Recent research has shown how experts may fail in their duty as advisors by providing advice that leads to a worse outcome than that anticipated by the user of expert opinion. However, those models have focused on the immediate effects of the failure on experts and nonexperts. Using a cascading network failure model, I show how expert failure can cascade throughout multiple sectors, even those not necessarily purchasing the expert opinion. Consequently, even relatively small failures end up having outsized aggregate effects. To provide evidence of my theory, I look at two case studies of COVID expert advice to show how one seemingly minor failure ended up contributing to the pandemic. I conclude with a discussion on institutional frameworks that can prevent such cascades.
{"title":"Cascading Expert Failure","authors":"Jon Murphy","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.3778836","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.3778836","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Recent research has shown how experts may fail in their duty as advisors by providing advice that leads to a worse outcome than that anticipated by the user of expert opinion. However, those models have focused on the immediate effects of the failure on experts and nonexperts. Using a cascading network failure model, I show how expert failure can cascade throughout multiple sectors, even those not necessarily purchasing the expert opinion. Consequently, even relatively small failures end up having outsized aggregate effects. To provide evidence of my theory, I look at two case studies of COVID expert advice to show how one seemingly minor failure ended up contributing to the pandemic. I conclude with a discussion on institutional frameworks that can prevent such cascades.","PeriodicalId":170831,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice: Analysis of Collective Decision-Making eJournal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-02-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131668831","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper studies the distribution of politically motivated intergovernmental transfers in Russia focusing on the case of the 2018 FIFA World Cup. It investigates what factors have accounted for the selection of the 2018 FIFA World Cup venues. Qualitative Comparative Analysis of 14 cases reveals that well-connected political elites were able to secure the right for their regions to host the championship and, as a result, to extract additional funds from the center. These findings are in line with the argument that the regional governments in Russia play an important role in the distribution of politically sensitive transfers. Taking into account that these transfers have been increasing over the past years, there is no surprise that the regional elites have developed various lobbying strategies and mechanisms for attracting them.
{"title":"Politically Motivated Intergovernmental Transfers in Russia: The Case of the 2018 FIFA World Cup","authors":"Ekaterina Paustyan","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3776026","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3776026","url":null,"abstract":"This paper studies the distribution of politically motivated intergovernmental transfers in Russia focusing on the case of the 2018 FIFA World Cup. It investigates what factors have accounted for the selection of the 2018 FIFA World Cup venues. Qualitative Comparative Analysis of 14 cases reveals that well-connected political elites were able to secure the right for their regions to host the championship and, as a result, to extract additional funds from the center. These findings are in line with the argument that the regional governments in Russia play an important role in the distribution of politically sensitive transfers. Taking into account that these transfers have been increasing over the past years, there is no surprise that the regional elites have developed various lobbying strategies and mechanisms for attracting them.","PeriodicalId":170831,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice: Analysis of Collective Decision-Making eJournal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131258111","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Does insurance alter voters' decisions to support the status-quo? As wealth provides a cushion against financial risk, which in turn decreases risk-aversion, we argue that wealth increases support for a change to the status quo. When calculating net benefits, a less risk averse individual places a lower weight on costs than on benefits, thereby reinforcing the decision to depart from the status quo. We test our theory in the case of Brexit, which has been widely characterized as a vote by economically left-behind voters. Our results show that individuals who lacked wealth are less likely to support leaving the EU, meaning they are more biased to the status quo. We corroborate our theory using two panel data surveys, accounting for unobserved individual level heterogeneity, and also using a survey experiment. The findings have implications for the role of wealth-as-insurance in electoral behavior, and also important implications for understanding the Brexit case.
{"title":"Mind the Gap: Why Wealthy Voters Support Brexit","authors":"Jane Green, Raluca L. Pahontu","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3764889","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3764889","url":null,"abstract":"Does insurance alter voters' decisions to support the status-quo? As wealth provides a cushion against financial risk, which in turn decreases risk-aversion, we argue that wealth increases support for a change to the status quo. When calculating net benefits, a less risk averse individual places a lower weight on costs than on benefits, thereby reinforcing the decision to depart from the status quo. We test our theory in the case of Brexit, which has been widely characterized as a vote by economically left-behind voters. Our results show that individuals who lacked wealth are less likely to support leaving the EU, meaning they are more biased to the status quo. We corroborate our theory using two panel data surveys, accounting for unobserved individual level heterogeneity, and also using a survey experiment. The findings have implications for the role of wealth-as-insurance in electoral behavior, and also important implications for understanding the Brexit case.","PeriodicalId":170831,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice: Analysis of Collective Decision-Making eJournal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130685099","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
An intermediary must make a decision on behalf of a group of agents, who are privately informed about their valuations attached to decisions. Examples include the government acting as an intermediary in the provision of public goods. We show that an imperfectly informed intermediary can help achieve an ex post efficient decision. We propose a cross-subsidization mechanism that implements an efficient decision. A condition on the intermediary's information that ensures efficiency is characterized. Our results provide a rationale for the government's involvement in public good projects based on information.
{"title":"Collective Decision Through an Intermediary","authors":"Yunan Li, Xingtan Zhang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3761473","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3761473","url":null,"abstract":"An intermediary must make a decision on behalf of a group of agents, who are privately informed about their valuations attached to decisions. Examples include the government acting as an intermediary in the provision of public goods. We show that an imperfectly informed intermediary can help achieve an ex post efficient decision. We propose a cross-subsidization mechanism that implements an efficient decision. A condition on the intermediary's information that ensures efficiency is characterized. Our results provide a rationale for the government's involvement in public good projects based on information.","PeriodicalId":170831,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice: Analysis of Collective Decision-Making eJournal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114244742","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper studies how former interest groups’ employees turned politicians (who we label as lobbyist legislators) influence the voting behavior of their colleague legislators. Using the alphabetic allocation of seats in the European Parliament and detailed individual résumé information, we find that legislators connected to lobbyist legislators are 7% more likely to coincide in their ballot with that of the lobbyist legislator only when the subject of the vote is deemed of importance to the interest group’s economic activity. Lobbyist legislators are influencing their connections’ ballots by achieving a 44% reduction in voting abstention. Lobbyist legislators substantially increase the likelihood of their connections casting their same ballot during high-stakes votes, however legislators slowly learn from their connections’ leanings and preferences, and tend to deviate overtime. All the effects are similar in size to that of being connected to lead legislators responsible for calling the party’s position in each motion.
{"title":"Reverse Revolving Doors: The Influence of Interest Groups on Legislative Voting","authors":"Miguel Alquezar-Yus, Josep Amer-Mestre","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3741488","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3741488","url":null,"abstract":"This paper studies how former interest groups’ employees turned politicians (who we label as lobbyist legislators) influence the voting behavior of their colleague legislators. Using the alphabetic allocation of seats in the European Parliament and detailed individual résumé information, we find that legislators connected to lobbyist legislators are 7% more likely to coincide in their ballot with that of the lobbyist legislator only when the subject of the vote is deemed of importance to the interest group’s economic activity. Lobbyist legislators are influencing their connections’ ballots by achieving a 44% reduction in voting abstention. Lobbyist legislators substantially increase the likelihood of their connections casting their same ballot during high-stakes votes, however legislators slowly learn from their connections’ leanings and preferences, and tend to deviate overtime. All the effects are similar in size to that of being connected to lead legislators responsible for calling the party’s position in each motion.","PeriodicalId":170831,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice: Analysis of Collective Decision-Making eJournal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134562104","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This report analyses the salience and overall position of the Belgian government on issues of European Integration between 2004 and 2020. The material analysed consists of mainly speeches and debates from institutional actors at the federal level; other Belgian governmental instances have been excluded from the analysis. The analysis showed that DI is a low salience issue in Belgium, possibly due to the government’s instability and the overall pro-EU stance of the country. The Belgian government has taken a positive stance towards a multi-speed Europe, especially in the post-Brexit debates. This solution is described as allowing different MS to pursue different interests, while still working towards the EU integration project. A notable contentious issue amongst Belgian federal parties has been the Financial Transaction Tax, notably over the possible unfair consequences on competition that this tax would bring about.
{"title":"The Politics of Differentiated Integration: What do Governments Want? Country Report – Belgium (FR)","authors":"Fabio Cescon","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3783816","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3783816","url":null,"abstract":"This report analyses the salience and overall position of the Belgian government on issues of European Integration between 2004 and 2020. The material analysed consists of mainly speeches and debates from institutional actors at the federal level; other Belgian governmental instances have been excluded from the analysis. The analysis showed that DI is a low salience issue in Belgium, possibly due to the government’s instability and the overall pro-EU stance of the country. The Belgian government has taken a positive stance towards a multi-speed Europe, especially in the post-Brexit debates. This solution is described as allowing different MS to pursue different interests, while still working towards the EU integration project. A notable contentious issue amongst Belgian federal parties has been the Financial Transaction Tax, notably over the possible unfair consequences on competition that this tax would bring about.","PeriodicalId":170831,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice: Analysis of Collective Decision-Making eJournal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127744388","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract After the 2020 U.S. presidential election, counting votes and calling states took more time than usual, particularly in battleground states. In the days following the election, winning probabilities changed frequently as new results were tabulated. Based on the sensitivity of stocks to changes in winning probabilities observed before the election, we show how the stock market’s assessment of the unobserved post-election winning probabilities can be backed out from stock prices. Our approach is based solely on publicly available data.
{"title":"Recovering Election Winner Probabilities from Stock Prices","authors":"M. Hanke, Sebastian Stöckl, Alex Weissensteiner","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3739982","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3739982","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract After the 2020 U.S. presidential election, counting votes and calling states took more time than usual, particularly in battleground states. In the days following the election, winning probabilities changed frequently as new results were tabulated. Based on the sensitivity of stocks to changes in winning probabilities observed before the election, we show how the stock market’s assessment of the unobserved post-election winning probabilities can be backed out from stock prices. Our approach is based solely on publicly available data.","PeriodicalId":170831,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice: Analysis of Collective Decision-Making eJournal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-11-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125851700","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Increasingly New Governance approaches are evident in public administration, in contrast to the New Public Management (NPM) approach and reforms of last century. In focusing on competition and outcomes, regulation under NPM has been a tool to manage self-interested decision-makers, and is beset by conflict. Kane’s model of regulatory dialectics could be applied to this approach. New Governance (variously known as New Public Governance, Public Value Governance) takes a process approach, aimed at problem solving and co-creating public good. It blurs traditional regulatory boundaries, and yet, the concern is that, when developing mandatory regulation, power imbalances may still occur and that the process approach may severely delay successful outcomes. We propose a New Governance-orientated model of regulatory dialectics. Here, the use of formal organisations, routine processes and informal dialogues facilitates repeated interactions, identifying more ‘soft’ than ‘hard’ responses by regulators and regulates. This less adversarial and more partnered process leads to greater engagement in regulatory development which impacts significantly on the regulation that results, and has the potential to improve acceptance of (and compliance with) mandatory regulation.
{"title":"How Can New Governance Regulation Develop? Regulatory Dialectics and Mandatory Charity Performance Reporting","authors":"D. Mcconville, C. Cordery","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3728801","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3728801","url":null,"abstract":"Increasingly New Governance approaches are evident in public administration, in contrast to the New Public Management (NPM) approach and reforms of last century. In focusing on competition and outcomes, regulation under NPM has been a tool to manage self-interested decision-makers, and is beset by conflict. Kane’s model of regulatory dialectics could be applied to this approach. New Governance (variously known as New Public Governance, Public Value Governance) takes a process approach, aimed at problem solving and co-creating public good. It blurs traditional regulatory boundaries, and yet, the concern is that, when developing mandatory regulation, power imbalances may still occur and that the process approach may severely delay successful outcomes. We propose a New Governance-orientated model of regulatory dialectics. Here, the use of formal organisations, routine processes and informal dialogues facilitates repeated interactions, identifying more ‘soft’ than ‘hard’ responses by regulators and regulates. This less adversarial and more partnered process leads to greater engagement in regulatory development which impacts significantly on the regulation that results, and has the potential to improve acceptance of (and compliance with) mandatory regulation.","PeriodicalId":170831,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice: Analysis of Collective Decision-Making eJournal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-11-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128740695","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper uses a unique data set and a natural experiment based on the shutdown in the official preliminary vote counting system to identify and estimate the size of electoral fraud in the 2019 Bolivian presidential elections. The 2016 Constitutional Referendum and the participation of other political parties serve as controls to estimate various difference-in-differences and difference-in-difference-in-differences specifications. The results show evidence of a statistically significant electoral case of fraud that increased the votes of the incumbent Movimiento al Socialismo and decreased the votes of the runner up Comunidad Ciudadana. We estimate that the extent of the fraud is 2.50% of valid votes, sufficient to change the outcome of the election. We report a break in trend and evidence of fraud beyond the shutdown. Our results are robust to polling-station-level shocks common across 2019 and 2016, as well as 2019 specific shocks. This controls for geography (e.g., rural vs. urban), unobserved voting preferences, voter's last names, and endogeneity in the arrival of the polling stations. We document a statistically significant discontinuous jump in the gap between the incumbent and the runner up during the shutdown.
本文使用独特的数据集和基于官方初步计票系统关闭的自然实验来识别和估计2019年玻利维亚总统选举中选举欺诈的规模。2016年宪法公投和其他政党的参与作为对照，以估计各种差异中的差异和差异中的差异规格。结果显示，有证据表明，在统计上存在重大的选举舞弊行为，使现任的社会主义运动党(Movimiento al Socialismo)的选票增加，而第二名的城市共同体(comidad Ciudadana)的选票减少。我们估计舞弊的程度为有效选票的2.50%，足以改变选举结果。我们在关闭之后报告了趋势的突破和欺诈的证据。我们的结果对于2019年和2016年常见的投票站级冲击以及2019年特定冲击都是稳健的。这控制了地理位置(如农村与城市)、未观察到的投票偏好、选民的姓氏以及投票站到达时的内生性。我们记录了统计上显著的不连续跳跃在现任者和亚军之间的差距在关闭期间。
{"title":"Evo Morales and Electoral Fraud in Bolivia: A Natural Experiment and Discontinuity Evidence","authors":"Diego Escobari, G. Hoover","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3492928","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3492928","url":null,"abstract":"This paper uses a unique data set and a natural experiment based on the shutdown in the official preliminary vote counting system to identify and estimate the size of electoral fraud in the 2019 Bolivian presidential elections. The 2016 Constitutional Referendum and the participation of other political parties serve as controls to estimate various difference-in-differences and difference-in-difference-in-differences specifications. The results show evidence of a statistically significant electoral case of fraud that increased the votes of the incumbent Movimiento al Socialismo and decreased the votes of the runner up Comunidad Ciudadana. We estimate that the extent of the fraud is 2.50% of valid votes, sufficient to change the outcome of the election. We report a break in trend and evidence of fraud beyond the shutdown. Our results are robust to polling-station-level shocks common across 2019 and 2016, as well as 2019 specific shocks. This controls for geography (e.g., rural vs. urban), unobserved voting preferences, voter's last names, and endogeneity in the arrival of the polling stations. We document a statistically significant discontinuous jump in the gap between the incumbent and the runner up during the shutdown.","PeriodicalId":170831,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice: Analysis of Collective Decision-Making eJournal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-10-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132989452","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The seminal contributions of William Nordhaus to scholarship on the long-run macroeconomics of global climate change are clear. Much more challenging to identify are the impacts of Nordhaus and his research on public policy in this domain. We examine three conceptually distinct pathways for that influence: his personal participation in the policy world; his research’s direct contribution to the formulation and evaluation of public policy; and his research’s indirect role informing public policy. Many of the themes that emerge in this assessment of the contributions of one of the most important economists to have worked in the domain of climate change analysis apply more broadly to the roles played by other leading economists in this and other policy domains.
{"title":"Rolling the Dice in the Corridors of Power: William Nordhaus's Impacts on Climate Change Policy","authors":"Joseph E. Aldy, Robert Stavins","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3656729","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3656729","url":null,"abstract":"The seminal contributions of William Nordhaus to scholarship on the long-run macroeconomics of global climate change are clear. Much more challenging to identify are the impacts of Nordhaus and his research on public policy in this domain. We examine three conceptually distinct pathways for that influence: his personal participation in the policy world; his research’s direct contribution to the formulation and evaluation of public policy; and his research’s indirect role informing public policy. Many of the themes that emerge in this assessment of the contributions of one of the most important economists to have worked in the domain of climate change analysis apply more broadly to the roles played by other leading economists in this and other policy domains.","PeriodicalId":170831,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice: Analysis of Collective Decision-Making eJournal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"113943908","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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