Theory and case studies suggest that emergencies and disasters increase corruption, especially in public procurement, hampering relief and reconstruction efforts. Despite a growing interest in the topic, including in research, there is still little systematic evidence about these effects, their structure and trajectories. We set out to investigate the medium-term impact of disasters on corruption risks, using large-scale administrative data on public tenders in Italy from 2007 to 2020, combined with data on 5 natural disasters. We employ logistic regression, coarsened exact matching and difference-in-differences estimators. We find that disasters increase corruption risks in the medium-term (3 or more years after the disaster), even more than on the short term (1 year after the disaster). In the matched and diff-in-diff analyses, we find 3%–10% points more non-open procedures used, 19%–21% points fewer call for tenders published, 19%–29% points more tenders with short advertisement period and 14%–17% points more single bidding tenders. Our findings highlight the importance of ring-fencing corruption risks associated with disaster response, especially in the medium to long term.
{"title":"The Impact of Emergencies on Corruption Risks: Italian Natural Disasters and Public Procurement","authors":"Mihaly Fazekas, Shrey Nishchal, Tina Soreide","doi":"10.1111/rego.12653","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12653","url":null,"abstract":"Theory and case studies suggest that emergencies and disasters increase corruption, especially in public procurement, hampering relief and reconstruction efforts. Despite a growing interest in the topic, including in research, there is still little systematic evidence about these effects, their structure and trajectories. We set out to investigate the medium-term impact of disasters on corruption risks, using large-scale administrative data on public tenders in Italy from 2007 to 2020, combined with data on 5 natural disasters. We employ logistic regression, coarsened exact matching and difference-in-differences estimators. We find that disasters increase corruption risks in the medium-term (3 or more years after the disaster), even more than on the short term (1 year after the disaster). In the matched and diff-in-diff analyses, we find 3%–10% points more non-open procedures used, 19%–21% points fewer call for tenders published, 19%–29% points more tenders with short advertisement period and 14%–17% points more single bidding tenders. Our findings highlight the importance of ring-fencing corruption risks associated with disaster response, especially in the medium to long term.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":"25 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2025-01-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143030919","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Ixchel Perez-Duran, Yannis Papadopoulos, Bastiaan Redert, Juan Carlos Triviño-Salazar
This paper examines expertise and professional diversity within new (agencies and central banks) and traditional (ministries) regulatory bodies (RBs) and assesses their effect on the perceived competence of RBs. In particular, we address the following research questions: To what extent do members of RBs have expertise and display diversity in terms of their professional trajectories? How do expertise and professional diversity affect the perceived competence of RBs? By using two empirical sources of data, this article provides core information on the educational and professional profiles of RBs staff. In addition, the paper provides evidence that both professional diversity and expertise among RBs do not have a significant effect on their perceived competence by regime actors. However, the study also suggests that regime actors that are more closely aligned to the professional trajectory of RB members (i.e., other regulators and members of the executive branch) tend to have a more positive perception of the competence of RBs. Conversely, societal actors tend to be more critical toward RBs, suggesting that a lack of a shared language creates a greater distance from the regulators.
{"title":"Does the Background of the Regulator Matter? The Role of Expertise and Diversity on the Perceived Competence of Regulatory Bodies","authors":"Ixchel Perez-Duran, Yannis Papadopoulos, Bastiaan Redert, Juan Carlos Triviño-Salazar","doi":"10.1111/rego.12654","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12654","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines expertise and professional diversity within new (agencies and central banks) and traditional (ministries) regulatory bodies (RBs) and assesses their effect on the perceived competence of RBs. In particular, we address the following research questions: To what extent do members of RBs have expertise and display diversity in terms of their professional trajectories? How do expertise and professional diversity affect the perceived competence of RBs? By using two empirical sources of data, this article provides core information on the educational and professional profiles of RBs staff. In addition, the paper provides evidence that both professional diversity and expertise among RBs do not have a significant effect on their perceived competence by regime actors. However, the study also suggests that regime actors that are more closely aligned to the professional trajectory of RB members (i.e., other regulators and members of the executive branch) tend to have a more positive perception of the competence of RBs. Conversely, societal actors tend to be more critical toward RBs, suggesting that a lack of a shared language creates a greater distance from the regulators.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":"15 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2025-01-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142991260","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Why do states subsidize unprofitable industries? This paper applies the Programmatic Action Framework and adapts it to neocorporatist settings to uncover the political determinants of industrial policies. Empirically, it explores how a longstanding coalition of economic, administrative and political actors has maintained public funding for the sugarcane agro‐industry in French overseas departments, despite new policy objectives for agricultural diversification and subsidy reallocation. Drawing on extensive archival and interview data, I argue that this tripartite programmatic group has leveraged long‐term institutionalized structures to resist subsidy reform and secure support for sugarcane production. Through coordinated discursive strategies to counter “transformative” policy proposals, and relational tactics to exclude challenging actors from the policy venue, each subgroup of this coalition has preserved its social position and the associated political resources gained from policymaking. These findings suggest that innovative policy reform in such sectors will require new public‐private alliances capable of challenging entrenched programmatic groups.
{"title":"Subsidizing Unprofitable Industries: The Political Determinants of Agro‐Industrial Policy in French Overseas Departments","authors":"Thibaut Joltreau","doi":"10.1111/rego.12657","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12657","url":null,"abstract":"Why do states subsidize unprofitable industries? This paper applies the Programmatic Action Framework and adapts it to neocorporatist settings to uncover the political determinants of industrial policies. Empirically, it explores how a longstanding coalition of economic, administrative and political actors has maintained public funding for the sugarcane agro‐industry in French overseas departments, despite new policy objectives for agricultural diversification and subsidy reallocation. Drawing on extensive archival and interview data, I argue that this tripartite programmatic group has leveraged long‐term institutionalized structures to resist subsidy reform and secure support for sugarcane production. Through coordinated discursive strategies to counter “transformative” policy proposals, and relational tactics to exclude challenging actors from the policy venue, each subgroup of this coalition has preserved its social position and the associated political resources gained from policymaking. These findings suggest that innovative policy reform in such sectors will require new public‐private alliances capable of challenging entrenched programmatic groups.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":"15 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2025-01-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142989850","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article focuses on the roles of insiders or outsiders in order to theorize the role that human agents play in systems change. It asks: (1) what strengths and weaknesses do insiders and outsiders have respectively as agents of change; and (2) what strategies are available to use these insights to increase, or to limit, the prospects of significant and lasting change? Drawing on an interdisciplinary range of scholarship, it develops a general theoretical framework for identifying the strengths and weaknesses of insiders and outsiders in terms of innovation (generating new ideas) and diffusion (promoting the adoption of new ideas). It identifies two strategies to leverage the strengths of both: (1) complexifying our understanding of change agents through identifying the special roles played by “insider–outsiders” and “outsider–insiders”; and (2) connecting insiders and outsiders through a process we refer to as “inside‐outside networked change.”
{"title":"Insiders and Outsiders: The Role of Human Agents and Networks in System Change","authors":"Miranda Forsyth, Anthea Roberts","doi":"10.1111/rego.12645","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12645","url":null,"abstract":"This article focuses on the roles of insiders or outsiders in order to theorize the role that human agents play in systems change. It asks: (1) what strengths and weaknesses do insiders and outsiders have respectively as agents of change; and (2) what strategies are available to use these insights to increase, or to limit, the prospects of significant and lasting change? Drawing on an interdisciplinary range of scholarship, it develops a general theoretical framework for identifying the strengths and weaknesses of insiders and outsiders in terms of innovation (generating new ideas) and diffusion (promoting the adoption of new ideas). It identifies two strategies to leverage the strengths of both: (1) complexifying our understanding of change agents through identifying the special roles played by “insider–outsiders” and “outsider–insiders”; and (2) connecting insiders and outsiders through a process we refer to as “inside‐outside networked change.”","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":"9 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2025-01-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142989851","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Against the background of the European decarbonization strategy, this study examines the extent to which the expansion of renewable energies can lead to tensions with the social and ecological dimensions of the sustainability concept. The study is based on qualitative interviews with 66 experts conducted in the trinational metropolitan region of the Upper Rhine in Germany, France, and Switzerland. Following a description of the status‐quo in each country, a public choice analysis is used to identify the key actors in the political decision‐making process to determine the extent to which they facilitate or impede the energy‐transition and cross‐border cooperation, as well as group‐specific socio‐environmental‐conflicts. Based on the identified conflicts, eco‐social‐policy recommendations are derived that can also enhance trinational cooperation.
{"title":"The Role of Political Actors in Realizing Sustainable European Energy Markets: Insights From the Trinational Upper Rhine Region","authors":"Franziska Leopold, Bianca Blum, Dominik Schröder","doi":"10.1111/rego.12651","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12651","url":null,"abstract":"Against the background of the European decarbonization strategy, this study examines the extent to which the expansion of renewable energies can lead to tensions with the social and ecological dimensions of the sustainability concept. The study is based on qualitative interviews with 66 experts conducted in the trinational metropolitan region of the Upper Rhine in Germany, France, and Switzerland. Following a description of the status‐quo in each country, a public choice analysis is used to identify the key actors in the political decision‐making process to determine the extent to which they facilitate or impede the energy‐transition and cross‐border cooperation, as well as group‐specific socio‐environmental‐conflicts. Based on the identified conflicts, eco‐social‐policy recommendations are derived that can also enhance trinational cooperation.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":"26 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2025-01-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142961582","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Recent studies focus on the issue of authority transfer to supranational institutions. While examining the opportunities and obstacles for expanding the Union's competencies, this literature often overlooks the effects of adopting ambitious policies on their implementation modes. This paper argues that the costs associated with the expansion of EU authority and opportunities for blame-shifting drive delegation choices and define the relative discretion granted to agents. Proposals for expanding EU authority increase the likelihood of the exclusively supranational implementation path being selected by the principals while undermining the appeal of the national path. In contrast, aiming to preserve opportunities for blame-shifting while maintaining some degree of control over implementation, the EU principals increasingly turn to joint delegation, where the Commission and national administrations cooperate. Yet, even within the partner-like relationship of joint implementation, national agents enjoy broader discretionary leeway.
{"title":"More Than One Agent? Authority Expansion and Delegation Dynamics in the EU","authors":"Anastasia Ershova","doi":"10.1111/rego.12652","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12652","url":null,"abstract":"Recent studies focus on the issue of authority transfer to supranational institutions. While examining the opportunities and obstacles for expanding the Union's competencies, this literature often overlooks the effects of adopting ambitious policies on their implementation modes. This paper argues that the costs associated with the expansion of EU authority and opportunities for blame-shifting drive delegation choices and define the relative discretion granted to agents. Proposals for expanding EU authority increase the likelihood of the exclusively supranational implementation path being selected by the principals while undermining the appeal of the national path. In contrast, aiming to preserve opportunities for blame-shifting while maintaining some degree of control over implementation, the EU principals increasingly turn to joint delegation, where the Commission and national administrations cooperate. Yet, even within the partner-like relationship of joint implementation, national agents enjoy broader discretionary leeway.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":"8 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2025-01-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142936444","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Research on policy accumulation established the hypothesis about a creeping divergence between implementation burdens and implementation capacity. This paper revisits this hypothesis using improved measures of implementation burden. Using official data on administration and enforcement costs, it finds that policy accumulation does raise implementation stress within the German Statutory Pension Insurance, analyzed as a least-likely case to do so. This finding supports the “implementation-gap hypothesis.” More generally, however, the paper serves as a “prove of concept” of how to adopt an epidemiological perspective within implementation research. This perspective is characterized by systematically capturing the changing prevalence of implementation stress within administrative organizations. It enables future research on how to deal with policy growth more effectively by raising awareness for whether and where implementation burden and capacity diverges strongly, and by helping to identify “best practice” cases able to cope with this divergence successfully.
{"title":"More Policies, More Work? An Epidemiological Assessment of Accumulating Implementation Stress in the Context of German Pension Policy","authors":"Christian Adam","doi":"10.1111/rego.12644","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12644","url":null,"abstract":"Research on policy accumulation established the hypothesis about a creeping divergence between implementation burdens and implementation capacity. This paper revisits this hypothesis using improved measures of implementation burden. Using official data on administration and enforcement costs, it finds that policy accumulation does raise implementation stress within the German Statutory Pension Insurance, analyzed as a least-likely case to do so. This finding supports the “implementation-gap hypothesis.” More generally, however, the paper serves as a “prove of concept” of how to adopt an epidemiological perspective within implementation research. This perspective is characterized by systematically capturing the changing prevalence of implementation stress within administrative organizations. It enables future research on how to deal with policy growth more effectively by raising awareness for whether and where implementation burden and capacity diverges strongly, and by helping to identify “best practice” cases able to cope with this divergence successfully.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":"43 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2024-12-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142793286","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Disembedded: Regulation, Crisis, and Democracy in the Age of FinanceBy Basak Kus, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2024, 200 pp. $29.95 (paperback). ISBN: 9780197764879","authors":"Jorge Díaz-Lanchas","doi":"10.1111/rego.12650","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12650","url":null,"abstract":"<h2> Conflicts of Interest</h2>\u0000<p>The author declares no conflicts of interest.</p>","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":"21 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2024-12-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142797757","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
As private asset‐based welfare like funded occupational pension schemes gain importance, legitimacy concerns arise due to financial market downturns and low investment returns. This paper assesses their input legitimacy by distinguishing between individual‐direct and collective‐representative input possibilities in decision‐making processes. We argue that individual‐direct input possibilities decrease while collective‐representative input possibilities increase with occupational pensions' compulsion. To test these hypotheses, we compare voluntary occupational pension schemes in Austria, Spain, and Ireland with (quasi‐)mandatory schemes in the Netherlands and Denmark, using Germany as a test case due to recent reforms enhancing their importance. Our institutional analysis and novel survey reveal that compulsory occupational pensions are associated with lower individual‐direct and higher collective‐representative input possibilities. These findings underscore the critical role of participatory procedures in establishing legitimacy in private governance, suggesting they may strengthen public trust and satisfaction with non‐state governance.
{"title":"Assessing Input Legitimacy of Occupational Pensions in Europe","authors":"Thomas Mayer, Tobias Wiß","doi":"10.1111/rego.12647","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12647","url":null,"abstract":"As private asset‐based welfare like funded occupational pension schemes gain importance, legitimacy concerns arise due to financial market downturns and low investment returns. This paper assesses their input legitimacy by distinguishing between individual‐direct and collective‐representative input possibilities in decision‐making processes. We argue that individual‐direct input possibilities decrease while collective‐representative input possibilities increase with occupational pensions' compulsion. To test these hypotheses, we compare voluntary occupational pension schemes in Austria, Spain, and Ireland with (quasi‐)mandatory schemes in the Netherlands and Denmark, using Germany as a test case due to recent reforms enhancing their importance. Our institutional analysis and novel survey reveal that compulsory occupational pensions are associated with lower individual‐direct and higher collective‐representative input possibilities. These findings underscore the critical role of participatory procedures in establishing legitimacy in private governance, suggesting they may strengthen public trust and satisfaction with non‐state governance.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":"27 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2024-11-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142753200","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This memoir describes the 40-year unfolding, project by project, of my sociolegal field research on legal and regulatory processes. It provides brief accounts of my interactions and interviews with regulatory officials and with businesspeople responsible for regulatory compliance. It also describes my ventures into the cross-national comparison of legal and regulatory institutions and the political systems that shape and support them.
{"title":"Scenes From a Sociolegal Career: An Informal Memoir","authors":"Robert A. Kagan","doi":"10.1111/rego.12638","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12638","url":null,"abstract":"This memoir describes the 40-year unfolding, project by project, of my sociolegal field research on legal and regulatory processes. It provides brief accounts of my interactions and interviews with regulatory officials and with businesspeople responsible for regulatory compliance. It also describes my ventures into the cross-national comparison of legal and regulatory institutions and the political systems that shape and support them.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":"226 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2024-11-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142670378","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：