":null,"abstract":"We provide an axiomatic characterization of Approval Voting without the approval balloting assumption. The dichotomous structure of the informational basis of Approval voting as well as its aggregative rationale are jointly derived from a set of normative conditions on the voting procedure. The first one is the well-known social-theoretic principle of consistency; the second one, ballot richness, requires voters to be able to express a sufficiently rich set of opinions; the last one, dubbed no single-voter overrides, demands that the addition of a voter to an electorate cannot radically change the outcome of the election. Such result is promising insofar it suggests that the informational basis of voting may have a normative relevance that deserves formal treatment.","PeriodicalId":170831,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice: Analysis of Collective Decision-Making eJournal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-12-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131488825","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Young people tend to be more liberal than older people. This paper goes beyond that generality to describe more precisely how self-described political ideology varies with age. I distinguish period (across people of different ages at a moment in time) from cohort (changes in people as they get older) characterizations of this age-ideology gradient. Data are from General Social Surveys from 1974 through 2018, including synthetic cohorts formed from 5 year subsamples of the data. Ideology is measured on a {-1, 1} scale: liberals (conservatives) are -1 (+1) and moderates are 0. The average of this measure (Libcon) generally increases with age both within every 5-year sub-period and among all available cohorts; the shape of these gradients varies considerably across these sub-periods. However, the longer run central tendency is a very well defined concave gradient that rises over the whole life course. The period and cohort versions of this gradient essentially overlap. The change in mean Libcon from early adulthood (25) to old age (80) is substantial (over. 20 on the -1, 1 scale), and around half of this occurs after age 45. I discuss implications for “purple America” characterizations of political ideology and for the strain of literature emphasizing ideological “persistence.”
{"title":"Political Ideology over the Life Course","authors":"S. Peltzman","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3501174","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3501174","url":null,"abstract":"Young people tend to be more liberal than older people. This paper goes beyond that generality to describe more precisely how self-described political ideology varies with age. I distinguish period (across people of different ages at a moment in time) from cohort (changes in people as they get older) characterizations of this age-ideology gradient. Data are from General Social Surveys from 1974 through 2018, including synthetic cohorts formed from 5 year subsamples of the data. Ideology is measured on a {-1, 1} scale: liberals (conservatives) are -1 (+1) and moderates are 0. The average of this measure (Libcon) generally increases with age both within every 5-year sub-period and among all available cohorts; the shape of these gradients varies considerably across these sub-periods. However, the longer run central tendency is a very well defined concave gradient that rises over the whole life course. The period and cohort versions of this gradient essentially overlap. The change in mean Libcon from early adulthood (25) to old age (80) is substantial (over. 20 on the -1, 1 scale), and around half of this occurs after age 45. I discuss implications for “purple America” characterizations of political ideology and for the strain of literature emphasizing ideological “persistence.”","PeriodicalId":170831,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice: Analysis of Collective Decision-Making eJournal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-12-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115717600","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Predicting the outcomes of United States Presidential Elections has become a favourite project of many data scientists and academics. Creating a model which can accurately predict who the next president will be is a sure-fire way to solidify one’s name as a reputable source of analysis. The objective of this research paper was to look at various data, and see if there are any important variables which modellers have ignored. A dataset was organized, which included many variables, including economic indicators like GDP growth, average presidential approval ratings, and changes in party composition in the House of Representatives. This included information for every presidential election from 1948 to present. The dataset was then bootstrapped and analyzed through a model which used gradient boosted trees. The findings of the model found a surprisingly high significance for the variable of average approval rating. In 5546 out of 10,000 bootstrap runs (55.46%), this variable was the most significant in predicting the outcome of the election. Given the model’s accuracy rating of 79.52% on test sets, there is validity to the claim that average approval rating is an important predictor of election outcome (though not by itself, as interaction with the other variables was necessary for predictions). The model was then used to predict the outcome of the 2020 presidential election, based on current data. After running the model 10,000 times with the 2020 election as the test set, it was found that Donald Trump was re-elected in 366 trials, indicating a 3.66% chance of re-election given current data (which, especially regarding the economic indicators, is subject to change). A sensitivity analysis of the average approval rating found that for his odds of re-election to exceed 50%, his average approvals must climb to at least 60%. Based on the findings of this report, it can be concluded that approval ratings, while generally ignored or minimized in other models, are actually a very significant indicator of election outcome. If this is correct, president Trump is facing serious challenges in 2020, though with one year left, and economic data left to be reported, his odds could change.
{"title":"Approval Ratings and Predicting United States Presidential Elections","authors":"S. Strong, I. S. Kohli","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3492191","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3492191","url":null,"abstract":"Predicting the outcomes of United States Presidential Elections has become a favourite project of many data scientists and academics. Creating a model which can accurately predict who the next president will be is a sure-fire way to solidify one’s name as a reputable source of analysis. The objective of this research paper was to look at various data, and see if there are any important variables which modellers have ignored. A dataset was organized, which included many variables, including economic indicators like GDP growth, average presidential approval ratings, and changes in party composition in the House of Representatives. This included information for every presidential election from 1948 to present. The dataset was then bootstrapped and analyzed through a model which used gradient boosted trees. The findings of the model found a surprisingly high significance for the variable of average approval rating. In 5546 out of 10,000 bootstrap runs (55.46%), this variable was the most significant in predicting the outcome of the election. Given the model’s accuracy rating of 79.52% on test sets, there is validity to the claim that average approval rating is an important predictor of election outcome (though not by itself, as interaction with the other variables was necessary for predictions). The model was then used to predict the outcome of the 2020 presidential election, based on current data. After running the model 10,000 times with the 2020 election as the test set, it was found that Donald Trump was re-elected in 366 trials, indicating a 3.66% chance of re-election given current data (which, especially regarding the economic indicators, is subject to change). A sensitivity analysis of the average approval rating found that for his odds of re-election to exceed 50%, his average approvals must climb to at least 60%. Based on the findings of this report, it can be concluded that approval ratings, while generally ignored or minimized in other models, are actually a very significant indicator of election outcome. If this is correct, president Trump is facing serious challenges in 2020, though with one year left, and economic data left to be reported, his odds could change.","PeriodicalId":170831,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice: Analysis of Collective Decision-Making eJournal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-11-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128501847","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Growing Euroscepticism across the European Union (EU) leaves open questions as to what citizens expect to gain from EU Membership and what influences their dissent for the EU integration project. This paper looks at EU Structural Funds, one of the largest and most visible expenditure items in the EU budget, to test the impact of EU money on electoral support for the EU. By leveraging the Referendum on Brexit hold in the United Kingdom, a spatial RDD analysis offers causal evidence that EU money does not influence citizens’ support for the EU. Conversely, the analysis shows that EU funds contribute to mitigate Euroscepticism only where they are coupled with tangible improvements in the local labour market conditions. In order to gain support from its citizens, the European Union needs to produce tangible impacts, generating opportunities at the local level where these are felt the most by voters.
{"title":"It’s Not About the Money! EU Funds, Local Opportunities, and the Brexit Vote","authors":"R. Crescenzi, Marco Di Cataldo, Mara Giua","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3489134","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3489134","url":null,"abstract":"Growing Euroscepticism across the European Union (EU) leaves open questions as to what citizens expect to gain from EU Membership and what influences their dissent for the EU integration project. This paper looks at EU Structural Funds, one of the largest and most visible expenditure items in the EU budget, to test the impact of EU money on electoral support for the EU. By leveraging the Referendum on Brexit hold in the United Kingdom, a spatial RDD analysis offers causal evidence that EU money does not influence citizens’ support for the EU. Conversely, the analysis shows that EU funds contribute to mitigate Euroscepticism only where they are coupled with tangible improvements in the local labour market conditions. In order to gain support from its citizens, the European Union needs to produce tangible impacts, generating opportunities at the local level where these are felt the most by voters.","PeriodicalId":170831,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice: Analysis of Collective Decision-Making eJournal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-11-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115173349","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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