Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin最新文献

What environmental factors are associated with individual differences in political ideology, and do such associations change over time? We examine whether reductions in pathogen prevalence in U.S. states over the past 60 years are associated with reduced associations between parasite stress and conservatism. We report a positive association between infection levels and conservative ideology in the United States during the 1960s and 1970s. However, this correlation reduces from the 1980s onwards. These results suggest that the ecological influence of infectious diseases may be larger for older people who grew up (or whose parents grew up) during earlier time periods. We test this hypothesis by analyzing the political affiliation of 45,000 Facebook users, and find a positive association between self-reported political affiliation and regional pathogen stress for older (>40 years) but not younger individuals. It is concluded that the influence of environmental pathogen stress on ideology may have reduced over time.

Intergenerational conflict appears frequently in American public discourse, often framed as clashes between Millennials and Baby Boomers. Building on intergroup threat theory in an exploratory survey, a preregistered correlational study, and a preregistered intervention (N = 1,714), we find that (a) Millennials and Baby Boomers do express more animosity toward each other than toward other generations (Studies 1-3); (b) their animosity reflects asymmetric generational concerns: Baby Boomers primarily fear that Millennials threaten traditional American values (symbolic threat) while Millennials primarily fear that Baby Boomers's delayed transmission of power hampers their life prospects (realistic threat; Studies 2-3); (c) finally, an intervention challenging the entitativity of generational categories alleviates perceived threats and hostility for both generations (Study 3). These findings inform research on intergroup threat, provide a theoretically grounded framework to understand intergenerational relations, and put forward a strategy to increase harmony in aging societies.

Cultural tightness is characterized by strong norms and harsh punishments for deviant behaviors. We hypothesized that followers in tight (vs. loose) cultures would more strongly prefer muscular leaders. This hypothesis was confirmed across seven studies (N = 1,615) employing samples from the United States, the United Kingdom, and China. Using actual political leaders, we demonstrated that the tighter the state's culture was, the more muscular the elected governor was (Study 1). Temporarily situating participants in a tight (vs. loose) culture made them select a leader higher on muscularity but not on body fat, and the effects obtained occurred for both male and female leaders (Studies 2-3B). In addition, we demonstrated the mediating role of authoritarianism and a preference for a dominant leadership in this process (Studies 4-5B). These results demonstrate the importance of considering the interface between culture and the physical appearance of leaders.

Across four studies (N = 1544), we examined the relationship between individuals' gender role mindsets, or beliefs about the malleability versus fixedness of traditional gender roles, and work-family conflict. We found that undergraduate women (but not men) business students holding a fixed, compared to growth, gender role mindset anticipated more work-family conflict. Next, we manipulated gender role mindset and demonstrated a causal link between women's growth mindsets (relative to fixed mindsets and control conditions) and reduced work-family conflict. We showed mechanistically that growth gender role mindsets unburden women from prescriptive gender roles, reducing work-family conflict. Finally, during COVID-19, we demonstrated a similar pattern among working women in high-achieving dual-career couples. We found an indirect effect of women's gender role mindset on job and relationship satisfaction, mediated through work-family conflict. Our preregistered studies suggest that holding the belief that gender roles can change mitigates women's work-family conflict.

Incels (involuntary celibates) have advocated for and even enacted violence against women. We explored two mechanisms that may underly incels' actions: identity fusion and self-verification. Study 1 (n = 155) revealed stronger identity fusion (deep alignment) with the ingroup among men active in online incel communities compared to men active in other male-dominated groups. Study 2 (n = 113) showed that feeling self-verified by other incels predicted fusion with incels; fusion, in turn, predicted endorsement of past and future violence toward women. Study 3 (n = 283; preregistered) replicated the indirect effects from Study 2 and extended them by linking fusion to online harassment of women. All indirect effects were particularly strong among self-identified incels high in narcissism. We discuss the synergistic links between self-verification and identity fusion in fostering extreme behaviors and identify directions for future research.

Much information people receive about others reaches them via gossip. But is this gossip trustworthy? We examined this in a scenario study (N_senders = 350, N_observations = 700) and an interactive laboratory experiment (N_senders = 126; N_observations = 3024). In both studies, participants played a sequential prisoner's dilemma where a gossip sender observed a target's (first decider's) decision and could gossip about this to a receiver (second decider). We manipulated the interdependence structure such that gossipers' outcomes were equal to targets' outcomes, equal to receivers' outcomes, or independent. Compared to no interdependence, gossip was more often false when gossipers were interdependent with targets but not when interdependent with receivers. As such, false positive gossip (self-serving when interdependent with targets) increased but false negative gossip (self-serving when interdependent with receivers) did not. In conclusion, the interdependence structure affected gossip's trustworthiness: When gossipers' outcomes were interdependent with targets, gossip was less trustworthy.

Humanity's long-term welfare may lie in the hands of those who are presently living, raising the question of whether people today hold the generations of tomorrow in their moral circles. Five studies (N_Total = 1652; Prolific) reveal present-oriented bias in the moral standing of future generations, with greater perceived moral obligation, moral concern, and prosocial intentions for proximal relative to distal future targets. Yet, present-oriented bias appears stronger for socially close compared with socially distant targets and for human targets relative to non-human animals and entities in nature. Individual differences, including longtermism beliefs and subjective imaginative vividness, predict greater concern for and obligation to the future. Likewise, concern and obligation predict greater future-oriented generosity. Our studies are among the first to explore moral considerations for targets across deep temporal expanses, reconcile conflicting evidence in the extant literature on moral judgment and future-thinking, and offer practical implications for bettering the shared societal future.

Using data from Project Implicit collected between 2005 and 2020, comprising 1,489,721 observations in 111 countries, we find that implicit and explicit gender stereotypes about career and family are more pronounced in more economically developed countries. Besides, these gender stereotypes are strongly correlated at the country level with gender differences in values (such as family values), self-reported personality traits (such as agreeableness or dependence), and occupational preferences (such as health-related occupations), and may account for the fact that these gender imbalances are "paradoxically" stronger in more economically developed countries (the so-called "gender equality paradox").In line with social role theory, our findings suggest that there are in developed countries strong gender stereotypes about career and family, which may at least partly explain the persistence or even the "paradoxical worsening" of a number of gender differences in these countries, despite generally high levels of gender equality in other areas.

Progress toward racial equality over the course of U.S. history has not been linear, and reductions in racial inequalities have historically been met with racist backlash. In the current research, we examine whether shifts in racial inequalities in key structural areas in recent decades can be used to predict implicit and explicit racial attitudes among White U.S. residents (N = 222,203). Consistent with the hypothesis that increasing racial equality is threatening, the majority of the statistically significant effects we observed indicated increased pro-White attitudes among White residents of states where racial inequalities decreased over time. State-level reductions in racial inequalities related to government assistance and employment-which have both been highly politicized-were predictive of greater pro-White attitudes among White U.S. residents. Overall, the current findings provide suggestive evidence that reductions in state-level racial inequalities may threaten the status quo, heightening pro-White attitudes among White U.S. residents.

Two implicit propositional measures designed to detect faking in personality-related scales were tested across four experimental studies. Study 1 (n = 116) included the Deception Relational Responding Task and Narcissistic Admiration and Rivalry Questionnaire as the faking-detector and target scale, respectively. Respondents were randomly assigned to faking or no-faking conditions. Faking respondents were instructed to appear opposite to their narcissistic profile, while no-faking had to respond honestly. In Study 2 (n = 133), the faking-detector was the Deception Implicit Association Test (Dec-aIAT), while the target scale and faking/no-faking instructions remained the same. In Studies 3 (n = 74) and 4 (n = 111), the faking-detector was again the Dec-aIAT, while the target scale was the Big Five Questionnaire-2. Faking respondents had to adhere to a desirable target profile (Study 3; faking-good) or its opposite (Study 4; faking-bad) while no-faking should respond honestly. Overall, the implicit measures showed adequate-to-excellent reliability, discriminating power, and classification accuracy.