This study investigates how bureaucratic strategies for structuring the policy environment shape regulatory outcomes, focusing on the extent to which agencies achieve their original policy preferences. Drawing on resource dependence theory and bureaucratic politics, we conceptualize the policy environment in two dimensions: internal, concerning engagement with interest and societal groups within the agency's jurisdiction, and external, relating to interactions with other institutional actors across government. We argue that regulators strategically define access, consultation, and debate to maximize preference attainment. However, these efforts are shaped and constrained by contextual factors, including the mobilization and coordination of external actors, as well as issue salience. Using the case of the Brazilian central bank's regulation of electronic payments in the country, we perform a process tracing to explain how bureaucratic strategies and unanticipated contextual dynamics interact to produce different outcomes. Our findings suggest that, while higher issue salience enables regulators to achieve greater preference attainment, excluding mobilized actors has a salience threshold beyond which they are compelled to accommodate demands they originally opposed, whereas including these actors tends to result in partial attainment.
{"title":"Regulatory Context and Bureaucratic Policy Making: Illustrations From Payment System Regulation in Brazil","authors":"João Pedro Haddad, Lauro Emilio Gonzalez","doi":"10.1111/rego.70121","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.70121","url":null,"abstract":"This study investigates how bureaucratic strategies for structuring the policy environment shape regulatory outcomes, focusing on the extent to which agencies achieve their original policy preferences. Drawing on resource dependence theory and bureaucratic politics, we conceptualize the policy environment in two dimensions: internal, concerning engagement with interest and societal groups within the agency's jurisdiction, and external, relating to interactions with other institutional actors across government. We argue that regulators strategically define access, consultation, and debate to maximize preference attainment. However, these efforts are shaped and constrained by contextual factors, including the mobilization and coordination of external actors, as well as issue salience. Using the case of the Brazilian central bank's regulation of electronic payments in the country, we perform a process tracing to explain how bureaucratic strategies and unanticipated contextual dynamics interact to produce different outcomes. Our findings suggest that, while higher issue salience enables regulators to achieve greater preference attainment, excluding mobilized actors has a salience threshold beyond which they are compelled to accommodate demands they originally opposed, whereas including these actors tends to result in partial attainment.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":"7 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2025-12-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145836074","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Onna Malou van den Broek, Judith Schrempf‐Stirling, Frank de Bakker, Arno Kourula
This paper conceptualizes how regulation is viewed in management studies in the context of business participation in regulation and explores its implications. We theorize six lenses through which management studies understand regulation: as competitive advantages, boundaries, forums, principles, systems, and cognitive frames. These partly overlapping lenses reveal distinct theoretical approaches to the motivations, strategies, and regulatory outcomes of business participation in regulation. Together, they enable multifocality, offering a more nuanced and comprehensive study of business participation in regulation across different levels of analysis. Building on these insights, we show how different lenses and embracing multifocality strengthen the relevance of management studies for regulation and governance scholarship, particularly in unraveling the evolving relationship between business and regulation. Our paper thus contributes to better mobilizing and integrating management studies into the broader interdisciplinary discourse on regulation and governance.
{"title":"Business Participation in Regulation: A Multifocal Perspective on Management Studies","authors":"Onna Malou van den Broek, Judith Schrempf‐Stirling, Frank de Bakker, Arno Kourula","doi":"10.1111/rego.70110","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.70110","url":null,"abstract":"This paper conceptualizes how regulation is viewed in management studies in the context of business participation in regulation and explores its implications. We theorize six lenses through which management studies understand regulation: as competitive advantages, boundaries, forums, principles, systems, and cognitive frames. These partly overlapping lenses reveal distinct theoretical approaches to the motivations, strategies, and regulatory outcomes of business participation in regulation. Together, they enable multifocality, offering a more nuanced and comprehensive study of business participation in regulation across different levels of analysis. Building on these insights, we show how different lenses and embracing multifocality strengthen the relevance of management studies for regulation and governance scholarship, particularly in unraveling the evolving relationship between business and regulation. Our paper thus contributes to better mobilizing and integrating management studies into the broader interdisciplinary discourse on regulation and governance.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":"93 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2025-12-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145801027","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We examine the impact of bureaucratic politics within the US Agency for International Development on the allocation of its development assistance. Existing studies of aid allocation have focused on donor interests, recipient needs, and recipient merit without accounting for the bureaucratic decision‐making process that helps determine these budgets. We theorize that most field‐based development officials seek to maximize their country's budgets and that better‐staffed country offices have greater capacities to do so. We test this theory using novel data on USAID staffing patterns between 1980 and 2020 and leverage staff rotation patterns using an instrumental variable strategy. Consistent with our theory, results show that increasing the number of USAID staff in a country mission led to substantial increases in aid allocation. We draw on key informant interviews to explore mechanisms underlying this effect. Interviews highlight the close relationships between country‐level aid allocation and two country office capacities which better staffing tended to increase: (1) understanding of the USAID budget process and (2) ability to move through time‐consuming procedures related to funding commitment and disbursement. The findings have important implications for debates regarding the allocation of development assistance as well as broader discussions on bureaucratic politics in US foreign policy.
{"title":"Bureaucratic Politics and Aid Allocation: Evidence From the US Agency for International Development","authors":"Gus Greenstein, Mirko Heinzel","doi":"10.1111/rego.70106","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.70106","url":null,"abstract":"We examine the impact of bureaucratic politics within the US Agency for International Development on the allocation of its development assistance. Existing studies of aid allocation have focused on donor interests, recipient needs, and recipient merit without accounting for the bureaucratic decision‐making process that helps determine these budgets. We theorize that most field‐based development officials seek to maximize their country's budgets and that better‐staffed country offices have greater capacities to do so. We test this theory using novel data on USAID staffing patterns between 1980 and 2020 and leverage staff rotation patterns using an instrumental variable strategy. Consistent with our theory, results show that increasing the number of USAID staff in a country mission led to substantial increases in aid allocation. We draw on key informant interviews to explore mechanisms underlying this effect. Interviews highlight the close relationships between country‐level aid allocation and two country office capacities which better staffing tended to increase: (1) understanding of the USAID budget process and (2) ability to move through time‐consuming procedures related to funding commitment and disbursement. The findings have important implications for debates regarding the allocation of development assistance as well as broader discussions on bureaucratic politics in US foreign policy.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":"22 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2025-12-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145801023","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Public investments in childcare generally improve parents' employment chances, yet evidence on their magnitude, cross‐national variation, and social distribution remains mixed. This study examines how public spending on early childhood education and care (ECEC) moderates post‐childbirth employment attachment across Europe. Using longitudinal EU‐SILC microdata for 26 countries (2003–2020) combined with social policy indicators, multilevel mixed‐effects models trace within‐person employment changes before and 2 years after childbirth by gender, skill level, and country context. Results show that childbirth substantially reduces women's employment probabilities, but higher public ECEC investment mitigates this decline by supporting re‐entry into employment. At above‐average spending levels, employment returns to pre‐childbirth levels within 2 years, whereas recovery remains limited where ECEC investments are lower. The pattern holds across skill groups and welfare regimes, except in the Nordic countries, where low‐skilled mothers benefit more. Findings underscore the role of ECEC investment in sustaining labor force participation in Europe.
{"title":"How Public Investments in Childcare Mitigate Childbirth Effects on Employment Transitions by Skill Level in Europe","authors":"Ilze Plavgo","doi":"10.1111/rego.70116","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.70116","url":null,"abstract":"Public investments in childcare generally improve parents' employment chances, yet evidence on their magnitude, cross‐national variation, and social distribution remains mixed. This study examines how public spending on early childhood education and care (ECEC) moderates post‐childbirth employment attachment across Europe. Using longitudinal EU‐SILC microdata for 26 countries (2003–2020) combined with social policy indicators, multilevel mixed‐effects models trace within‐person employment changes before and 2 years after childbirth by gender, skill level, and country context. Results show that childbirth substantially reduces women's employment probabilities, but higher public ECEC investment mitigates this decline by supporting re‐entry into employment. At above‐average spending levels, employment returns to pre‐childbirth levels within 2 years, whereas recovery remains limited where ECEC investments are lower. The pattern holds across skill groups and welfare regimes, except in the Nordic countries, where low‐skilled mothers benefit more. Findings underscore the role of ECEC investment in sustaining labor force participation in Europe.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":"173 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2025-12-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145801029","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Marieke H. A. Kluin, Arjan A. J. Blokland, Wim Huisman
The present study examines diversity in corporate offending. Corporations can be diverse or rather specialized in their pattern of rule violating behavior. Offending diversity (or crime mix) constitutes an important dimension of the criminal career and different theories of offending lead to different predictions with regard to the extent of offending diversity expected. Though a bourgeoning literature has begun to view corporate offending through a criminal career lens, extant studies tend to focus on the frequency of corporate offending, rather than on corporate crime mix. Here, we examine corporate crime mix using regulatory inspection data on 567 Dutch corporations subject to the Seveso‐III Directive pertaining to occupational safety, external safety and disaster control for companies handling large amounts of hazardous materials. Seveso corporations show high levels of offending diversity. Latent class analysis reveals three distinct patterns of corporate offending driven by the frequency of inspection and offending, rather than by clustering of offenses within corporate criminal careers. Theoretical and practical implications of these findings are discussed.
{"title":"Are Rule Violating Corporations Specialist or Generalist Perpetrators? A Quantitative Exploration Based on Regulatory Inspection Data","authors":"Marieke H. A. Kluin, Arjan A. J. Blokland, Wim Huisman","doi":"10.1111/rego.70112","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.70112","url":null,"abstract":"The present study examines diversity in corporate offending. Corporations can be diverse or rather specialized in their pattern of rule violating behavior. Offending diversity (or crime mix) constitutes an important dimension of the criminal career and different theories of offending lead to different predictions with regard to the extent of offending diversity expected. Though a bourgeoning literature has begun to view corporate offending through a criminal career lens, extant studies tend to focus on the frequency of corporate offending, rather than on corporate crime mix. Here, we examine corporate crime mix using regulatory inspection data on 567 Dutch corporations subject to the Seveso‐III Directive pertaining to occupational safety, external safety and disaster control for companies handling large amounts of hazardous materials. Seveso corporations show high levels of offending diversity. Latent class analysis reveals three distinct patterns of corporate offending driven by the frequency of inspection and offending, rather than by clustering of offenses within corporate criminal careers. Theoretical and practical implications of these findings are discussed.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":"93 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2025-12-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145785834","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Polycentric governance is a trust‐intensive and trust‐dependent governance that should actively seek to build and restore trust. The different ways in which this is done are poorly understood. Our study of the environmental, social, and governance (ESG) strategies and the green transition clarifies the role of enhanced self‐regulation and intermediaries in trust‐building and trust‐repair in polycentric governance. ESG rating providers as intermediaries may help to build and repair trust, but as with any trustee, they represent a trust challenge as well. This article addresses these issues and is organized around three major questions: First, what are the political dynamics around the adoption of the rules for ESG ratings providers in the EU and United Kingdom? Second, what are the differences between the trust‐building and the trust‐repair strategies deployed? Third, how do these differences reflect the different approaches to the trust challenges of regulation by and of intermediaries? We apply process tracing and a comparative analysis of the regulation of ESG rating providers to generate insights into the trust‐building and trust‐repair strategies of rule‐makers. Our analysis leads us to identify varieties of enhanced self‐regulation that are differentiated by the regulatory strategies adopted by the rule‐makers vis‐à‐vis regulatory intermediaries. We show how such efforts may combine different elements of mandatory and voluntary regulation, and we shed light on the differentiated conceptualizations and complexities of the function of trust in polycentric governance regimes as a whole.
{"title":"Greenwashing and Trust via Enhanced Self‐Regulation: The Case of ESG Rating Providers in Sustainable Finance","authors":"Agnieszka Smoleńska, David Levi‐Faur","doi":"10.1111/rego.70114","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.70114","url":null,"abstract":"Polycentric governance is a trust‐intensive and trust‐dependent governance that should actively seek to build and restore trust. The different ways in which this is done are poorly understood. Our study of the environmental, social, and governance (ESG) strategies and the green transition clarifies the role of enhanced self‐regulation and intermediaries in trust‐building and trust‐repair in polycentric governance. ESG rating providers as intermediaries may help to build and repair trust, but as with any trustee, they represent a trust challenge as well. This article addresses these issues and is organized around three major questions: First, what are the political dynamics around the adoption of the rules for ESG ratings providers in the EU and United Kingdom? Second, what are the differences between the trust‐building and the trust‐repair strategies deployed? Third, how do these differences reflect the different approaches to the trust challenges of regulation by and of intermediaries? We apply process tracing and a comparative analysis of the regulation of ESG rating providers to generate insights into the trust‐building and trust‐repair strategies of rule‐makers. Our analysis leads us to identify varieties of enhanced self‐regulation that are differentiated by the regulatory strategies adopted by the rule‐makers vis‐à‐vis regulatory intermediaries. We show how such efforts may combine different elements of mandatory and voluntary regulation, and we shed light on the differentiated conceptualizations and complexities of the function of trust in polycentric governance regimes as a whole.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2025-12-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145785989","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In times of crisis, maintaining citizens' trust in government is crucial for policy legitimacy. Yet, research on how institutional design shapes trust under crisis conditions remains limited. This study addresses this gap by examining how the delegation of authority and the degree of institutional independence of public health agencies relate to citizens' trust in government across 28 European countries during the COVID‐19 pandemic. Using country‐level panel data, the analysis shows that trust tends to be higher in contexts where delegated agencies enjoy substantial independence from ministerial control. Moreover, governments with either strong ministries or fully independent agencies display higher average trust levels than those with intermediate or overlapping institutional arrangements. These findings highlight an independence–legitimacy nexus, suggesting that clear authority, political insulation, and policy stability are key to sustaining public trust during crises.
{"title":"Trust, Crisis, and Delegation: A Comparative Analysis of Public Health Authorities During the COVID ‐19 Pandemic","authors":"Jana Gómez Díaz","doi":"10.1111/rego.70115","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.70115","url":null,"abstract":"In times of crisis, maintaining citizens' trust in government is crucial for policy legitimacy. Yet, research on how institutional design shapes trust under crisis conditions remains limited. This study addresses this gap by examining how the delegation of authority and the degree of institutional independence of public health agencies relate to citizens' trust in government across 28 European countries during the COVID‐19 pandemic. Using country‐level panel data, the analysis shows that trust tends to be higher in contexts where delegated agencies enjoy substantial independence from ministerial control. Moreover, governments with either strong ministries or fully independent agencies display higher average trust levels than those with intermediate or overlapping institutional arrangements. These findings highlight an independence–legitimacy nexus, suggesting that clear authority, political insulation, and policy stability are key to sustaining public trust during crises.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":"21 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2025-12-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145765224","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Oliver Meza, Elizabeth Pérez‐Chiqués, Aldo Martínez‐Hernandez
This article theorizes about weak checks and balances (C&B) and its plausible consequences. Drawing on empirical data from over 1100 municipal officials in Mexico, the study examines how executive dominance over three key institutions—the local council, internal comptroller offices, and human resources offices—facilitates consequences associated with abuse of power and a demise in democratic regimes. We use the case of systemic corruption in local governments to propose how C&B erosion undermines institutional autonomy and capacity, thereby fostering conditions in which corruption becomes normalized and self‐sustaining. By offering theoretical propositions supported by extensive survey data, the article illustrates how C&B mechanisms are systematically undermined. These findings have broader implications for understanding the global drift toward illiberal governance and the challenges to revert the situation. The study contributes to global debates on democratic backsliding by highlighting how subnational dynamics reflect broader patterns of authoritarian power consolidation.
{"title":"Power Unleashed: Theorizing a Weak Ecology of Checks and Balances and Its Consequences. A Case From the Global South","authors":"Oliver Meza, Elizabeth Pérez‐Chiqués, Aldo Martínez‐Hernandez","doi":"10.1111/rego.70105","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.70105","url":null,"abstract":"This article theorizes about weak checks and balances (C&B) and its plausible consequences. Drawing on empirical data from over 1100 municipal officials in Mexico, the study examines how executive dominance over three key institutions—the local council, internal comptroller offices, and human resources offices—facilitates consequences associated with abuse of power and a demise in democratic regimes. We use the case of systemic corruption in local governments to propose how C&B erosion undermines institutional autonomy and capacity, thereby fostering conditions in which corruption becomes normalized and self‐sustaining. By offering theoretical propositions supported by extensive survey data, the article illustrates how C&B mechanisms are systematically undermined. These findings have broader implications for understanding the global drift toward illiberal governance and the challenges to revert the situation. The study contributes to global debates on democratic backsliding by highlighting how subnational dynamics reflect broader patterns of authoritarian power consolidation.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":"150 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2025-12-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145759708","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Ezenwa E. Olumba, Samuel Oyewole, Christopher Isike, Tony Onazi Oche
Lethal autonomous weapon systems (LAWS), while offering strategic advantages in warfare, pose significant ethical, legal, and security risks, especially for countries in the Global South. This article examines how a philosophical perspective, rooted in African ethical and political thought, can enrich regional and global debates on regulating LAWS, which remain dominated by Eurocentric assumptions. The findings of this study, which draw from secondary data, suggest that existing international and regional safeguards are insufficient to address the risks posed by LAWS. It proposes a dual‐theoretical approach informed by technological determinism and grounded in ubuntu . This approach centres on collective human accountability and reinforces the imperative of meaningful human control in the design, deployment, and governance of LAWS to safeguard the security and sovereignty of affected states and communities. This article lays the groundwork for African‐led regulatory mechanisms for emerging military technologies and offers an Afrocentric perspective on rethinking the global governance of LAWS.
{"title":"Regulating Autonomous Weapon Systems: Searching for African Solutions to Regional and Global Problems","authors":"Ezenwa E. Olumba, Samuel Oyewole, Christopher Isike, Tony Onazi Oche","doi":"10.1111/rego.70111","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.70111","url":null,"abstract":"Lethal autonomous weapon systems (LAWS), while offering strategic advantages in warfare, pose significant ethical, legal, and security risks, especially for countries in the Global South. This article examines how a philosophical perspective, rooted in African ethical and political thought, can enrich regional and global debates on regulating LAWS, which remain dominated by Eurocentric assumptions. The findings of this study, which draw from secondary data, suggest that existing international and regional safeguards are insufficient to address the risks posed by LAWS. It proposes a dual‐theoretical approach informed by technological determinism and grounded in <jats:italic>ubuntu</jats:italic> . This approach centres on collective human accountability and reinforces the imperative of <jats:italic>meaningful human control</jats:italic> in the design, deployment, and governance of LAWS to safeguard the security and sovereignty of affected states and communities. This article lays the groundwork for African‐led regulatory mechanisms for emerging military technologies and offers an Afrocentric perspective on rethinking the global governance of LAWS.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2025-12-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145664919","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
To address the shortcomings associated with state ownership, countries have implemented various legal strategies to curb political influence in state‐owned enterprises. This research studies whether these strategies constrain the government's ability to use their appointment powers for political considerations. Using logit models, I analyze whether the probability of chief executive officer (CEO) turnover increases once a new government comes into power and whether some state‐owned enterprise governance structures (board of directors' independence, ownership models and legal status) can moderate the CEO turnover sensitivity to political change. This study is based on an original dataset of state‐owned enterprises' governance characteristics and turnover events in Chile from 2006 to 2023. I find that, while CEOs are more likely to be replaced following a change in government, the turnover sensitivity to political change is heterogeneous among companies with different governance structures. These findings provide insights into what governance mechanisms are the most effective in preventing political interference.
{"title":"Governance Structures, Political Change and Executive Turnover in State‐Owned Enterprises: Evidence From Chile","authors":"Pablo Torres","doi":"10.1111/rego.70113","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.70113","url":null,"abstract":"To address the shortcomings associated with state ownership, countries have implemented various legal strategies to curb political influence in state‐owned enterprises. This research studies whether these strategies constrain the government's ability to use their appointment powers for political considerations. Using logit models, I analyze whether the probability of chief executive officer (CEO) turnover increases once a new government comes into power and whether some state‐owned enterprise governance structures (board of directors' independence, ownership models and legal status) can moderate the CEO turnover sensitivity to political change. This study is based on an original dataset of state‐owned enterprises' governance characteristics and turnover events in Chile from 2006 to 2023. I find that, while CEOs are more likely to be replaced following a change in government, the turnover sensitivity to political change is heterogeneous among companies with different governance structures. These findings provide insights into what governance mechanisms are the most effective in preventing political interference.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":"3 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2025-12-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145664492","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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