Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin最新文献

The co-occurrence of a neutral stimulus with affective stimuli typically causes the neutral stimulus's evaluation to shift toward the affective stimuli's valence. Does that assimilative effect occur even when one knows the co-occurrence is due to an opposition relation between the stimuli (e.g., Batman stops crime)? Previous evidence tentatively supported that possibility, based on results compatible with an assimilative effect obscured by a larger contrast effect of the opposition relation (e.g., people like Batman less than expected, perhaps due to his co-occurrence with crime). We report three experiments (N = 802) in which participants preferred stimuli that stopped positive events over stimuli that stopped negative events-an assimilative effect of co-occurrence, unobscured by a contrast effect, despite comprehending the opposition relation and its evaluative implications. Our findings suggest that the assimilative effect of co-occurrence is potentially ubiquitous, not limited only to co-occurrence due to relations that suggest valence similarity.

Psychological discomfort can motivate, demotivate, or even backfire upon efforts to encourage allyship. We consider the intensity of such discomfort to test curvilinear relationships between psychological discomfort and Whites' engagement in equity efforts. Across four pre-registered studies (N = 4,563), we find support for our curvilinear model. First, we explore the relationship between collective discomfort and allyship intentions. While we find that collective discomfort is linearly associated with greater allyship, we find little evidence of diminishing returns. Second, we find a curvilinear relationship between collective discomfort and defensive reactions: Both low and high discomfort was associated with increasing defensive reactions to evidence of racial inequity (victimhood claiming, stigma reversal) than moderate discomfort. Thus, we provide empirical support for the idea that dominant group members who experience high (vs. moderate) discomfort in the face of social inequality may be less likely to support equity. We offer insights on how to manage this issue.

Personality-development research is flourishing. Here, we extend these efforts horizontally (new constructs) and vertically (new levels within the same construct) by charting out age-graded differences in Schwarz's human values across 80,814 individuals. Conducting a systematic investigation of cross-sectional age-graded differences in human values-from late teenage years to post-retirement-featuring 36 analytical model choices and 180,000 simulation-based decisions, our analyses replicate some earlier findings (e.g., increasing self- and growth-focus during adolescence and increasing security concerns during adulthood), while also highlighting complex and previously unappreciated dynamics. As such, while it is a common practice to aggregate specific values into parsimonious higher-order concepts to ease interpretation, this may risk overlooking meaningful trends in lower-order value development. Specifically, revealing unique and asynchronous patterns for value nuances, we find that aggregation (a) leads to a loss of critical information, (b) creates conflicting results when nuances diverge, and (c) significantly reduces predictive power.

Three preregistered studies (N = 533) investigated the relationship between intellectual humility (IH) and cognitive and emotional empathy. Study 1 (n = 212) revealed a positive association between IH and empathic accuracy (EA), especially toward the outgroup. Study 2 (n = 112) replicated the significant association between IH and EA. Study 3 (n = 209) employed a manipulation to enhance IH to demonstrate causality. We found evidence for an indirect effect, wherein the manipulation increased state IH, which was associated with greater EA. A mini meta-analysis revealed that, on average, individuals with higher levels of IH exhibit increased EA, showing a greater understanding of others' emotional states. Moreover, IH predicts empathic resilience-buffering against personal distress while maintaining or increasing empathic concern for others. These findings highlight the positive influence of IH on empathy, emphasizing its potential for fostering deeper connections and better understanding in social interactions.

Three preregistered cross-cultural studies (N = 6,049 across India, Singapore, and the United States) tested how belief in karma shapes victim blaming and helping. Study 1 found that belief in karmic causality positively predicts a variety of system-justifying beliefs that legitimate social inequalities, but experimental reminders of karma also encouraged generosity toward others experiencing financial hardship. Studies 2 and 3 tested whether karma framing had different effects on generosity toward different recipients, who varied in their level of need and reason for need. Thinking about karma changed the importance of recipient characteristics, with need being less predictive and external attributions more predictive of giving when thinking about karma. Overall, experimental reminders of karma only reliably increased generosity toward recipients whose financial need was no fault of their own, showing that karmic beliefs draw attention to the reasons for people's bad fortune, and evoke responses to misfortune that are sensitive to naturalistic explanations.

We investigate the extent that political identity, political belief content (i.e., attitude stances), and political belief system structure (i.e., relations among attitudes) differences are associated with affective polarization (i.e., viewing ingroup partisans positively and outgroup partisans negatively) in two multinational, cross-sectional studies (Study 1 N = 4,152, Study 2 N = 29,994). First, we found a large, positive association between political identity and group liking-participants liked their ingroup substantially more than their outgroup. Second, political belief system content and structure had opposite associations with group liking: Sharing similar belief system content with an outgroup was associated with more outgroup liking, but similarity with the ingroup was associated with less ingroup liking. The opposite pattern was found for political belief system structure. Thus, affective polarization was greatest when belief system content similarity was low and structure similarity was high.

Enclothed cognition refers to the systematic influence that clothes can have on the wearer's feelings, thoughts, and behaviors through their symbolic meaning. It has attracted considerable academic and nonacademic interest, with the 2012 article that coined the phrase cited more than 600 times and covered in more than 160 news outlets. However, a recent high-powered replication failed to replicate one of the original effects. To determine whether the larger body of research on enclothed cognition possesses evidential value and replicable effects, we performed z-curve and meta-analyses using 105 effects from 40 studies across 24 articles (N = 3,789). Underscoring the marked improvement of psychological research practices in the mid-2010s, our results raise concerns about the replicability of early enclothed cognition studies but affirm the evidential value for effects published after 2015. These later studies support the core principle of enclothed cognition-what we wear influences how we think, feel, and act.

We examined how the number of groups in a categorization task influences how White Americans categorize ambiguous faces. We investigated the strength of identity-driven ingroup overexclusion-wherein highly identified perceivers overexclude ambiguous members from the ingroup-proposing that, compared with dichotomous tasks (with only the ingroup and one outgroup), tasks with more outgroups attenuate identity-driven ingroup overexclusion (a dilution effect). Fourteen studies (n = 4,001) measured White Americans' racial identification and their categorizations of ambiguous faces and manipulated the categorization task to have two groups, three groups, or an unspecified number of groups (open-ended). In all three conditions, participants overexcluded faces from the White category on average. There was limited support for the dilution effect: identity-driven ingroup overexclusion was absent in the three-group task and only weakly supported in the open-ended task. The presence of multiple outgroups may dampen the impact of racial identity on race perceptions among White Americans.

Moral foundations theory proposes five domains of morality-harm, fairness, loyalty, purity, and authority. Endorsement of these moral domains is assessed by the Moral Foundations Questionnaire (MFQ), a 30-item scale that has undergone intense measurement scrutiny. Across five samples (N = 464,229), we show greatly improved model fit using a Bifactor model that accounts for two kinds of items in the MFQ: judgment and relevance. We add to this space by demonstrating how using this improved measurement structure changes the strength of correlations of the moral foundations with numerous attitudes, cognitive styles, and moral decision-making. Future research should continue to identify what, if anything, the relevance and judgment factors might substantively capture over and above the substantive domains of moral foundations. In the meantime, we recommend that researchers use the Bifactor model for its improved model structure, rather than dropping the relevant items as some have proposed.

When a person indicates they are "liberal" or "conservative," an important part of what they are communicating is their goals for how they would like society to be structured. However, past theories have described these goals in dramatically different fashions, suggesting that either conservativism or liberalism reflects a divisive or unifying goal. To help overcome this impasse, we systematically compared a broad, representative sample of all possible higher-order goals (drawn a previous lexical investigation of more than 1,000 goals) to the political ideology of American adults (total n = 1,588). The results of five studies suggested that proposals from competing theories are all partially correct. Conservativism simultaneously reflects the unifying "value" of Tradition, as well as the divisive "vice" of Elitism; while Liberalism simultaneously reflects the unifying "value" of Inclusiveness, and the divisive "vice" of Rebellion. These results help to integrate proposals from previous competing theories into a single framework.