Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin最新文献

More than 5,000 Native American and Alaska Native women and girls go missing annually in the United States, and murder is the third leading cause of death for those aged 10 to 24. The current studies assess why, despite such statistics, individuals who are not Native American fail to advocate for Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women and Girls (MMIWG). The Pilot Study (N = 205) and Study 1 (N = 3,992) revealed that greater cognitive invisibility of contemporary Native Peoples (i.e., the absence of cognitive representations) was related to greater minimization of Native Peoples' experiences with racism. Racism minimization was associated with greater blaming of MMIWG victims and less blaming of societal contributors to the epidemic. These factors predicted greater apathy toward MMIWG and less MMIWG advocacy. The results suggest that the cognitive invisibility of Native Peoples affords attitudes and beliefs that allow non-Native individuals to deny, justify, and distance themselves from the MMIWG epidemic.

Utilizing reverse correlation, we investigated Black and White participants' mental representations of Black-White Biracial people. Across 200 trails, Black and White participants chose which of two faces best fit specific social categories. Using these decisions, we visually estimated Black and White people's mental representations of Biracial people by generating classification images (CIs). Independent raters blind to condition determined that White CI generators' Biracial CI was prototypically Blacker (i.e., more Afrocentric facial features and darker skin tone) than Black CI generators' Biracial CI (Study 1a/b). Furthermore, independent raters could not distinguish between White CI generators' Black and Biracial CIs, a bias not exhibited by Black CI generators (Study 2). A separate task demonstrated that prejudiced White participants allocated fewer imaginary funds to the more prototypically Black Biracial CI (Study 3), providing converging evidence. How phenotypicality bias, the outgroup homogeneity effect, and hypodescent influences people's mental images of ingroup/outgroup members is discussed.

There are substantive theoretical questions about whether personal values affect romantic relationship functioning. The current research tested the association between personal values and romantic relationship quality while considering potential mediating mechanisms related to pro-relational attitudes, communal strength, intrinsic relationship motivation, and entitlement. Across five studies using different measures of value priorities, we found that the endorsement of self-transcendence values (i.e., benevolence, universalism) was related to higher romantic relationship quality. The findings provided support for the mediating roles of pro-relational attitudes, communal strength, and intrinsic relationship motivation. Finally, a dyadic analysis in our fifth study showed that self-transcendence values mostly influence a person's own relationship quality but not that of their partner. These findings provide the first evidence that personal values are important variables in romantic relationship functioning while helping to map the mechanisms through which this role occurs.

People with biological essentialist beliefs about social groups also tend to endorse biased beliefs about individuals in those groups, including intensified emphasis on the group, stereotypes, and prejudices. These correlations could be due to biological essentialism causing bias, and some experimental studies support this causal direction. Given this prior work, we expected to find that biological essentialism would lead to increased bias compared with a control condition and set out to extend this prior work in a new direction (regarding "value-based" essentialism). But although the manipulation affected essentialist beliefs and essentialist beliefs were correlated with group emphasis (Study 1), stereotyping (Studies 2, 3a, 3b, and 3c), prejudice (Studies 3a), there was no evidence that biological essentialism caused these outcomes (N_Total = 1,903). Given these findings, our initial research question became moot. We thus focus on reexamining the relationship between essentialism and bias.

People sometimes must choose between prioritizing meaningful work or high compensation. Eight studies (N = 4,177; 7 preregistered) examined the relative importance of meaningful work and salary in evaluations of actual and hypothetical jobs. Although meaningful work and high salaries are both perceived as highly important job attributes when evaluated independently, when presented with tradeoffs between these job attributes, participants consistently preferred high-salary jobs with low meaningfulness over low-salary jobs with high meaningfulness (Studies 1-5). Forecasts of happiness and meaning outside of work helped explain condition differences in job interest (Studies 4 and 5). Extending the investigation toward actual jobs, Studies 6a and 6b showed that people express stronger preferences for higher pay (vs. more meaningful work) in their current jobs. Although meaningful work is a strongly valued job attribute, it may be less influential than salary to evaluations of hypothetical and current jobs.

Implicit measures of attitudes have classically focused on the association between a social group and generalized valence, but debate exists surrounding how these associations arise and what they can tell us about beliefs and attitudes. Here, we suggest that representations of oppression, which relate positively to implicitly measured prejudice but negatively to explicitly measured prejudice, can serve to decrease the predictive validity of implicit measures through statistical suppression. We had participants complete a Black-White implicit association test (IAT) and an IAT measuring representations of oppression, and find that oppression-related representations statistically suppress the relation between IAT scores and explicit attitudes, such that accounting for these representations increases the total amount of variance explained by implicit measures. We discuss the implications of this work both for practical matters around use of the IAT and for theoretical debates on the conceptualization of valence in implicit attitudes.

Society changes, but the degree to which it has changed can be difficult to evaluate. We propose that people possess beliefs that society has made, and will make, progress in a linear fashion toward social justice. Five sets of studies (13 studies in total) demonstrate that American participants consistently estimated that over time, society has made positive, linear progress toward social issues, such as gender equality, racial diversity, and environmental protection. These estimates were often not aligned with reality, where much progress has been made in a nonlinear fashion. We also ruled out some potential alternative explanations (Study 3) and explored the potential correlates of linear progress beliefs (Study 4). We further showed that these beliefs reduced the perceived urgency and effort needed to make further progress on social issues (Study 5), which may ultimately inhibit people's willingness to act.

High subjective social status (SSS) is believed to protect health in the current literature. However, high SSS entails social responsibilities that can be stressful in collectivistic cultural contexts. Here, we tested the hypothesis that those socialized in collectivistic societies (e.g., Japan) recognize their high social status as entailing social duties difficult to ignore even when they are excessive. Using cross-cultural survey data (N = 1,289) and a measure of biological health risk (BHR) by biomarkers of inflammation and cardiovascular malfunction, we found that higher SSS predicted lower BHR for American males. In contrast, higher SSS predicted higher BHR for Japanese males, mediated by the perceived difficulty of disengaging from their current goals. In both cultural groups, females showed no association between SSS and BHR. These findings suggest that social status has differing health implications, depending on the relative salience of privileges and burden-producing responsibilities in different cultural contexts.

By conforming to ingroup norms, individuals coordinate with other group members, preserve cohesion, and avoid costs of exclusion. Previous experiments have shown that increased concerns about infectious disease increase conformity. However, coordination with other group members has multiple benefits, most of which exist independent of pathogenic infection. Hence, a strong causal effect of pathogen avoidance motivations on conformity seems unlikely. Results from five experiments (N = 1,931) showed only limited support for the hypothesis that experimentally increasing pathogen avoidance motivations influences conformity. Overall, our findings are not consistent with the notion that the human mind contains a fast-acting psychological mechanism that regulates conformity as a function of short-term pathogen avoidance motivations.

When a task or goal is hard to think about or do, people can infer that it is a waste of their time (difficulty-as-impossibility) or valuable to them (difficulty-as-importance). Separate from chosen tasks and goals, life can present unchosen difficulties. Building on identity-based motivation theory, people can see these as opportunities for self-betterment (difficulty-as-improvement). People use this language when they recall or communicate about difficulties (autobiographical memories, Study 1; "Common Crawl" corpus, Study 2). Our difficulty mindset measures are culture-general (Australia, Canada, China, India, Iran, New Zealand, Turkey, the United States, Studies 3-15, N = 3,532). People in Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, Democratic (WEIRD)-er countries slightly agree with difficulty-as-improvement. Religious, spiritual, conservative people, believers in karma and a just world, and people from less-WEIRD countries score higher. People who endorse difficulty-as-importance see themselves as conscientious, virtuous, and leading lives of purpose. So do endorsers of difficulty-as-improvement-who also see themselves as optimists (all scores lower for difficulty-as-impossibility endorsers).