Despite decades of awareness, societies have failed to adequately respond to climate change, as evidenced by rising CO2 emissions and the continued dominance of fossil fuels in global energy consumption. This failure underscores the structural constraints of capitalist modernity, where economic and political incentives, as well as consumer behaviors, obstruct effective climate action. Beyond the challenge of mitigation, climate change raises pressing questions about its social and political consequences. Societies will face increasing losses due to extreme weather events, resource depletion, and declining living conditions, exacerbating social inequalities and undermining the legitimacy of existing political and economic structures. The inability of capitalist modernity to address this crisis fosters a state of social anomie, where normative commitments to sustainability clash with entrenched systemic realities. Social scientists have a crucial role in examining these structural failures and identifying pathways for adaptation, resilience, and transformation. By analyzing the conflicts and contradictions within current societal arrangements, they can contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of climate change as a profound challenge to social order and political stability.
{"title":"Climate Change and the Social Order","authors":"Jens Beckert","doi":"10.1111/rego.70003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.70003","url":null,"abstract":"Despite decades of awareness, societies have failed to adequately respond to climate change, as evidenced by rising CO<sub>2</sub> emissions and the continued dominance of fossil fuels in global energy consumption. This failure underscores the structural constraints of capitalist modernity, where economic and political incentives, as well as consumer behaviors, obstruct effective climate action. Beyond the challenge of mitigation, climate change raises pressing questions about its social and political consequences. Societies will face increasing losses due to extreme weather events, resource depletion, and declining living conditions, exacerbating social inequalities and undermining the legitimacy of existing political and economic structures. The inability of capitalist modernity to address this crisis fosters a state of social anomie, where normative commitments to sustainability clash with entrenched systemic realities. Social scientists have a crucial role in examining these structural failures and identifying pathways for adaptation, resilience, and transformation. By analyzing the conflicts and contradictions within current societal arrangements, they can contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of climate change as a profound challenge to social order and political stability.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":"16 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2025-02-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143462417","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Andrea Migone, David Chen, Bryan Evans, Alex Howlett, Michael Howlett
Lobbying is a multi‐faceted phenomenon that involves interest groups and corporations contacting politicians and officials in order to try to achieve their policy preferences. While interest group policy‐related lobbying has received a great deal of attention, studies of corporate contract lobbying are rarer even though this is a much older phenomenon. The article critically examines the commonly‐held position that in the latter case “lobbying is for winners”; that is, that large scale corporate lobbying helps secure contracts that might otherwise have gone to a different firm. It argues instead that firms enjoying technological and other market‐related strengths enjoy an “insider advantage” and lobby less than firms in more competitive situations. In other words that in many situations “lobbying is for losers,” a tool used by weaker firms trying to match or offset the technological and other advantages enjoyed by dominant firms. The article draws on government lobbying registers to examine recent defense‐related procurement efforts in Canada to purchase fighter jets, naval surface ships, patrol vessels, and search and rescue aircraft and the contract lobbying they engendered. Evidence from the four cases provides support for the “loser” thesis with respect to large‐scale technologically advanced goods but also the need to carefully define what constitutes an “inside advantage” allowing firms to forego or delay their lobbying activity, often until only after a contract has been awarded.
{"title":"“Is Lobbying for Losers?”: Corporate Behavior and Canadian Military Procurement Contracting","authors":"Andrea Migone, David Chen, Bryan Evans, Alex Howlett, Michael Howlett","doi":"10.1111/rego.12658","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12658","url":null,"abstract":"Lobbying is a multi‐faceted phenomenon that involves interest groups and corporations contacting politicians and officials in order to try to achieve their policy preferences. While interest group policy‐related lobbying has received a great deal of attention, studies of corporate contract lobbying are rarer even though this is a much older phenomenon. The article critically examines the commonly‐held position that in the latter case “lobbying is for winners”; that is, that large scale corporate lobbying helps secure contracts that might otherwise have gone to a different firm. It argues instead that firms enjoying technological and other market‐related strengths enjoy an “insider advantage” and lobby less than firms in more competitive situations. In other words that in many situations “lobbying is for losers,” a tool used by weaker firms trying to match or offset the technological and other advantages enjoyed by dominant firms. The article draws on government lobbying registers to examine recent defense‐related procurement efforts in Canada to purchase fighter jets, naval surface ships, patrol vessels, and search and rescue aircraft and the contract lobbying they engendered. Evidence from the four cases provides support for the “loser” thesis with respect to large‐scale technologically advanced goods but also the need to carefully define what constitutes an “inside advantage” allowing firms to forego or delay their lobbying activity, often until only <jats:italic>after</jats:italic> a contract has been awarded.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":"180 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2025-02-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143435249","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The budget is the outcome of bargaining between spenders and guardians. Most research on budgeting sees all spenders as a unitary actor. This article argues, instead, that there are different relations at play between guardians and each spending ministry. Based on a comparison between four social ministries in Israel, it shows that these relations differ in terms of the level of involvement of guardians in spenders' budgetary inputs and outputs, ranging from near‐complete autonomy within existing budget limits to tight budgetary control and interference in policymaking. The difference is a function of the perceived risk of overspending or ineffectiveness. When the guardian's level of involvement is high, the dynamic between the parties can be conflictual if they do not share the same policy ideas. In a conflictual dynamic, spenders have more chances of forcing their will on guardians if they can use their political power to stand up to them.
{"title":"Guardians and Spenders in the Budgetary Process: More Than One Type of Relations","authors":"Ilana Shpaizman","doi":"10.1111/rego.70002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.70002","url":null,"abstract":"The budget is the outcome of bargaining between spenders and guardians. Most research on budgeting sees all spenders as a unitary actor. This article argues, instead, that there are different relations at play between guardians and each spending ministry. Based on a comparison between four social ministries in Israel, it shows that these relations differ in terms of the level of involvement of guardians in spenders' budgetary inputs and outputs, ranging from near‐complete autonomy within existing budget limits to tight budgetary control and interference in policymaking. The difference is a function of the perceived risk of overspending or ineffectiveness. When the guardian's level of involvement is high, the dynamic between the parties can be conflictual if they do not share the same policy ideas. In a conflictual dynamic, spenders have more chances of forcing their will on guardians if they can use their political power to stand up to them.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":"10 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2025-02-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143401931","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Secrecy jurisdictions play a crucial role in the legal framework perpetuating climate change. This paper demonstrates how these jurisdictions sustain the dynamics of climate change by enabling capital accumulation rooted in environmental degradation. A regulatory approach to law and climate change must address the global nature of the legal structure that upholds exploitative and ecocidal social relationships. This paper argues that secrecy jurisdictions are a pivotal yet under-analyzed element of the global legal architecture that facilitates climate change. It, therefore, proposes the term regulatory havens to describe their purpose more adequately. Our analysis includes a case study of the Caribbean, as this geographical region operates as the epicenter for externalizing legal liabilities and extra-legal activities that contribute to climate change while also disproportionately suffering its impacts. The paper outlines how the corporate organizational structure prevalent in regulatory havens enable fossil fuel companies to shield themselves from liability, thus allowing them to detoxify fossil fuel assets. It then sets out a typology of “mechanisms of avoidance” that enable fossil fuel companies to secure key commercial advantages and operate under the radar of regulatory constraints. It briefly analyses the need to dismantle regulatory havens as a prerequisite for building a sustainable economy.
{"title":"Fossil Capital in the Caribbean: The Toxic Role of “Regulatory Havens” in Climate Change","authors":"Jose Atiles, David Whyte","doi":"10.1111/rego.70001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.70001","url":null,"abstract":"Secrecy jurisdictions play a crucial role in the legal framework perpetuating climate change. This paper demonstrates how these jurisdictions sustain the dynamics of climate change by enabling capital accumulation rooted in environmental degradation. A regulatory approach to law and climate change must address the global nature of the legal structure that upholds exploitative and ecocidal social relationships. This paper argues that secrecy jurisdictions are a pivotal yet under-analyzed element of the global legal architecture that facilitates climate change. It, therefore, proposes the term <i>regulatory havens</i> to describe their purpose more adequately. Our analysis includes a case study of the Caribbean, as this geographical region operates as the epicenter for externalizing legal liabilities and extra-legal activities that contribute to climate change while also disproportionately suffering its impacts. The paper outlines how the corporate organizational structure prevalent in regulatory havens enable fossil fuel companies to shield themselves from liability, thus allowing them to detoxify fossil fuel assets. It then sets out a typology of “mechanisms of avoidance” that enable fossil fuel companies to secure key commercial advantages and operate under the radar of regulatory constraints. It briefly analyses the need to dismantle regulatory havens as a prerequisite for building a sustainable economy.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":"34 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2025-02-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143401603","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper explores the nature of governance both within and by blockchains and the economies they support. There is a widespread assumption that the proper governance model for these economies is political. In this paper, I make an alternative claim, namely that a more accurate model for blockchain governance is as a species of corporate governance. Political and corporate governance are similar, but they solve different problems with different incentives. Political governance, at its base, seeks to create legitimacy for coercive acts. Corporate governance is about solving agency problems with voluntary agreement. I explain why crypto governance is more like the latter, and in so doing draw out some of the lessons of the theory of modern corporate governance that might then usefully apply to the design of blockchain governance mechanisms.
{"title":"Corporate Governance in a Crypto-World","authors":"Sinclair Davidson","doi":"10.1111/rego.12661","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12661","url":null,"abstract":"This paper explores the nature of governance both within and by blockchains and the economies they support. There is a widespread assumption that the proper governance model for these economies is political. In this paper, I make an alternative claim, namely that a more accurate model for blockchain governance is as a species of corporate governance. Political and corporate governance are similar, but they solve different problems with different incentives. Political governance, at its base, seeks to create legitimacy for coercive acts. Corporate governance is about solving agency problems with voluntary agreement. I explain why crypto governance is more like the latter, and in so doing draw out some of the lessons of the theory of modern corporate governance that might then usefully apply to the design of blockchain governance mechanisms.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":"34 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2025-02-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143375313","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
While outsourcing of public services is today widespread, maintaining their quality remains a challenge. External inspections are seen as essential for overseeing private providers, yet their effectiveness has not been thoroughly investigated. This study evaluates the impact of pre-scheduled inspections on the performance of private and publicly operated prisons in England and Wales between 2004 and 2012, focusing on two key safety indicators: self-harm and violence. Our findings reveal that private prisons' performance in these safety measures was weak, and that pre-scheduled predictable inspections are not effective enough to mitigate this weakness. The findings suggest that governments should consider areas where outsourcing may be inappropriate, and how existing inspection systems can be optimized.
{"title":"Outsourced, Inspected, and Effective? The Effect of Inspections on the Safety Performance of Prisons in England and Wales 2004–2012","authors":"Ayako Nakamura","doi":"10.1111/rego.12660","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12660","url":null,"abstract":"While outsourcing of public services is today widespread, maintaining their quality remains a challenge. External inspections are seen as essential for overseeing private providers, yet their effectiveness has not been thoroughly investigated. This study evaluates the impact of pre-scheduled inspections on the performance of private and publicly operated prisons in England and Wales between 2004 and 2012, focusing on two key safety indicators: self-harm and violence. Our findings reveal that private prisons' performance in these safety measures was weak, and that pre-scheduled predictable inspections are not effective enough to mitigate this weakness. The findings suggest that governments should consider areas where outsourcing may be inappropriate, and how existing inspection systems can be optimized.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":"41 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2025-02-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143375314","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Blockchain treasuries are pools of cryptocurrency earmarked for funding goods and services within a blockchain ecosystem, such as protocol upgrades. Blockchain participants, such as users and developers, face a trust problem in ensuring that the treasury is robust to opportunism, such as theft or misappropriation of the assets. Treasury governance structures, such as committees or stakeholder voting, seek to create trust in treasury functions. In this paper, we use new comparative economics to examine how treasury governance mechanisms minimize the costs of dictatorship and disorder, thereby bolstering trust. We interpret case studies of innovative treasury governance within this Institutional Possibilities Frontier (IPF) framework, showing that the costs shift throughout the lifecycle of a blockchain community, and those costs are often revealed or learned through governance crises. These changes lead ecosystem participants to choose and innovate on treasury governance.
{"title":"The Blockchain Treasury Governance Dilemma","authors":"Darcy W. E. Allen, Chris Berg, Aaron M. Lane","doi":"10.1111/rego.12659","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12659","url":null,"abstract":"Blockchain treasuries are pools of cryptocurrency earmarked for funding goods and services within a blockchain ecosystem, such as protocol upgrades. Blockchain participants, such as users and developers, face a trust problem in ensuring that the treasury is robust to opportunism, such as theft or misappropriation of the assets. Treasury governance structures, such as committees or stakeholder voting, seek to create trust in treasury functions. In this paper, we use new comparative economics to examine how treasury governance mechanisms minimize the costs of dictatorship and disorder, thereby bolstering trust. We interpret case studies of innovative treasury governance within this Institutional Possibilities Frontier (IPF) framework, showing that the costs shift throughout the lifecycle of a blockchain community, and those costs are often revealed or learned through governance crises. These changes lead ecosystem participants to choose and innovate on treasury governance.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":"39 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2025-02-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143083446","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Karlis Laksevics, Janis Brizga, Pia Mamut, Halliki Kreinin, Doris Fuchs, Inga Belousa
Bridging the gap between welfare and climate policies is essential for simultaneously pursuing increased well‐being and reduced carbon emissions. This study uses a policy Delphi approach, involving experts and stakeholders from five European countries: Germany, Hungary, Latvia, Spain, and Sweden, to assess the perceived desirability and feasibility of six eco‐social policies for enabling 1.5°C lifestyles. The results show that eco‐social policies are challenged by current growth and work paradigms, which transcend welfare‐regime‐related, ideological, social, and institutional rationales. Of the selected policies, stakeholders found low‐efficiency housing retrofits the most desirable, but income caps the least desirable. Worktime reduction, job guarantees, and income ceilings raise deep concerns over work, motivation, and consumption. However, universal basic services, free public transport, and public renovation raise concerns about service efficiency, innovation incentives, and welfare entitlement. Stakeholders agreed that eco‐social policies are desirable and feasible, but only when combined in a way that balances social and environmental impacts. They believe it might be easier to address challenges in understanding and implementing these policies if they were part of a broader, coordinated approach at a supranational level, rather than isolated, single‐issue policies targeting specific sectors.
{"title":"An Eco‐Social Policy Mix for 1.5°C Lifestyles: A Multi‐Country Policy Delphi Analysis","authors":"Karlis Laksevics, Janis Brizga, Pia Mamut, Halliki Kreinin, Doris Fuchs, Inga Belousa","doi":"10.1111/rego.12655","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12655","url":null,"abstract":"Bridging the gap between welfare and climate policies is essential for simultaneously pursuing increased well‐being and reduced carbon emissions. This study uses a policy Delphi approach, involving experts and stakeholders from five European countries: Germany, Hungary, Latvia, Spain, and Sweden, to assess the perceived desirability and feasibility of six eco‐social policies for enabling 1.5°C lifestyles. The results show that eco‐social policies are challenged by current growth and work paradigms, which transcend welfare‐regime‐related, ideological, social, and institutional rationales. Of the selected policies, stakeholders found low‐efficiency housing retrofits the most desirable, but income caps the least desirable. Worktime reduction, job guarantees, and income ceilings raise deep concerns over work, motivation, and consumption. However, universal basic services, free public transport, and public renovation raise concerns about service efficiency, innovation incentives, and welfare entitlement. Stakeholders agreed that eco‐social policies are desirable and feasible, but only when combined in a way that balances social and environmental impacts. They believe it might be easier to address challenges in understanding and implementing these policies if they were part of a broader, coordinated approach at a supranational level, rather than isolated, single‐issue policies targeting specific sectors.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":"60 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2025-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143071520","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Theory and case studies suggest that emergencies and disasters increase corruption, especially in public procurement, hampering relief and reconstruction efforts. Despite a growing interest in the topic, including in research, there is still little systematic evidence about these effects, their structure and trajectories. We set out to investigate the medium-term impact of disasters on corruption risks, using large-scale administrative data on public tenders in Italy from 2007 to 2020, combined with data on 5 natural disasters. We employ logistic regression, coarsened exact matching and difference-in-differences estimators. We find that disasters increase corruption risks in the medium-term (3 or more years after the disaster), even more than on the short term (1 year after the disaster). In the matched and diff-in-diff analyses, we find 3%–10% points more non-open procedures used, 19%–21% points fewer call for tenders published, 19%–29% points more tenders with short advertisement period and 14%–17% points more single bidding tenders. Our findings highlight the importance of ring-fencing corruption risks associated with disaster response, especially in the medium to long term.
{"title":"The Impact of Emergencies on Corruption Risks: Italian Natural Disasters and Public Procurement","authors":"Mihaly Fazekas, Shrey Nishchal, Tina Soreide","doi":"10.1111/rego.12653","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12653","url":null,"abstract":"Theory and case studies suggest that emergencies and disasters increase corruption, especially in public procurement, hampering relief and reconstruction efforts. Despite a growing interest in the topic, including in research, there is still little systematic evidence about these effects, their structure and trajectories. We set out to investigate the medium-term impact of disasters on corruption risks, using large-scale administrative data on public tenders in Italy from 2007 to 2020, combined with data on 5 natural disasters. We employ logistic regression, coarsened exact matching and difference-in-differences estimators. We find that disasters increase corruption risks in the medium-term (3 or more years after the disaster), even more than on the short term (1 year after the disaster). In the matched and diff-in-diff analyses, we find 3%–10% points more non-open procedures used, 19%–21% points fewer call for tenders published, 19%–29% points more tenders with short advertisement period and 14%–17% points more single bidding tenders. Our findings highlight the importance of ring-fencing corruption risks associated with disaster response, especially in the medium to long term.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":"25 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2025-01-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143030919","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Ixchel Perez-Duran, Yannis Papadopoulos, Bastiaan Redert, Juan Carlos Triviño-Salazar
This paper examines expertise and professional diversity within new (agencies and central banks) and traditional (ministries) regulatory bodies (RBs) and assesses their effect on the perceived competence of RBs. In particular, we address the following research questions: To what extent do members of RBs have expertise and display diversity in terms of their professional trajectories? How do expertise and professional diversity affect the perceived competence of RBs? By using two empirical sources of data, this article provides core information on the educational and professional profiles of RBs staff. In addition, the paper provides evidence that both professional diversity and expertise among RBs do not have a significant effect on their perceived competence by regime actors. However, the study also suggests that regime actors that are more closely aligned to the professional trajectory of RB members (i.e., other regulators and members of the executive branch) tend to have a more positive perception of the competence of RBs. Conversely, societal actors tend to be more critical toward RBs, suggesting that a lack of a shared language creates a greater distance from the regulators.
{"title":"Does the Background of the Regulator Matter? The Role of Expertise and Diversity on the Perceived Competence of Regulatory Bodies","authors":"Ixchel Perez-Duran, Yannis Papadopoulos, Bastiaan Redert, Juan Carlos Triviño-Salazar","doi":"10.1111/rego.12654","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12654","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines expertise and professional diversity within new (agencies and central banks) and traditional (ministries) regulatory bodies (RBs) and assesses their effect on the perceived competence of RBs. In particular, we address the following research questions: To what extent do members of RBs have expertise and display diversity in terms of their professional trajectories? How do expertise and professional diversity affect the perceived competence of RBs? By using two empirical sources of data, this article provides core information on the educational and professional profiles of RBs staff. In addition, the paper provides evidence that both professional diversity and expertise among RBs do not have a significant effect on their perceived competence by regime actors. However, the study also suggests that regime actors that are more closely aligned to the professional trajectory of RB members (i.e., other regulators and members of the executive branch) tend to have a more positive perception of the competence of RBs. Conversely, societal actors tend to be more critical toward RBs, suggesting that a lack of a shared language creates a greater distance from the regulators.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":"15 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2025-01-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142991260","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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