Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin最新文献

Although there is a tendency to think all forms of essentialism-the belief that characteristics are inherent and unchangeable-are similar, some theories suggest different foundations and outcomes. We investigated if belief systems about the stability of political ideology (trait essentialism) and the fundamental nature of partisans (social essentialism) predict prejudice in opposite ways and if they do so via differential relations with blame. Across six studies (N = 2,231), we found that the more people believe the trait of political ideology is fixed (trait essentialism), the more they think that Republicans and Democrats are inherently different (social essentialism). Crucially, despite this positive correlation, trait essentialism was negatively linked to partisan prejudice and social essentialism was positively linked. The essentialism to prejudice links were driven, in part, by differential associations with blame attributions. Media messaging robustly influenced both types of essentialist thinking, with implications for prejudice.

Ambiguity acts as a veil that can help conceal and justify dishonest behavior. While an individual's ability to disambiguate information in a task may help remove the veil of ambiguity and thus promote honesty, the relationship between ambiguity, ability, and dishonesty is currently unexplored. To investigate this, we employed an experimental design where participants attempted to resolve an ambiguous task and reported their performance. Results showed that ambiguity and dishonesty increase in unison. Importantly, the participants who resolved ambiguity acted less dishonestly (Study 1). In Studies 2a, 2b, and 3, we increased participants' ability by briefly training them to disambiguate the information presented in the task. The results showed that participants acted less dishonestly when their ability levels were increased. Overall, the findings indicate that dishonesty can be reduced not only by making tasks less ambiguous but also by enhancing an individual's ability to successfully resolve ambiguity.

The active social media use (ASMU) and passive social media use (PSMU) hypotheses suggest the impact of social media on perceived loneliness depends on how it is used. However, empirical studies examining the impact of ASMU and PSMU on loneliness are limited. Using a longitudinal study with a nationally representative sample of Dutch adults surveyed across nine annual waves, our findings lend support to the PSMU hypothesis, showing PSMU leads to higher loneliness over time. However, ASMU was not found to have the salubrious effects suggested by the ASMU hypothesis; instead ASMU was also positively associated with loneliness over time. Our findings bolster the emerging literature which suggests that social media, when used passively, may contribute to the epidemic of loneliness. However, it is premature to assume that active use of social media reduces loneliness. Our results also suggest that a bidirectional relationship exists between social media use and loneliness.

Despite extensive research, the relationship between income inequality and life satisfaction remains unclear, with some countries experiencing negative consequences, while others show neutral or positive outcomes. Using data from the Gallup World Poll (2006-2022) with nearly two million respondents from more than 110 countries, we disentangle the distinct within-country and between-country effects of inequality. Our multilevel analyses reveal a significant within-country effect: Temporal increases in inequality are associated with decreases in life satisfaction. At the between-country level, power distance-a cultural dimension reflecting tolerance for social disparities-moderates the relationship. In low power distance countries, higher inequality strongly predicts lower life satisfaction, whereas in high power distance countries, the effect is nonsignificant. These findings are robust across two measures of income inequality and controls for wealth and individualism, offering a refined methodological and cultural interpretation to resolve inconsistencies in prior cross-national research.

Replicating psychological research has become a central concern for psychologists. Although attention has been paid to the possibility of heterogeneous populations driving replication success/failure, the heterogeneous recruitment strategies researchers use to draw samples from those populations are often overlooked. Yet recruitment strategies may bias the participants who show up and shape replication results. We examine this idea through several unique paradigms (sampling North American university students, N_total = 1,009). First, subtle manipulations of recruitment strategies (i.e., mentioning cash, expedient credit, fun, or a study narrative) were differentially appealing to individuals varying on experiential versus reward-based motivations (Experiment 1). Second, employing different recruitment strategies biased the motivational styles of actual participant show-ups, and sometimes even shaped the success of several replication studies (Experiment 2-3). We conclude that recruitment strategies may sometimes alter the degree of successful replication.

When a neutral stimulus is paired with a stimulus denoting an attribute, the neutral stimulus inherits that attribute (i.e., Attribute Conditioning; AC). The current experiments examined whether this effect is sensitive to cue competition, specifically blocking (Experiment 1, n = 245) and overshadowing (Experiment 2, n = 213), and whether personality traits can predict this effect (n = 458). Participants were shown cartoon images of people (CSs) paired with healthy or unhealthy foods (USs) and completed the Big Five Inventory. An AC effect was evident-people paired with healthy foods were rated healthier than people paired with unhealthy foods. However, there was no evidence of cue competition or personality traits impacting the AC effect, although females displayed a stronger AC effect than males. These findings indicate that AC is a robust phenomenon of relevance to social learning processes but is insensitive to factors that influence other forms of conditioning.

Mediterranean societies are often labeled as "honor cultures," in contrast with presumed "dignity" and "face" cultures of Anglo-Western and East Asian societies. We measured these cultural logics in two large-scale surveys (Studies 1 & 3: N = 2,942 students from 11 societies; Study 2: N = 5,471 adults from 14 societies). Middle Eastern and North African groups perceived honor values as the most normative in their societies, followed by Southeast European, and then Latin-European groups (who were comparable to Anglo-Western and East-Asian groups). East-Asian and Anglo-Western groups, respectively, perceived face and dignity values as most normative. Culture-level variation in perceived normative honor values, but not personal values, accounted for previously reported differences between Mediterranean and non-Mediterranean samples in several (but not all) measures of social cognitive tendencies. We conclude that a cultural logic of honor plays a role in Mediterranean societies, but labeling these societies as "honor cultures" is oversimplistic.

Do narcissists enjoy better or worse wellbeing than others? Psychological theories disagree. In an attempt to reconcile them, we conducted a comprehensive cross-cultural meta-analysis testing the core hypotheses that grandiose narcissism would be associated with better wellbeing and vulnerable narcissism with worse wellbeing. We also hypothesized that these associations would be explained by self-esteem and would be stronger in countries higher on individualism. First, as hypothesized, grandiose narcissism was associated with better wellbeing and vulnerable narcissism with worse wellbeing. Second, as hypothesized, both associations became nonsignificant after controlling for self-esteem, suggesting that they are explained by self-esteem. Third, partly as hypothesized, the association between grandiose-but not vulnerable-narcissism and wellbeing was stronger in more individualistic countries. Results held across wellbeing forms (hedonic, eudaimonic) and methods (cross-sectional, longitudinal). Advancing psychological theory, we demonstrated that only grandiose narcissists enjoy better wellbeing, especially in individualistic countries, a phenomenon accounted for by their higher self-esteem.

Prior research finds that hierarchical representation-the vertical distribution of minorities across a hierarchy-can influence team attractiveness. Extending these findings, we offer a novel account for why these perceptions arise: teams with minorities clustered in low-ranking positions are perceived as less diverse and more conflict-prone than equally diverse teams with hierarchical representation. Across five studies (N = 2946), participants perceived teams with low hierarchical representation as less attractive than teams with hierarchical representation, regardless of participant race. Teams with low hierarchical representation were considered just as unattractive as teams with lower numerical diversity (Study 2). Individuals also underestimated the percentage of Black employees present in teams with low hierarchical representation, signaling a "diversity deflation" effect (Study 3). Conversely, teams with hierarchical representation were considered as attractive as diverse teams with flatter hierarchies (Study 4). The effect of hierarchical representation on attractiveness weakens for teams portrayed as conflict-laden (Study 5).

Although conspiracy belief may arise from a frustration of psychological needs, research has yet to investigate these relationships over time. Using four annual waves of longitudinal panel data in New Zealand (2019-2022; N = 55,269), we examined the relationship between four psychological needs (namely belonging, control, meaning in life, and self-esteem) and conspiracy belief. Results from four random-intercept cross-lagged panel models reveal stable between-person effects indicating that those whose core needs are less satisfied tend to exhibit higher levels of conspiracy belief across time. Within-person analyses further identify small cross-lagged effects within individuals: decreases in levels of control and belonging, as well as increases in levels of meaning in life, temporally precede increases in conspiracy belief. Within-person fluctuations in conspiracy belief also have negative cross-lagged associations with control (but not with the three other needs). These data provide novel insights into the psychological factors that foster conspiracy belief.