Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin最新文献

Four studies investigate a fear of imbalanced minds hypothesis that threatening agents perceived to be relatively mismatched in capacities for cognition (e.g., self-control and reasoning) and emotion (e.g., sensations and emotions) will be rated as scarier and more dangerous by observers. In ratings of fictional monsters (e.g., zombies and vampires), agents seen as more imbalanced between capacities for cognition and emotion (high cognition-low emotion or low cognition-high emotion) were rated as scarier compared to those with equally matched levels of cognition and emotion (Studies 1 and 2). Similar effects were observed using ratings of scary animals (e.g., tigers, sharks; Studies 2 and 3), and infected humans (Study 4). Moreover, these effects are explained through diminished perceived control/predictability over the target agent. These findings highlight the role of balance between cognition and emotion in appraisal of threatening agents, in part because those agents are seen as more chaotic and uncontrollable.

Previous research has demonstrated an inverse relation between subjective social class (SSC) and performance on emotion recognition tasks. Study 1 (N = 418) involved a preregistered replication of this effect using the Reading the Mind in the Eyes Task and the Cambridge Mindreading Face-Voice Battery. The inverse relation replicated; however, exploratory analyses revealed a significant interaction between sex and SSC in predicting emotion recognition, indicating that the effect was driven by males. In Study 2 (N = 745), we preregistered and tested the interaction on a separate archival dataset. The interaction replicated; the association between SSC and emotion recognition again occurred only in males. Exploratory analyses (Study 3; N = 381) examined the generalizability of the interaction to incidental face memory. Our results underscore the need to reevaluate previous research establishing the main effects of social class and sex on emotion recognition abilities, as these effects apparently moderate each other.

Laypeople often believe that God punishes transgressions; however, their inferences about God's punishment motives remain unclear. We addressed this topic by asking laypeople to indicate why God punishes. We also examined participants' inferences about why humans punish to contribute to scholarly conversations regarding the extent to which people may anthropomorphize God's mind. In Studies 1A to 1C, participants viewed God as less retributive than humans. In Study 2, participants expected God (vs. humans) to view humans' true selves more positively; this difference mediated participants' views of God as less retributive than humans. Study 3 manipulated agents' views of humans' true selves and examined how such information influenced each agent's perceived motives. Participants viewed a given agent as less retributive when that agent regarded the true self as good (versus bad). These findings extend scholarship on lay theories of punishment motives and highlight links between religious and moral cognition.

Ideal partner preferences for traits in a partner are said to be stable cognitive constructs. However, longitudinal studies investigating the same participants' ideals repeatedly have so far been limited to relatively short retest intervals of a maximum of 3 years. Here, we investigate the stability and change of ideals across 13 years and participants' insight into how ideals have changed. A total of 204 participants (M = 46.2 years, SD = 7.4, 104 women) reported their ideals at two time points. We found a mean rank-order stability of r = .42 and an overall profile stability of r = .73 (distinctive r = .53). Some ideals changed over time, for example, increased for status-resources in relation to age and parenthood. We found some but varying insight into how ideals had changed (mean r = .20). Results support the idea of ideals being stable cognitive constructs but suggest some variability related to the demands of different life stages.

Authenticity refers to behaving in a manner that aligns with one's true self. The true self, though, is positive. From a self-enhancement standpoint, people exaggerate their strengths and overlook their shortcomings, forming positively-distorted views of themselves. We propose a self-enhancement framework of authenticity, advocating a reciprocal relation between the two constructs. Trait self-enhancement was associated with higher trait authenticity (Study 1), and day-to-day fluctuations in self-enhancement predicted corresponding variations in state authenticity (Study 2). Furthermore, manipulating self-enhancement elevated state authenticity (Studies 3-4), which was associated with meaning in life (Study 4), and manipulating authenticity augmented self-enhancement, which was associated with meaning in life and thriving (Study 5). The authentic self is largely the self-enhancing self.

The "selfie" phenomenon shaped the past two decades, yet there is inconsistent evidence concerning the relationship between selfie behaviors and self-evaluations. This meta-analysis investigates the relationship between selfie taking, editing, and posting behavior and general and appearance-specific self-evaluations. The results reveal that selfie taking and posting are related to positive appearance-specific self-evaluations. In contrast, selfie editing is related to negative self-evaluations both generally and specific to appearance. Gender and age did not moderate these relationships, but methodological factors did, suggesting these relationships depend on factors, such as how selfie behaviors are measured and study design. We interpret these findings through the lens of prominent social psychological theories and conclude with suggestions to guide future research.

Periods of social mobility, such as attending college, can challenge one's status-based identity, leading to uncertainty around one's status in society. Status uncertainty is associated with poorer well-being and academic outcomes. Little is known, however, about what experiences lead to status uncertainty. The current longitudinal study investigated discrimination experiences and cultural mismatch as predictors of status uncertainty. We propose that discrimination indirectly predicts increased status uncertainty by increasing perceived cultural mismatch with the university. Participants were Latinx college students, all of whom were low-income and/or first generation to college. Discrimination experiences were measured at the end of participants' first year. Cultural mismatch and status uncertainty were measured at the end of Year 2. Status uncertainty was measured again at the end of Year 3. Results indicated that students who experienced more frequent discrimination felt more cultural mismatch 1 year later, and, in turn, reported increased status uncertainty over the following year.

In this investigation, we tested the hypothesis that increased income inequality between individuals will reduce social affiliation within dyadic interactions. In three experiments, we examined the effects of income inequality on key indices of affiliation using semi-structured interactions. In the first two experiments, a participant and confederate were randomly assigned to a low- or high-power role and compensated mildly or extremely unequally. In Experiment 3, inequality and inequity were orthogonally manipulated to determine whether inequality's social consequences are moderated by the fairness of the income distribution. We demonstrated that greater inequality produced more negative emotional responses, reduced desire for closeness, and harsher evaluations of one's partner, regardless of one's power role and the equitability of the income distribution. We also obtained evidence that greater inequality reduces behavioral warmth, although this effect was less consistent. Our results begin to unpack the psychological processes through which income inequality worsens societal well-being.

Psychological theories of mobilization tend to focus on explaining people's motivations for action, rather than mobilization ("activation") processes. To investigate the online behaviors associated with mobilization, we compared the online communications data of 26 people who subsequently mobilized to right-wing extremist action and 48 people who held similar extremist views but did not mobilize (N = 119,473 social media posts). In a three-part analysis, involving content analysis (Part 1), topic modeling (Part 2), and machine learning (Part 3), we showed that communicating ideological or hateful content was not related to mobilization, but rather mobilization was positively related to talking about violent action, operational planning, and logistics. Our findings imply that to explain mobilization to extremist action, rather than the motivations for action, theories of collective action should extend beyond how individuals express grievances and anger, to how they equip themselves with the "know-how" and capability to act.

How do people resist in-the-moment temptation if they are poor at inhibiting their impulses? Theory on self-control suggests that people have a toolbox of strategies available to them that may be used preemptively to dampen temptations. Applying this to the goal of relationship maintenance, in two studies, we examined whether people motivated to maintain their romantic relationship but poor at inhibitory control would appraise an attractive alternative (AA) as less appealing prior to a face-to-face interaction. In Study 1 (N = 190), those with high motivation and low inhibitory control (measured with the Stroop) rated the AA as less appealing as compared with singles and those high in motivation and inhibitory control. We replicated the motivation by inhibitory control interaction in Study 2 (N = 219). The AAs paradigm and the Devaluation Effect provide a useful way to explore the toolbox approach to self-control strategies.