Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin最新文献

This study examined the use of machine learning in detecting deception among 210 individuals reporting homicides or missing persons to 911. The sample included an equal number of false allegation callers (FAC) and true report callers (TRC) identified through case adjudication. Independent coders, unaware of callers' deception, analyzed each 911 call using 86 behavioral cues. Using the random forest model with k-fold cross-validation and repeated sampling, the study achieved an accuracy rate of 68.2% for all 911 calls, with sensitivity and specificity at 68.7% and 67.7%, respectively. For homicide reports, accuracy was higher at 71.2%, with a sensitivity of 77.3% but slightly lower specificity at 65.0%. In contrast, accuracy decreased to 61.4% for missing person reports, with a sensitivity of 49.1% and notably higher specificity at 73.6%. Beyond accuracy, key cues distinguishing FACs from TRCs were identified and included cues like "Blames others," "Is self-dramatizing," and "Is uncertain and insecure."

Emotion regulation research has routinely pitted the antecedent-focused strategy of cognitive reappraisal against the response-focused strategy of expressive suppression. This research has largely yielded that reappraisal is an effective strategy by which to change emotional experience, but implications of expressive suppression are not as clear. This may be due to variations in experimental methodologies, which have not consistently evaluated suppression against a within-subject control condition, as well as conceptual limitations that have muddled the implications of significant findings. Across two high-powered, within-subject paradigms, the present study demonstrates that expressive suppression induces significant decreases in negative emotion relative to one's general attempts to downregulate negative emotion (Study 1) and respond naturally (Study 2). Our findings add to a growing body of literature that demonstrate that suppression may facilitate emotion regulation at both the expressive and experiential levels, and underscore the importance of incorporating flexibility and goal-focused frameworks in future research.

"Forbidden knowledge" claims are central to conspiracy theories, yet they have received little systematic study. Forbidden knowledge claims imply that information is censored or suppressed. Theoretically, forbidden knowledge could be alluring or alarming, depending on alignment with recipients' political worldviews. In three studies (N = 2363, two preregistered), we examined censorship claims about (conservative-aligned) controversial COVID-19 topics. In Studies 1a and 2 participants read COVID-19 claims framed as censored or not. Conservatives reported more attraction to and belief in the claims, regardless of censorship condition, while liberals showed decreased interest and belief when information was presented as censored. Study 1b revealed divergent interpretations of suppression motives: liberals assumed censored information was harmful or false, whereas conservatives deemed it valuable and true. In Study 2, conservatives made more critical thinking errors in a vaccine risk reasoning task when information was framed as censored. Findings reveal the polarizing effects of forbidden knowledge frames.

What environmental factors are associated with individual differences in political ideology, and do such associations change over time? We examine whether reductions in pathogen prevalence in U.S. states over the past 60 years are associated with reduced associations between parasite stress and conservatism. We report a positive association between infection levels and conservative ideology in the United States during the 1960s and 1970s. However, this correlation reduces from the 1980s onwards. These results suggest that the ecological influence of infectious diseases may be larger for older people who grew up (or whose parents grew up) during earlier time periods. We test this hypothesis by analyzing the political affiliation of 45,000 Facebook users, and find a positive association between self-reported political affiliation and regional pathogen stress for older (>40 years) but not younger individuals. It is concluded that the influence of environmental pathogen stress on ideology may have reduced over time.

Cultural tightness is characterized by strong norms and harsh punishments for deviant behaviors. We hypothesized that followers in tight (vs. loose) cultures would more strongly prefer muscular leaders. This hypothesis was confirmed across seven studies (N = 1,615) employing samples from the United States, the United Kingdom, and China. Using actual political leaders, we demonstrated that the tighter the state's culture was, the more muscular the elected governor was (Study 1). Temporarily situating participants in a tight (vs. loose) culture made them select a leader higher on muscularity but not on body fat, and the effects obtained occurred for both male and female leaders (Studies 2-3B). In addition, we demonstrated the mediating role of authoritarianism and a preference for a dominant leadership in this process (Studies 4-5B). These results demonstrate the importance of considering the interface between culture and the physical appearance of leaders.

Intergenerational conflict appears frequently in American public discourse, often framed as clashes between Millennials and Baby Boomers. Building on intergroup threat theory in an exploratory survey, a preregistered correlational study, and a preregistered intervention (N = 1,714), we find that (a) Millennials and Baby Boomers do express more animosity toward each other than toward other generations (Studies 1-3); (b) their animosity reflects asymmetric generational concerns: Baby Boomers primarily fear that Millennials threaten traditional American values (symbolic threat) while Millennials primarily fear that Baby Boomers's delayed transmission of power hampers their life prospects (realistic threat; Studies 2-3); (c) finally, an intervention challenging the entitativity of generational categories alleviates perceived threats and hostility for both generations (Study 3). These findings inform research on intergroup threat, provide a theoretically grounded framework to understand intergenerational relations, and put forward a strategy to increase harmony in aging societies.

Across four studies (N = 1544), we examined the relationship between individuals' gender role mindsets, or beliefs about the malleability versus fixedness of traditional gender roles, and work-family conflict. We found that undergraduate women (but not men) business students holding a fixed, compared to growth, gender role mindset anticipated more work-family conflict. Next, we manipulated gender role mindset and demonstrated a causal link between women's growth mindsets (relative to fixed mindsets and control conditions) and reduced work-family conflict. We showed mechanistically that growth gender role mindsets unburden women from prescriptive gender roles, reducing work-family conflict. Finally, during COVID-19, we demonstrated a similar pattern among working women in high-achieving dual-career couples. We found an indirect effect of women's gender role mindset on job and relationship satisfaction, mediated through work-family conflict. Our preregistered studies suggest that holding the belief that gender roles can change mitigates women's work-family conflict.

Incels (involuntary celibates) have advocated for and even enacted violence against women. We explored two mechanisms that may underly incels' actions: identity fusion and self-verification. Study 1 (n = 155) revealed stronger identity fusion (deep alignment) with the ingroup among men active in online incel communities compared to men active in other male-dominated groups. Study 2 (n = 113) showed that feeling self-verified by other incels predicted fusion with incels; fusion, in turn, predicted endorsement of past and future violence toward women. Study 3 (n = 283; preregistered) replicated the indirect effects from Study 2 and extended them by linking fusion to online harassment of women. All indirect effects were particularly strong among self-identified incels high in narcissism. We discuss the synergistic links between self-verification and identity fusion in fostering extreme behaviors and identify directions for future research.

Much information people receive about others reaches them via gossip. But is this gossip trustworthy? We examined this in a scenario study (N_senders = 350, N_observations = 700) and an interactive laboratory experiment (N_senders = 126; N_observations = 3024). In both studies, participants played a sequential prisoner's dilemma where a gossip sender observed a target's (first decider's) decision and could gossip about this to a receiver (second decider). We manipulated the interdependence structure such that gossipers' outcomes were equal to targets' outcomes, equal to receivers' outcomes, or independent. Compared to no interdependence, gossip was more often false when gossipers were interdependent with targets but not when interdependent with receivers. As such, false positive gossip (self-serving when interdependent with targets) increased but false negative gossip (self-serving when interdependent with receivers) did not. In conclusion, the interdependence structure affected gossip's trustworthiness: When gossipers' outcomes were interdependent with targets, gossip was less trustworthy.

Humanity's long-term welfare may lie in the hands of those who are presently living, raising the question of whether people today hold the generations of tomorrow in their moral circles. Five studies (N_Total = 1652; Prolific) reveal present-oriented bias in the moral standing of future generations, with greater perceived moral obligation, moral concern, and prosocial intentions for proximal relative to distal future targets. Yet, present-oriented bias appears stronger for socially close compared with socially distant targets and for human targets relative to non-human animals and entities in nature. Individual differences, including longtermism beliefs and subjective imaginative vividness, predict greater concern for and obligation to the future. Likewise, concern and obligation predict greater future-oriented generosity. Our studies are among the first to explore moral considerations for targets across deep temporal expanses, reconcile conflicting evidence in the extant literature on moral judgment and future-thinking, and offer practical implications for bettering the shared societal future.