Adopted in 2024, the EU Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive (EUCS3D, alternatively EUCSDDD) instructs member states to regulate human rights and environmental due diligence across business operations and their global value chains. Businesses started to familiarize themselves with the new directive to develop future compliance strategies. Despite its importance, the familiarization process has received little attention in research. Through interviews with employees and legal intermediaries, this paper investigates how multinational enterprises in the chocolate sector experienced this process. Drawing from socio‐legal theory, the findings show that business behavior adapts to shifts in regulatory governance that underpin key concepts of the EUCS3D, such as due diligence. Although the impact of those changes on the rights situation across global value chains remains uncertain, this paper contributes valuable insights for governance and compliance research. For practitioners, it underlines the importance of reliable transposition of rules for business, of multi‐partite negotiation in compliance‐relevant processes, and that appropriate regulatory governance may ease resistance to new regulation in interplay with business and global value chain context.
{"title":"Navigating the EU Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive: How Multinational Enterprises Approach Regulatory Familiarization in the Chocolate Sector","authors":"Manuel Kiewisch","doi":"10.1111/rego.70042","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.70042","url":null,"abstract":"Adopted in 2024, the EU Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive (EUCS3D, alternatively EUCSDDD) instructs member states to regulate human rights and environmental due diligence across business operations and their global value chains. Businesses started to familiarize themselves with the new directive to develop future compliance strategies. Despite its importance, the familiarization process has received little attention in research. Through interviews with employees and legal intermediaries, this paper investigates how multinational enterprises in the chocolate sector experienced this process. Drawing from socio‐legal theory, the findings show that business behavior adapts to shifts in regulatory governance that underpin key concepts of the EUCS3D, such as <jats:italic>due diligence</jats:italic>. Although the impact of those changes on the rights situation across global value chains remains uncertain, this paper contributes valuable insights for governance and compliance research. For practitioners, it underlines the importance of reliable transposition of rules for business, of multi‐partite negotiation in compliance‐relevant processes, and that appropriate regulatory governance may ease resistance to new regulation in interplay with business and global value chain context.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":"7 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2025-06-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144202185","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The New Knowledge: Information, Data and the Remaking of Global PowerBy BlayneHaggart and NatashaTusikov, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2023. 337 pp. $120.00 (hardback). ISBN: 978‐1‐5381‐6087‐9","authors":"Roxana Vatanparast","doi":"10.1111/rego.70043","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.70043","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":"6 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2025-06-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144202179","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Sanne R. van Duin, Henri C. Dekker, Juan P. Mendoza, Jacco L. Wielhouwer
In various regulatory settings, firms receive feedback (i.e., firm-specific private advice) from authorities on how to improve compliance. Although the literature sheds light on the authorities' decision of when to provide feedback, less is known about firms' decisions on how to respond. Building on research on compliance and regulation, we expect a higher level of responsiveness to feedback when the financial capacity to cover short-term costs is higher (as this allows firms to allocate resources for compliance in the current period) and when firms expect higher revenues for the upcoming period (as current non-compliance represents the risk of a larger future loss). We also expect a conditional association: having a limited financial capacity may truncate the effect of positive expectations (inability to respond), and negative expectations may truncate the effect of having a sufficient financial capacity (lack of incentive to respond). To test these hypotheses, we examine anonymized financial and regulation-related data of over 5500 financial intermediaries operating in the Netherlands during 2009 and 2010. The results of a series of tests indicate that the effects of financial capacity and revenue expectations are indeed distinct yet independent. Interestingly, responding to feedback depends on positive expectations, even when firms have a limited current financial capacity to respond.
{"title":"Responding to Regulatory Feedback: Financial Capacity, Revenue Expectations, and Firms' Responses to the Authority's Recommendations","authors":"Sanne R. van Duin, Henri C. Dekker, Juan P. Mendoza, Jacco L. Wielhouwer","doi":"10.1111/rego.70034","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.70034","url":null,"abstract":"In various regulatory settings, firms receive feedback (i.e., firm-specific private advice) from authorities on how to improve compliance. Although the literature sheds light on the authorities' decision of when to provide feedback, less is known about firms' decisions on how to respond. Building on research on compliance and regulation, we expect a higher level of responsiveness to feedback when the financial capacity to cover short-term costs is higher (as this allows firms to allocate resources for compliance in the current period) and when firms expect higher revenues for the upcoming period (as current non-compliance represents the risk of a larger future loss). We also expect a conditional association: having a limited financial capacity may truncate the effect of positive expectations (inability to respond), and negative expectations may truncate the effect of having a sufficient financial capacity (lack of incentive to respond). To test these hypotheses, we examine anonymized financial and regulation-related data of over 5500 financial intermediaries operating in the Netherlands during 2009 and 2010. The results of a series of tests indicate that the effects of financial capacity and revenue expectations are indeed distinct yet independent. Interestingly, responding to feedback depends on positive expectations, even when firms have a limited current financial capacity to respond.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":"6 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2025-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144193232","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Even if member states formally comply with EU law, the ‘ideal type’ of literal compliance, where EU rules are compliantly transposed without customizing their density or restrictiveness, is both rare and improbable. Why do EU member states engage in literal compliance in the ‘least likely’ case of the EU's Fiscal Compact, where customized transposition is crucial for member states to ‘regain control’ over a core state power? Why do external pressures for uniformity trump or reinforce internal pressures for diversity, or vice versa? We analyze the transposition of six fiscal treaty rules in France, Germany, and Italy (N = 18) using fuzzy‐set Qualitative Comparative Analysis. Literal compliance results from high policy fit and the need to signal responsiveness to external pressures from the EU and financial markets. Even though it may appear unlikely, literal compliance with EU fiscal policy does occur when uniformity is both easier and more important than diversity for member states.
{"title":"Understanding Literal Compliance in the European Union's Multilevel Fiscal Governance","authors":"Tiziano Zgaga, Eva Thomann","doi":"10.1111/rego.70025","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.70025","url":null,"abstract":"Even if member states formally comply with EU law, the ‘ideal type’ of literal compliance, where EU rules are compliantly transposed without customizing their density or restrictiveness, is both rare and improbable. Why do EU member states engage in literal compliance in the ‘least likely’ case of the EU's Fiscal Compact, where customized transposition is crucial for member states to ‘regain control’ over a core state power? Why do external pressures for uniformity trump or reinforce internal pressures for diversity, or vice versa? We analyze the transposition of six fiscal treaty rules in France, Germany, and Italy (<jats:italic>N</jats:italic> = 18) using fuzzy‐set Qualitative Comparative Analysis. Literal compliance results from high policy fit and the need to signal responsiveness to external pressures from the EU and financial markets. Even though it may appear unlikely, literal compliance with EU fiscal policy does occur when uniformity is both easier and more important than diversity for member states.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":"13 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2025-05-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144165403","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper assesses what type of comments are most useful to what type of stakeholder in gaining influence during public consultations. Theoretically, the paper approaches stakeholders' consultation comments as reputational threats from key audiences that the agency needs to respond to. Different types of threats are expected to carry different weights depending on the type of stakeholders. The analysis is based on a dataset of 73,283 consultation comments left by stakeholders in EASA rulemaking consultations. The findings indicate that it matters what interests pose what kind of threat in regulatory rulemaking. Certain group types become more influential while others lose out when making specific kinds of threats. This extends our understanding of how stakeholders gain influence and what reputational threats are seen as credible by regulatory agencies.
{"title":"Is That a Threat? How Types of Stakeholder and Reputational Threat Matter for Gaining Influence in Regulatory Rulemaking","authors":"Rik Joosen","doi":"10.1111/rego.70027","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.70027","url":null,"abstract":"This paper assesses what type of comments are most useful to what type of stakeholder in gaining influence during public consultations. Theoretically, the paper approaches stakeholders' consultation comments as reputational threats from key audiences that the agency needs to respond to. Different types of threats are expected to carry different weights depending on the type of stakeholders. The analysis is based on a dataset of 73,283 consultation comments left by stakeholders in EASA rulemaking consultations. The findings indicate that it matters what interests pose what kind of threat in regulatory rulemaking. Certain group types become more influential while others lose out when making specific kinds of threats. This extends our understanding of how stakeholders gain influence and what reputational threats are seen as credible by regulatory agencies.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":"59 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2025-05-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144153460","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Nandana Wasantha Pathiranage, K. N. Thilini Dayarathna, Christine Jubb, Wahed Waheduzzaman
This study investigates the impact of selective good corporate governance practices on the development of mandatory whistleblower protection policies in corporations. Using a coding instrument aligned with legislative requirements, we analyzed 66 whistleblower policies to assess their comprehensiveness and alignment with best practices. The findings reveal that, except for executive gender diversity, most good governance practices do not significantly contribute to the development of comprehensive whistleblower policies. The results suggest that many corporations adopt a minimum compliance approach, treating mandatory whistleblower policies as a legal requirement rather than a genuine commitment to fostering whistleblower protection. Drawing on Compliance Theory, this study highlights the need for a deeper understanding of how corporate governance practices impact the integrity and organizational commitment to whistleblower protection.
{"title":"Beyond Compliance: The Role of Corporate Governance in Shaping Whistleblower Protection Policies","authors":"Nandana Wasantha Pathiranage, K. N. Thilini Dayarathna, Christine Jubb, Wahed Waheduzzaman","doi":"10.1111/rego.70035","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.70035","url":null,"abstract":"This study investigates the impact of selective good corporate governance practices on the development of mandatory whistleblower protection policies in corporations. Using a coding instrument aligned with legislative requirements, we analyzed 66 whistleblower policies to assess their comprehensiveness and alignment with best practices. The findings reveal that, except for executive gender diversity, most good governance practices do not significantly contribute to the development of comprehensive whistleblower policies. The results suggest that many corporations adopt a minimum compliance approach, treating mandatory whistleblower policies as a legal requirement rather than a genuine commitment to fostering whistleblower protection. Drawing on Compliance Theory, this study highlights the need for a deeper understanding of how corporate governance practices impact the integrity and organizational commitment to whistleblower protection.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":"4 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2025-05-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144145534","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The European Commission's decision to expand its 2014 Regulation on electronic identification and trust services toward wallet‐based digital identities marked a significant shift in the governance of users' digital identities. The intersection between private digital services, public prerogatives, and individual self‐determination raises questions of data governance, notably power conflicts over control and usage. This study investigates the governance of the European Digital Identity Framework using institutional isomorphism to understand how EU policy‐making evolves and gains legitimacy by mimicking successful regulatory models like the GDPR. Our analysis shows that the narrowly defined scope of power for supervisory bodies allows greater discretion for Member States, which could make the system vulnerable to abuse. Additionally, the lack of organizational independence among these bodies further complicates governance arrangements.
{"title":"The Governance of the European Digital Identity Framework Through the Lens of Institutional Mimesis","authors":"Linda Weigl, Marta Reysner","doi":"10.1111/rego.70032","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.70032","url":null,"abstract":"The European Commission's decision to expand its 2014 Regulation on electronic identification and trust services toward wallet‐based digital identities marked a significant shift in the governance of users' digital identities. The intersection between private digital services, public prerogatives, and individual self‐determination raises questions of data governance, notably power conflicts over control and usage. This study investigates the governance of the European Digital Identity Framework using institutional isomorphism to understand how EU policy‐making evolves and gains legitimacy by mimicking successful regulatory models like the GDPR. Our analysis shows that the narrowly defined scope of power for supervisory bodies allows greater discretion for Member States, which could make the system vulnerable to abuse. Additionally, the lack of organizational independence among these bodies further complicates governance arrangements.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":"39 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2025-05-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144133766","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Resilience of New Public Management. By Irvine Lapsley and Peter Miller, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2024. 400 pp. $145 (hardback). ISBN: 978-0-19-888381-4","authors":"Danture Wickramasinghe","doi":"10.1111/rego.70031","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.70031","url":null,"abstract":"<h2> Conflicts of Interest</h2>\u0000<p>The author declares no conflicts of interest.</p>","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":"136 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2025-05-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144114319","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Amid the COVID‐19 Pandemic, many countries worldwide have resorted to social distancing to maintain a certain physical distance to avoid direct contact between people. Despite the abundant literature on social distancing, how this mode of direct state intervention, which inevitably requires a lot of regulatory resources, was implemented has been a rare source of scientific inquiry. This paper attempts to fill this gap by presenting a case study that explores how regulatory resource deficits faced by regulators implementing social distancing were addressed in the regulator‐intermediary‐target (RIT) network. This paper highlights the role of local facilities as regulatory intermediaries in implementing social distancing in South Korea. Although social distancing was purported to keep physical distance among individuals, authorities' enforcement activities were primarily, though not entirely, targeted at local facilities. Analyzing in‐depth interviews with 30 local frontline inspectors conducted in September 2021, this paper finds that local facilities played a key intermediary role in deterring the spread of COVID‐19 as a private regulator. We argue that this role, constructed in the RIT network, was one reason South Korea could successfully deter the spread of the virus without a lockdown in the early stage of the Pandemic.
{"title":"Assuring Social Distancing Through Regulatory Intermediaries: The Role of Local Facilities in Deterring COVID‐19 in South Korea","authors":"Jong Hun Lee, Seung‐Hun Hong","doi":"10.1111/rego.70033","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.70033","url":null,"abstract":"Amid the COVID‐19 Pandemic, many countries worldwide have resorted to social distancing to maintain a certain physical distance to avoid direct contact between people. Despite the abundant literature on social distancing, how this mode of direct state intervention, which inevitably requires a lot of regulatory resources, was implemented has been a rare source of scientific inquiry. This paper attempts to fill this gap by presenting a case study that explores how regulatory resource deficits faced by regulators implementing social distancing were addressed in the regulator‐intermediary‐target (RIT) network. This paper highlights the role of local facilities as regulatory intermediaries in implementing social distancing in South Korea. Although social distancing was purported to keep physical distance among individuals, authorities' enforcement activities were primarily, though not entirely, targeted at local facilities. Analyzing in‐depth interviews with 30 local frontline inspectors conducted in September 2021, this paper finds that local facilities played a key intermediary role in deterring the spread of COVID‐19 as a private regulator. We argue that this role, constructed in the RIT network, was one reason South Korea could successfully deter the spread of the virus without a lockdown in the early stage of the Pandemic.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":"72 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2025-05-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144113648","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Regulatory review—assessing the legality, use of evidence, and correct calculation of costs and benefits in regulations before they are enacted—is a core function of regulatory oversight bodies. In principle, reviewing aims to improve the effectiveness of regulations through economic rationality, tools, and methods. In practice, the work of oversight bodies occurs amid the politics of the rulemaking process and can be a way for the executive to control the regulatory agenda. Based on a 13‐month ethnography of Mexico's regulatory oversight body, I examine how analysts enact the technical and legal requirements of regulatory improvement while facing political tensions and interference. Using negotiated order theory, I show how analysts respond to political attention, conflict, or interference by expanding, shielding, or bending their mandate and conducting their work accordingly. Reviewing to improve regulations takes on different meanings and forms, allowing analysts to protect their work, organization, and techno‐legal mandate in the long term. The article contributes to a better understanding of regulatory review and oversight bodies. More importantly, it draws attention to how workers make ambitious statecraft projects like regulatory improvement possible by continuously reconciling the legal, technical, and political dimensions of their work.
{"title":"The Politics of Regulatory Oversight: How Analysts Expand, Shield, or Bend Their Mandate While Reviewing Regulations","authors":"Samantha Ortiz Casillas","doi":"10.1111/rego.70029","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.70029","url":null,"abstract":"Regulatory review—assessing the legality, use of evidence, and correct calculation of costs and benefits in regulations before they are enacted—is a core function of regulatory oversight bodies. In principle, reviewing aims to improve the effectiveness of regulations through economic rationality, tools, and methods. In practice, the work of oversight bodies occurs amid the politics of the rulemaking process and can be a way for the executive to control the regulatory agenda. Based on a 13‐month ethnography of Mexico's regulatory oversight body, I examine how analysts enact the technical and legal requirements of regulatory improvement while facing political tensions and interference. Using negotiated order theory, I show how analysts respond to political attention, conflict, or interference by expanding, shielding, or bending their mandate and conducting their work accordingly. Reviewing to improve regulations takes on different meanings and forms, allowing analysts to protect their work, organization, and techno‐legal mandate in the long term. The article contributes to a better understanding of regulatory review and oversight bodies. More importantly, it draws attention to how workers make ambitious statecraft projects like regulatory improvement possible by continuously reconciling the legal, technical, and political dimensions of their work.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":"5 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2025-05-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144066144","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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