This article reports findings of a Q Methodology study in which we explored the opinions of employees from eight Dutch regulatory agencies on how agencies gain their reputation. This is the largest study to date examining employee's views on the relative importance of different factors in reputation acquisition by public organizations, and the first analyzing employees in regulatory agencies. Results reveal five distinct “profiles” of opinion among employees about the factors most important in reputation acquisition. Regression analysis, further, supports that different regulatory agencies are dominated by employees with different opinions on how reputation is formed. These findings contribute to the growing empirical literature on how regulatory agencies, and their various employees, understand and approach reputation management.
{"title":"Regulatory agency reputation acquisition: A Q Methodology analysis of the views of agency employees","authors":"Lauren A. Fahy, Erik-Hans Klijn, Judith van Erp","doi":"10.1111/rego.12603","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12603","url":null,"abstract":"This article reports findings of a Q Methodology study in which we explored the opinions of employees from eight Dutch regulatory agencies on how agencies gain their reputation. This is the largest study to date examining employee's views on the relative importance of different factors in reputation acquisition by public organizations, and the first analyzing employees in regulatory agencies. Results reveal five distinct “profiles” of opinion among employees about the factors most important in reputation acquisition. Regression analysis, further, supports that different regulatory agencies are dominated by employees with different opinions on how reputation is formed. These findings contribute to the growing empirical literature on how regulatory agencies, and their various employees, understand and approach reputation management.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":"28 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2024-06-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141299270","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Koen Verhoest, Martino Maggetti, Edoardo Guaschino, Jan Wynen
Trust is expected to play a vital role in regulatory regimes. However, how trust affects the performance and legitimacy of these regimes is poorly understood. Our study examines how the interplay of trust and distrust relationships among and toward political, administrative, and regulatory actors shapes perceptions of performance and legitimacy. Drawing on cross-country survey data measuring trust and distrust among various actors within regulatory regimes, our analysis reveals that relationships of watchful trust in terms of a “trust but verify” attitude among actors are conducive to higher regulatory performance. Conversely, the combination of high trust with low distrust fosters regime legitimacy, while high levels of watchfulness even have a detrimental impact on legitimacy. Our research underscores that actors within regulatory regimes adopt a logic of consequentiality when evaluating and contributing to regime performance. In contrast, for fostering regime legitimacy, a logic of appropriateness appears to be more relevant.
{"title":"How trust matters for the performance and legitimacy of regulatory regimes: The differential impact of watchful trust and good-faith trust","authors":"Koen Verhoest, Martino Maggetti, Edoardo Guaschino, Jan Wynen","doi":"10.1111/rego.12596","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12596","url":null,"abstract":"Trust is expected to play a vital role in regulatory regimes. However, how trust affects the performance and legitimacy of these regimes is poorly understood. Our study examines how the interplay of trust and distrust relationships among and toward political, administrative, and regulatory actors shapes perceptions of performance and legitimacy. Drawing on cross-country survey data measuring trust and distrust among various actors within regulatory regimes, our analysis reveals that relationships of watchful trust in terms of a “trust but verify” attitude among actors are conducive to higher regulatory performance. Conversely, the combination of high trust with low distrust fosters regime legitimacy, while high levels of watchfulness even have a detrimental impact on legitimacy. Our research underscores that actors within regulatory regimes adopt a logic of consequentiality when evaluating and contributing to regime performance. In contrast, for fostering regime legitimacy, a logic of appropriateness appears to be more relevant.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":"66 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2024-06-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141251999","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Cooperative forms of policy implementation bear the promise of being an answer to the policy delivery challenge resulting from policy growth, with the quality of network management often rated as a key success factor. The positive relationship between network management and performance in networks, however, is primarily supported by theoretical reasoning rather than empirical evidence. The present study empirically investigates this relationship in the context of rapid policy growth resulting from a change in the governance structure in the field of smoking prevention in Switzerland. The results of the analyzed 13 Swiss smoking prevention networks and the 187 associated projects show that network management improves the performance of new policy projects by facilitating access to implementing partners and target groups, but has no impact on output delivery in existing interventions. The study shows that networks, if actively managed, can be a means to ensure adequate enforcement in the context of increasing numbers of new policies.
{"title":"Come together: Does network management make a difference for collaborative implementation performance in the context of sudden policy growth?","authors":"Susanne Hadorn, Fritz Sager","doi":"10.1111/rego.12595","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12595","url":null,"abstract":"Cooperative forms of policy implementation bear the promise of being an answer to the policy delivery challenge resulting from policy growth, with the quality of network management often rated as a key success factor. The positive relationship between network management and performance in networks, however, is primarily supported by theoretical reasoning rather than empirical evidence. The present study empirically investigates this relationship in the context of rapid policy growth resulting from a change in the governance structure in the field of smoking prevention in Switzerland. The results of the analyzed 13 Swiss smoking prevention networks and the 187 associated projects show that network management improves the performance of new policy projects by facilitating access to implementing partners and target groups, but has no impact on output delivery in existing interventions. The study shows that networks, if actively managed, can be a means to ensure adequate enforcement in the context of increasing numbers of new policies.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":"27 1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2024-05-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141185261","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The governing attributes of authority, legitimacy, and accountability are essential to any type of governance to be able to function effectively. For public forms of governing, the attributes are part of the structures and institutions of democratic states, for example, through the tripartition of power, voting, and legal structures. For private forms of governance, such as multi-stakeholder initiatives (MSIs), these attributes need to be built or attained. This paper sets out to examine how MSIs increase their governing capacity through public–private interactions. Empirically, the paper investigates two national MSIs in mining: the Finnish Sustainable Mining Network and the Chilean Dialogo Territorial. I find that as part of the interactions within the governance sphere of mining, the roles, governance capacity, and expectations toward public and private actors are rearranged. I propose the term “governance transference” to denote the shift of authority, legitimacy, and accountability from one governing body to another. This phenomenon occurs through three mechanisms: lending legitimacy, emulating decision-making, and enmeshing expectations. The findings extend the previous literature on the outcomes of public–private governance interactions and governance spheres.
{"title":"Governance transference and shifting capacities and expectations in multi-stakeholder initiatives","authors":"Johanna Järvelä","doi":"10.1111/rego.12597","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12597","url":null,"abstract":"The governing attributes of authority, legitimacy, and accountability are essential to any type of governance to be able to function effectively. For public forms of governing, the attributes are part of the structures and institutions of democratic states, for example, through the tripartition of power, voting, and legal structures. For private forms of governance, such as multi-stakeholder initiatives (MSIs), these attributes need to be built or attained. This paper sets out to examine how MSIs increase their governing capacity through public–private interactions. Empirically, the paper investigates two national MSIs in mining: the Finnish Sustainable Mining Network and the Chilean Dialogo Territorial. I find that as part of the interactions within the governance sphere of mining, the roles, governance capacity, and expectations toward public and private actors are rearranged. I propose the term “governance transference” to denote the shift of authority, legitimacy, and accountability from one governing body to another. This phenomenon occurs through three mechanisms: lending legitimacy, emulating decision-making, and enmeshing expectations. The findings extend the previous literature on the outcomes of public–private governance interactions and governance spheres.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":"3 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2024-05-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141156558","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Making security has been Leviathan's home turf and its prime responsibility. Yet, while security states in advanced democracies share this uniform purpose, there is vast variation in how they legitimize and how they make security policies. First, the political authority of elected policy‐makers is sometimes superseded by the epistemic authority of experts. Second, states make security, in some instances, by drawing on their own capacities, whereas in other fields they rely on rules to manage non‐state actors. Based on this variation in authority foundations and policy instruments, we disentangle Leviathan into different types of (i) positive, (ii) managing, (iii) technocratic, and (iv) regulatory security states. Our typology helps better understand contemporary security policy‐making; it advances regulatory governance theory by conceptualizing the relationship between expertise and rules in a complex and contested issue area; and it provides insights into the “new economic security state” and the domestic underpinnings of weaponized interdependence.
{"title":"Disentangling Leviathan on its home turf: Authority foundations, policy instruments, and the making of security","authors":"Andreas Kruck, Moritz Weiss","doi":"10.1111/rego.12594","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12594","url":null,"abstract":"Making security has been <jats:italic>Leviathan's</jats:italic> home turf and its prime responsibility. Yet, while security states in advanced democracies share this uniform purpose, there is vast variation in how they legitimize and how they make security policies. First, the political authority of elected policy‐makers is sometimes superseded by the epistemic authority of experts. Second, states make security, in some instances, by drawing on their own capacities, whereas in other fields they rely on rules to manage non‐state actors. Based on this variation in authority foundations and policy instruments, we disentangle <jats:italic>Leviathan</jats:italic> into different types of (i) positive, (ii) managing, (iii) technocratic, and (iv) regulatory security states. Our typology helps better understand contemporary security policy‐making; it advances regulatory governance theory by conceptualizing the relationship between expertise and rules in a complex and contested issue area; and it provides insights into the “new economic security state” and the domestic underpinnings of weaponized interdependence.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":"39 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2024-04-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140640237","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
How does regulatory statehood develop from the regulatory work which governments have always done? This article challenges conventional views that regulatory statehood is achieved by transition to arm's length agencies and that it replaces court‐based enforcement or displaces legislatures in favor of less accountable executive power. To do so, we examine the major 19th‐century surge in development of micro‐economic regulatory statehood in Britain, which had followed more gradual development in early modern times. We show that when the transformation of the Board of Trade is understood properly, a richer appreciation emerges of how regulatory statehood is institutionalized generally and of British state‐making in particular. To demonstrate this, we introduce a novel conceptual framework for analyzing and assessing change on multiple dimensions of regulatory statehood, distinguishing depth of regulatory capacity and regulatory capability along six dimensions.
{"title":"The Board of Trade and the regulatory state in the long 19th century, 1815–1914","authors":"Perri 6, Eva Heims","doi":"10.1111/rego.12593","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12593","url":null,"abstract":"How does regulatory statehood develop from the regulatory work which governments have always done? This article challenges conventional views that regulatory statehood is achieved by transition to arm's length agencies and that it replaces court‐based enforcement or displaces legislatures in favor of less accountable executive power. To do so, we examine the major 19th‐century surge in development of micro‐economic regulatory statehood in Britain, which had followed more gradual development in early modern times. We show that when the transformation of the Board of Trade is understood properly, a richer appreciation emerges of how regulatory statehood is institutionalized generally and of British state‐making in particular. To demonstrate this, we introduce a novel conceptual framework for analyzing and assessing change on multiple dimensions of regulatory statehood, distinguishing depth of regulatory capacity and regulatory capability along six dimensions.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":"16 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2024-04-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140622869","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
As a result of policy growth, implementing agencies often face new mandates without the necessary capacity expansion to comply with, thus resorting to intermediaries. However, intermediaries are not innocuous to the implementation process, especially when they are expected to play the double role of target and intermediary, responsible for translating/interpreting regulation for beneficiaries. How does the interaction between beneficiaries and intermediaries-target shape policy implementation? I argue that such interaction is not only determined by the role the intermediary adopts, and their relation with the beneficiary, but also by the motivations beneficiaries have for engaging in the regulatory process, and their capacity to do so. I develop a theoretical framework for understanding their interaction and apply it to a new regulatory policy in Mexico to provide social security for paid domestic workers. I explore the mechanisms by which the interaction between intermediaries and beneficiaries affects the outcome of the regulatory process.
{"title":"Unraveling how intermediary-beneficiary interaction shapes policy implementation","authors":"Cynthia L. Michel","doi":"10.1111/rego.12592","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12592","url":null,"abstract":"As a result of policy growth, implementing agencies often face new mandates without the necessary capacity expansion to comply with, thus resorting to intermediaries. However, intermediaries are not innocuous to the implementation process, especially when they are expected to play the double role of target and intermediary, responsible for translating/interpreting regulation for beneficiaries. How does the interaction between beneficiaries and intermediaries-target shape policy implementation? I argue that such interaction is not only determined by the role the intermediary adopts, and their relation with the beneficiary, but also by the motivations beneficiaries have for engaging in the regulatory process, and their capacity to do so. I develop a theoretical framework for understanding their interaction and apply it to a new regulatory policy in Mexico to provide social security for paid domestic workers. I explore the mechanisms by which the interaction between intermediaries and beneficiaries affects the outcome of the regulatory process.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":"90 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2024-04-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140552017","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
How data on individuals are gathered, analyzed, and stored remains largely ungoverned at both domestic and global levels. We address the unique governance problem posed by digital data to provide a framework for understanding why data governance remains elusive. Data are easily transferable and replicable, making them a useful tool. But this characteristic creates massive governance problems for all of us who want to have some agency and choice over how (or if) our data are collected and used. Moreover, data are co‐created: individuals are the object from which data are culled by an interested party. Yet, any data point has a marginal value of close to zero and thus individuals have little bargaining power when it comes to negotiating with data collectors. Relatedly, data follow the rule of winner take all—the parties that have the most can leverage that data for greater accuracy and utility, leading to natural oligopolies. Finally, data's value lies in combination with proprietary algorithms that analyze and predict the patterns. Given these characteristics, private governance solutions are ineffective. Public solutions will also likely be insufficient. The imbalance in market power between platforms that collect data and individuals will be reproduced in the political sphere. We conclude that some form of collective data governance is required. We examine the challenges to the data governance by looking a public effort, the EU's General Data Protection Regulation, a private effort, Apple's “privacy nutrition labels” in their App Store, and a collective effort, the First Nations Information Governance Centre in Canada.
{"title":"Why data about people are so hard to govern","authors":"Wendy H. Wong, Jamie Duncan, David A. Lake","doi":"10.1111/rego.12591","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12591","url":null,"abstract":"How data on individuals are gathered, analyzed, and stored remains largely ungoverned at both domestic and global levels. We address the unique governance problem posed by digital data to provide a framework for understanding why data governance remains elusive. Data are easily transferable and replicable, making them a useful tool. But this characteristic creates massive governance problems for all of us who want to have some agency and choice over how (or if) our data are collected and used. Moreover, data are co‐created: individuals are the object from which data are culled by an interested party. Yet, any data point has a marginal value of close to zero and thus individuals have little bargaining power when it comes to negotiating with data collectors. Relatedly, data follow the rule of winner take all—the parties that have the most can leverage that data for greater accuracy and utility, leading to natural oligopolies. Finally, data's value lies in combination with proprietary algorithms that analyze and predict the patterns. Given these characteristics, private governance solutions are ineffective. Public solutions will also likely be insufficient. The imbalance in market power between platforms that collect data and individuals will be reproduced in the political sphere. We conclude that some form of collective data governance is required. We examine the challenges to the data governance by looking a public effort, the EU's General Data Protection Regulation, a private effort, Apple's “privacy nutrition labels” in their App Store, and a collective effort, the First Nations Information Governance Centre in Canada.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":"24 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2024-04-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140533215","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Regulators are increasingly concerned about deceptive, online choice architecture, including dark patterns and behavioral sludge. From a behavioral science perspective, fostering a regulatory environment which reduces the economic harm caused by deceptive designs, while safeguarding the benefits of well‐meaning behavioral insights, is essential. This article argues for a principles‐based approach and proposes behavioral audits as a tool to support this approach.
{"title":"Deceptive choice architecture and behavioral audits: A principles‐based approach","authors":"Stuart Mills","doi":"10.1111/rego.12590","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12590","url":null,"abstract":"Regulators are increasingly concerned about deceptive, online choice architecture, including dark patterns and behavioral sludge. From a behavioral science perspective, fostering a regulatory environment which reduces the economic harm caused by deceptive designs, while safeguarding the benefits of well‐meaning behavioral insights, is essential. This article argues for a principles‐based approach and proposes behavioral audits as a tool to support this approach.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":"73 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2024-03-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140317230","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Bert de Graaff, Suzanne Rutz, Annemiek Stoopendaal, Hester van de Bovenkamp
The literature on responsive regulation argues that citizens should be involved in regulatory practices to avoid capture between regulator and regulatee. It also argues that including citizens can add an important perspective to regulatory practices. However, we know little about how citizens' perspectives are brought into regulatory practices. This paper draws on existing qualitative research to compare and analyze four cases of experimental participatory regulation in Dutch health care, focusing on the theoretical assumptions that citizen involvement (a) prevents capture, and (b) stimulates the inclusion of new perspectives. Our results show that involving citizens in regulation can increase transparency and trust in regulatory practices and familiarizes regulators with other perspectives. It is, however, up to the regulator to work on deriving benefits from that involvement—not only the practical work of organizing participatory regulation, but also the conceptual work of reflecting on their own assumptions and standards. We do find evidence for weak forms of capture and argue for the need to extend capture to involve multiple actors. We reflect on these results for theory development and regulatory practice.
{"title":"Involving citizens in regulation: A comparative qualitative study of four experimentalist cases of participatory regulation in Dutch health care","authors":"Bert de Graaff, Suzanne Rutz, Annemiek Stoopendaal, Hester van de Bovenkamp","doi":"10.1111/rego.12589","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12589","url":null,"abstract":"The literature on responsive regulation argues that citizens should be involved in regulatory practices to avoid capture between regulator and regulatee. It also argues that including citizens can add an important perspective to regulatory practices. However, we know little about how citizens' perspectives are brought into regulatory practices. This paper draws on existing qualitative research to compare and analyze four cases of experimental participatory regulation in Dutch health care, focusing on the theoretical assumptions that citizen involvement (a) prevents capture, and (b) stimulates the inclusion of new perspectives. Our results show that involving citizens in regulation can increase transparency and trust in regulatory practices and familiarizes regulators with other perspectives. It is, however, up to the regulator to work on deriving benefits from that involvement—not only the practical work of organizing participatory regulation, but also the conceptual work of reflecting on their own assumptions and standards. We do find evidence for weak forms of capture and argue for the need to extend capture to involve multiple actors. We reflect on these results for theory development and regulatory practice.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":"27 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2024-03-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140317229","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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