How do regulatory bodies ensure that including the beneficiaries of regulation in regulatory processes improves governance? In many regulatory arrangements, beneficiaries' “fire alarm” monitoring and reporting of targets' violations via complaint mechanisms activate regulatory bodies' enforcement role. This article theorizes how beneficiaries may misuse complaint mechanisms, undermine regulators' performance, and prompt regulators to adopt strategies within and beyond the complaint process to regulate beneficiaries' behavior. It argues regulators' assessment of the issues driving misuse and their enforcement approach (cooperative or deterrent) affect their strategies for influencing beneficiaries. Case studies of two Canadian human rights institutions, which have different enforcement approaches but experienced similarly extreme levels of beneficiary misuse during the COVID‐19 pandemic, evaluate these theoretical claims. Overall, the study illustrates potential enforcement challenges arising from using beneficiaries as intermediaries for monitoring and reporting violations and how regulating beneficiary participation may be required to improve decentralized regulatory governance.
{"title":"Managing Complaint Mechanisms for Regulatory Enforcement: Evidence From Human Rights Institutions During the COVID ‐19 Pandemic","authors":"Nicole De Silva","doi":"10.1111/rego.70084","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.70084","url":null,"abstract":"How do regulatory bodies ensure that including the beneficiaries of regulation in regulatory processes improves governance? In many regulatory arrangements, beneficiaries' “fire alarm” monitoring and reporting of targets' violations via complaint mechanisms activate regulatory bodies' enforcement role. This article theorizes how beneficiaries may misuse complaint mechanisms, undermine regulators' performance, and prompt regulators to adopt strategies within and beyond the complaint process to regulate beneficiaries' behavior. It argues regulators' assessment of the issues driving misuse and their enforcement approach (cooperative or deterrent) affect their strategies for influencing beneficiaries. Case studies of two Canadian human rights institutions, which have different enforcement approaches but experienced similarly extreme levels of beneficiary misuse during the COVID‐19 pandemic, evaluate these theoretical claims. Overall, the study illustrates potential enforcement challenges arising from using beneficiaries as intermediaries for monitoring and reporting violations and how regulating beneficiary participation may be required to improve decentralized regulatory governance.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2025-10-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145382333","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
People frequently compete with one another for awards, benefits, contracts, positions, or roles. One of the regulatory challenges in these contexts lies in preventing people from making dishonest claims to win such competitions. Honesty pledges, asking people to commit to ethical behavior ex ante, have been found to reduce cheating under non‐competitive settings (when rewards were given based on individual reports only). However, as people behave differently under competitive settings, it is unclear whether honesty pledges could be effective and recommended in such situations as well. In four experiments, we apply honesty pledges to competitive and non‐competitive settings, finding that pledges remain effective in reducing cheating behavior under competitive contexts (Studies 1–4). Moreover, this effect is not crowded out if a sanction (fine) is added to the honesty pledge (Study 2). Honesty pledges are also effective among people who tend to cheat more, due to low or overestimated task‐related ability (Study 2) or due to high competitiveness (Study 3). Additionally, people's estimations regarding others' cheating behavior explain why pledges accompanied by descriptive honesty norms affect cheating behavior (Study 3). Lastly, even in high‐stakes competitive environments that demonstrably increased dishonesty, honesty pledges remained effective in reducing dishonesty (Study 4). These findings demonstrate that honesty pledges can serve as effective non‐coercive regulatory instruments to reduce dishonesty in competitive environments, offering advantages over traditional enforcement mechanisms while remaining effective even among individuals most prone to cheating and under high‐stakes conditions, with important implications for organizational policy design and regulatory approaches.
{"title":"Competing Under Oath: Can Honesty Pledges Reduce Cheating in Competitive Environments?","authors":"Ronit Montal‐Rosenberg, Eyal Peer, Yuval Feldman","doi":"10.1111/rego.70099","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.70099","url":null,"abstract":"People frequently compete with one another for awards, benefits, contracts, positions, or roles. One of the regulatory challenges in these contexts lies in preventing people from making dishonest claims to win such competitions. Honesty pledges, asking people to commit to ethical behavior ex ante, have been found to reduce cheating under non‐competitive settings (when rewards were given based on individual reports only). However, as people behave differently under competitive settings, it is unclear whether honesty pledges could be effective and recommended in such situations as well. In four experiments, we apply honesty pledges to competitive and non‐competitive settings, finding that pledges remain effective in reducing cheating behavior under competitive contexts (Studies 1–4). Moreover, this effect is not crowded out if a sanction (fine) is added to the honesty pledge (Study 2). Honesty pledges are also effective among people who tend to cheat more, due to low or overestimated task‐related ability (Study 2) or due to high competitiveness (Study 3). Additionally, people's estimations regarding others' cheating behavior explain why pledges accompanied by descriptive honesty norms affect cheating behavior (Study 3). Lastly, even in high‐stakes competitive environments that demonstrably increased dishonesty, honesty pledges remained effective in reducing dishonesty (Study 4). These findings demonstrate that honesty pledges can serve as effective non‐coercive regulatory instruments to reduce dishonesty in competitive environments, offering advantages over traditional enforcement mechanisms while remaining effective even among individuals most prone to cheating and under high‐stakes conditions, with important implications for organizational policy design and regulatory approaches.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":"26 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2025-10-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145382329","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
States, firms, and other types of governors routinely rely on intermediaries to govern issues on their behalf. Such indirect governance drives regime complexity: governors frequently enlist multiple intermediaries for governing an issue. I theorize that governors foster complexity to maximize utility from indirect governance. When governors enlist intermediaries, they face the governor's dilemma: a tradeoff between the competence they can obtain and the control they can exert, I identify two strategies for mitigating this dilemma. Diversification creates competition among intermediaries providing similar competencies to prevent drift and slack. Differentiation promotes complementarity among intermediaries to exploit variation in the control elasticity of different competency types. In each case, governors increase regime complexity to obtain a preferred combination of competence and control. I illustrate my argument with examples from international cooperation. I conclude with a discussion of the broader implications of the article's findings for international relations and political science scholarship.
{"title":"The Governor's Dilemma and Regime Complexity: Diversification and Differentiation","authors":"David Hagebölling","doi":"10.1111/rego.70091","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.70091","url":null,"abstract":"States, firms, and other types of governors routinely rely on intermediaries to govern issues on their behalf. Such indirect governance drives regime complexity: governors frequently enlist multiple intermediaries for governing an issue. I theorize that governors foster complexity to maximize utility from indirect governance. When governors enlist intermediaries, they face the governor's dilemma: a tradeoff between the competence they can obtain and the control they can exert, I identify two strategies for mitigating this dilemma. <jats:italic>Diversification</jats:italic> creates competition among intermediaries providing similar competencies to prevent drift and slack. <jats:italic>Differentiation</jats:italic> promotes complementarity among intermediaries to exploit variation in the control elasticity of different competency types. In each case, governors increase regime complexity to obtain a preferred combination of competence and control. I illustrate my argument with examples from international cooperation. I conclude with a discussion of the broader implications of the article's findings for international relations and political science scholarship.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":"16 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2025-10-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145382328","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Matteo Mandelli, Ekaterina Domorenok, Paolo Graziano, Katharina Zimmermann
In recent years, research on the integration between social and ecological policies has significantly expanded, highlighting the multiple ways in which these two domains interact. Concepts such as “just transition” and “sustainable welfare” have gained prominence as normative frameworks capturing these interconnections. However, despite the increasing scholarly attention, several important theoretical, conceptual, and empirical gaps remain, particularly regarding how social and ecological spheres intersect across different political systems. This Special Issue contributes to this debate by exploring the complex policymaking dynamics underlying eco‐social policies. Before presenting the contributions, this introductory article provides a thorough review of existing studies on eco‐social policies. The review serves a dual purpose: first, it synthesizes existing knowledge, identifying key gaps; second, it allows us to develop a comprehensive framework to understand eco‐social policymaking, based on a political system or systemic approach. This framework conceptualizes eco‐social policies as the output of a process driven by escalating eco‐social risks and concerns. Citizens' attitudes and voting behavior regarding social and environmental policies serve as the initial inputs that shape policy outputs. Within this system, eco‐ and welfare regimes represent the broader institutional contexts in which political parties and organized interest groups compete to find solutions to eco‐social conflicts and eventually supply eco‐social policies.
{"title":"Navigating Eco‐Social Policymaking: Trends, Drivers, and Barriers. Introduction to the Special Issue","authors":"Matteo Mandelli, Ekaterina Domorenok, Paolo Graziano, Katharina Zimmermann","doi":"10.1111/rego.70048","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.70048","url":null,"abstract":"In recent years, research on the integration between social and ecological policies has significantly expanded, highlighting the multiple ways in which these two domains interact. Concepts such as “just transition” and “sustainable welfare” have gained prominence as normative frameworks capturing these interconnections. However, despite the increasing scholarly attention, several important theoretical, conceptual, and empirical gaps remain, particularly regarding how social and ecological spheres intersect across different political systems. This Special Issue contributes to this debate by exploring the complex policymaking dynamics underlying eco‐social policies. Before presenting the contributions, this introductory article provides a thorough review of existing studies on eco‐social policies. The review serves a dual purpose: first, it synthesizes existing knowledge, identifying key gaps; second, it allows us to develop a comprehensive framework to understand eco‐social policymaking, based on a political system or systemic approach. This framework conceptualizes eco‐social policies as the output of a process driven by escalating eco‐social risks and concerns. Citizens' attitudes and voting behavior regarding social and environmental policies serve as the initial inputs that shape policy outputs. Within this system, eco‐ and welfare regimes represent the broader institutional contexts in which political parties and organized interest groups compete to find solutions to eco‐social conflicts and eventually supply eco‐social policies.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":"40 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2025-10-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145382330","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In response to the interconnected ecological and social crises, there is growing interest in the integration of climate and social policy, both in academic discourse and in public debate. While the European Union has begun to address both dimensions jointly through the European Green Deal (EGD), it remains institutionally separate at the national level. Non‐state actors on both levels are increasingly engaged in debates about the social consequences of climate change and related policies. Drawing on field theory , this article conceptualizes the EGD as a field intervention and examines how national‐level actors respond to it—specifically, whether these responses signal an emerging field change . Using Germany as a case study, the article analyzes a dataset of public communications by non‐state actors in the eco‐social nexus at both the EU and the national level. A mixed‐methods approach combines computer‐assisted quantitative text analysis tools such as Structural Topic Modeling and Sentiment Analysis with selective qualitative document analysis. The findings reveal three distinct actor types and their respective strategies: (1) less‐equipped challengers, who largely ignore the EGD; (2) well‐equipped challengers, who engage with it to advance eco‐social demands; and (3) incumbents, who either frame the EGD positively to promote investments in their respective industry or explicitly oppose its objectives. Given the dominance of incumbents' strategies in the debate, combined with their structural advantages, the article concludes that the EGD is unlikely to trigger substantial field change toward national eco‐social integration—yet it offers critical discursive opportunities for challengers.
{"title":"Non‐State Actor Reactions to the European Green Deal: Implications for Eco‐Social Integration","authors":"Julia C. Cremer","doi":"10.1111/rego.70089","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.70089","url":null,"abstract":"In response to the interconnected ecological and social crises, there is growing interest in the integration of climate and social policy, both in academic discourse and in public debate. While the European Union has begun to address both dimensions jointly through the European Green Deal (EGD), it remains institutionally separate at the national level. Non‐state actors on both levels are increasingly engaged in debates about the social consequences of climate change and related policies. Drawing on <jats:italic>field theory</jats:italic> , this article conceptualizes the EGD as a field intervention and examines how national‐level actors respond to it—specifically, whether these responses signal an emerging <jats:italic>field change</jats:italic> . Using Germany as a case study, the article analyzes a dataset of public communications by non‐state actors in the eco‐social nexus at both the EU and the national level. A mixed‐methods approach combines computer‐assisted quantitative text analysis tools such as Structural Topic Modeling and Sentiment Analysis with selective qualitative document analysis. The findings reveal three distinct actor types and their respective strategies: (1) less‐equipped challengers, who largely ignore the EGD; (2) well‐equipped challengers, who engage with it to advance eco‐social demands; and (3) incumbents, who either frame the EGD positively to promote investments in their respective industry or explicitly oppose its objectives. Given the dominance of incumbents' strategies in the debate, combined with their structural advantages, the article concludes that the EGD is unlikely to trigger substantial field change toward national eco‐social integration—yet it offers critical discursive opportunities for challengers.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":"39 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2025-10-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145382331","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Accountability infrastructures' spread may give the impression that organizations are embracing accountability. Yet accountability professionals continue to encounter defensive reactions from those they are holding accountable. How do they navigate these reactions? Looking at the case of professionals in independent accountability mechanisms—grievance mechanisms at development finance institutions—this article identifies one approach: normalizing defensive reactions. Normalization is an emotion management strategy. It casts defensive reactions as an expected and explainable part of accountability processes. Particularly when accountability mechanisms depend on organizational stakeholders' participation, I argue normalization can help professionals diminish potential strain and keep running accountability processes—but only when defensive reactions do not cross boundaries that professionals draw between what is expected and not. For research and institutions, this raises future questions not only about emotions' role in accountability processes, but also about what organizational reactions should be expected in “normal” accountability and what inequalities could surround these expectations.
{"title":"“A Normal, Natural Tension”: Accountability Professionals' Use of Normalization to Navigate Defensive Organizational Reactions","authors":"Claire Penty Sieffert","doi":"10.1111/rego.70094","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.70094","url":null,"abstract":"Accountability infrastructures' spread may give the impression that organizations are embracing accountability. Yet accountability professionals continue to encounter defensive reactions from those they are holding accountable. How do they navigate these reactions? Looking at the case of professionals in independent accountability mechanisms—grievance mechanisms at development finance institutions—this article identifies one approach: normalizing defensive reactions. Normalization is an emotion management strategy. It casts defensive reactions as an expected and explainable part of accountability processes. Particularly when accountability mechanisms depend on organizational stakeholders' participation, I argue normalization can help professionals diminish potential strain and keep running accountability processes—but only when defensive reactions do not cross boundaries that professionals draw between what is expected and not. For research and institutions, this raises future questions not only about emotions' role in accountability processes, but also about what organizational reactions should be expected in “normal” accountability and what inequalities could surround these expectations.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":"39 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2025-10-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145397419","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
How legitimate is Financial Action Task Force (FATF)? We address this question with cross‐country evidence spanning performance‐wise aspects—standards, evaluation, strategy. FATF's legitimacy needs strengthening. Standards‐wise, compliance to FATF's Recommendations generally contributes to both FATF's and external effectiveness proxies, yet the latter has much weaker evidence. Granularly, FATF's Recommendations pose challenges for good‐faith developing states, since capacity constraints hinder compliance and effectiveness conversion. Evaluation‐wise, the effectiveness appraisal may be biased due to heavy reliance on compliance ratings, evidenced by weak correlations with external corruption control and financial transparency indicators. Strategy‐wise, though enhanced follow‐up boosts persistent compliance, the dominantly punitive strategy system is detrimental to good‐faith yet low‐capacity states. Theoretically, we build an extended framework on Mitchell's theory by deepening the analysis of effectiveness and justifying its applicability to non‐binding institutions. We also enrich the dialogue on the legitimacy of international organizations by presenting a quantitative, objective approach using official data.
{"title":"On the Performance‐Based Legitimacy of Financial Action Task Force: A Quantitative Exploration","authors":"Guo Cheng, Bo Wen","doi":"10.1111/rego.70088","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.70088","url":null,"abstract":"How legitimate is Financial Action Task Force (FATF)? We address this question with cross‐country evidence spanning performance‐wise aspects—<jats:italic>standards, evaluation, strategy</jats:italic>. FATF's legitimacy needs strengthening. <jats:italic>Standards‐wise,</jats:italic> compliance to FATF's Recommendations generally contributes to both FATF's and external effectiveness proxies, yet the latter has much weaker evidence. Granularly, FATF's Recommendations pose challenges for good‐faith developing states, since capacity constraints hinder compliance and effectiveness conversion. <jats:italic>Evaluation‐wise</jats:italic>, the effectiveness appraisal may be biased due to heavy reliance on compliance ratings, evidenced by weak correlations with external corruption control and financial transparency indicators. <jats:italic>Strategy‐wise</jats:italic>, though enhanced follow‐up boosts persistent compliance, the dominantly punitive strategy system is detrimental to good‐faith yet low‐capacity states. Theoretically, we build an extended framework on Mitchell's theory by deepening the analysis of effectiveness and justifying its applicability to non‐binding institutions. We also enrich the dialogue on the legitimacy of international organizations by presenting a quantitative, objective approach using official data.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":"25 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2025-10-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145306337","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The regulation of business is increasingly characterized by “soft” governance regimes that blur the boundaries of public and private authority, as signaled by the rapid proliferation of multistakeholder initiatives in global governance. This article explores how the spread of multistakeholderism creates opportunities for new forms of strategic action, enabling actors to participate in multiple fora, successively or simultaneously in order to pursue a particular agenda. The article focuses on multistakeholder initiatives in UK food policy and corporate political strategy in the regulation of ultra‐processed food. We adapt the concept of venue shopping, introducing the idea of venue hopping, which captures how actors advance agendas in multiple spaces and at multiple political levels. The analysis traces negotiations across two food policy partnerships, showing how industry actors operated in and between venues, playing one setting off against the other.
{"title":"Corporate Power in a Multistakeholder World: Venue Hopping and the Multilevel Politics of Ultra‐Processed Food","authors":"Rob Ralston, Ben Hawkins","doi":"10.1111/rego.70086","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.70086","url":null,"abstract":"The regulation of business is increasingly characterized by “soft” governance regimes that blur the boundaries of public and private authority, as signaled by the rapid proliferation of multistakeholder initiatives in global governance. This article explores how the spread of multistakeholderism creates opportunities for new forms of strategic action, enabling actors to participate in multiple fora, successively or simultaneously in order to pursue a particular agenda. The article focuses on multistakeholder initiatives in UK food policy and corporate political strategy in the regulation of ultra‐processed food. We adapt the concept of venue shopping, introducing the idea of venue <jats:italic>hopping</jats:italic>, which captures how actors advance agendas in multiple spaces and at multiple political levels. The analysis traces negotiations across two food policy partnerships, showing how industry actors operated in and between venues, playing one setting off against the other.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":"119 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2025-10-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145282657","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The climate crisis poses an acute threat to humanity. Eco‐social policy can help mitigate this threat, but eco‐social policy and the green transition are expensive. Our paper contributes to a better understanding of the role that green subsidies play in advancing eco‐social politics and policies. We assert that green subsidies increase the political viability of eco‐social policies. Green subsidies lead trade unions and business organizations to support eco‐social policies, regardless of institutional differences. We illustrate these positive‐sum effect dynamics with a most different systems design that compares green subsidies and eco‐social policies in Germany (subsidies, qualification and training measures, coal phase‐out strategy, green housing) with the United States (climate‐related tax credits, Inflation Reduction Act, and green housing). Based on a content analysis of documents and interviews, our comparison of business organizations and unions in both countries reveals strong and broad support for green subsidies in combination with eco‐social policies. We also discuss the second Trump administration and suggest that green subsidies help advance the green transformation in the face of significant political adversity.
{"title":"Green Subsidies and the Promotion of Eco‐Social Policy in Germany and the United States","authors":"Benedikt Bender, Daniel Kinderman","doi":"10.1111/rego.70087","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.70087","url":null,"abstract":"The climate crisis poses an acute threat to humanity. Eco‐social policy can help mitigate this threat, but eco‐social policy and the green transition are expensive. Our paper contributes to a better understanding of the role that green subsidies play in advancing eco‐social politics and policies. We assert that green subsidies increase the political viability of eco‐social policies. Green subsidies lead trade unions and business organizations to support eco‐social policies, regardless of institutional differences. We illustrate these positive‐sum effect dynamics with a most different systems design that compares green subsidies and eco‐social policies in Germany (subsidies, qualification and training measures, coal phase‐out strategy, green housing) with the United States (climate‐related tax credits, Inflation Reduction Act, and green housing). Based on a content analysis of documents and interviews, our comparison of business organizations and unions in both countries reveals strong and broad support for green subsidies in combination with eco‐social policies. We also discuss the second Trump administration and suggest that green subsidies help advance the green transformation in the face of significant political adversity.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":"57 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2025-10-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145254614","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article argues that if the aspiration is to enhance regulatory and governance responses to white‐collar and corporate crimes, consideration of the organization of these offending behaviors must be central to the scholarly, practice, and policy discussion. Regulation and governance scholarship has thrived as a field of study in its contributions to the theories and practices of regulation (and regulators) but has backgrounded the dynamics of how regulatees organize their rule‐breaking behaviors, and the implications of this for intentional interventions. Criminology has advanced our understanding of the procedural aspects of crimes but has largely marginalized business and organizational offending, with proportionately few criminologists displaying interest in how better to regulate organizations that violate the rules. To help bridge these gaps, in this article we draw on an “organizational perspective” to argue that “good enough” regulatory approaches should be directly informed by an understanding of how and why such crimes or offending behaviors are organized in the ways they are, and of the factors that shape these dynamics over time within particular contexts. We argue for the development of a program of research that synthesizes abstract and concrete research inquiry, and that challenges regulation academics to identify the necessary and contingent structures, mechanisms, and conditions that combine to produce white‐collar and corporate rule‐breaking behaviors to develop more plausible regulatory interventions, on a spectrum from immediate to long‐lasting.
{"title":"When Business Breaks the Rules: The Value of a Criminology‐Informed “Organizational” Perspective for the Regulation of White‐Collar and Corporate Crimes","authors":"Nicholas Lord, Michael Levi","doi":"10.1111/rego.70083","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.70083","url":null,"abstract":"This article argues that if the aspiration is to enhance regulatory and governance responses to white‐collar and corporate crimes, consideration of the <jats:italic>organization</jats:italic> of these offending behaviors must be central to the scholarly, practice, and policy discussion. Regulation and governance scholarship has thrived as a field of study in its contributions to the theories and practices of regulation (and regulators) but has backgrounded the dynamics of <jats:italic>how</jats:italic> regulatees organize their rule‐breaking behaviors, and the implications of this for intentional interventions. Criminology has advanced our understanding of the procedural aspects of crimes but has largely marginalized business and organizational offending, with proportionately few criminologists displaying interest in how better to regulate organizations that violate the rules. To help bridge these gaps, in this article we draw on an “organizational perspective” to argue that “good enough” regulatory approaches should be directly informed by an understanding of <jats:italic>how</jats:italic> and <jats:italic>why</jats:italic> such crimes or offending behaviors are organized in the ways they are, and of the factors that shape these dynamics over time within particular contexts. We argue for the development of a program of research that synthesizes abstract and concrete research inquiry, and that challenges regulation academics to identify the necessary and contingent structures, mechanisms, and conditions that combine to produce white‐collar and corporate rule‐breaking behaviors to develop more plausible regulatory interventions, on a spectrum from immediate to long‐lasting.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":"52 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2025-09-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145140867","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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