Why do states subsidize unprofitable industries? This paper applies the Programmatic Action Framework and adapts it to neocorporatist settings to uncover the political determinants of industrial policies. Empirically, it explores how a longstanding coalition of economic, administrative and political actors has maintained public funding for the sugarcane agro‐industry in French overseas departments, despite new policy objectives for agricultural diversification and subsidy reallocation. Drawing on extensive archival and interview data, I argue that this tripartite programmatic group has leveraged long‐term institutionalized structures to resist subsidy reform and secure support for sugarcane production. Through coordinated discursive strategies to counter “transformative” policy proposals, and relational tactics to exclude challenging actors from the policy venue, each subgroup of this coalition has preserved its social position and the associated political resources gained from policymaking. These findings suggest that innovative policy reform in such sectors will require new public‐private alliances capable of challenging entrenched programmatic groups.
{"title":"Subsidizing Unprofitable Industries: The Political Determinants of Agro‐Industrial Policy in French Overseas Departments","authors":"Thibaut Joltreau","doi":"10.1111/rego.12657","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12657","url":null,"abstract":"Why do states subsidize unprofitable industries? This paper applies the Programmatic Action Framework and adapts it to neocorporatist settings to uncover the political determinants of industrial policies. Empirically, it explores how a longstanding coalition of economic, administrative and political actors has maintained public funding for the sugarcane agro‐industry in French overseas departments, despite new policy objectives for agricultural diversification and subsidy reallocation. Drawing on extensive archival and interview data, I argue that this tripartite programmatic group has leveraged long‐term institutionalized structures to resist subsidy reform and secure support for sugarcane production. Through coordinated discursive strategies to counter “transformative” policy proposals, and relational tactics to exclude challenging actors from the policy venue, each subgroup of this coalition has preserved its social position and the associated political resources gained from policymaking. These findings suggest that innovative policy reform in such sectors will require new public‐private alliances capable of challenging entrenched programmatic groups.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":"15 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2025-01-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142989850","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article focuses on the roles of insiders or outsiders in order to theorize the role that human agents play in systems change. It asks: (1) what strengths and weaknesses do insiders and outsiders have respectively as agents of change; and (2) what strategies are available to use these insights to increase, or to limit, the prospects of significant and lasting change? Drawing on an interdisciplinary range of scholarship, it develops a general theoretical framework for identifying the strengths and weaknesses of insiders and outsiders in terms of innovation (generating new ideas) and diffusion (promoting the adoption of new ideas). It identifies two strategies to leverage the strengths of both: (1) complexifying our understanding of change agents through identifying the special roles played by “insider–outsiders” and “outsider–insiders”; and (2) connecting insiders and outsiders through a process we refer to as “inside‐outside networked change.”
{"title":"Insiders and Outsiders: The Role of Human Agents and Networks in System Change","authors":"Miranda Forsyth, Anthea Roberts","doi":"10.1111/rego.12645","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12645","url":null,"abstract":"This article focuses on the roles of insiders or outsiders in order to theorize the role that human agents play in systems change. It asks: (1) what strengths and weaknesses do insiders and outsiders have respectively as agents of change; and (2) what strategies are available to use these insights to increase, or to limit, the prospects of significant and lasting change? Drawing on an interdisciplinary range of scholarship, it develops a general theoretical framework for identifying the strengths and weaknesses of insiders and outsiders in terms of innovation (generating new ideas) and diffusion (promoting the adoption of new ideas). It identifies two strategies to leverage the strengths of both: (1) complexifying our understanding of change agents through identifying the special roles played by “insider–outsiders” and “outsider–insiders”; and (2) connecting insiders and outsiders through a process we refer to as “inside‐outside networked change.”","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":"9 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2025-01-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142989851","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Against the background of the European decarbonization strategy, this study examines the extent to which the expansion of renewable energies can lead to tensions with the social and ecological dimensions of the sustainability concept. The study is based on qualitative interviews with 66 experts conducted in the trinational metropolitan region of the Upper Rhine in Germany, France, and Switzerland. Following a description of the status‐quo in each country, a public choice analysis is used to identify the key actors in the political decision‐making process to determine the extent to which they facilitate or impede the energy‐transition and cross‐border cooperation, as well as group‐specific socio‐environmental‐conflicts. Based on the identified conflicts, eco‐social‐policy recommendations are derived that can also enhance trinational cooperation.
{"title":"The Role of Political Actors in Realizing Sustainable European Energy Markets: Insights From the Trinational Upper Rhine Region","authors":"Franziska Leopold, Bianca Blum, Dominik Schröder","doi":"10.1111/rego.12651","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12651","url":null,"abstract":"Against the background of the European decarbonization strategy, this study examines the extent to which the expansion of renewable energies can lead to tensions with the social and ecological dimensions of the sustainability concept. The study is based on qualitative interviews with 66 experts conducted in the trinational metropolitan region of the Upper Rhine in Germany, France, and Switzerland. Following a description of the status‐quo in each country, a public choice analysis is used to identify the key actors in the political decision‐making process to determine the extent to which they facilitate or impede the energy‐transition and cross‐border cooperation, as well as group‐specific socio‐environmental‐conflicts. Based on the identified conflicts, eco‐social‐policy recommendations are derived that can also enhance trinational cooperation.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":"26 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2025-01-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142961582","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Recent studies focus on the issue of authority transfer to supranational institutions. While examining the opportunities and obstacles for expanding the Union's competencies, this literature often overlooks the effects of adopting ambitious policies on their implementation modes. This paper argues that the costs associated with the expansion of EU authority and opportunities for blame-shifting drive delegation choices and define the relative discretion granted to agents. Proposals for expanding EU authority increase the likelihood of the exclusively supranational implementation path being selected by the principals while undermining the appeal of the national path. In contrast, aiming to preserve opportunities for blame-shifting while maintaining some degree of control over implementation, the EU principals increasingly turn to joint delegation, where the Commission and national administrations cooperate. Yet, even within the partner-like relationship of joint implementation, national agents enjoy broader discretionary leeway.
{"title":"More Than One Agent? Authority Expansion and Delegation Dynamics in the EU","authors":"Anastasia Ershova","doi":"10.1111/rego.12652","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12652","url":null,"abstract":"Recent studies focus on the issue of authority transfer to supranational institutions. While examining the opportunities and obstacles for expanding the Union's competencies, this literature often overlooks the effects of adopting ambitious policies on their implementation modes. This paper argues that the costs associated with the expansion of EU authority and opportunities for blame-shifting drive delegation choices and define the relative discretion granted to agents. Proposals for expanding EU authority increase the likelihood of the exclusively supranational implementation path being selected by the principals while undermining the appeal of the national path. In contrast, aiming to preserve opportunities for blame-shifting while maintaining some degree of control over implementation, the EU principals increasingly turn to joint delegation, where the Commission and national administrations cooperate. Yet, even within the partner-like relationship of joint implementation, national agents enjoy broader discretionary leeway.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":"8 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2025-01-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142936444","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Research on policy accumulation established the hypothesis about a creeping divergence between implementation burdens and implementation capacity. This paper revisits this hypothesis using improved measures of implementation burden. Using official data on administration and enforcement costs, it finds that policy accumulation does raise implementation stress within the German Statutory Pension Insurance, analyzed as a least-likely case to do so. This finding supports the “implementation-gap hypothesis.” More generally, however, the paper serves as a “prove of concept” of how to adopt an epidemiological perspective within implementation research. This perspective is characterized by systematically capturing the changing prevalence of implementation stress within administrative organizations. It enables future research on how to deal with policy growth more effectively by raising awareness for whether and where implementation burden and capacity diverges strongly, and by helping to identify “best practice” cases able to cope with this divergence successfully.
{"title":"More Policies, More Work? An Epidemiological Assessment of Accumulating Implementation Stress in the Context of German Pension Policy","authors":"Christian Adam","doi":"10.1111/rego.12644","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12644","url":null,"abstract":"Research on policy accumulation established the hypothesis about a creeping divergence between implementation burdens and implementation capacity. This paper revisits this hypothesis using improved measures of implementation burden. Using official data on administration and enforcement costs, it finds that policy accumulation does raise implementation stress within the German Statutory Pension Insurance, analyzed as a least-likely case to do so. This finding supports the “implementation-gap hypothesis.” More generally, however, the paper serves as a “prove of concept” of how to adopt an epidemiological perspective within implementation research. This perspective is characterized by systematically capturing the changing prevalence of implementation stress within administrative organizations. It enables future research on how to deal with policy growth more effectively by raising awareness for whether and where implementation burden and capacity diverges strongly, and by helping to identify “best practice” cases able to cope with this divergence successfully.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":"43 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2024-12-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142793286","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}