When pandemics threaten, governments are expected to protect citizens. Trustworthiness and trust are central to meeting public expectations. Motivational posturing theory differentiates resistant and dismissive defiance during the COVID‐19 pandemic. While trust is central to responding to resistant defiance, it is less relevant for dismissive defiance. Dismissive defiance is associated with distrust, conceptualized as losing hope that trust norms will restore trust. Using multiple linear regression and path analysis of Australian survey data, pathways are identified to resistant defiance and dismissive defiance. Hypotheses are confirmed, but with some unexpected insights. Trust in government and medical experts dampens both resistant and dismissive defiance. Intervening variables on the resistant defiance pathway include disagreement with government COVID decisions and vaccine hesitancy. On the dismissive defiance pathway, intervening variables include poor information seeking on COVID and poor adherence to COVID‐safe behaviors. Resistant and dismissive defiance, while related, require different approaches to trust building.
{"title":"Trust Norms, Distrust, and Worst‐Case Defiance in the COVID‐19 Pandemic","authors":"Valerie Braithwaite","doi":"10.1111/rego.70073","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.70073","url":null,"abstract":"When pandemics threaten, governments are expected to protect citizens. Trustworthiness and trust are central to meeting public expectations. Motivational posturing theory differentiates resistant and dismissive defiance during the COVID‐19 pandemic. While trust is central to responding to resistant defiance, it is less relevant for dismissive defiance. Dismissive defiance is associated with distrust, conceptualized as losing hope that trust norms will restore trust. Using multiple linear regression and path analysis of Australian survey data, pathways are identified to resistant defiance and dismissive defiance. Hypotheses are confirmed, but with some unexpected insights. Trust in government and medical experts dampens both resistant and dismissive defiance. Intervening variables on the resistant defiance pathway include disagreement with government COVID decisions and vaccine hesitancy. On the dismissive defiance pathway, intervening variables include poor information seeking on COVID and poor adherence to COVID‐safe behaviors. Resistant and dismissive defiance, while related, require different approaches to trust building.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":"33 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2025-09-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144995386","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The 2008 Global Financial Crisis (GFC) and the 2020 Covid‐19 pandemic triggered large economic stimulus packages in most countries. While aimed primarily at saving the domestic economy from widespread bankruptcies and mass unemployment, these stimulus packages also offered governments windows of opportunity for pivoting toward decarbonization. Drawing on a new dataset covering 40 of the world's largest economies' stimulus spending during the two crises, this article addresses two questions: (1) Did the allocation toward green investments increase in government stimulus packages from the GFC to the Covid‐19 downturn? (2) What country characteristics are associated with green stimulus spending in each crisis? Grounded in distributive‐conflict theory, we hypothesize that the relative strength of green and fossil stakeholders in the economy is decisive in shaping climate policy outcomes. Consistent with this theory, our empirical analysis reveals (1) a (small) uptick in major economies' net green spending from 2008 to 2020 and (2) that robust green industrial interests strongly predict cross‐country variation in green stimulus spending. In contrast, countries' levels of fossil fuels production did not exert a proportional influence. Notably, our research also uncovers a pattern of path dependency, with countries leading in green stimulus spending during the GFC maintaining this position also through the Covid‐19 pandemic. Overall, this article contributes new insights to the comparative political economy literature on climate change by analyzing how economic recessions affect the energy transition and how economic structures drive cross‐country variation in investment‐based climate policy.
{"title":"Does Distributive Conflict Explain Variation in Green Stimulus Spending? Evidence From 40 Major Economies During the Global Financial Crisis and the Covid‐19 Recession","authors":"Vegard Tørstad, Jon Hovi, Håkon Sælen","doi":"10.1111/rego.70071","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.70071","url":null,"abstract":"The 2008 Global Financial Crisis (GFC) and the 2020 Covid‐19 pandemic triggered large economic stimulus packages in most countries. While aimed primarily at saving the domestic economy from widespread bankruptcies and mass unemployment, these stimulus packages also offered governments windows of opportunity for pivoting toward decarbonization. Drawing on a new dataset covering 40 of the world's largest economies' stimulus spending during the two crises, this article addresses two questions: (1) Did the allocation toward green investments increase in government stimulus packages from the GFC to the Covid‐19 downturn? (2) What country characteristics are associated with green stimulus spending in each crisis? Grounded in distributive‐conflict theory, we hypothesize that the relative strength of green and fossil stakeholders in the economy is decisive in shaping climate policy outcomes. Consistent with this theory, our empirical analysis reveals (1) a (small) uptick in major economies' net green spending from 2008 to 2020 and (2) that robust green industrial interests strongly predict cross‐country variation in green stimulus spending. In contrast, countries' levels of fossil fuels production did not exert a proportional influence. Notably, our research also uncovers a pattern of path dependency, with countries leading in green stimulus spending during the GFC maintaining this position also through the Covid‐19 pandemic. Overall, this article contributes new insights to the comparative political economy literature on climate change by analyzing how economic recessions affect the energy transition and how economic structures drive cross‐country variation in investment‐based climate policy.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":"22 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2025-08-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144899071","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Sebastian Diessner, Niccolo Durazzi, Federico Filetti, David Hope, Hanna Kleider, Simone Tonelli
How have advanced capitalist democracies transitioned from a Fordist to a post‐Fordist, knowledge‐based economy? And why have they followed seemingly similar policy trajectories despite different economic models and sectoral specializations? We develop the notion of skill‐biased policy change to answer these questions. Drawing on a distinction between valence and partisan issues in the transition to the knowledge economy, we highlight the partisan and business group politics underpinning different policy areas to argue that policies that create or mobilize high‐level skills attract relatively broader consensus across political parties and business groups than protective labor market policies targeted at the lower end of the skills distribution. The argument is illustrated through case studies of Germany, Sweden, and the UK—three countries that have transitioned to a knowledge‐based economy but that have done so by relying on markedly different sectoral specializations.
{"title":"Skill‐Biased Policy Change: Governing the Transition to the Knowledge Economy in Germany, Sweden and Britain","authors":"Sebastian Diessner, Niccolo Durazzi, Federico Filetti, David Hope, Hanna Kleider, Simone Tonelli","doi":"10.1111/rego.70072","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.70072","url":null,"abstract":"How have advanced capitalist democracies transitioned from a Fordist to a post‐Fordist, knowledge‐based economy? And why have they followed seemingly similar policy trajectories despite different economic models and sectoral specializations? We develop the notion of skill‐biased policy change to answer these questions. Drawing on a distinction between valence and partisan issues in the transition to the knowledge economy, we highlight the partisan and business group politics underpinning different policy areas to argue that policies that create or mobilize high‐level skills attract relatively broader consensus across political parties and business groups than protective labor market policies targeted at the lower end of the skills distribution. The argument is illustrated through case studies of Germany, Sweden, and the UK—three countries that have transitioned to a knowledge‐based economy but that have done so by relying on markedly different sectoral specializations.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":"44 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2025-08-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144898951","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The rapid adoption of artificial intelligence (AI) introduces significant uncertainty regarding its future applications and potential risks. What is the preferred regulatory approach when confronted with such uncertainty? To cope with uncertainty, people often screen information in a biased way, consistent with their own prior beliefs and predispositions. Heuristics such as trust and affect are likely to influence how new (scientific) information is judged, in turn influencing the preferred regulatory approach. This article explores the complex interplay between trust, affect, and regulatory preferences in the context of AI governance. Drawing on an exploratory survey and interviews with AI regulators and professionals in the Netherlands, the study finds relatively low trust in AI providers and users, alongside a preference for flexible, adaptive regulation that is strictly enforced by the public authorities. By shedding light on the role of trust and affect in the emerging regulation of AI, this article contributes to understanding how such heuristics influence the preferred regulatory approach.
{"title":"Regulating Uncertainty: The Importance of Trust and Affect in the Regulation of AI in The Netherlands","authors":"Esther Versluis, Aneta Spendzharova, Odile Feltkamp","doi":"10.1111/rego.70070","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.70070","url":null,"abstract":"The rapid adoption of artificial intelligence (AI) introduces significant uncertainty regarding its future applications and potential risks. What is the preferred regulatory approach when confronted with such uncertainty? To cope with uncertainty, people often screen information in a biased way, consistent with their own prior beliefs and predispositions. Heuristics such as trust and affect are likely to influence how new (scientific) information is judged, in turn influencing the preferred regulatory approach. This article explores the complex interplay between trust, affect, and regulatory preferences in the context of AI governance. Drawing on an exploratory survey and interviews with AI regulators and professionals in the Netherlands, the study finds relatively low trust in AI providers and users, alongside a preference for flexible, adaptive regulation that is strictly enforced by the public authorities. By shedding light on the role of trust and affect in the emerging regulation of AI, this article contributes to understanding how such heuristics influence the preferred regulatory approach.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":"14 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2025-08-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144898961","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Many climate change mitigation policies face public opposition, especially when they impose visible costs on households and are perceived as unfairly regressive. This country‐comparative study examines specific social policy instruments that may help build public support for increasing fossil fuel taxes in Europe. Using multilevel modeling with data from the European Social Survey and the Social Policy Indicators database, we find that higher levels of means‐tested social assistance are positively associated with greater public support for fossil fuel taxes. More specifically, means‐tested social assistance appears to promote support by reducing self‐experienced economic hardship and lessening value conflicts among individuals with strong eco‐social values. Policies that raise the minimum income floor in society thus seem crucial for fostering eco‐social synergies and strengthening public support for government‐led climate action and decarbonization efforts.
{"title":"Decarbonization Politics for All: Means‐Tested Social Assistance, Eco‐Social Values, and Public Support for Increased Fossil Fuel Taxes in Europe","authors":"Arvid Lindh, Kenneth Nelson","doi":"10.1111/rego.70063","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.70063","url":null,"abstract":"Many climate change mitigation policies face public opposition, especially when they impose visible costs on households and are perceived as unfairly regressive. This country‐comparative study examines specific social policy instruments that may help build public support for increasing fossil fuel taxes in Europe. Using multilevel modeling with data from the European Social Survey and the Social Policy Indicators database, we find that higher levels of means‐tested social assistance are positively associated with greater public support for fossil fuel taxes. More specifically, means‐tested social assistance appears to promote support by reducing self‐experienced economic hardship and lessening value conflicts among individuals with strong eco‐social values. Policies that raise the minimum income floor in society thus seem crucial for fostering eco‐social synergies and strengthening public support for government‐led climate action and decarbonization efforts.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":"4 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2025-08-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144898952","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Whistleblowing in private and public sector organizations has gained momentum in the last decade. Most theories seeking to explain why some employees report wrongdoings largely disregard the interaction between the cognitive and emotional components of this decision. Our article addresses this gap in the literature and proposes a theoretical model that was initially developed in cognitive psychology and accounts for such an interaction. We explore empirically its relevance in the case of private and public sector employees in Romania, which is the least likely case for the use of whistleblowing. We use data from semi‐structured interviews conducted with employees from the private and public sector. The key findings contribute to the debates on whistleblowing as a specific regulator in organizations: emotions and cognition have high explanatory power; the irrational beliefs matter in developing emotional and behavioral consequences for potential whistleblowers; and the organizational support is crucial in disputing these irrational beliefs.
{"title":"New Tools for Old Habits: How Whistleblowing Works in Organizations","authors":"Alexandrina Augusta Bora, Sergiu Gherghina","doi":"10.1111/rego.70069","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.70069","url":null,"abstract":"Whistleblowing in private and public sector organizations has gained momentum in the last decade. Most theories seeking to explain why some employees report wrongdoings largely disregard the interaction between the cognitive and emotional components of this decision. Our article addresses this gap in the literature and proposes a theoretical model that was initially developed in cognitive psychology and accounts for such an interaction. We explore empirically its relevance in the case of private and public sector employees in Romania, which is the least likely case for the use of whistleblowing. We use data from semi‐structured interviews conducted with employees from the private and public sector. The key findings contribute to the debates on whistleblowing as a specific regulator in organizations: emotions and cognition have high explanatory power; the irrational beliefs matter in developing emotional and behavioral consequences for potential whistleblowers; and the organizational support is crucial in disputing these irrational beliefs.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":"37 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2025-08-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144898960","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Education equips individuals with valuable skills to protect them against employment risks associated with the digital transition. As scholars debate whether vocational education and training (VET) or general education better insures against technology‐induced employment risk, we ask how this type of risk, as perceived by individuals, shapes their education preferences. Our analyses, based on a survey of over 11,500 respondents across seven European countries, show that VET is regarded as a safe haven by those perceiving heightened risk. This relationship remains robust when controlling for various alternative explanations and is consistent across countries. Subgroup interactions indicate that men, high‐income earners, respondents with tertiary education, and those politically on the right more strongly favor VET in response to subjective technology risk. Hence, our study suggests that VET's practical, job‐oriented focus is perceived as better protection against the growing uncertainty over skill demands in the twin transition than general education.
{"title":"Subjective Technology Risk and Education Preferences: VET as a Safe Haven or Dead End?","authors":"Matthias Haslberger, Scherwin M. Bajka","doi":"10.1111/rego.70067","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.70067","url":null,"abstract":"Education equips individuals with valuable skills to protect them against employment risks associated with the digital transition. As scholars debate whether vocational education and training (VET) or general education better insures against technology‐induced employment risk, we ask how this type of risk, as perceived by individuals, shapes their education preferences. Our analyses, based on a survey of over 11,500 respondents across seven European countries, show that VET is regarded as a safe haven by those perceiving heightened risk. This relationship remains robust when controlling for various alternative explanations and is consistent across countries. Subgroup interactions indicate that men, high‐income earners, respondents with tertiary education, and those politically on the right more strongly favor VET in response to subjective technology risk. Hence, our study suggests that VET's practical, job‐oriented focus is perceived as better protection against the growing uncertainty over skill demands in the twin transition than general education.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":"13 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2025-08-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144898953","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The rationalization of corruption allows individuals to detach from moral imperatives, enabling them to perceive unethical or unlawful actions as acceptable or justifiable. Closely linked to the concept of moral disengagement, rationalization involves cognitive distortions that frame inhumane or immoral behavior as neither wrong nor inconsistent with the agent's values. Despite its conceptual significance, rationalization has been empirically understudied, largely due to the limited availability of firsthand qualitative data from corruption perpetrators. This study addresses this gap by analyzing how individuals involved in corruption rationalize their actions. We conduct an abductive thematic analysis of 141 h of testimony from 49 Odebrecht executives, collected as part of their leniency agreements during Brazil's high‐profile Car Wash investigation. Through these depositions, we uncover and interpret the discursive strategies used by the executives to normalize their involvement in systemic corruption. Drawing on prior research and our empirical findings, we propose eight categories of rationalization. These categories offer a framework that not only advances academic understanding of corruption rationalization mechanisms but also provides practitioners—such as compliance officers, ethics trainers, and internal auditors—with actionable insights to design more effective ethics training programs and preventive strategies that focus on cultural and psychological mechanisms rather than legislation and market regulations.
{"title":"“The Excuses We Make”: Defining Eight Corruption Rationalization Categories","authors":"Caio César Coelho Rodrigues","doi":"10.1111/rego.70068","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.70068","url":null,"abstract":"The rationalization of corruption allows individuals to detach from moral imperatives, enabling them to perceive unethical or unlawful actions as acceptable or justifiable. Closely linked to the concept of moral disengagement, rationalization involves cognitive distortions that frame inhumane or immoral behavior as neither wrong nor inconsistent with the agent's values. Despite its conceptual significance, rationalization has been empirically understudied, largely due to the limited availability of firsthand qualitative data from corruption perpetrators. This study addresses this gap by analyzing how individuals involved in corruption rationalize their actions. We conduct an abductive thematic analysis of 141 h of testimony from 49 Odebrecht executives, collected as part of their leniency agreements during Brazil's high‐profile Car Wash investigation. Through these depositions, we uncover and interpret the discursive strategies used by the executives to normalize their involvement in systemic corruption. Drawing on prior research and our empirical findings, we propose eight categories of rationalization. These categories offer a framework that not only advances academic understanding of corruption rationalization mechanisms but also provides practitioners—such as compliance officers, ethics trainers, and internal auditors—with actionable insights to design more effective ethics training programs and preventive strategies that focus on cultural and psychological mechanisms rather than legislation and market regulations.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":"26 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2025-08-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144899072","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Martin B. Carstensen, Patrick Emmenegger, Cecilia Ivardi
Societies are grappling with uncertainty about how to adapt to the emerging knowledge economy. Drawing on the public policy literature, we propose a new approach to studying the politics of ideas during long‐term structural changes. We depart from existing scholarship that focuses on the politics of ideas during episodic crises, and instead focus on ideas that develop gradually in the context of “slow‐burning” crises, using the example of the knowledge economy. In slow‐burning crises, the processes of defining problems and identifying solutions unfold over different timeframes and lead to variation in coalition building because they involve a diverse set of actors promoting ideas at different levels of abstraction. Our cross‐national quantitative analysis of national public debates shows that employers act as key problem brokers, proposing problem diagnoses that focus on efficiency challenges. In contrast, the actors proposing solutions are more diverse, promoting ideas centered on inclusion and governance.
{"title":"Problems and Solutions in the Knowledge Economy: Ideational Power in Slow‐Burning Crises","authors":"Martin B. Carstensen, Patrick Emmenegger, Cecilia Ivardi","doi":"10.1111/rego.70060","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.70060","url":null,"abstract":"Societies are grappling with uncertainty about how to adapt to the emerging knowledge economy. Drawing on the public policy literature, we propose a new approach to studying the politics of ideas during long‐term structural changes. We depart from existing scholarship that focuses on the politics of ideas during episodic crises, and instead focus on ideas that develop gradually in the context of “slow‐burning” crises, using the example of the knowledge economy. In slow‐burning crises, the processes of defining problems and identifying solutions unfold over different timeframes and lead to variation in coalition building because they involve a diverse set of actors promoting ideas at different levels of abstraction. Our cross‐national quantitative analysis of national public debates shows that employers act as key problem brokers, proposing problem diagnoses that focus on efficiency challenges. In contrast, the actors proposing solutions are more diverse, promoting ideas centered on inclusion and governance.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":"287 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2025-08-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144766145","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper investigates how citizens perceive and evaluate the digitalization of education. Drawing on original survey data from six OECD countries (Germany, Japan, Poland, Spain, Sweden, and the US), the study addresses the overarching question: Does public opinion support or inhibit the digital transformation of education? The analysis focuses on three core aspects in this regard—perceptions of state performance, demand for digital device use in schools, and concerns about data governance. Findings reveal cautious but conditional public support: while many endorse digitalization, significant concerns persist about data privacy, especially regarding private tech companies. Support varies systematically by socio‐economic status, age, household composition as well as in line with general dispositions and attitudes towards global technology companies. The paper also identifies a significant degree of cross‐country variation, which, however, does not neatly map onto existing welfare state regimes.
{"title":"Who Supports the Digitalization of Education? New Survey Evidence From Six OECD Countries","authors":"Marius R. Busemeyer","doi":"10.1111/rego.70059","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.70059","url":null,"abstract":"This paper investigates how citizens perceive and evaluate the digitalization of education. Drawing on original survey data from six OECD countries (Germany, Japan, Poland, Spain, Sweden, and the US), the study addresses the overarching question: Does public opinion support or inhibit the digital transformation of education? The analysis focuses on three core aspects in this regard—perceptions of state performance, demand for digital device use in schools, and concerns about data governance. Findings reveal cautious but conditional public support: while many endorse digitalization, significant concerns persist about data privacy, especially regarding private tech companies. Support varies systematically by socio‐economic status, age, household composition as well as in line with general dispositions and attitudes towards global technology companies. The paper also identifies a significant degree of cross‐country variation, which, however, does not neatly map onto existing welfare state regimes.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":"54 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2025-07-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144748213","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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