US regulatory agencies have been encouraged to consider the equity and distributional impacts of regulations for decades. This paper examines the extent to which such analysis is done and provides recommendations for improving it. We analyze 189 regulatory impact analyses (RIAs) that monetize at least some benefits and costs prepared by a variety of agencies from October 2003 to January 2021. We find that only two RIAs calculated the net benefits of a policy for a specific demographic group. Furthermore, only 21% of RIAs calculate some benefits by group (typically for demographic groups) and only 20% calculate some costs by group (typically for industry groups such as small entities). Overall, the differences between presidential administrations are relatively small compared to the differences between agencies in their performance using our measures of distributional analysis. We then evaluate a sample of 23 analyses related to environmental justice (EJ) prepared by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) between January 2010 and January 2022. The EJ analyses frequently identify disproportionate exposures to pollutants for a variety of groups and discuss the effects of proposed regulations on these exposures, but they rarely consider the distribution of costs and less than half consider any alternatives. To date, virtually no agency prepares a distributional analysis that could help regulators evaluate whether a proposed regulation, on net, advantages or disadvantages a particular group and whether an alternative could generate a preferred distributional outcome.
{"title":"Incorporating equity and justice concerns in regulation","authors":"Caroline Cecot, Robert W. Hahn","doi":"10.1111/rego.12508","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12508","url":null,"abstract":"US regulatory agencies have been encouraged to consider the equity and distributional impacts of regulations for decades. This paper examines the extent to which such analysis is done and provides recommendations for improving it. We analyze 189 regulatory impact analyses (RIAs) that monetize at least some benefits and costs prepared by a variety of agencies from October 2003 to January 2021. We find that only two RIAs calculated the net benefits of a policy for a specific demographic group. Furthermore, only 21% of RIAs calculate some benefits by group (typically for demographic groups) and only 20% calculate some costs by group (typically for industry groups such as small entities). Overall, the differences between presidential administrations are relatively small compared to the differences between agencies in their performance using our measures of distributional analysis. We then evaluate a sample of 23 analyses related to environmental justice (EJ) prepared by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) between January 2010 and January 2022. The EJ analyses frequently identify disproportionate exposures to pollutants for a variety of groups and discuss the effects of proposed regulations on these exposures, but they rarely consider the distribution of costs and less than half consider any alternatives. To date, virtually no agency prepares a distributional analysis that could help regulators evaluate whether a proposed regulation, on net, advantages or disadvantages a particular group and whether an alternative could generate a preferred distributional outcome.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2022-12-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50165626","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Joan-Ramon Borrell, Carmen García, Juan Luis Jiménez
This paper estimates the impact of reforming competition authorities on perceived antitrust effectiveness using methods of causal inference. We study how 20 countries reformed their competition authorities in depth between 1995 and 2020, and what has been the outcome of such reforms in the perceived competition policy effectiveness by the business community compared with 18 control countries in a balanced panel. As the political economy literature warned, we find that reforms paradoxically have not always improved antitrust effectiveness. Some of the reforms approved stalled or backlashed as politicians opted for a Machiavelli option: undertaking “counter-reforms” even in the name of an apparent but deceptive progressiveness and pro-competition drive.
{"title":"The difficult road to a better competition policy: How do competition authorities reforms affect antitrust effectiveness?","authors":"Joan-Ramon Borrell, Carmen García, Juan Luis Jiménez","doi":"10.1111/rego.12507","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12507","url":null,"abstract":"This paper estimates the impact of reforming competition authorities on perceived antitrust effectiveness using methods of causal inference. We study how 20 countries reformed their competition authorities in depth between 1995 and 2020, and what has been the outcome of such reforms in the perceived competition policy effectiveness by the business community compared with 18 control countries in a balanced panel. As the political economy literature warned, we find that reforms paradoxically have not always improved antitrust effectiveness. Some of the reforms approved stalled or backlashed as politicians opted for a Machiavelli option: undertaking “counter-reforms” even in the name of an apparent but deceptive progressiveness and pro-competition drive.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2022-12-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50165629","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Reputation scholars in the field of regulation tend to focus on the strategic nature—or: “agency”—of reputation management. We know fairly little about the precise nature of the dynamics and conflicts between structural and agential factors that are experienced by regulators in practice, and how these dynamics impact reputation management and its outcomes. This study addresses these questions, using conceptual language from the strategic-relational approach to study the reputation management of the Belgian financial regulator during an event of high reputational salience: the global financial crisis. The results present an image of a regulator as a strategic actor who—either consciously or more intuitively—calculated its possible moves in light of a strategically selective context (which, in turn, was constantly evolving as a result of strategic actions). This contributes to a more complex and behaviorally realistic understanding of regulatory reputation management.
{"title":"Reputation management as an interplay of structure and agency: A strategic-relational approach","authors":"Jan Boon","doi":"10.1111/rego.12506","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12506","url":null,"abstract":"Reputation scholars in the field of regulation tend to focus on the strategic nature—or: “agency”—of reputation management. We know fairly little about the precise nature of the dynamics and conflicts between structural and agential factors that are experienced by regulators in practice, and how these dynamics impact reputation management and its outcomes. This study addresses these questions, using conceptual language from the strategic-relational approach to study the reputation management of the Belgian financial regulator during an event of high reputational salience: the global financial crisis. The results present an image of a regulator as a strategic actor who—either consciously or more intuitively—calculated its possible moves in light of a strategically selective context (which, in turn, was constantly evolving as a result of strategic actions). This contributes to a more complex and behaviorally realistic understanding of regulatory reputation management.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2022-11-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50165634","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Despite the salience of transparency in policy and democracy debates a global measurement of transparency has always been missing. In its absence, measuring the impact of transparency on accountability and corruption for a large number of countries has been difficult, with scholars using more or less adequate proxies. This paper introduces a new measurement of real transparency—the T-index—using 14 de facto components, based on direct observations of official websites in 129 countries and five de jure components, based on the transparency laws and conventions adopted. The resulting index is a measurement with very good internal and external validity and moderate precision. The paper argues that de facto transparency must be considered alongside de jure (legal) transparency if we are to judge the impact (or lack of) transparency against accountability and corruption, as a large implementation gap exists, in particular in poor countries, between legal commitments and real transparency. The T-index has significant impact on both perception and objective indicators of corruption, including perceived change in corruption over time as measured by the Global Corruption Barometer. An analysis of outliers shows that high transparency alone is not sufficient to achieve control of corruption, especially in countries with low human development and poor rule of law, although transparency is a robust predictor of corruption with GDP controls. The data with all sources is available for download as T-index 2022 dataset: DOI 10.5281/zenodo.7225627 and an interactive webpage developed for updates is available at www.corruptionrisk.org/transparency.
{"title":"Transparency and corruption: Measuring real transparency by a new index","authors":"Alina Mungiu-Pippidi","doi":"10.1111/rego.12502","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12502","url":null,"abstract":"Despite the salience of transparency in policy and democracy debates a global measurement of transparency has always been missing. In its absence, measuring the impact of transparency on accountability and corruption for a large number of countries has been difficult, with scholars using more or less adequate proxies. This paper introduces a new measurement of real transparency—the T-index—using 14 <i>de facto</i> components, based on direct observations of official websites in 129 countries and five <i>de jure</i> components, based on the transparency laws and conventions adopted. The resulting index is a measurement with very good internal and external validity and moderate precision. The paper argues that <i>de facto</i> transparency must be considered alongside <i>de jure</i> (legal) transparency if we are to judge the impact (or lack of) transparency against accountability and corruption, as a large implementation gap exists, in particular in poor countries, between legal commitments and real transparency. The T-index has significant impact on both perception and objective indicators of corruption, including perceived change in corruption over time as measured by the Global Corruption Barometer. An analysis of outliers shows that high transparency alone is not sufficient to achieve control of corruption, especially in countries with low human development and poor rule of law, although transparency is a robust predictor of corruption with GDP controls. The data with all sources is available for download as T-index 2022 dataset: DOI 10.5281/zenodo.7225627 and an interactive webpage developed for updates is available at www.corruptionrisk.org/transparency.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2022-11-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50165645","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Regulatory failure caused by overlapping regulations is ubiquitous, with examples in all jurisdictions across a range of disciplines. Overlapping regulation can be problematic. It obscures policy objectives and hinders the development of effective and clear regulation. In addition, regulatory overlap can inflict real costs on businesses through repetitive inspections and data collection efforts. It is particularly burdensome when agencies issue conflicting rules with inconsistent standards. Recognizing that regulatory overlap exists and is a problem provides the context to this program of research. Our research project was an exploration using a systematic quantitative literature review (SQLR) method to better understand the way regulatory failure, caused by overlapping regulations, has featured in academic literature. The SQLR method was chosen as it employs a systematic process to consolidate a sample of literature, and quantitative measures to draw connections between different academic sources. Ultimately, our research concluded that the literature does not provide clear prescriptive principles for reducing unnecessary regulatory overlap. This begs a question as to whether more research is needed in this area, or alternatively whether the complexities raised by regulatory overlap are not reducible to general principles.
{"title":"Regulatory overlap: A systematic quantitative literature review","authors":"Lachlan Robb, Trent Candy, Felicity Deane","doi":"10.1111/rego.12504","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12504","url":null,"abstract":"Regulatory failure caused by overlapping regulations is ubiquitous, with examples in all jurisdictions across a range of disciplines. Overlapping regulation can be problematic. It obscures policy objectives and hinders the development of effective and clear regulation. In addition, regulatory overlap can inflict real costs on businesses through repetitive inspections and data collection efforts. It is particularly burdensome when agencies issue conflicting rules with inconsistent standards. Recognizing that regulatory overlap exists and is a problem provides the context to this program of research. Our research project was an exploration using a systematic quantitative literature review (SQLR) method to better understand the way regulatory failure, caused by overlapping regulations, has featured in academic literature. The SQLR method was chosen as it employs a systematic process to consolidate a sample of literature, and quantitative measures to draw connections between different academic sources. Ultimately, our research concluded that the literature does not provide clear prescriptive principles for reducing unnecessary regulatory overlap. This begs a question as to whether more research is needed in this area, or alternatively whether the complexities raised by regulatory overlap are not reducible to general principles.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2022-10-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50165821","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article makes important contributions to governance research by studying the implementation of policies with high potential for goal incongruence between intermediaries and regulators. Building on a regulatory intermediation framework and prevailing theories from organizational institutionalism, we propose an original typology that classifies intermediaries' strategies for coping with challenging regulations. Furthermore, we explain the choice of these strategies based on intermediaries' value systems, the degree of interdependency with the regulator, and policy ambiguity. The empirical strategy is based on the case of Catholic, Protestant, and Muslim religious organizations engaged in the implementation of abortion and euthanasia policies in Belgium. These latter constitute a typical case of policy implementation that prompts value conflicts between permissive official regulations and intermediaries' conservative values on life-and-death issues.
{"title":"Regulatory intermediaries and value conflicts in policy implementation: Religious organizations and life-and-death policies in Belgium","authors":"Irina Ciornei, Eva-Maria Euchner, Michalina Preisner, Ilay Yesil","doi":"10.1111/rego.12500","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12500","url":null,"abstract":"This article makes important contributions to governance research by studying the implementation of policies with high potential for goal incongruence between intermediaries and regulators. Building on a regulatory intermediation framework and prevailing theories from organizational institutionalism, we propose an original typology that classifies intermediaries' strategies for coping with challenging regulations. Furthermore, we explain the choice of these strategies based on intermediaries' value systems, the degree of interdependency with the regulator, and policy ambiguity. The empirical strategy is based on the case of Catholic, Protestant, and Muslim religious organizations engaged in the implementation of abortion and euthanasia policies in Belgium. These latter constitute a typical case of policy implementation that prompts value conflicts between permissive official regulations and intermediaries' conservative values on life-and-death issues.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2022-10-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50165842","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Following a long-standing and highly contested policy debate, in June 2021, the German parliament passed the Supply Chain Due Diligence Act requiring mandatory due diligence (MDD) of large companies, holding them accountable for the impacts of their supply chain operations abroad. Applying the discursive agency approach and using evidence from policy documents and 21 interviews with key stakeholders, we analyze the political strategies that paved the way toward MDD in Germany. The decisive strategy was an innovative benchmarking and monitoring mechanism that provided the legitimacy for a law and opened a window of opportunity for MDD supporters. Civil society and supportive politicians used this window of opportunity to build broad political coalitions that included the support of some companies. We discuss the ramifications of these findings for understanding the domestic politics behind the newly emerging norm of foreign corporate accountability.
{"title":"From voluntary to mandatory corporate accountability: The politics of the German Supply Chain Due Diligence Act","authors":"David Weihrauch, Sophia Carodenuto, Sina Leipold","doi":"10.1111/rego.12501","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12501","url":null,"abstract":"Following a long-standing and highly contested policy debate, in June 2021, the German parliament passed the Supply Chain Due Diligence Act requiring mandatory due diligence (MDD) of large companies, holding them accountable for the impacts of their supply chain operations abroad. Applying the discursive agency approach and using evidence from policy documents and 21 interviews with key stakeholders, we analyze the political strategies that paved the way toward MDD in Germany. The decisive strategy was an innovative benchmarking and monitoring mechanism that provided the legitimacy for a law and opened a window of opportunity for MDD supporters. Civil society and supportive politicians used this window of opportunity to build broad political coalitions that included the support of some companies. We discuss the ramifications of these findings for understanding the domestic politics behind the newly emerging norm of foreign corporate accountability.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2022-10-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50165844","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Tom Christensen, Mads Dagnis Jensen, Michael Kluth, Gunnar Helgi Kristinsson, Kennet Lynggaard, Per Lægreid, Risto Niemikari, Jon Pierre, Tapio Raunio, Gústaf Adolf Skúlason
Government responses to the Covid-19 pandemic in the Nordic states-Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden-exhibit similarities and differences. This article investigates the extent to which crisis policymaking diverges from normal policymaking within the Nordic countries and whether variations between the countries are associated with the role of expertise and the level of politicization. Government responses are analyzed in terms of governance arrangements and regulatory instruments. Findings demonstrate some deviation from normal policymaking within and considerable variation between the Nordic countries, as Denmark, Finland, and to some extent Norway exhibit similar patterns with hierarchical command and control governance arrangements, while Iceland, in some instances, resembles the case of Sweden, which has made use of network-based governance. The article shows that the higher the influence of experts, the more likely it is that the governance arrangement will be network-based.
{"title":"The Nordic governments' responses to the Covid-19 pandemic: A comparative study of variation in governance arrangements and regulatory instruments.","authors":"Tom Christensen, Mads Dagnis Jensen, Michael Kluth, Gunnar Helgi Kristinsson, Kennet Lynggaard, Per Lægreid, Risto Niemikari, Jon Pierre, Tapio Raunio, Gústaf Adolf Skúlason","doi":"10.1111/rego.12497","DOIUrl":"10.1111/rego.12497","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Government responses to the Covid-19 pandemic in the Nordic states-Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden-exhibit similarities and differences. This article investigates the extent to which crisis policymaking diverges from normal policymaking <i>within</i> the Nordic countries and whether variations <i>between</i> the countries are associated with the role of expertise and the level of politicization. Government responses are analyzed in terms of governance arrangements and regulatory instruments. Findings demonstrate some deviation from normal policymaking <i>within</i> and considerable variation <i>between</i> the Nordic countries, as Denmark, Finland, and to some extent Norway exhibit similar patterns with hierarchical command and control governance arrangements, while Iceland, in some instances, resembles the case of Sweden, which has made use of network-based governance. The article shows that the higher the influence of experts, the more likely it is that the governance arrangement will be network-based.</p>","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2022-10-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC9538262/pdf/REGO-9999-0.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"33514612","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article analyzes whether, and if so, why, national inspectorates adopt different enforcement strategies when controlling the provision of welfare services, such as health care, eldercare, and the compulsory school. The findings show that the Swedish Schools Inspectorate uses a predominantly strict strategy, while the Health and Social Care Inspectorate relies on a more situational strategy. To explain this variation in enforcement strategy, the article tests four hypotheses derived from the literature on regulatory enforcement. The findings suggest that the variation between the agencies is not primarily the result of differences in resources or the authority to issue punitive decisions, as suggested by previous research. Instead, we find support for the hypothesis that the definition of quality can explain variation in adopted strategies, and partial support for the hypothesis that differences in regulatory mission can account for a variation in the agencies' formal enforcement strategies.
{"title":"Explaining variations in enforcement strategy: A comparison of the Swedish health care, eldercare, and compulsory school sector","authors":"Linda Moberg, Mio Fredriksson, Karin Leijon","doi":"10.1111/rego.12499","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12499","url":null,"abstract":"This article analyzes whether, and if so, why, national inspectorates adopt different enforcement strategies when controlling the provision of welfare services, such as health care, eldercare, and the compulsory school. The findings show that the Swedish Schools Inspectorate uses a predominantly strict strategy, while the Health and Social Care Inspectorate relies on a more situational strategy. To explain this variation in enforcement strategy, the article tests four hypotheses derived from the literature on regulatory enforcement. The findings suggest that the variation between the agencies is not primarily the result of differences in resources or the authority to issue punitive decisions, as suggested by previous research. Instead, we find support for the hypothesis that the <i>definition of quality</i> can explain variation in adopted strategies, and partial support for the hypothesis that differences in <i>regulatory mission</i> can account for a variation in the agencies' formal enforcement strategies.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2022-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50165845","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Ori Aronson, Julia Elad-Strenger, Thomas Kessler, Yuval Feldman
Public legitimation of legal decisionmaking can be promoted through various strategies. We examine strategies of legitimation that are premised on personalizing the public image of legal agents. A personalized public administration emphasizes individual decisionmakers and seeks legitimacy through familiarity with the character, identity, and virtues of individual agents, whereas a non-personalized public administration projects an ethos of technocratic decisionmaking, seeking legitimacy through institutional objectivity and impartiality. We conducted an experiment to examine the efficacy of personalization strategies in the context of a politically charged legal affair: the criminal cases involving the prime minister of Israel, Benjamin Netanyahu. We focus on people's perceived objectivity of the office of the Israeli attorney general (AG), given exposure (vs. no exposure) to different types of personal information about the AG, and while manipulating the salience of contrasting decisions concerning Netanyahu (indicting him on several counts of corruption versus exculpating him in others). We find that exposure to personal information about the AG decreased the perceived objectivity of his office, compared to no exposure to personal information, regardless of the type of information, decision salience, and respondents' political leanings. Our findings, therefore, support the legitimating potential of the non-personalization of decisionmakers, and show that it pertains to people positioned as both “losers” and “winners” with regard the political impact of the decision. The study further reflects the capacity of nonabstract real-world, real-time, analyses to shed light on the drivers of public trust in legal decisionmaking in politically polarized contexts—an issue of pertinence in many contemporary democracies.
{"title":"Does personalization of officeholders undermine the legitimacy of the office? On perceptions of objectivity in legal decisionmaking","authors":"Ori Aronson, Julia Elad-Strenger, Thomas Kessler, Yuval Feldman","doi":"10.1111/rego.12495","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12495","url":null,"abstract":"Public legitimation of legal decisionmaking can be promoted through various strategies. We examine strategies of legitimation that are premised on personalizing the public image of legal agents. A personalized public administration emphasizes individual decisionmakers and seeks legitimacy through familiarity with the character, identity, and virtues of individual agents, whereas a non-personalized public administration projects an ethos of technocratic decisionmaking, seeking legitimacy through institutional objectivity and impartiality. We conducted an experiment to examine the efficacy of personalization strategies in the context of a politically charged legal affair: the criminal cases involving the prime minister of Israel, Benjamin Netanyahu. We focus on people's perceived objectivity of the office of the Israeli attorney general (AG), given exposure (vs. no exposure) to different types of personal information about the AG, and while manipulating the salience of contrasting decisions concerning Netanyahu (indicting him on several counts of corruption versus exculpating him in others). We find that exposure to personal information about the AG decreased the perceived objectivity of his office, compared to no exposure to personal information, regardless of the type of information, decision salience, and respondents' political leanings. Our findings, therefore, support the legitimating potential of the non-personalization of decisionmakers, and show that it pertains to people positioned as both “losers” and “winners” with regard the political impact of the decision. The study further reflects the capacity of nonabstract real-world, real-time, analyses to shed light on the drivers of public trust in legal decisionmaking in politically polarized contexts—an issue of pertinence in many contemporary democracies.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2022-09-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50165846","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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