Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin最新文献

Progress toward racial equality over the course of U.S. history has not been linear, and reductions in racial inequalities have historically been met with racist backlash. In the current research, we examine whether shifts in racial inequalities in key structural areas in recent decades can be used to predict implicit and explicit racial attitudes among White U.S. residents (N = 222,203). Consistent with the hypothesis that increasing racial equality is threatening, the majority of the statistically significant effects we observed indicated increased pro-White attitudes among White residents of states where racial inequalities decreased over time. State-level reductions in racial inequalities related to government assistance and employment-which have both been highly politicized-were predictive of greater pro-White attitudes among White U.S. residents. Overall, the current findings provide suggestive evidence that reductions in state-level racial inequalities may threaten the status quo, heightening pro-White attitudes among White U.S. residents.

Gossip is ubiquitous. People gossip for several reasons. Beyond well-studied explanations, we propose an underexplored reason: tellers overestimate the extent to which gossiping encourages listeners' self-disclosure. This overestimation is observed for gossip but not for nongossip, and for self-disclosure but not for disclosing information unrelated to oneself. We also document that tellers' overestimation arises because tellers (vs. listeners) focus more on the trust that they convey to listeners by gossiping, whereas listeners (vs. tellers) focus more on their concerns about being the target of gossip in the future. This study identifies a novel misprediction and contributes to the literature on gossip by revealing a new motivation underlying gossiping. Practically, it provides an effective debiasing approach to mitigate tellers' overestimation and consequently manage gossip.

Stereotype threat refers to the concern of being judged based on stereotypes about one's social group. This preregistered meta-analysis examines the correlates of stereotype threat in the workplace (k = 61 independent samples, N = 40,134). Results showed that stereotype threat was positively related to exhaustion, identity separation, negative affect, turnover intentions, and behavioral coping, and negatively related to career aspirations, job satisfaction, organizational commitment, job engagement, job performance, positive affect, self-efficacy, and work authenticity. In addition, moderator analyses for constructs represented in at least k = 10 samples in the focal analyses showed that relations did not differ for measures of stereotype threat and stigma consciousness. However, the negative relationships between stereotype threat and career aspirations, job satisfaction, and job engagement were stronger for older employees compared with female employees as the stereotyped group. Overall, the findings suggest that stereotype threat constitutes an important stressor in the workplace.

This research demonstrates that people distance themselves not just from out-group partisans or policies but also from completely neutral and apolitical consumer products that have been "contaminated" simply by being preferred by the political out-group. Using large representative samples of Swedish adults, we investigated how aesthetic judgments of clothes (Study 1), evaluations of chocolate bars (Study 2), and allocations to charitable organizations (Study 3) were influenced by a randomly assigned association between these products and the leader or supporters of the participant's least- or most-liked political party. Products liked by the least-liked party became less attractive in all studies; the results were mixed for products liked by the most-liked party. Study 4 found that the presence of in-group-observers increased distancing from products liked by the least-liked party, indicating that self-presentational concerns bolster political distancing. These results suggest that affective political polarization influences our lives more subtly and profoundly than previously known.

The second coming of the Ku Klux Klan popularized the Klan and its ideas in the early 1920s, terrorizing Black American, their allies, and others deemed un-American. This article investigates the extent to which the cultural legacy of racial hatred of the Klan has persisted over the years. We use data from large online databases, multiverse analyses, and spatial models to evaluate whether regions with more historical Klan activity show higher levels of modern-day racial bias, and more modern-day White Supremacist activity. We find that regions with more Ku Klux Klan activity in the 1920s show higher levels of modern White Supremacist activity but, unexpectedly, lower levels of modern implicit and explicit racial bias. We discuss the implications of these findings for models linking historical events with present-day attitudes and behavior, and for situational models of bias more broadly.

This study examined the use of machine learning in detecting deception among 210 individuals reporting homicides or missing persons to 911. The sample included an equal number of false allegation callers (FAC) and true report callers (TRC) identified through case adjudication. Independent coders, unaware of callers' deception, analyzed each 911 call using 86 behavioral cues. Using the random forest model with k-fold cross-validation and repeated sampling, the study achieved an accuracy rate of 68.2% for all 911 calls, with sensitivity and specificity at 68.7% and 67.7%, respectively. For homicide reports, accuracy was higher at 71.2%, with a sensitivity of 77.3% but slightly lower specificity at 65.0%. In contrast, accuracy decreased to 61.4% for missing person reports, with a sensitivity of 49.1% and notably higher specificity at 73.6%. Beyond accuracy, key cues distinguishing FACs from TRCs were identified and included cues like "Blames others," "Is self-dramatizing," and "Is uncertain and insecure."

In diverse societies, minority groups may face challenges when events signal exclusion from a superordinate identity (SOI) shared with the relevant majority groups. We examine how such SOI threats relate to hardline political attitudes, focusing on betrayal as a potential mechanism. A cross-sectional study of Ethiopian Jews in Israel (N = 276) showed that priming an SOI threat was associated with support for violent resistance via betrayal. A two-wave study of Arab-Muslims in Israel (N = 165) showed that a real-time SOI-threatening event predicted betrayal and, in turn, increased support for violence, particularly among those with stronger baseline SOI. An additional two-wave study of Israeli Jewish women (N = 584) during the recent Gaza war extended this framework to a broader SOI shared with women worldwide: stronger baseline SOI predicted higher expectations of solidarity, which, when undermined by SOI threat, was associated with greater betrayal and hawkish wartime policy support.

How do people form cross-race relationships in everyday life, and do people vary from each other in this process? Answering these questions can yield useful insights for scholars interested in encouraging cross-race contact. We investigated how people (N = 1,156 Bay Area adults) met their different-race (vs. same-race) contacts, the roles that different-race contacts occupied in their personal networks, and the content and quality of their relationships with their different-race contacts. We found that different-race contacts were, on average, "around but not close." They were met in less intimate settings; they occupied less intimate roles; and they were felt less close to. Importantly, processes varied across people. People who formed cross-race kin relationships were the most likely to have stable cross-race contact, and people who engaged in "high effort" activities with their different-race contacts (e.g., confiding in) had closer relationships with them. We highlight insights of these results for encouraging cross-race contact.

Animosity toward immigrants, especially those who are undocumented, has reached high levels in many parts of the United States. What can be done to counteract anti-immigrant hostility? One solution is to implement media interventions, which are uniquely positioned to reduce animosity. We thus conducted two studies to assess the efficacy of three media interventions to reduce anti-immigrant attitudes. In Study 1 (N = 2,050), we conducted an intervention tournament and found that one video was particularly effective at reducing anti-immigrant hostility and support for anti-immigrant policies, especially among Republicans. This video shared the story of undocumented immigrants who served in the U.S. military but were subsequently deported due to their legal status. In Study 2 (N = 3,000), we replicated these findings among nationally representative partisan voters. These results suggest that a simple media intervention has the power to improve attitudes toward undocumented immigrants across the political spectrum.