Maximilian Haag, Steffen Hurka, Constantin Kaplaner
This study examines the relationship between the complexity of EU directives and their successful implementation at the national level. Moving beyond the state-of-the-art, we propose a comprehensive framework considering structural, linguistic, and relational dimensions of policy complexity. We argue that policy complexity entails higher transaction costs, hindering effective implementation. Using a novel dataset covering roughly 1000 directives from 1994 to 2022, we find strong evidence of policy complexity negatively impacting implementation performance. Moreover, we find that states with higher administrative capacity are better able to process high complexity efficiently and that Eurosceptic member states attract fewer infringement proceedings in highly complex policy environments than Europhile member states. This could alternatively point to strategic enforcement behavior of the Commission or to bureaucracies that are less Eurosceptic than their political masters might wish for. Our study thereby contributes to a deeper understanding of the challenges of successful implementation of EU directives.
{"title":"Policy complexity and implementation performance in the European Union","authors":"Maximilian Haag, Steffen Hurka, Constantin Kaplaner","doi":"10.1111/rego.12580","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12580","url":null,"abstract":"This study examines the relationship between the complexity of EU directives and their successful implementation at the national level. Moving beyond the state-of-the-art, we propose a comprehensive framework considering structural, linguistic, and relational dimensions of policy complexity. We argue that policy complexity entails higher transaction costs, hindering effective implementation. Using a novel dataset covering roughly 1000 directives from 1994 to 2022, we find strong evidence of policy complexity negatively impacting implementation performance. Moreover, we find that states with higher administrative capacity are better able to process high complexity efficiently and that Eurosceptic member states attract fewer infringement proceedings in highly complex policy environments than Europhile member states. This could alternatively point to strategic enforcement behavior of the Commission or to bureaucracies that are less Eurosceptic than their political masters might wish for. Our study thereby contributes to a deeper understanding of the challenges of successful implementation of EU directives.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":"17 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2024-01-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139573859","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Many studies show that supranational governance structures (SGS)—understood as international organizations or international treaties—contribute to the global diffusion of public policies. However, we still have a limited understanding of which properties of SGS hasten the number of policy adoptions. To advance this literature, we argue that SGS making legally binding and univocal claims are more likely to act as diffusion accelerators. We demonstrate the suitability of this argument through a case study of the global diffusion of mifepristone approvals, a single-purpose medicine to terminate pregnancies that has revolutionized abortion services. The analysis supports our expectation. Links to the EU and the Maputo Protocol—the only two considered SGS that make binding claims with clear implications for this policy field—hasten mifepristone approvals. By contrast, ratification of four other treaties—that do not make binding and univocal claims—and exposure to World Health Organization guidelines on medical abortion does not hasten these approvals.
{"title":"Properties of supranational governance structures and policy diffusion: The case of mifepristone approvals","authors":"Juan J. Fernández, Pilar Sánchez","doi":"10.1111/rego.12576","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12576","url":null,"abstract":"Many studies show that supranational governance structures (SGS)—understood as international organizations or international treaties—contribute to the global diffusion of public policies. However, we still have a limited understanding of which properties of SGS hasten the number of policy adoptions. To advance this literature, we argue that SGS making legally binding and univocal claims are more likely to act as diffusion accelerators. We demonstrate the suitability of this argument through a case study of the global diffusion of mifepristone approvals, a single-purpose medicine to terminate pregnancies that has revolutionized abortion services. The analysis supports our expectation. Links to the EU and the Maputo Protocol—the only two considered SGS that make binding claims with clear implications for this policy field—hasten mifepristone approvals. By contrast, ratification of four other treaties—that do not make binding and univocal claims—and exposure to World Health Organization guidelines on medical abortion does not hasten these approvals.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":"56 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2024-01-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139510927","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Building on the concept of participatory regulation, this study emphasizes recognizing the multidimensional character of citizens' risk regulation preferences. Using the case of autonomous vehicles, we specify six technology-related risks: product safety, regulatory oversight, legal liability, ethical prioritization, data protection, and human supervision. We argue that differences in these multidimensional risk regulation preferences are shaped by citizens' political beliefs, technology attitudes, and national innovation cultures. To test these hypotheses, a conjoint experiment was conducted in the United States (1188 participants), Japan (1135 participants), and Germany (1174 participants) in which respondents compared hypothetical regulation regimes for self-driving cars, varying alongside the six regulatory risk dimensions. The findings show a universal preference for increased legal responsibility of manufacturers and more stringent safety regulations for autonomous vehicles. Political beliefs and technological attitudes had minimal impact on these preferences. Although there were some cultural differences in privacy and ethical prioritization, no systematic differences were noted across countries, suggesting the possibility of finding common ground in standardizing risk regulations for self-driving cars.
{"title":"Multidimensional preference for technology risk regulation: The role of political beliefs, technology attitudes, and national innovation cultures","authors":"Sebastian Hemesath, Markus Tepe","doi":"10.1111/rego.12578","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12578","url":null,"abstract":"Building on the concept of participatory regulation, this study emphasizes recognizing the multidimensional character of citizens' risk regulation preferences. Using the case of autonomous vehicles, we specify six technology-related risks: product safety, regulatory oversight, legal liability, ethical prioritization, data protection, and human supervision. We argue that differences in these multidimensional risk regulation preferences are shaped by citizens' political beliefs, technology attitudes, and national innovation cultures. To test these hypotheses, a conjoint experiment was conducted in the United States (1188 participants), Japan (1135 participants), and Germany (1174 participants) in which respondents compared hypothetical regulation regimes for self-driving cars, varying alongside the six regulatory risk dimensions. The findings show a universal preference for increased legal responsibility of manufacturers and more stringent safety regulations for autonomous vehicles. Political beliefs and technological attitudes had minimal impact on these preferences. Although there were some cultural differences in privacy and ethical prioritization, no systematic differences were noted across countries, suggesting the possibility of finding common ground in standardizing risk regulations for self-driving cars.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":"26 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2024-01-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139511049","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The International Atomic Energy Agency asserts that the regulation of the safety of civil nuclear power requires national regulatory agencies to be effectively independent. However, in the early years of national civil nuclear power programs national nuclear industries were dominated by iron triangles or subgovernments of powerful actors with an interest in promoting the industry. The creation of an independent safety regulator requires a radical restructuring of the national governance framework. Windows of opportunity or critical junctures for such reform occur only occasionally. This paper examines the cases of France, Japan, and India to identify the factors that determine the degree of success in attempts to break the power of nuclear iron triangles or subgovernments and create an effectively independent regulator. This analysis shows a serious nuclear accident can create the opportunity to dismantle an iron triangle. The extent and speed with which reforms can be implemented depend greatly on pre-existing and prevailing conditions. Key determinants include the power structures and attitudes toward nuclear power in elite politics, the degree of engagement of civil society, and pressures from international organizations. Of these, the first, elite politics, appears to be the most important in these three cases.
{"title":"Breaking the iron triangle around nuclear safety regulation: The cases of France, Japan, and India","authors":"Philip Andrews-Speed, Nur Azha Putra","doi":"10.1111/rego.12577","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12577","url":null,"abstract":"The International Atomic Energy Agency asserts that the regulation of the safety of civil nuclear power requires national regulatory agencies to be effectively independent. However, in the early years of national civil nuclear power programs national nuclear industries were dominated by iron triangles or subgovernments of powerful actors with an interest in promoting the industry. The creation of an independent safety regulator requires a radical restructuring of the national governance framework. Windows of opportunity or critical junctures for such reform occur only occasionally. This paper examines the cases of France, Japan, and India to identify the factors that determine the degree of success in attempts to break the power of nuclear iron triangles or subgovernments and create an effectively independent regulator. This analysis shows a serious nuclear accident can create the opportunity to dismantle an iron triangle. The extent and speed with which reforms can be implemented depend greatly on pre-existing and prevailing conditions. Key determinants include the power structures and attitudes toward nuclear power in elite politics, the degree of engagement of civil society, and pressures from international organizations. Of these, the first, elite politics, appears to be the most important in these three cases.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":"23 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2024-01-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139431744","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In the early 2000s, Latin America witnessed a resurgence in debates concerning the state's economic role, coinciding with a political transformation as new parties emerged to power. Existing literature on the “return of Industrial Policy” in the region largely offers a descriptive perspective, bypassing the intricacies of policy typifications and their associated political foundations. This paper addresses these gaps with two main contributions: First, it posits that the state's proactive economic interventions in Latin America were not comprehensive, but instead divided into two distinct channels: the sectoral and the macroeconomic. Second, by employing a fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) of 59 democratic Latin American administrations, the paper delves into the political dynamics that underlie each channel. A detailed comparative analysis between Brazil and Chile serves as a focal point, illuminating their notable policy divergence. The research concludes that labor-supported parties are predisposed toward adopting active developmental roles, especially in contexts lacking complex economic structures. However, even incomplete strategies require the presence of robust developmental institutions and is contingent upon a government's capability to establish developmental coalitions and countervail opposing interests.
{"title":"Developmental channels: (Incomplete) development strategies in democratic Latin America","authors":"Renato H. de Gaspi","doi":"10.1111/rego.12575","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12575","url":null,"abstract":"In the early 2000s, Latin America witnessed a resurgence in debates concerning the state's economic role, coinciding with a political transformation as new parties emerged to power. Existing literature on the “return of Industrial Policy” in the region largely offers a descriptive perspective, bypassing the intricacies of policy typifications and their associated political foundations. This paper addresses these gaps with two main contributions: First, it posits that the state's proactive economic interventions in Latin America were not comprehensive, but instead divided into two distinct channels: the sectoral and the macroeconomic. Second, by employing a fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) of 59 democratic Latin American administrations, the paper delves into the political dynamics that underlie each channel. A detailed comparative analysis between Brazil and Chile serves as a focal point, illuminating their notable policy divergence. The research concludes that labor-supported parties are predisposed toward adopting active developmental roles, especially in contexts lacking complex economic structures. However, even incomplete strategies require the presence of robust developmental institutions and is contingent upon a government's capability to establish developmental coalitions and countervail opposing interests.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":"9 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2024-01-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139420265","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Existing research investigating regulatory agencies' reputation-conscious behavior have primarily focused on reactive behavior in the context of reputational threats. Additionally, this literature has primarily focused on agencies' responses to such threats and external audiences' perceptions of agencies reputation, although reputation resides in both external and internal audiences. This study aims to address these two gaps by (1) identifying the relevance of regulatory agencies' reputations vis-à-vis internal audiences and (2) investigating whether reputations, in this case as judged by internal audiences, can be cultivated when managers of regulatory agencies perform reputation management in a more proactive sense. Using a unique two-wave panel survey targeting internal audiences from three Danish regulatory agencies, we find a positive and significant relationship between reputation management and how internal audiences perceive the organizational reputation. Moreover, we find that employee advocacy partially mediates this relationship. Given that regulatory agencies are particularly susceptible to reputational threats and given that the reputational perception of employees affect other employee outcomes as well as their regulatory decision making, this study shows the potential of reputation management by regulatory agencies as an instrument for affecting employees' outcomes.
{"title":"How is reputation management by regulatory agencies related to their employees' reputational perception?","authors":"Mette Østergaard Pedersen, Koen Verhoest, Heidi Houlberg Salomonsen","doi":"10.1111/rego.12574","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12574","url":null,"abstract":"Existing research investigating regulatory agencies' reputation-conscious behavior have primarily focused on reactive behavior in the context of reputational threats. Additionally, this literature has primarily focused on agencies' responses to such threats and external audiences' perceptions of agencies reputation, although reputation resides in both external and internal audiences. This study aims to address these two gaps by (1) identifying the relevance of regulatory agencies' reputations vis-à-vis internal audiences and (2) investigating whether reputations, in this case as judged by internal audiences, can be cultivated when managers of regulatory agencies perform reputation management in a more proactive sense. Using a unique two-wave panel survey targeting internal audiences from three Danish regulatory agencies, we find a positive and significant relationship between reputation management and how internal audiences perceive the organizational reputation. Moreover, we find that employee advocacy partially mediates this relationship. Given that regulatory agencies are particularly susceptible to reputational threats and given that the reputational perception of employees affect other employee outcomes as well as their regulatory decision making, this study shows the potential of reputation management by regulatory agencies as an instrument for affecting employees' outcomes.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":"32 11 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2023-12-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139061264","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Populist, illiberal, or outright autocratic movements threaten democracies worldwide, particularly when such extreme political forces gain control of executive power. For public administration illiberal backsliders in government pose a dilemma. Trained on instrumental values and expected to implement neutrally the political choices of their elected superiors, bureaucrats lack orientation of how to act in situations when obeying their own government may mean becoming an accomplice to democratic regression. Against this background, this article maps the dubious demands of backsliders in government as well as the potential reactions of bureaucrats to them. Public administration thinking is subsequently examined with a view to showing how administrative resistance to democratic backsliding could be normatively justified. Finally, the article provides practical recommendations to enhance the resilience of democratic public administration in the face of illiberal challenges.
{"title":"Administrative responses to democratic backsliding: When is bureaucratic resistance justified?","authors":"Michael W. Bauer","doi":"10.1111/rego.12567","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12567","url":null,"abstract":"Populist, illiberal, or outright autocratic movements threaten democracies worldwide, particularly when such extreme political forces gain control of executive power. For public administration illiberal backsliders in government pose a dilemma. Trained on instrumental values and expected to implement neutrally the political choices of their elected superiors, bureaucrats lack orientation of how to act in situations when obeying their own government may mean becoming an accomplice to democratic regression. Against this background, this article maps the dubious demands of backsliders in government as well as the potential reactions of bureaucrats to them. Public administration thinking is subsequently examined with a view to showing how administrative resistance to democratic backsliding could be normatively justified. Finally, the article provides practical recommendations to enhance the resilience of democratic public administration in the face of illiberal challenges.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":"55 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2023-12-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138714217","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The European Commission has pioneered the coercive regulation of artificial intelligence (AI), including a proposal of banning some applications altogether on moral grounds. Core to its regulatory strategy is a nominally “risk-based” approach with interventions that are proportionate to risk levels. Yet, neither standard accounts of risk-based regulation as rational problem-solving endeavor nor theories of organizational legitimacy-seeking, both prominently discussed in Regulation & Governance, fully explain the Commission's attraction to the risk heuristic. This article responds to this impasse with three contributions. First, it enrichens risk-based regulation scholarship—beyond AI—with a firm foundation in constructivist and critical political economy accounts of emerging tech regulation to capture the performative politics of defining and enacting risk vis-à-vis global economic competitiveness. Second, it conceptualizes the role of risk analysis within a Cultural Political Economy framework: as a powerful epistemic tool for the discursive and regulatory differentiation of an uncertain regulatory terrain (semiosis and structuration) which the Commission wields in its pursuit of a future common European AI market. Thirdly, the paper offers an in-depth empirical reconstruction of the Commission's risk-based semiosis and structuration in AI regulation through qualitative analysis of a substantive sample of documents and expert interviews. This finds that the Commission's use of risk analysis, outlawing some AI uses as matters of deep value conflicts and tightly controlling (at least discursively) so-called high-risk AI systems, enables Brussels to fashion its desired trademark of European “cutting-edge AI … trusted throughout the world” in the first place.
{"title":"European artificial intelligence “trusted throughout the world”: Risk-based regulation and the fashioning of a competitive common AI market","authors":"Regine Paul","doi":"10.1111/rego.12563","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12563","url":null,"abstract":"The European Commission has pioneered the coercive regulation of artificial intelligence (AI), including a proposal of banning some applications altogether on moral grounds. Core to its regulatory strategy is a nominally “risk-based” approach with interventions that are proportionate to risk levels. Yet, neither standard accounts of risk-based regulation as rational problem-solving endeavor nor theories of organizational legitimacy-seeking, both prominently discussed in <i>Regulation & Governance</i>, fully explain the Commission's attraction to the risk heuristic. This article responds to this impasse with three contributions. First, it enrichens risk-based regulation scholarship—beyond AI—with a firm foundation in constructivist and critical political economy accounts of emerging tech regulation to capture the performative politics of defining and enacting risk vis-à-vis global economic competitiveness. Second, it conceptualizes the role of risk analysis within a <i>Cultural Political Economy</i> framework: as a powerful epistemic tool for the discursive and regulatory differentiation of an uncertain regulatory terrain (semiosis and structuration) which the Commission wields in its pursuit of a future common European AI market. Thirdly, the paper offers an in-depth empirical reconstruction of the Commission's risk-based semiosis and structuration in AI regulation through qualitative analysis of a substantive sample of documents and expert interviews. This finds that the Commission's use of risk analysis, outlawing some AI uses as matters of deep value conflicts and tightly controlling (at least discursively) so-called high-risk AI systems, enables Brussels to fashion its desired trademark of European “cutting-edge AI … trusted throughout the world” in the first place.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":"27 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2023-12-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138714208","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Neo-Brandeisian legal scholars have recently revived the ideas of Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis, who championed state regulation that preserved market competition and economic liberty in the face of concentrated private power. Yet ultimately and perhaps paradoxically, it has been Europe and not the United States that has proved more hospitable to accommodating key features of the Brandeisian approach. We explain this outcome by tracing the evolution of EU competition law to gain insight into the social learning processes through which such regimes change over time. We argue that the EU's administrative system, which provides the European Commission with significant bureaucratic discretion, has facilitated processes of ongoing deliberative adjustment to policy and practice, which over time has resulted in a system of “regulated competition” with striking similarities to the Brandeisian vision. The analysis highlights how administrative law institutions condition how regulatory regimes evolve in response to acquired experience and knowledge.
{"title":"Brandeis in Brussels? Bureaucratic discretion, social learning, and the development of regulated competition in the European Union","authors":"Chase Foster, Kathleen Thelen","doi":"10.1111/rego.12570","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12570","url":null,"abstract":"Neo-Brandeisian legal scholars have recently revived the ideas of Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis, who championed state regulation that preserved market competition and economic liberty in the face of concentrated private power. Yet ultimately and perhaps paradoxically, it has been Europe and not the United States that has proved more hospitable to accommodating key features of the Brandeisian approach. We explain this outcome by tracing the evolution of EU competition law to gain insight into the social learning processes through which such regimes change over time. We argue that the EU's administrative system, which provides the European Commission with significant bureaucratic discretion, has facilitated processes of ongoing deliberative adjustment to policy and practice, which over time has resulted in a system of “regulated competition” with striking similarities to the Brandeisian vision. The analysis highlights how administrative law institutions condition how regulatory regimes evolve in response to acquired experience and knowledge.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":"54 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2023-12-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138565249","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Andreas Öjehag-Pettersson, Vanja Carlssson, Malin Rönnblom
In this paper, we develop an approach for analyzing the increasingly important strand of research that deals with automated systems of governing. Such systems, which figure prominently in public policy and regulation, are designed to utilize the rapid advancement in computer technology, like artificial intelligence, with the purpose of governing something or someone. Drawing on a large sample of articles we present a comprehensive analysis of scholarly works where these systems are studied as political, rather than neutral, instruments of governing. We find that the current state of the art articulates the politics of automated systems of governing in three ways. Namely, as part of ontological, epistemological and ideological questions. We conclude that future research should investigate the complex forms of marketization nested in these systems, that it should move from theoretical examples to detailed empirical studies and that political science should get more involved with the issue.
{"title":"Political studies of automated governing: A bird's eye (re)view","authors":"Andreas Öjehag-Pettersson, Vanja Carlssson, Malin Rönnblom","doi":"10.1111/rego.12569","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12569","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, we develop an approach for analyzing the increasingly important strand of research that deals with automated systems of governing. Such systems, which figure prominently in public policy and regulation, are designed to utilize the rapid advancement in computer technology, like artificial intelligence, with the purpose of governing something or someone. Drawing on a large sample of articles we present a comprehensive analysis of scholarly works where these systems are studied as political, rather than neutral, instruments of governing. We find that the current state of the art articulates the politics of automated systems of governing in three ways. Namely, as part of ontological, epistemological and ideological questions. We conclude that future research should investigate the complex forms of marketization nested in these systems, that it should move from theoretical examples to detailed empirical studies and that political science should get more involved with the issue.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":" 41","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2023-12-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138492147","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}