Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin最新文献

How does a person's socioeconomic status (SES) relate to how she thinks others see her? Seventeen studies (eight pre-registered; three reported in-text and 14 replications in supplemental online material [SOM], total N = 6,124) found that people with low SES believe others see them as colder and less competent than those with high SES. The SES difference in meta-perceptions was explained by people's self-regard and self-presentation expectations. Moreover, lower SES people's more negative meta-perceptions were not warranted: Those with lower SES were not seen more negatively, and were less accurate in guessing how others saw them. They also had important consequences: People with lower SES blamed themselves more for negative feedback about their warmth and competence. Internal meta-analyses suggested this effect was larger and more consistent for current socioeconomic rank than cultural background.

Lifshin et al. found that death primes increased support for killing animals, suggesting that the killing of animals serves a terror management function. The present research adds to this by suggesting that protecting animals can also serve a terror management function when people see such behaviors as culturally valuable. In three studies (N = 765), environmental contingent self-worth (ECSW) moderated the effect of death primes on attitudes toward animals. Attitudes toward animals also mediated the effect of a death prime on increased power-based invulnerability for those with low ECSW and decreased power-based invulnerability for those with high ECSW (Study 3). Finally, we found little support that death primes influenced beliefs regarding human-animal superiority (Study 1 and 2) or similarity (Study 2). Our findings therefore provide partial support for past terror management research and further the understanding regarding how to promote more benevolent human-animal relations.

To provide deeper insights into the relationships between psychopathic traits and utilitarian moral judgment, we studied N = 702 adults using three psychopathy scales: (a) the Levenson's Self-report Psychopathy Scale; (b) the Psychopathic Personality Inventory; and (c) the Triarchic Psychopathy Measure; and three measures of utilitarian moral judgment: (a) trolley dilemmas; (b) the Consequences, Norms, and Inaction (CNI) model of moral decision-making; and (c) the Oxford Utilitarianism Scale. When using the traditional approach to moral judgment (i.e., trolley dilemmas, instrumental harm, traditional score from the CNI model), we found that higher levels of psychopathic traits were associated with a higher utilitarian tendency. When using the modeling approach, we found that a higher level of psychopathic traits was related to weaker sensitivity to moral norms and less action averse in morally problematic situations. In addition, we found negative associations between impartial beneficence and all psychopathy scores.

Goal commitment typically relates to successful goal realization. Yet, individuals differ in how much their goals correspond to their implicit motives. We hypothesized that for those adolescents high in a given implicit motive, goal commitment and goal success in the corresponding motive domain (i.e., achievement, affiliation, power) are more closely related than for those low in the implicit motive. Data were assessed in an individualistic (Germany) and a collectivistic cultural context (Zambia) on two measurement occasions (i.e., T1: Picture Story Exercise for implicit motives; T1 and T2: GOALS questionnaire for goal commitment and success, respectively). Goal success at T2 was reliably predicted by goal importance and goal success at T1, respectively. The hypothesized interaction was found only for the implicit power motive but not for the implicit needs of achievement and affiliation, respectively. Results were equivalent across adolescents' cultural backgrounds. Findings are discussed with respect to motive-specific effects on goal dimensions.

Keeping a secret is often considered burdensome, with numerous consequences for well-being. However, there is no standardized measure of secrecy burden, and most studies focus on individual/cognitive burden without considering social/relational aspects. This research aimed to develop and validate a secrecy burden measure tapping both intrapersonal and interpersonal components. Study 1 used exploratory factor analysis to reveal a four-factor model of secrecy burden: Daily Personal Impact, Relationship Impact, Pull to Reveal, and Anticipated Consequences. Study 2 used confirmatory factor analysis to replicate this factor structure and found that each factor was uniquely associated with different emotional and well-being outcomes. Study 3 employed a longitudinal design and found that higher scores on each factor predicted lower authenticity and higher depression and anxiety 2 to 3 weeks later. Altogether, this research is the first step in standardizing a secrecy burden measure and applying it to real-world secrets and well-being outcomes.

Four studies investigate a fear of imbalanced minds hypothesis that threatening agents perceived to be relatively mismatched in capacities for cognition (e.g., self-control and reasoning) and emotion (e.g., sensations and emotions) will be rated as scarier and more dangerous by observers. In ratings of fictional monsters (e.g., zombies and vampires), agents seen as more imbalanced between capacities for cognition and emotion (high cognition-low emotion or low cognition-high emotion) were rated as scarier compared to those with equally matched levels of cognition and emotion (Studies 1 and 2). Similar effects were observed using ratings of scary animals (e.g., tigers, sharks; Studies 2 and 3), and infected humans (Study 4). Moreover, these effects are explained through diminished perceived control/predictability over the target agent. These findings highlight the role of balance between cognition and emotion in appraisal of threatening agents, in part because those agents are seen as more chaotic and uncontrollable.

Integrating insights from interdependence theory with the narcissistic admiration and rivalry concept, we propose that a pivotal obstacle for narcissistic leaders is their inability to sustain benevolent perceptions over time. As people strive to interpret social behavior in terms of self- or other-interest, the narcissistic tendency of prioritizing self-interests over the collective may become apparent and eventually taint their reputation as a leader. We examined how interpersonal motive perceptions-based on attributions of self- and other-interest-would clarify the leadership paradox of narcissism. We tracked 472 participants in 119 teams across four time-points. Narcissistic rivalry (but not admiration) corresponded to increasingly negative leader effectiveness ratings. The extent to which individuals were perceived as self-maximizing and lacking concern for other interests was tightly connected to declines in leader effectiveness across time. Altogether, these results offer insight into how perceived interpersonal motives may explain the downfall of narcissistic leadership.

Past research has demonstrated that older adults are stereotyped as less malleable than young adults. Moreover, beliefs that people are less malleable are associated with lower confrontations of prejudice, as perpetrators are seen as less capable of changing their (prejudiced) behavior. The present research sought to integrate these lines of research to demonstrate that endorsement of ageist beliefs that older adults are less malleable will lead to a lower confrontation of anti-Black prejudice espoused by older adults. Across four experimental studies (N = 1,573), people were less likely to confront anti-Black prejudice espoused by an 82-year-old compared with a 62-, 42-, or 20-year-old, due, in part, to beliefs that older adults are less malleable. Further exploration demonstrated that malleability beliefs about older adults were held across young, middle-aged, and older adult samples. These findings demonstrate how stereotypes about older adults can impede racial equality.

Previous research has demonstrated an inverse relation between subjective social class (SSC) and performance on emotion recognition tasks. Study 1 (N = 418) involved a preregistered replication of this effect using the Reading the Mind in the Eyes Task and the Cambridge Mindreading Face-Voice Battery. The inverse relation replicated; however, exploratory analyses revealed a significant interaction between sex and SSC in predicting emotion recognition, indicating that the effect was driven by males. In Study 2 (N = 745), we preregistered and tested the interaction on a separate archival dataset. The interaction replicated; the association between SSC and emotion recognition again occurred only in males. Exploratory analyses (Study 3; N = 381) examined the generalizability of the interaction to incidental face memory. Our results underscore the need to reevaluate previous research establishing the main effects of social class and sex on emotion recognition abilities, as these effects apparently moderate each other.

Laypeople often believe that God punishes transgressions; however, their inferences about God's punishment motives remain unclear. We addressed this topic by asking laypeople to indicate why God punishes. We also examined participants' inferences about why humans punish to contribute to scholarly conversations regarding the extent to which people may anthropomorphize God's mind. In Studies 1A to 1C, participants viewed God as less retributive than humans. In Study 2, participants expected God (vs. humans) to view humans' true selves more positively; this difference mediated participants' views of God as less retributive than humans. Study 3 manipulated agents' views of humans' true selves and examined how such information influenced each agent's perceived motives. Participants viewed a given agent as less retributive when that agent regarded the true self as good (versus bad). These findings extend scholarship on lay theories of punishment motives and highlight links between religious and moral cognition.