This article examines trust in regulation as a core value and precondition of the modern liberal democratic regulatory state. It develops a concept of justified trust in regulation, grounded in regulatory trustworthiness—honesty, competence, and reliability—rather than in proxies such as partisan loyalty, blind faith, obedience, or resignation. The article situates this conception of regulatory trustworthiness within liberal democratic rule-of-law commitments to equal respect, fairness, and accountability, and shows how it underpinned late-twentieth-century imaginings of the “regulatory state.” It then contrasts this model with an emerging illiberal vision, exemplified by the current American President's emphasis on personal loyalty, in-group allegiance, and zero-sum politics—all of which actively repudiate the conditions for justified trust. Using regulatory theory and examples from contemporary US governance, the article argues that mutual justified trust between regulators and regulated actors is an indispensable “capital good” for effective, flexible, and fair regulatory regimes. It concludes that rebuilding a functional regulatory state after an illiberal turn requires explicitly naming, protecting, and measuring regulatory trustworthiness as a central liberal value, alongside the rule of law, democratic accountability, and a basic commitment to equality.
{"title":"Trust in Regulation in a Time of Revolution","authors":"Cristie Ford","doi":"10.1111/rego.70141","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.70141","url":null,"abstract":"This article examines trust in regulation as a core value and precondition of the modern liberal democratic regulatory state. It develops a concept of <i>justified</i> trust in regulation, grounded in regulatory trustworthiness—honesty, competence, and reliability—rather than in proxies such as partisan loyalty, blind faith, obedience, or resignation. The article situates this conception of regulatory trustworthiness within liberal democratic rule-of-law commitments to equal respect, fairness, and accountability, and shows how it underpinned late-twentieth-century imaginings of the “regulatory state.” It then contrasts this model with an emerging illiberal vision, exemplified by the current American President's emphasis on personal loyalty, in-group allegiance, and zero-sum politics—all of which actively repudiate the conditions for justified trust. Using regulatory theory and examples from contemporary US governance, the article argues that mutual justified trust between regulators and regulated actors is an indispensable “capital good” for effective, flexible, and fair regulatory regimes. It concludes that rebuilding a functional regulatory state after an illiberal turn requires explicitly naming, protecting, and measuring regulatory trustworthiness as a central liberal value, alongside the rule of law, democratic accountability, and a basic commitment to equality.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":"30 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2026-03-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147439847","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This study examines the impact of tax-related formal institutions on corporate tax disclosures. Our theorizing, based on voluntary disclosure theory and institutional theory, highlights the cost–benefit analysis firms engage in to decide on corporate tax disclosures, where transparency enhances legitimacy but also entails risks like revealing proprietary information and increased political scrutiny. We argue that tax complexity and the maturity of cooperative compliance programs affect this cost–benefit analysis. We use data on tax disclosure practices for the period 2018 to 2022 for listed firms from 21 countries to test our expectations. After controlling for country- and firm-level differences, we find that tax complexity is positively associated with corporate tax disclosures, suggesting firms want to show they are “good citizens”. The maturity of cooperative compliance programs, programs aiming to create mutual benefits for tax authorities and large firms by fostering collaboration and trust, is also positively associated with corporate tax disclosure levels.
{"title":"Formal Institutions and Corporate Tax Disclosures: A Cross-Country Analysis","authors":"Reggy Hooghiemstra, Irene Burgers, Jos Offerein","doi":"10.1111/rego.70135","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.70135","url":null,"abstract":"This study examines the impact of tax-related formal institutions on corporate tax disclosures. Our theorizing, based on voluntary disclosure theory and institutional theory, highlights the cost–benefit analysis firms engage in to decide on corporate tax disclosures, where transparency enhances legitimacy but also entails risks like revealing proprietary information and increased political scrutiny. We argue that tax complexity and the maturity of cooperative compliance programs affect this cost–benefit analysis. We use data on tax disclosure practices for the period 2018 to 2022 for listed firms from 21 countries to test our expectations. After controlling for country- and firm-level differences, we find that tax complexity is positively associated with corporate tax disclosures, suggesting firms want to show they are “good citizens”. The maturity of cooperative compliance programs, programs aiming to create mutual benefits for tax authorities and large firms by fostering collaboration and trust, is also positively associated with corporate tax disclosure levels.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":"84 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2026-03-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147384116","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Due diligence laws respond to labor governance challenges and to a lack of public governance addressing human rights violations in Global Value Chains. Despite ongoing contestation, the German Supply Chain Due Diligence Act seeks to hold German‐based firms accountable for human rights risks in their supply chains. This paper explores how an underrepresented actor, organized labor, leverages this legal mechanism for local labor conflicts within transnational production systems, considering political‐economic specificities of the targeted countries. Drawing on a single case study based on expert interviews and document analysis, it examines the mobilization of a complaint filed under the Act in Brazil. The Act can function as a complementary transnational governance lever to national governance, yet its implementation requires a comprehensive National System of Industrial Relations and broader national labor‐related regulatory frameworks. The Act exemplifies a new form of transnational horizontal‐vertical labor governance while outsourcing sustainability governance to organized labor.
尽职调查法应对了劳工治理方面的挑战，以及全球价值链中缺乏解决侵犯人权问题的公共治理。尽管争议不断，《德国供应链尽职调查法案》（German Supply Chain Due Diligence Act）寻求让德国企业对其供应链中的人权风险负责。本文探讨了一个代表性不足的行动者，有组织的劳工，如何在跨国生产系统中利用这种法律机制来解决当地的劳资冲突，同时考虑到目标国家的政治经济特殊性。根据基于专家访谈和文件分析的单一案例研究，本报告审查了在巴西根据该法提起申诉的动员情况。该法案可以作为国家治理的跨国治理杠杆，但其实施需要一个全面的国家劳资关系体系和更广泛的国家劳动相关监管框架。该法案体现了跨国横向-纵向劳动治理的新形式，同时将可持续性治理外包给有组织的劳工。
{"title":"New Labor Governance? The German Supply Chain Act and National Governance Mechanisms in Brazil","authors":"Helena Gräf","doi":"10.1111/rego.70137","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.70137","url":null,"abstract":"Due diligence laws respond to labor governance challenges and to a lack of public governance addressing human rights violations in Global Value Chains. Despite ongoing contestation, the German Supply Chain Due Diligence Act seeks to hold German‐based firms accountable for human rights risks in their supply chains. This paper explores how an underrepresented actor, organized labor, leverages this legal mechanism for local labor conflicts within transnational production systems, considering political‐economic specificities of the targeted countries. Drawing on a single case study based on expert interviews and document analysis, it examines the mobilization of a complaint filed under the Act in Brazil. The Act can function as a complementary transnational governance lever to national governance, yet its implementation requires a comprehensive National System of Industrial Relations and broader national labor‐related regulatory frameworks. The Act exemplifies a new form of transnational horizontal‐vertical labor governance while outsourcing sustainability governance to organized labor.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":"5 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2026-03-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147380796","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Non‐majoritarian institutions are designed to depoliticize policymaking and enhance the credibility of regulatory decisions. Yet many such bodies have become sites of contestation, exposing the limits of technocratic insulation. While research highlights external and behavioral drivers of politicization, the role of institutional design features in shaping this process remains underexplored. This article develops the concept of design‐based politicization to explain how structural features intended to depoliticize decision‐making can instead generate conflict. Drawing on interview and document material, it examines the European Commission's Regulatory Scrutiny Board as a critical case of technocratic oversight in regulatory governance. The analysis identifies three design‐related mechanisms for politicization: delegation ambiguity, mandate contradictions, and weak throughput legitimacy. Politicization may thus stem not only from external pressures or poor performance but from specific institutional design features, thereby revealing the contradictions of depoliticization and clarifying when and why technocratic oversight bodies become contested within and beyond Europe.
{"title":"Design‐Based Politicization in Non‐Majoritarian Institutions: The Case of the European Commission's Regulatory Scrutiny Board","authors":"Brigitte Pircher","doi":"10.1111/rego.70139","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.70139","url":null,"abstract":"Non‐majoritarian institutions are designed to depoliticize policymaking and enhance the credibility of regulatory decisions. Yet many such bodies have become sites of contestation, exposing the limits of technocratic insulation. While research highlights external and behavioral drivers of politicization, the role of institutional design features in shaping this process remains underexplored. This article develops the concept of design‐based politicization to explain how structural features intended to depoliticize decision‐making can instead generate conflict. Drawing on interview and document material, it examines the European Commission's Regulatory Scrutiny Board as a critical case of technocratic oversight in regulatory governance. The analysis identifies three design‐related mechanisms for politicization: delegation ambiguity, mandate contradictions, and weak throughput legitimacy. Politicization may thus stem not only from external pressures or poor performance but from specific institutional design features, thereby revealing the contradictions of depoliticization and clarifying when and why technocratic oversight bodies become contested within and beyond Europe.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":"55 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2026-03-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147380795","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Critics of private regulation argue that voluntary standards often fail to meaningfully improve corporate conduct while simultaneously functioning as a stumbling block that prevents the development of more stringent, mandatory regulation by states. This paper complicates this view by illustrating the instrumental value of private regulation—that is, its potential to act as a building block that facilitates the development of new government regulation that serves the public interest. Through a combination of in-depth interviews and analysis of publicly available documents, I examine the impact of voluntary corporate non-financial reporting on public policy over the period 1997–2025. The analysis highlights the critical role that both businesses and civil society organizations have played in (1) expanding the regulatory space by developing voluntary standards in policy areas that state officials have been either unwilling or unable to address, (2) changing expectations for good corporate behavior by popularizing these standards, and (3) sharing responsibility for regulation with public policymakers through interlocking voluntary and mandatory rules. The analysis also demonstrates the importance of institutional complementarity as a scope condition of this three-stage model.
{"title":"The Instrumental Value of Private Regulation: Evidence From the Case of Corporate Non-Financial Reporting","authors":"Matthew Maguire","doi":"10.1111/rego.70132","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.70132","url":null,"abstract":"Critics of private regulation argue that voluntary standards often fail to meaningfully improve corporate conduct while simultaneously functioning as a stumbling block that prevents the development of more stringent, mandatory regulation by states. This paper complicates this view by illustrating the <i>instrumental value</i> of private regulation—that is, its potential to act as a building block that facilitates the development of new government regulation that serves the public interest. Through a combination of in-depth interviews and analysis of publicly available documents, I examine the impact of voluntary corporate non-financial reporting on public policy over the period 1997–2025. The analysis highlights the critical role that both businesses and civil society organizations have played in (1) <i>expanding the regulatory space</i> by developing voluntary standards in policy areas that state officials have been either unwilling or unable to address, (2) <i>changing expectations</i> for good corporate behavior by popularizing these standards, and (3) <i>sharing responsibility</i> for regulation with public policymakers through interlocking voluntary and mandatory rules. The analysis also demonstrates the importance of institutional complementarity as a scope condition of this three-stage model.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":"98 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2026-02-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147351264","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The 21st century has witnessed a surge in the number of global corporate responsibility (GCR) frameworks issued by international organizations (IOs). Our study investigates whether and to what extent these frameworks shape businesses' Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) communications. Integrating insights from computational linguistics, we propose that the textual characteristics of GCR frameworks, mainly how they are written, play a crucial role in determining their use by businesses. Using natural language processing, we analyze CSR communications from 320 firms, encompassing 4025 documents, to determine the extent of their incorporation of text from GCR frameworks. The study identifies a “Goldilocks effect,” whereby businesses' use of GCR framework is greatest when the language is neither overly simple nor excessively complex.
{"title":"The Goldilocks Effect: How the “Just Right” Writing Styles of Global Corporate Responsibility Frameworks Shapes Their Use by Businesses","authors":"Adam William Chalmers, Robyn Klingler-Vidra","doi":"10.1111/rego.70133","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.70133","url":null,"abstract":"The 21st century has witnessed a surge in the number of global corporate responsibility (GCR) frameworks issued by international organizations (IOs). Our study investigates whether and to what extent these frameworks shape businesses' Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) communications. Integrating insights from computational linguistics, we propose that the textual characteristics of GCR frameworks, mainly <i>how</i> they are written, play a crucial role in determining their use by businesses. Using natural language processing, we analyze CSR communications from 320 firms, encompassing 4025 documents, to determine the extent of their incorporation of text from GCR frameworks. The study identifies a “Goldilocks effect,” whereby businesses' use of GCR framework is greatest when the language is neither overly simple nor excessively complex.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":"71 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2026-02-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147287357","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Policy makers are showing increased interest in understanding the impacts of public policies on subgroups of the population. We provide the first cross‐regional comparison of distributional analyses by examining 907 benefit–cost analyses (BCAs) in the United States, the United Kingdom, and the European Union from 2016 through 2020. In these regions, we find almost no quantification of net benefits for a population subgroup (2 US BCAs, 0 UK BCAs, and 1 EU BCA). Distributional weights were also rarely used (5 UK BCAs, none elsewhere). Moreover, when distributional weights were used in the United Kingdom, they were used mainly to evaluate policies involving income transfers between low‐ and high‐income groups rather than in broader regulatory analyses. We consider possible explanations for the lack of quantification of net benefits by subgroup along with the implications of our findings for conducting distributional analysis. JEL Classification: K23, K32, Q58, I0
{"title":"How Well Do Governments Assess the Distributional Impacts of Policy?","authors":"Caroline Cecot, Robert W. Hahn, Eslem Imamoglu","doi":"10.1111/rego.70122","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.70122","url":null,"abstract":"Policy makers are showing increased interest in understanding the impacts of public policies on subgroups of the population. We provide the first cross‐regional comparison of distributional analyses by examining 907 benefit–cost analyses (BCAs) in the United States, the United Kingdom, and the European Union from 2016 through 2020. In these regions, we find almost no quantification of net benefits for a population subgroup (2 US BCAs, 0 UK BCAs, and 1 EU BCA). Distributional weights were also rarely used (5 UK BCAs, none elsewhere). Moreover, when distributional weights were used in the United Kingdom, they were used mainly to evaluate policies involving income transfers between low‐ and high‐income groups rather than in broader regulatory analyses. We consider possible explanations for the lack of quantification of net benefits by subgroup along with the implications of our findings for conducting distributional analysis. JEL Classification: K23, K32, Q58, I0","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":"284 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2026-02-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146261180","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Transparency is a key concern in global governance scholarship, yet its contribution to good governance remains deeply ambivalent. Scholars are increasingly questioning the idea of transparency as a silver bullet, emphasizing the need to better understand its potential, pitfalls, and regulatory challenges. This article focuses on the field of business and human rights (BHR), and recent regulatory advancements in human rights due diligence (HRDD) in the European Union specifically, to examine the conditions under which transparency supports business responsibilities for human rights. Drawing on expert and policymaker interviews from the negotiations of the EU Directive on Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence, complemented by document analysis of related laws, policies, and research, the study identifies four interrelated dimensions that condition transparency as a regulatory pivot in HRDD: the design and audience of disclosure, the operationalization of reporting standards, the balance of accountability mechanisms, and the role of stakeholders and their modes of engagement. The analysis demonstrates that transparency operates within complex tensions—between capacity‐building and control, politics and law, and cooperation and contestation. By tracing how these tensions are addressed in EU‐level policymaking, the article advances understanding of how integrated communicative practices, clear and fair standard‐setting, accountability governance, and a culture of plural and deliberative stakeholder engagement can shape transparency as a means of good governance rather than an impediment to it. The findings extend beyond BHR to broader global governance debates on information disclosure, effectiveness, accountability, and democratization, while underscoring the need to recognize businesses as global governance actors.
{"title":"Toward Transparent Global Governance? Human Rights Due Diligence in the European Union","authors":"Janne Mende, Richard Georgi","doi":"10.1111/rego.70131","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.70131","url":null,"abstract":"Transparency is a key concern in global governance scholarship, yet its contribution to good governance remains deeply ambivalent. Scholars are increasingly questioning the idea of transparency as a silver bullet, emphasizing the need to better understand its potential, pitfalls, and regulatory challenges. This article focuses on the field of business and human rights (BHR), and recent regulatory advancements in human rights due diligence (HRDD) in the European Union specifically, to examine the conditions under which transparency supports business responsibilities for human rights. Drawing on expert and policymaker interviews from the negotiations of the EU Directive on Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence, complemented by document analysis of related laws, policies, and research, the study identifies four interrelated dimensions that condition transparency as a regulatory pivot in HRDD: the design and audience of disclosure, the operationalization of reporting standards, the balance of accountability mechanisms, and the role of stakeholders and their modes of engagement. The analysis demonstrates that transparency operates within complex tensions—between capacity‐building and control, politics and law, and cooperation and contestation. By tracing how these tensions are addressed in EU‐level policymaking, the article advances understanding of how integrated communicative practices, clear and fair standard‐setting, accountability governance, and a culture of plural and deliberative stakeholder engagement can shape transparency as a means of good governance rather than an impediment to it. The findings extend beyond BHR to broader global governance debates on information disclosure, effectiveness, accountability, and democratization, while underscoring the need to recognize businesses as global governance actors.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":"16 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2026-02-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146261179","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Marieke H. A. Kluin, Natalie Schell-Busey, Sally S. Simpson, Jordan M. Pierce
In a systematic narrative review of 33 longitudinal corporate crime studies, we identify and describe corporate criminal career dimensions: participation, frequency, crime mix, and duration. Themes and patterns across data sources are assessed, including information collected that informs a corporate criminal career perspective and what remains unexamined. Main findings reveal: (1) most longitudinal studies do not explicitly focus on the corporate criminal career; (2) a significant number of companies offend occasionally over time, but others offend often (chronically) or not at all; (3) typically, studies examine one or two types of offending, offering little insight into crime mix; and (4) identifiable groups of corporations show evidence of both stability and change over time. Studies provide insights for understanding the dimensions of corporate criminal careers (some more than others), but more explicit and detailed longitudinal work is needed. We conclude by identifying potential areas for theoretical advances and future research.
{"title":"Understanding Corporate Criminal Careers: Insights From a Systematic Narrative Review of Longitudinal Studies","authors":"Marieke H. A. Kluin, Natalie Schell-Busey, Sally S. Simpson, Jordan M. Pierce","doi":"10.1111/rego.70127","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.70127","url":null,"abstract":"In a systematic narrative review of 33 longitudinal corporate crime studies, we identify and describe corporate criminal career dimensions: participation, frequency, crime mix, and duration. Themes and patterns across data sources are assessed, including information collected that informs a corporate criminal career perspective and what remains unexamined. Main findings reveal: (1) most longitudinal studies do not explicitly focus on the corporate criminal career; (2) a significant number of companies offend occasionally over time, but others offend often (chronically) or not at all; (3) typically, studies examine one or two types of offending, offering little insight into crime mix; and (4) identifiable groups of corporations show evidence of both stability and change over time. Studies provide insights for understanding the dimensions of corporate criminal careers (some more than others), but more explicit and detailed longitudinal work is needed. We conclude by identifying potential areas for theoretical advances and future research.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":"44 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2026-02-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146210187","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Regulatory sandboxes have become increasingly prevalent over the past decade. In this paper we systematically review 15 peer‐reviewed studies and 5 gray literature sources (2016–2025) identified through structured searches of Scopus, Web of Science, and regulatory repositories. Treating effectiveness as contested and multidimensional, we combine existing studies to demonstrate when, how, and for whom sandboxes generate benefits and risks. Three patterns emerge. First, the clearest gains are ecosystem spillovers: once a sector has its first sandbox entrant, funding for non‐participating firms often rises, consistent with signaling and information diffusion. Second, direct firm‐level funding advantages largely fade after accounting for staggered adoption, with positive effects concentrated in smaller firms. Third, system‐level impacts depend on context, varying with supervisory capacity, complementary policies, and wider pro‐innovation reform bundles. Overall, the evidence base is small, UK‐centric, and methodologically heterogeneous, so findings should be read as indicative. We conclude with evaluation implications for regulators.
在过去十年中，监管沙盒变得越来越普遍。在本文中，我们系统地回顾了15项同行评议研究和5个灰色文献来源（2016-2025），这些文献来源是通过Scopus、Web of Science和监管知识库的结构化搜索确定的。将有效性视为有争议的和多维的，我们结合现有的研究来证明何时，如何以及为谁产生利益和风险。出现了三种模式。首先，最明显的收益是生态系统溢出效应：一旦一个行业有了第一个沙盒参与者，对非参与公司的融资往往会增加，这与信号和信息扩散相一致。其次，考虑到交错采用后，直接公司层面的融资优势在很大程度上消退，积极影响集中在较小的公司。第三，系统层面的影响取决于环境，因监管能力、补充性政策和更广泛的促进创新的改革而异。总的来说，证据基础小，以英国为中心，方法上不一致，因此研究结果应被视为指示性的。我们总结了对监管机构的评估意义。
{"title":"Effectiveness of Regulatory Sandboxes in Financial Services: A Systematic Review","authors":"Yanqing Wang, Zijian Zhou","doi":"10.1111/rego.70129","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.70129","url":null,"abstract":"Regulatory sandboxes have become increasingly prevalent over the past decade. In this paper we systematically review 15 peer‐reviewed studies and 5 gray literature sources (2016–2025) identified through structured searches of Scopus, Web of Science, and regulatory repositories. Treating effectiveness as contested and multidimensional, we combine existing studies to demonstrate when, how, and for whom sandboxes generate benefits and risks. Three patterns emerge. First, the clearest gains are ecosystem spillovers: once a sector has its first sandbox entrant, funding for non‐participating firms often rises, consistent with signaling and information diffusion. Second, direct firm‐level funding advantages largely fade after accounting for staggered adoption, with positive effects concentrated in smaller firms. Third, system‐level impacts depend on context, varying with supervisory capacity, complementary policies, and wider pro‐innovation reform bundles. Overall, the evidence base is small, UK‐centric, and methodologically heterogeneous, so findings should be read as indicative. We conclude with evaluation implications for regulators.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":"45 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2026-02-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146146128","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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