Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin最新文献

The United States is characterized as having relatively weak social norms compared to other countries. However, this characterization may be an oversimplification due to the cultural diversity that exists within the country. Four studies (N = 1,537) examined whether and why U.S. racial minorities (East Asian, Latinx, and African Americans) perceive their racial community's norms to be significantly stronger than European Americans and White immigrants to the United States (Studies 1-4). This difference was not due to increased perceived discrimination (Study 3) or concerns about out-group member punishment (Study 4). Instead, racial minorities' stronger perceptions of community norms were motivated primarily by interdependence (Studies 1-4) and concerns about being punished by in-group members for not following norms (Study 4). These findings illustrate differences in norm strength between racial groups in a single country, deepening our understanding of how social norm perceptions may vary in a multicultural society.

Virtual dating has become popular, but how do people feel about potential romantic partners on virtual versus in-person first dates? In Study 1, a sample of online participants predicted that in-person dates would be markedly better than virtual dates. Study 2 examined whether this prediction received support in a dataset of 4,542 real-life blind dates. We examined first-date outcomes (e.g., date enjoyment and attraction) and partner trait-perceptions (e.g., ambitious and confident) reported after each date. In-person dates were generally longer, but otherwise, virtual and in-person dates were highly similar across the full sample, and virtual dates outperformed in-person dates when controlling for date length. We conducted a one-with-many Social Relations Model analysis on a subsample of Study 2 daters (n = 1,833 dates) and documented a modest amount of actor and partner variance, and a large amount of relationship variance. Virtual dates may be an underappreciated screening strategy for potential partners.

Morality and ability are two key dimensions of social judgment. Across four experiments (total N = 1,418, three preregistered), we examined how information about one dimension shapes impressions in the other. In Experiment 1, participants generated positive and negative behaviors related to either morality or ability and then evaluated each behavior on the other dimension. Negative moral behaviors led to stronger inferences of low ability than negative ability behaviors led to inferences of immorality (i.e., asymmetric Horn effect). No asymmetry emerged for positive behaviors (i.e., symmetric Halo effects). Experiments 2a and 2b confirmed the asymmetric Horn effect and showed it was stronger for extreme versus moderate negative behaviors. Experiment 3 showed that immoral behaviors elicited more perceived threat than unable behaviors, which partly explained the asymmetric horn effect. These findings complement and extend prior models of impression formation by highlighting the primacy of morality in influencing judgments on other fundamental content dimensions.

Support for redistribution is often dismissed as driven by a morally questionable motive: Malicious envy. Seemingly supporting this notion, in some studies, liberalism was correlated with envy, and envy predicted support for redistribution. However, we argue that these results can be explained by meritocracy beliefs rather than envy; specifically, we hypothesize that liberals are only indirectly prone to envy to the extent that they believe wealth is often not merited. Consequently, we argue that these meritocracy beliefs drive redistribution support, not envy. We found support for our predictions in three surveys and one experiment (total N = 4,171), showing that (a) liberalism only indirectly predicted envy via lowered meritocracy beliefs, and (b) meritocracy beliefs, not envy, (negatively) predicted support for redistribution. Moreover, when an experimental manipulation increased liberals' perceptions of wealth as deserved, their support for redistribution decreased. These findings may inform a more evidence-based debate amid growing inequality.

In person impression formation, target characteristics such as suitability for a vacant position or interpersonal likeability are inferred from information samples. This process strongly depends on the diagnosticity of observed (i.e., sampled) behaviors. Applying a likelihood-based conceptualization of diagnosticity, we tested two major implications: First, diagnosticity depends on the hypothesis being tested, and second, it is shaped by situational base-rates. We examined both facets by manipulating the extent of positive versus negative valence within the big two (agency vs. communion). In Experiment 1, we varied the hypothesis to be tested by providing different job profiles in a personnel selection task. Consistent with the predictions, hypothesis-relevant information impacted both sampling and judgment behavior more than hypothesis-irrelevant information. In Experiments 2A and 2B, we manipulated big-two specific valence base-rate expectations on target persons characterized as psychotherapy patients: Genuinely diagnostic violations of group-based expectancies turned out to result in strongest judgments. The findings suggest that participants' sampling patterns and judgments follow the proposed likelihood-based diagnosticity concept.

Theoretical work has proposed that people can have four different patterns of interpersonal evaluations: mostly positive, mostly negative, ambivalent (both positive and negative), and indifferent (neither positive nor negative). Notably, indifference has been largely overlooked by empirical research, despite growing evidence that indifferent feelings can occur in romantic relationships. To address this gap, we examined the associations of feelings of indifference toward one's romantic partner with relationship and personal well-being across four studies (N = 2,490), using cross-sectional and longitudinal data from couples and individuals in relationships. To do so, we developed the Subjective Interpersonal Indifference Scale and established it as a valid and reliable measure to assess this evaluation. Our findings showed that indifference toward a romantic partner is associated with lower relationship and personal well-being, both concurrently and longitudinally. Underlying these associations were higher feelings of boredom in the relationship, higher desire for attractive alternatives, and lower intimacy.

Conspiracy theorists often prompt others to "Do your own research." Could a general desire for such epistemic autonomy-to make up one's own mind rather than deferring to others' testimony-explain why some people are attracted to conspiracy theories? In four pre-registered studies (United States and United Kingdom, N = 1196), we test whether participants more likely to believe in conspiracy theories have a stronger preference for forming their own beliefs independently. Participants chose between doing a difficult perceptual task themselves or relying on an expert's answer. Internal fixed-effect meta-analyses revealed a weak but statistically significant relationship between belief in conspiracy theories and preference for first-hand evidence. By contrast, the relationship between epistemic individualism and this preference was stronger and more robust. This suggests that, although individuals endorsing conspiracy theories express a stronger preference for "doing their own research," their behavior mostly does not match this preference in non-conspiratorial contexts.

Conspiracy beliefs can harm interpersonal relationships, but their impact on future relationships remains underexplored. Across four preregistered experiments (N = 1,603), we examined how sharing conspiracy theories in online dating profiles affects interpersonal impressions and intentions to start relationships, and whether these outcomes depend on perceivers' political orientation. Experiments 1a and 1b revealed that profiles including right-wing conspiracy theories were perceived less favorably compared to controls. Participants were also more reluctant to start relationships with the profile holder. In Experiment 2, implausible (vs. plausible) left-wing conspiracy theories elicited stronger negative reactions. In Experiment 3, participants showed less interest in conspiracy-sharing profiles (vs. controls) on a mock dating app. Political orientation moderated these effects-liberals were more critical, while conservatives were more lenient and sometimes favored conspiracy-sharing profiles. These findings further highlight the social consequences of sharing conspiracy theories and the moderating role of political orientation.

Gender inequality has been an enduring issue throughout history and continues to persist in modern society. Although we have achieved much gender equality, this progress has stagnated. We propose that gender equality differentiation, defined as the variance in the levels of gender equality across different dimensions, is a critical but neglected factor that impedes progress toward gender equality. Using a global dataset of 158 countries spanning from 2006 to 2022 (Study 1; N = 1,906), we find that countries with a higher level of gender equality differentiation at the focal year have a lower level of gender equality in the next year. A global survey (Study 2; N = 45,611) and a preregistered experiment (Study 3; N = 566) further demonstrate the underlying mechanisms. This research reveals a paradox-isolated efforts in addressing some aspects of gender inequality inadvertently stall efforts to address holistic gender inequality.

Third-party punishment communicates with offenders to resocialize them. However, little is known about what it communicates to victims. Considering group contexts, the current research focuses on the effects on victims of either one individual or the entire group punishing offenders. Five preregistered experiments (N = 1,231; student and online adult samples from Germany and the United Kingdom) demonstrate that various forms of third-party punishment empower victims (Studies 1, 3, 4, and 5) and that this effect is amplified when the entire group supports the punishment (Studies 1-4). Sequential mediation analyses and experimental designs show that punishment restores value consensus, which in turn revalidates victims' group membership status, thereby empowering victims. Regardless of explicit messages, stand-alone punishment empowers victims (Studies 4 and 5). These findings emphasize the communicative effects of third-party punishment on victims, contributing to our understanding of how punishment can support them in coping.