We inform our readers that we have found an article in our pages, Capano and Pritoni (2020), to have sentences of identical text to an article published by the same authors in another journal (Capano et al. 2020). The overlap is considered by the Editors to be minor.
We have reproduced the overlapping text below with the appropriate citation to the Journal of Public Policy article:
我们通知读者，我们在我们的页面上发现了一篇文章，Capano和Pritoni(2020)，与同一作者在另一期刊上发表的一篇文章(Capano et al. 2020)具有相同文本的句子。编辑认为重叠是次要的。我们复制了下面重叠的文本，并适当引用了《公共政策杂志》的文章:
{"title":"Corrigendum","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/rego.12480","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12480","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We inform our readers that we have found an article in our pages, Capano and Pritoni (<span>2020</span>), to have sentences of identical text to an article published by the same authors in another journal (Capano <i>et al</i>. <span>2020</span>). The overlap is considered by the Editors to be minor.</p>\u0000<p>We have reproduced the overlapping text below with the appropriate citation to the <i>Journal of Public Policy</i> article:</p>","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2022-07-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50166004","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Are stronger direct financial incentives or regulatory enforcement effective in reducing fatalities in the construction industry? We examine two important policies—state workers' compensation (WC) programs and federal and state Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) activities—which embody those strategies. We examine their impact by looking at state-level fatality rates in the construction industry from 1992 to 2016. Setting aside highway crashes and violence, the majority of employee deaths occur in construction. We find that states which exempt small firms from the requirement to buy WC insurance have higher fatality rates. When eligibility for compensation is restricted by longer waiting periods, fatality rates are substantially higher. More frequent federal or state OSHA inspections and, especially, consultation visits are associated with lower fatality rates, but higher average penalties are not. Limited variation in these policies over our sample period, especially for WC, makes these results suggestive rather than definitively causal.
{"title":"Preventing construction deaths: The role of public policies","authors":"Wayne B. Gray, John Mendeloff","doi":"10.1111/rego.12486","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12486","url":null,"abstract":"Are stronger direct financial incentives or regulatory enforcement effective in reducing fatalities in the construction industry? We examine two important policies—state workers' compensation (WC) programs and federal and state Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) activities—which embody those strategies. We examine their impact by looking at state-level fatality rates in the construction industry from 1992 to 2016. Setting aside highway crashes and violence, the majority of employee deaths occur in construction. We find that states which exempt small firms from the requirement to buy WC insurance have higher fatality rates. When eligibility for compensation is restricted by longer waiting periods, fatality rates are substantially higher. More frequent federal or state OSHA inspections and, especially, consultation visits are associated with lower fatality rates, but higher average penalties are not. Limited variation in these policies over our sample period, especially for WC, makes these results suggestive rather than definitively causal.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2022-07-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50166005","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Over the past three decades the Latin American region has experienced various regulatory reforms, and distinctive normative changes have been introduced in the framework, instruments, or procedures adopted by independent regulatory agencies (IRAs). While there is evidence that the establishment of an IRA positively affects regulated sector performance, little is known about the effects of these additional legal dispositions when incorporated in primary or secondary legislation. However, normative changes may shape IRAs' actual regulatory activities and the signals they send to their stakeholders, potentially influencing sectoral performance. This research traces the evolution of several instruments and procedures legally adopted by IRAs located in Latin America and comprehensively assesses the influence of these normative changes on the performance dimensions of the electricity sector. We built indexes that describe the adoption of specific legal dispositions in the region. These indexes reveal that the evolution of the normative dispositions varies in terms of extent, context, and timing of adoption. In addition, the changes are not equally or even positively associated with specific performance dimensions. While economic regulatory instruments shape many performance dimensions, “soft” procedural dispositions also play an important role in perceptions of quality in the electricity sector.
{"title":"Regulatory reforms, normative changes, and performance: Evidence from the electricity sector in Latin America","authors":"Camilo Ignacio González, Alketa Peci","doi":"10.1111/rego.12484","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12484","url":null,"abstract":"Over the past three decades the Latin American region has experienced various regulatory reforms, and distinctive normative changes have been introduced in the framework, instruments, or procedures adopted by independent regulatory agencies (IRAs). While there is evidence that the establishment of an IRA positively affects regulated sector performance, little is known about the effects of these additional legal dispositions when incorporated in primary or secondary legislation. However, normative changes may shape IRAs' actual regulatory activities and the signals they send to their stakeholders, potentially influencing sectoral performance. This research traces the evolution of several instruments and procedures legally adopted by IRAs located in Latin America and comprehensively assesses the influence of these normative changes on the performance dimensions of the electricity sector. We built indexes that describe the adoption of specific legal dispositions in the region. These indexes reveal that the evolution of the normative dispositions varies in terms of extent, context, and timing of adoption. In addition, the changes are not equally or even positively associated with specific performance dimensions. While economic regulatory instruments shape many performance dimensions, “soft” procedural dispositions also play an important role in perceptions of quality in the electricity sector.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2022-07-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50166006","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted the issue of mobilization policies, that is, government practices directed at making the mass public voluntarily perform various behaviors for the collective benefit during a crisis. As COVID-19 vaccinations became accessible, governments faced the challenge of mass vaccination mobilization in order to achieve herd immunization. Aiming to effectively realize this goal, policy designers and regulators worldwide considered various mobilizing tools for vaccination compliance, including rewards and penalties, as they targeted vaccine opposers and hesitators, while trying to avoid the crowding-out effect among individuals who were intrinsically motivated to get vaccinated. However, the unique circumstances of the Coronavirus pandemic may have eliminated the crowding-out effect. Thus, our study explored the effect of regulation in the form of positive and negative incentivizing tools (i.e., rewards and penalties) during the coronavirus pandemic on vaccination intentions of 1184 Israeli citizens, prior to the national vaccination campaign. Results indicate that (1) both negative and positive incentives have a similar positive effect on individuals who declare they will not get vaccinated and those who hesitate to get the shot; (2) both positive and negative incentives induce the crowding-out effect; and (3) negative incentives generate a larger crowding-out effect in individuals who report preliminary intentions to get vaccinated, compared to positive ones. This emphasizes the need to avoid the crowding-out effect during the current and similar crises, and suggests considering applying a gradual and adaptive policy design in order to maximize regulatory efficacy and compliance.
{"title":"Framing policies to mobilize citizens' behavior during a crisis: Examining the effects of positive and negative vaccination incentivizing policies","authors":"Talia Goren, Itai Beeri, Dana R. Vashdi","doi":"10.1111/rego.12478","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12478","url":null,"abstract":"The COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted the issue of mobilization policies, that is, government practices directed at making the mass public voluntarily perform various behaviors for the collective benefit during a crisis. As COVID-19 vaccinations became accessible, governments faced the challenge of mass vaccination mobilization in order to achieve herd immunization. Aiming to effectively realize this goal, policy designers and regulators worldwide considered various mobilizing tools for vaccination compliance, including rewards and penalties, as they targeted vaccine opposers and hesitators, while trying to avoid the crowding-out effect among individuals who were intrinsically motivated to get vaccinated. However, the unique circumstances of the Coronavirus pandemic may have eliminated the crowding-out effect. Thus, our study explored the effect of regulation in the form of positive and negative incentivizing tools (i.e., rewards and penalties) during the coronavirus pandemic on vaccination intentions of 1184 Israeli citizens, prior to the national vaccination campaign. Results indicate that (1) both negative and positive incentives have a similar positive effect on individuals who declare they will not get vaccinated and those who hesitate to get the shot; (2) both positive and negative incentives induce the crowding-out effect; and (3) negative incentives generate a larger crowding-out effect in individuals who report preliminary intentions to get vaccinated, compared to positive ones. This emphasizes the need to avoid the crowding-out effect during the current and similar crises, and suggests considering applying a gradual and adaptive policy design in order to maximize regulatory efficacy and compliance.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2022-06-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50166025","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Implementing precautionary measures that have obvious distributional consequences today but often only invisible future benefits is politically difficult. It requires that policymakers reconcile technocratic expertise with political consent. This paper traces attempts to enact such measures, focusing on countercyclical policies to limit the systemic risks of housing booms as proposed by financial stability committees in Germany, France, and the Netherlands from 2015 onwards. These committees bring together technocrats and political authorities in order to overcome the inaction bias inherent to these measures, seeking to forge both epistemic and political consensus on the need for action. We find that the work of these committees is characterized by lengthy processes of consensus-building, during which technocrats amass evidence and search for politically acceptable solutions. We argue that whether this leads to meaningful steps crucially depends on the committee's institutional set-up. What particularly matters is its capacity to engage the Ministry of Finance in binding discussions and the governance arrangements for the activation of precautionary instruments, which shape whether a shared framing of the problem and appropriate response emerges.
{"title":"Between technocracy and politics: How financial stability committees shape precautionary interventions in real estate markets","authors":"Matthias Thiemann, Bart Stellinga","doi":"10.1111/rego.12476","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12476","url":null,"abstract":"Implementing precautionary measures that have obvious distributional consequences today but often only invisible future benefits is politically difficult. It requires that policymakers reconcile technocratic expertise with political consent. This paper traces attempts to enact such measures, focusing on countercyclical policies to limit the systemic risks of housing booms as proposed by financial stability committees in Germany, France, and the Netherlands from 2015 onwards. These committees bring together technocrats and political authorities in order to overcome the inaction bias inherent to these measures, seeking to forge both epistemic and political consensus on the need for action. We find that the work of these committees is characterized by lengthy processes of consensus-building, during which technocrats amass evidence and search for politically acceptable solutions. We argue that whether this leads to meaningful steps crucially depends on the committee's institutional set-up. What particularly matters is its capacity to engage the Ministry of Finance in binding discussions and the governance arrangements for the activation of precautionary instruments, which shape whether a shared framing of the problem and appropriate response emerges.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2022-06-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50166032","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The need for supranational regulatory capacity and the drive for governmental control are two colliding forces in international governance. As a solution to this governance dilemma, European administrative networks need to simultaneously fulfill the demand for supranational institutions and maintain governmental control. The assessment of risks associated with medicines authorized on the European market is carried out by such a network of national regulators as part of the European Medicines Agency. To uncover how these double-hatted experts navigate the opportunity structures created by supranational and intergovernmental forces, this study employs social network analysis. Developing exponential random graph models, this study tests to what extent members can act as professional experts in service of the supranational administration and to what extent national features shape interaction. The results indicate that while PRAC members are socialized as professionals in service of supranational deliberation on pharmacovigilance, intergovernmental forces do structure their interactions.
{"title":"Expert network interaction in the European Medicines Agency","authors":"Reini Schrama","doi":"10.1111/rego.12466","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12466","url":null,"abstract":"The need for supranational regulatory capacity and the drive for governmental control are two colliding forces in international governance. As a solution to this governance dilemma, European administrative networks need to simultaneously fulfill the demand for supranational institutions and maintain governmental control. The assessment of risks associated with medicines authorized on the European market is carried out by such a network of national regulators as part of the European Medicines Agency. To uncover how these double-hatted experts navigate the opportunity structures created by supranational and intergovernmental forces, this study employs social network analysis. Developing exponential random graph models, this study tests to what extent members can act as professional experts in service of the supranational administration and to what extent national features shape interaction. The results indicate that while PRAC members are socialized as professionals in service of supranational deliberation on pharmacovigilance, intergovernmental forces do structure their interactions.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2022-05-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50166219","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The entry of gig-platforms to labor markets world-wide has caused significant frictions with national institutions and regulators, including trade unions. In this article, we compare the interactions between taxi and food delivery platforms with the industrial relations (IR) systems of Denmark and Sweden, where we observe isolated instances of unions striking collective agreements with platforms. We assess and compare platform strategies and interactions with IR system agents, using an RIT-framework (rulemaker-intermediary-ruletaker) which considers how rulemaking capacity is allocated within the Nordic IR systems. We detect both IR system evasion and integration in Denmark and Sweden, with significant variation in causes and mechanisms. We find that IR system integration can be explained by public backlash, pressure from IR system insiders, and gaining first-mover advantages. Our findings shed light on integrative mechanisms of the Nordic IR systems allowing us to identify and discuss future challenges posed by the platform economy.
{"title":"Will there be a Nordic model in the platform economy? Evasive and integrative platform strategies in Denmark and Sweden","authors":"Anna Ilsøe, Carl Fredrik Söderqvist","doi":"10.1111/rego.12465","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12465","url":null,"abstract":"The entry of gig-platforms to labor markets world-wide has caused significant frictions with national institutions and regulators, including trade unions. In this article, we compare the interactions between taxi and food delivery platforms with the industrial relations (IR) systems of Denmark and Sweden, where we observe isolated instances of unions striking collective agreements with platforms. We assess and compare platform strategies and interactions with IR system agents, using an RIT-framework (rulemaker-intermediary-ruletaker) which considers how rulemaking capacity is allocated within the Nordic IR systems. We detect both IR system evasion and integration in Denmark and Sweden, with significant variation in causes and mechanisms. We find that IR system integration can be explained by public backlash, pressure from IR system insiders, and gaining first-mover advantages. Our findings shed light on integrative mechanisms of the Nordic IR systems allowing us to identify and discuss future challenges posed by the platform economy.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2022-04-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50166224","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
A controversial U.S. Supreme Court decision in Kelo v. City of New London (2005) which did not limit the use of state's eminent domain powers, led to an unprecedented legislative reaction by almost all 50 states. Of all, New York State stands out as one of the single states not to respond with a legislative amendment. In this study, I ask whether the state's predation was greater in the years following these legal and political developments, in light of the freedom which was granted to local politicians by both the Supreme Court and the state's legislators. The article hypothesizes that contrary to common perceptions, judicial decisions impact local government actions even when no limits on the use of powers are being posed. I use rigorous statistics and scrupulously defined data to expand scholarly understanding of the aftermath of the judicial decision in Kelo. The main finding is that the decision has in fact affected political behavior, but in the opposite direction than commonly expected: politicians in New York City acted consistently with public opinion, which was hostile too Kelo, not by changing the law, but by changing their practice. Studying all known taking exercises in New York City between 1991 and 2019, the paper finds no increase in the number of development projects involving condemnations after 2005. In fact, the probability of a taking for economic development or urban renewal dropped by 90%. The use of eminent domain for such projects declined even when both state and federal courts refrain from interposing any actual limit on its use. The paper lends qualified support to an alternative assertion that takings decisions by government officials are largely shaped by planning and political needs and that officials are sensitive to revealed public preferences even when there is no constitutional or legal impediment on their exercise of power.
{"title":"Is the government exhausting its powers? An empirical examination of eminent domain exercises in New York City pre- and post-Kelo","authors":"Ronit Levine-Schnur","doi":"10.1111/rego.12464","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12464","url":null,"abstract":"A controversial U.S. Supreme Court decision in <i>Kelo v. City of New London</i> (2005) which did not limit the use of state's eminent domain powers, led to an unprecedented legislative reaction by almost all 50 states. Of all, New York State stands out as one of the single states not to respond with a legislative amendment. In this study, I ask whether the state's predation was greater in the years following these legal and political developments, in light of the freedom which was granted to local politicians by both the Supreme Court and the state's legislators. The article hypothesizes that contrary to common perceptions, judicial decisions impact local government actions even when no limits on the use of powers are being posed. I use rigorous statistics and scrupulously defined data to expand scholarly understanding of the aftermath of the judicial decision in Kelo. The main finding is that the decision has in fact affected political behavior, but in the opposite direction than commonly expected: politicians in New York City acted consistently with public opinion, which was hostile too <i>Kelo</i>, not by changing the law, but by changing their practice. Studying all known taking exercises in New York City between 1991 and 2019, the paper finds no increase in the number of development projects involving condemnations after 2005. In fact, the probability of a taking for economic development or urban renewal dropped by 90%. The use of eminent domain for such projects declined even when both state and federal courts refrain from interposing any actual limit on its use. The paper lends qualified support to an alternative assertion that takings decisions by government officials are largely shaped by planning and political needs and that officials are sensitive to revealed public preferences even when there is no constitutional or legal impediment on their exercise of power.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2022-04-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50166234","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Fiona Kinniburgh, Henrik Selin, Noelle E. Selin, Miranda Schreurs
Private standards play an increasingly important governance role, yet their effects on state-led policymaking remain understudied. We examine how the operation of private agricultural standards influences multilateral pesticide governance with a particular focus on the listing of substances under the Rotterdam Convention on the Prior Informed Consent Procedure for Certain Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade, a treaty-based information-sharing mechanism that allows countries to refuse hazardous chemical imports. We find that private agricultural standard-setting bodies use the Rotterdam Convention's pesticide list to develop their own lists of banned substances. This alters the Rotterdam Convention's intended role, impeding efforts to add substances to the treaty, as attempts by private actors to impose stricter governance than state actors can undermine the potential for international state-based governance to become more stringent. We characterize this as a “confounding interaction” whereby institutional linkages between actions by public and private actors with broadly aligned goals results in unexpected negative consequences for governance.
{"title":"When private governance impedes multilateralism: The case of international pesticide governance","authors":"Fiona Kinniburgh, Henrik Selin, Noelle E. Selin, Miranda Schreurs","doi":"10.1111/rego.12463","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12463","url":null,"abstract":"Private standards play an increasingly important governance role, yet their effects on state-led policymaking remain understudied. We examine how the operation of private agricultural standards influences multilateral pesticide governance with a particular focus on the listing of substances under the Rotterdam Convention on the Prior Informed Consent Procedure for Certain Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade, a treaty-based information-sharing mechanism that allows countries to refuse hazardous chemical imports. We find that private agricultural standard-setting bodies use the Rotterdam Convention's pesticide list to develop their own lists of banned substances. This alters the Rotterdam Convention's intended role, impeding efforts to add substances to the treaty, as attempts by private actors to impose stricter governance than state actors can undermine the potential for international state-based governance to become more stringent. We characterize this as a “confounding interaction” whereby institutional linkages between actions by public and private actors with broadly aligned goals results in unexpected negative consequences for governance.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2022-04-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50166235","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Gene drive technology is a nascent biotechnology with the potential to purposefully alter or eliminate a species. There have been broad calls for engagement to inform gene drive governance. Over the past seven years, the gene drive community has been developing risk assessment guidelines to determine what form future gene drive risk assessments take, including whether and how they involve engagement. To explore who is developing these guidelines and how engagement in risk assessment is being prescribed, we conduct a document analysis of gene drive risk assessment guideline documents from 2014 to 2020. We found that a narrow set of organizations have developed 10 key guideline documents and that with only one exception the documents prescribe a narrow, vague, or completely absent role for engagement in gene drive risk assessment. Without substantively prescribed engagement in guidelines, the relevance, rigor, and trustworthiness of gene drive risk assessment and governance will suffer.
{"title":"Prescribing engagement in environmental risk assessment for gene drive technology","authors":"Sarah Hartley, Adam Kokotovich, Caroline McCalman","doi":"10.1111/rego.12452","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12452","url":null,"abstract":"Gene drive technology is a nascent biotechnology with the potential to purposefully alter or eliminate a species. There have been broad calls for engagement to inform gene drive governance. Over the past seven years, the gene drive community has been developing risk assessment guidelines to determine what form future gene drive risk assessments take, including whether and how they involve engagement. To explore who is developing these guidelines and how engagement in risk assessment is being prescribed, we conduct a document analysis of gene drive risk assessment guideline documents from 2014 to 2020. We found that a narrow set of organizations have developed 10 key guideline documents and that with only one exception the documents prescribe a narrow, vague, or completely absent role for engagement in gene drive risk assessment. Without substantively prescribed engagement in guidelines, the relevance, rigor, and trustworthiness of gene drive risk assessment and governance will suffer.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2022-03-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50166511","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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