Regulatory intermediaries—organizations that operate between regulators (public and private) and target groups—perform a range of important functions. While most previous research has focused on intermediaries that have been delegated official authority, in this paper we focus on unofficial and informal intermediary functions aiming to advance the governance of per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS) chemicals. Chemical pollution is a growing environmental and health concern, leading to both public and private regulatory initiatives. By studying a particular segment—paperboard food packaging in Sweden—the study generates insights into critical functions performed by unofficial intermediaries (Svenskt Vatten and ChemSec) in this regulatory regime, which extend and expand regulatory reach in various ways. The study also shows the importance of different types of intermediaries that interact in dynamic ways, and the role of material artifacts in processes of intermediation. These unofficial functions are arguably important for the functioning of complex, hybrid forms of governance, but they also prompt critical questions about the effectiveness, legitimacy, and role of intermediaries in generating needed transformative change.
监管中介机构--在（公共和私营）监管机构与目标群体之间运作的组织--发挥着一系列重要功能。以往的研究大多集中于获得官方授权的中介机构，而本文则关注非官方和非正式中介机构的职能，旨在推进全氟和多氟烷基物质（PFAS）化学品的治理。化学污染是一个日益严重的环境和健康问题，导致了公共和私人监管措施的出台。通过对瑞典纸板食品包装这一特定领域的研究，我们深入了解了非官方中介机构（Svenskt Vatten 和 ChemSec）在这一监管制度中发挥的关键作用，它们以各种方式延伸和扩大了监管范围。研究还显示了以动态方式互动的不同类型中介的重要性，以及物质人工制品在中介过程中的作用。可以说，这些非官方功能对于复杂的混合治理形式的运作非常重要，但它们也引发了关于中介机构在产生所需的转型变革中的有效性、合法性和作用的关键问题。
{"title":"Unofficial intermediation in the regulatory governance of hazardous chemicals","authors":"Erik Hysing, Sabina Du Rietz Dahlström","doi":"10.1111/rego.12586","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12586","url":null,"abstract":"Regulatory intermediaries—organizations that operate between regulators (public and private) and target groups—perform a range of important functions. While most previous research has focused on intermediaries that have been delegated official authority, in this paper we focus on unofficial and informal intermediary functions aiming to advance the governance of per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS) chemicals. Chemical pollution is a growing environmental and health concern, leading to both public and private regulatory initiatives. By studying a particular segment—paperboard food packaging in Sweden—the study generates insights into critical functions performed by unofficial intermediaries (Svenskt Vatten and ChemSec) in this regulatory regime, which extend and expand regulatory reach in various ways. The study also shows the importance of different types of intermediaries that interact in dynamic ways, and the role of material artifacts in processes of intermediation. These unofficial functions are arguably important for the functioning of complex, hybrid forms of governance, but they also prompt critical questions about the effectiveness, legitimacy, and role of intermediaries in generating needed transformative change.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":"178 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2024-03-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140097112","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Reini Schrama, Dorte Sindbjerg Martinsen, Ellen Mastenbroek
European administrative networks (EANs) are an increasingly prominent form of European Union (EU) governance. Although these networks are typically portrayed as important and flexible forms of organization, we lack knowledge of their temporal dimension, including their development in times of crisis. This paper provides a first analysis of network interaction as it unfolds before and during times of severe crisis for the EU internal market. Specifically, we examine interactions in the EU internal market network SOLVIT. This network offers member states both a formalized procedure for the bilateral resolution of cases of alleged misapplication of EU law, and an informal network for general discussions on internal market topics and SOLVIT-related matters beyond specific case-resolution. Based on unique three-wave survey data, we develop a continuous-time model (stochastic actor-oriented model) to analyze the evolution of SOLVIT's informal interactions over time. In explaining these developments, we reflect on the importance of two crises: the exit of a central SOLVIT member (the United Kingdom), which drove informal interactions to a great extent, and COVID-19, which led to great sudden uncertainty and challenges for the implementation of internal market law. Our results show that the network is remarkably stable and despite, or rather because of, these crises, has become denser over time.
{"title":"European administrative networks during times of crisis: Exploring the temporal development of the internal market network SOLVIT","authors":"Reini Schrama, Dorte Sindbjerg Martinsen, Ellen Mastenbroek","doi":"10.1111/rego.12585","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12585","url":null,"abstract":"European administrative networks (EANs) are an increasingly prominent form of European Union (EU) governance. Although these networks are typically portrayed as important and flexible forms of organization, we lack knowledge of their temporal dimension, including their development in times of crisis. This paper provides a first analysis of network interaction as it unfolds before and during times of severe crisis for the EU internal market. Specifically, we examine interactions in the EU internal market network SOLVIT. This network offers member states both a formalized procedure for the bilateral resolution of cases of alleged misapplication of EU law, and an informal network for general discussions on internal market topics and SOLVIT-related matters beyond specific case-resolution. Based on unique three-wave survey data, we develop a continuous-time model (stochastic actor-oriented model) to analyze the evolution of SOLVIT's informal interactions over time. In explaining these developments, we reflect on the importance of two crises: the exit of a central SOLVIT member (the United Kingdom), which drove informal interactions to a great extent, and COVID-19, which led to great sudden uncertainty and challenges for the implementation of internal market law. Our results show that the network is remarkably stable and despite, or rather because of, these crises, has become denser over time.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":"39 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2024-03-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140076375","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Bureaucratic rulemaking is a key feature of American policymaking. However, rulemaking activities do not occur uniformly, but fluctuate throughout the year. We consider three mechanisms to explain these changes in rule volume, each of which produces unique expectations for rulemaking during periods of divided government and legislative recess. To test these expectations, we leverage an original dataset including all rules proposed by bureaucratic agencies in three U.S. states from 2004 to 2013 matched with data tracking periods of divided government and legislative recess. We find that state bureaucracies publish significantly more proposed rules during periods of divided government or a split legislature and are most productive in the months immediately following legislative recess. These results underscore the importance of bureaucratic policymaking and improve our understanding of the balance of power between branches of state governments.
{"title":"Regulation timing in the states: The role of divided government and legislative recess","authors":"Tracey Bark, Elizabeth Bell, Ani Ter-Mkrtchyan","doi":"10.1111/rego.12583","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12583","url":null,"abstract":"Bureaucratic rulemaking is a key feature of American policymaking. However, rulemaking activities do not occur uniformly, but fluctuate throughout the year. We consider three mechanisms to explain these changes in rule volume, each of which produces unique expectations for rulemaking during periods of divided government and legislative recess. To test these expectations, we leverage an original dataset including all rules proposed by bureaucratic agencies in three U.S. states from 2004 to 2013 matched with data tracking periods of divided government and legislative recess. We find that state bureaucracies publish significantly more proposed rules during periods of divided government or a split legislature and are most productive in the months immediately following legislative recess. These results underscore the importance of bureaucratic policymaking and improve our understanding of the balance of power between branches of state governments.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":"141 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2024-02-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139945365","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Maximilian Haag, Steffen Hurka, Constantin Kaplaner
This study examines the relationship between the complexity of EU directives and their successful implementation at the national level. Moving beyond the state-of-the-art, we propose a comprehensive framework considering structural, linguistic, and relational dimensions of policy complexity. We argue that policy complexity entails higher transaction costs, hindering effective implementation. Using a novel dataset covering roughly 1000 directives from 1994 to 2022, we find strong evidence of policy complexity negatively impacting implementation performance. Moreover, we find that states with higher administrative capacity are better able to process high complexity efficiently and that Eurosceptic member states attract fewer infringement proceedings in highly complex policy environments than Europhile member states. This could alternatively point to strategic enforcement behavior of the Commission or to bureaucracies that are less Eurosceptic than their political masters might wish for. Our study thereby contributes to a deeper understanding of the challenges of successful implementation of EU directives.
{"title":"Policy complexity and implementation performance in the European Union","authors":"Maximilian Haag, Steffen Hurka, Constantin Kaplaner","doi":"10.1111/rego.12580","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12580","url":null,"abstract":"This study examines the relationship between the complexity of EU directives and their successful implementation at the national level. Moving beyond the state-of-the-art, we propose a comprehensive framework considering structural, linguistic, and relational dimensions of policy complexity. We argue that policy complexity entails higher transaction costs, hindering effective implementation. Using a novel dataset covering roughly 1000 directives from 1994 to 2022, we find strong evidence of policy complexity negatively impacting implementation performance. Moreover, we find that states with higher administrative capacity are better able to process high complexity efficiently and that Eurosceptic member states attract fewer infringement proceedings in highly complex policy environments than Europhile member states. This could alternatively point to strategic enforcement behavior of the Commission or to bureaucracies that are less Eurosceptic than their political masters might wish for. Our study thereby contributes to a deeper understanding of the challenges of successful implementation of EU directives.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":"17 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2024-01-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139573859","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Many studies show that supranational governance structures (SGS)—understood as international organizations or international treaties—contribute to the global diffusion of public policies. However, we still have a limited understanding of which properties of SGS hasten the number of policy adoptions. To advance this literature, we argue that SGS making legally binding and univocal claims are more likely to act as diffusion accelerators. We demonstrate the suitability of this argument through a case study of the global diffusion of mifepristone approvals, a single-purpose medicine to terminate pregnancies that has revolutionized abortion services. The analysis supports our expectation. Links to the EU and the Maputo Protocol—the only two considered SGS that make binding claims with clear implications for this policy field—hasten mifepristone approvals. By contrast, ratification of four other treaties—that do not make binding and univocal claims—and exposure to World Health Organization guidelines on medical abortion does not hasten these approvals.
{"title":"Properties of supranational governance structures and policy diffusion: The case of mifepristone approvals","authors":"Juan J. Fernández, Pilar Sánchez","doi":"10.1111/rego.12576","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12576","url":null,"abstract":"Many studies show that supranational governance structures (SGS)—understood as international organizations or international treaties—contribute to the global diffusion of public policies. However, we still have a limited understanding of which properties of SGS hasten the number of policy adoptions. To advance this literature, we argue that SGS making legally binding and univocal claims are more likely to act as diffusion accelerators. We demonstrate the suitability of this argument through a case study of the global diffusion of mifepristone approvals, a single-purpose medicine to terminate pregnancies that has revolutionized abortion services. The analysis supports our expectation. Links to the EU and the Maputo Protocol—the only two considered SGS that make binding claims with clear implications for this policy field—hasten mifepristone approvals. By contrast, ratification of four other treaties—that do not make binding and univocal claims—and exposure to World Health Organization guidelines on medical abortion does not hasten these approvals.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":"56 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2024-01-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139510927","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Building on the concept of participatory regulation, this study emphasizes recognizing the multidimensional character of citizens' risk regulation preferences. Using the case of autonomous vehicles, we specify six technology-related risks: product safety, regulatory oversight, legal liability, ethical prioritization, data protection, and human supervision. We argue that differences in these multidimensional risk regulation preferences are shaped by citizens' political beliefs, technology attitudes, and national innovation cultures. To test these hypotheses, a conjoint experiment was conducted in the United States (1188 participants), Japan (1135 participants), and Germany (1174 participants) in which respondents compared hypothetical regulation regimes for self-driving cars, varying alongside the six regulatory risk dimensions. The findings show a universal preference for increased legal responsibility of manufacturers and more stringent safety regulations for autonomous vehicles. Political beliefs and technological attitudes had minimal impact on these preferences. Although there were some cultural differences in privacy and ethical prioritization, no systematic differences were noted across countries, suggesting the possibility of finding common ground in standardizing risk regulations for self-driving cars.
{"title":"Multidimensional preference for technology risk regulation: The role of political beliefs, technology attitudes, and national innovation cultures","authors":"Sebastian Hemesath, Markus Tepe","doi":"10.1111/rego.12578","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12578","url":null,"abstract":"Building on the concept of participatory regulation, this study emphasizes recognizing the multidimensional character of citizens' risk regulation preferences. Using the case of autonomous vehicles, we specify six technology-related risks: product safety, regulatory oversight, legal liability, ethical prioritization, data protection, and human supervision. We argue that differences in these multidimensional risk regulation preferences are shaped by citizens' political beliefs, technology attitudes, and national innovation cultures. To test these hypotheses, a conjoint experiment was conducted in the United States (1188 participants), Japan (1135 participants), and Germany (1174 participants) in which respondents compared hypothetical regulation regimes for self-driving cars, varying alongside the six regulatory risk dimensions. The findings show a universal preference for increased legal responsibility of manufacturers and more stringent safety regulations for autonomous vehicles. Political beliefs and technological attitudes had minimal impact on these preferences. Although there were some cultural differences in privacy and ethical prioritization, no systematic differences were noted across countries, suggesting the possibility of finding common ground in standardizing risk regulations for self-driving cars.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":"26 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2024-01-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139511049","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The International Atomic Energy Agency asserts that the regulation of the safety of civil nuclear power requires national regulatory agencies to be effectively independent. However, in the early years of national civil nuclear power programs national nuclear industries were dominated by iron triangles or subgovernments of powerful actors with an interest in promoting the industry. The creation of an independent safety regulator requires a radical restructuring of the national governance framework. Windows of opportunity or critical junctures for such reform occur only occasionally. This paper examines the cases of France, Japan, and India to identify the factors that determine the degree of success in attempts to break the power of nuclear iron triangles or subgovernments and create an effectively independent regulator. This analysis shows a serious nuclear accident can create the opportunity to dismantle an iron triangle. The extent and speed with which reforms can be implemented depend greatly on pre-existing and prevailing conditions. Key determinants include the power structures and attitudes toward nuclear power in elite politics, the degree of engagement of civil society, and pressures from international organizations. Of these, the first, elite politics, appears to be the most important in these three cases.
{"title":"Breaking the iron triangle around nuclear safety regulation: The cases of France, Japan, and India","authors":"Philip Andrews-Speed, Nur Azha Putra","doi":"10.1111/rego.12577","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12577","url":null,"abstract":"The International Atomic Energy Agency asserts that the regulation of the safety of civil nuclear power requires national regulatory agencies to be effectively independent. However, in the early years of national civil nuclear power programs national nuclear industries were dominated by iron triangles or subgovernments of powerful actors with an interest in promoting the industry. The creation of an independent safety regulator requires a radical restructuring of the national governance framework. Windows of opportunity or critical junctures for such reform occur only occasionally. This paper examines the cases of France, Japan, and India to identify the factors that determine the degree of success in attempts to break the power of nuclear iron triangles or subgovernments and create an effectively independent regulator. This analysis shows a serious nuclear accident can create the opportunity to dismantle an iron triangle. The extent and speed with which reforms can be implemented depend greatly on pre-existing and prevailing conditions. Key determinants include the power structures and attitudes toward nuclear power in elite politics, the degree of engagement of civil society, and pressures from international organizations. Of these, the first, elite politics, appears to be the most important in these three cases.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":"23 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2024-01-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139431744","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In the early 2000s, Latin America witnessed a resurgence in debates concerning the state's economic role, coinciding with a political transformation as new parties emerged to power. Existing literature on the “return of Industrial Policy” in the region largely offers a descriptive perspective, bypassing the intricacies of policy typifications and their associated political foundations. This paper addresses these gaps with two main contributions: First, it posits that the state's proactive economic interventions in Latin America were not comprehensive, but instead divided into two distinct channels: the sectoral and the macroeconomic. Second, by employing a fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) of 59 democratic Latin American administrations, the paper delves into the political dynamics that underlie each channel. A detailed comparative analysis between Brazil and Chile serves as a focal point, illuminating their notable policy divergence. The research concludes that labor-supported parties are predisposed toward adopting active developmental roles, especially in contexts lacking complex economic structures. However, even incomplete strategies require the presence of robust developmental institutions and is contingent upon a government's capability to establish developmental coalitions and countervail opposing interests.
{"title":"Developmental channels: (Incomplete) development strategies in democratic Latin America","authors":"Renato H. de Gaspi","doi":"10.1111/rego.12575","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12575","url":null,"abstract":"In the early 2000s, Latin America witnessed a resurgence in debates concerning the state's economic role, coinciding with a political transformation as new parties emerged to power. Existing literature on the “return of Industrial Policy” in the region largely offers a descriptive perspective, bypassing the intricacies of policy typifications and their associated political foundations. This paper addresses these gaps with two main contributions: First, it posits that the state's proactive economic interventions in Latin America were not comprehensive, but instead divided into two distinct channels: the sectoral and the macroeconomic. Second, by employing a fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) of 59 democratic Latin American administrations, the paper delves into the political dynamics that underlie each channel. A detailed comparative analysis between Brazil and Chile serves as a focal point, illuminating their notable policy divergence. The research concludes that labor-supported parties are predisposed toward adopting active developmental roles, especially in contexts lacking complex economic structures. However, even incomplete strategies require the presence of robust developmental institutions and is contingent upon a government's capability to establish developmental coalitions and countervail opposing interests.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":"9 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2024-01-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139420265","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Existing research investigating regulatory agencies' reputation-conscious behavior have primarily focused on reactive behavior in the context of reputational threats. Additionally, this literature has primarily focused on agencies' responses to such threats and external audiences' perceptions of agencies reputation, although reputation resides in both external and internal audiences. This study aims to address these two gaps by (1) identifying the relevance of regulatory agencies' reputations vis-à-vis internal audiences and (2) investigating whether reputations, in this case as judged by internal audiences, can be cultivated when managers of regulatory agencies perform reputation management in a more proactive sense. Using a unique two-wave panel survey targeting internal audiences from three Danish regulatory agencies, we find a positive and significant relationship between reputation management and how internal audiences perceive the organizational reputation. Moreover, we find that employee advocacy partially mediates this relationship. Given that regulatory agencies are particularly susceptible to reputational threats and given that the reputational perception of employees affect other employee outcomes as well as their regulatory decision making, this study shows the potential of reputation management by regulatory agencies as an instrument for affecting employees' outcomes.
{"title":"How is reputation management by regulatory agencies related to their employees' reputational perception?","authors":"Mette Østergaard Pedersen, Koen Verhoest, Heidi Houlberg Salomonsen","doi":"10.1111/rego.12574","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12574","url":null,"abstract":"Existing research investigating regulatory agencies' reputation-conscious behavior have primarily focused on reactive behavior in the context of reputational threats. Additionally, this literature has primarily focused on agencies' responses to such threats and external audiences' perceptions of agencies reputation, although reputation resides in both external and internal audiences. This study aims to address these two gaps by (1) identifying the relevance of regulatory agencies' reputations vis-à-vis internal audiences and (2) investigating whether reputations, in this case as judged by internal audiences, can be cultivated when managers of regulatory agencies perform reputation management in a more proactive sense. Using a unique two-wave panel survey targeting internal audiences from three Danish regulatory agencies, we find a positive and significant relationship between reputation management and how internal audiences perceive the organizational reputation. Moreover, we find that employee advocacy partially mediates this relationship. Given that regulatory agencies are particularly susceptible to reputational threats and given that the reputational perception of employees affect other employee outcomes as well as their regulatory decision making, this study shows the potential of reputation management by regulatory agencies as an instrument for affecting employees' outcomes.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":"32 11 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2023-12-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139061264","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Populist, illiberal, or outright autocratic movements threaten democracies worldwide, particularly when such extreme political forces gain control of executive power. For public administration illiberal backsliders in government pose a dilemma. Trained on instrumental values and expected to implement neutrally the political choices of their elected superiors, bureaucrats lack orientation of how to act in situations when obeying their own government may mean becoming an accomplice to democratic regression. Against this background, this article maps the dubious demands of backsliders in government as well as the potential reactions of bureaucrats to them. Public administration thinking is subsequently examined with a view to showing how administrative resistance to democratic backsliding could be normatively justified. Finally, the article provides practical recommendations to enhance the resilience of democratic public administration in the face of illiberal challenges.
{"title":"Administrative responses to democratic backsliding: When is bureaucratic resistance justified?","authors":"Michael W. Bauer","doi":"10.1111/rego.12567","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12567","url":null,"abstract":"Populist, illiberal, or outright autocratic movements threaten democracies worldwide, particularly when such extreme political forces gain control of executive power. For public administration illiberal backsliders in government pose a dilemma. Trained on instrumental values and expected to implement neutrally the political choices of their elected superiors, bureaucrats lack orientation of how to act in situations when obeying their own government may mean becoming an accomplice to democratic regression. Against this background, this article maps the dubious demands of backsliders in government as well as the potential reactions of bureaucrats to them. Public administration thinking is subsequently examined with a view to showing how administrative resistance to democratic backsliding could be normatively justified. Finally, the article provides practical recommendations to enhance the resilience of democratic public administration in the face of illiberal challenges.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":"55 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2023-12-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138714217","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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