As private asset‐based welfare like funded occupational pension schemes gain importance, legitimacy concerns arise due to financial market downturns and low investment returns. This paper assesses their input legitimacy by distinguishing between individual‐direct and collective‐representative input possibilities in decision‐making processes. We argue that individual‐direct input possibilities decrease while collective‐representative input possibilities increase with occupational pensions' compulsion. To test these hypotheses, we compare voluntary occupational pension schemes in Austria, Spain, and Ireland with (quasi‐)mandatory schemes in the Netherlands and Denmark, using Germany as a test case due to recent reforms enhancing their importance. Our institutional analysis and novel survey reveal that compulsory occupational pensions are associated with lower individual‐direct and higher collective‐representative input possibilities. These findings underscore the critical role of participatory procedures in establishing legitimacy in private governance, suggesting they may strengthen public trust and satisfaction with non‐state governance.
{"title":"Assessing Input Legitimacy of Occupational Pensions in Europe","authors":"Thomas Mayer, Tobias Wiß","doi":"10.1111/rego.12647","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12647","url":null,"abstract":"As private asset‐based welfare like funded occupational pension schemes gain importance, legitimacy concerns arise due to financial market downturns and low investment returns. This paper assesses their input legitimacy by distinguishing between individual‐direct and collective‐representative input possibilities in decision‐making processes. We argue that individual‐direct input possibilities decrease while collective‐representative input possibilities increase with occupational pensions' compulsion. To test these hypotheses, we compare voluntary occupational pension schemes in Austria, Spain, and Ireland with (quasi‐)mandatory schemes in the Netherlands and Denmark, using Germany as a test case due to recent reforms enhancing their importance. Our institutional analysis and novel survey reveal that compulsory occupational pensions are associated with lower individual‐direct and higher collective‐representative input possibilities. These findings underscore the critical role of participatory procedures in establishing legitimacy in private governance, suggesting they may strengthen public trust and satisfaction with non‐state governance.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":"27 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2024-11-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142753200","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This memoir describes the 40-year unfolding, project by project, of my sociolegal field research on legal and regulatory processes. It provides brief accounts of my interactions and interviews with regulatory officials and with businesspeople responsible for regulatory compliance. It also describes my ventures into the cross-national comparison of legal and regulatory institutions and the political systems that shape and support them.
{"title":"Scenes From a Sociolegal Career: An Informal Memoir","authors":"Robert A. Kagan","doi":"10.1111/rego.12638","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12638","url":null,"abstract":"This memoir describes the 40-year unfolding, project by project, of my sociolegal field research on legal and regulatory processes. It provides brief accounts of my interactions and interviews with regulatory officials and with businesspeople responsible for regulatory compliance. It also describes my ventures into the cross-national comparison of legal and regulatory institutions and the political systems that shape and support them.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":"226 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2024-11-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142670378","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Effective cyber incident response and crisis management increasingly relies on the coordination of relevant actors at supranational levels. A polycentric governance structure is one of the institutional arrangements that can promote active participation of involved actors, an aspect decisive for the rapid and effective response to cyber incidents and crises. This research aims to dissect whether, and to what extent, a polycentric structure is manifested within the cyber crisis management framework of the European Union (EU) and assesses the extent to which these policies signal a balance between centralization and decentralization. By employing Institutional Grammar 2.0, we examine the roles and interactions among actors delineated within four key policies to identify the structural characteristics, institutional essentials, and prerequisites indicative of a polycentric governance system. Additionally, we apply network analysis to evaluate dyadic relationships of actors, further assessing the balance between centralization and decentralization in the EU's cyber crisis management framework. Our analysis reveals that the EU has adopted a polycentric governance model for cyber crisis management, characterized by a nuanced distribution of responsibilities and authorities. The findings highlight a tendency toward centralization, especially in the roles of Member States and the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA), while maintaining a polycentric structure that blends centralization and decentralization. This balance can ensure structural integrity and coherence of the system, while theoretically providing the flexibility and resilience needed to adapt to the dynamic cyber threat landscape. The study contributes methodologically, offering a framework that can be applied to other domains, and provides insights into the effective coordination of cyber incident response and crisis management at supranational levels.
{"title":"Analysis of Institutional Design of European Union Cyber Incident and Crisis Management as a Complex Public Good","authors":"Mazaher Kianpour, Christopher Frantz","doi":"10.1111/rego.12640","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12640","url":null,"abstract":"Effective cyber incident response and crisis management increasingly relies on the coordination of relevant actors at supranational levels. A polycentric governance structure is one of the institutional arrangements that can promote active participation of involved actors, an aspect decisive for the rapid and effective response to cyber incidents and crises. This research aims to dissect whether, and to what extent, a polycentric structure is manifested within the cyber crisis management framework of the European Union (EU) and assesses the extent to which these policies signal a balance between centralization and decentralization. By employing Institutional Grammar 2.0, we examine the roles and interactions among actors delineated within four key policies to identify the structural characteristics, institutional essentials, and prerequisites indicative of a polycentric governance system. Additionally, we apply network analysis to evaluate dyadic relationships of actors, further assessing the balance between centralization and decentralization in the EU's cyber crisis management framework. Our analysis reveals that the EU has adopted a polycentric governance model for cyber crisis management, characterized by a nuanced distribution of responsibilities and authorities. The findings highlight a tendency toward centralization, especially in the roles of Member States and the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA), while maintaining a polycentric structure that blends centralization and decentralization. This balance can ensure structural integrity and coherence of the system, while theoretically providing the flexibility and resilience needed to adapt to the dynamic cyber threat landscape. The study contributes methodologically, offering a framework that can be applied to other domains, and provides insights into the effective coordination of cyber incident response and crisis management at supranational levels.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":"34 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2024-11-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142596619","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Large, listed companies are under increasing pressure to respond to critical issues such as climate change, modern slavery, and the protection of First Nations' heritage. Much of this pressure is exerted by civil society actors through corporate governance mechanisms, including leveraging shareholder rights to lobby firms. At the heart of this process sit largely understudied actors, proxy advisors, who advise large institutional investors on whether to support civil society's claim‐making on companies. The proxy advising industry is an influential duopoly that advises almost all institutional investors globally. This article advances our understanding of how norms are formed to become established market practices. It maps the relational power structures that govern ethical investment and reveals the capacity of proxy advisors to contribute to the cascading of ethical investment norms. In doing so, we argue that markets are not solely guided by exogenous forces but are reflective of the web of social relations between actors. We conclude that despite historically being seen as neutral experts in their role in advising institutional investors, proxy advisors should be viewed as political actors with significant influence over the outcome of social movement campaigns.
{"title":"The Political Influence of Proxy Advisors in Campaigns for Ethical Investment: Guiding the Invisible Hand","authors":"Ainsley Elbra, Erin O'Brien, Martijn Boersma","doi":"10.1111/rego.12641","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12641","url":null,"abstract":"Large, listed companies are under increasing pressure to respond to critical issues such as climate change, modern slavery, and the protection of First Nations' heritage. Much of this pressure is exerted by civil society actors through corporate governance mechanisms, including leveraging shareholder rights to lobby firms. At the heart of this process sit largely understudied actors, proxy advisors, who advise large institutional investors on whether to support civil society's claim‐making on companies. The proxy advising industry is an influential duopoly that advises almost all institutional investors globally. This article advances our understanding of how norms are formed to become established market practices. It maps the relational power structures that govern ethical investment and reveals the capacity of proxy advisors to contribute to the cascading of ethical investment norms. In doing so, we argue that markets are not solely guided by exogenous forces but are reflective of the web of social relations between actors. We conclude that despite historically being seen as neutral experts in their role in advising institutional investors, proxy advisors should be viewed as political actors with significant influence over the outcome of social movement campaigns.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":"26 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2024-10-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142541151","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In recent years, many countries have adopted biodiversity offset policies to internalize the ecological impacts of land developments. Although national policies share the general principle of equalizing ecological harm with gain, there is substantial variation across programs regarding the institutional forms governing offsetting. In this paper, we compare biodiversity governance in the United States and France to reflect more broadly on the factors shaping divergent trajectories of green developmental policies. Both countries have some form of biodiversity offsetting in place, but the major fault line of difference is the more extensive use of market‐based instruments (MBI) in the United States. Using a historical lens, we argue that one important reason for this variation lies in the different legal‐institutional definitions of biodiversity. A narrower definition in the United States focused on individual species, versus a broader definition in France focused on ecosystems, has facilitated a more standardized biodiversity governance arrangement in the United States. Leveraging this standardization, biodiversity markets have expanded in the United States while similar efforts to institutionalize market mechanisms have struggled in France. The comparison allows us to draw insights into the challenges in greening economic development, particularly in showing how historical scientific, legal, and institutional structures condition policy outcomes.
{"title":"Historical Foundations of Green Developmental Policies: Divergent Trajectories in United States and France","authors":"Ritwick Ghosh, Stephanie Barral, Fanny Guillet","doi":"10.1111/rego.12639","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12639","url":null,"abstract":"In recent years, many countries have adopted biodiversity offset policies to internalize the ecological impacts of land developments. Although national policies share the general principle of equalizing ecological harm with gain, there is substantial variation across programs regarding the institutional forms governing offsetting. In this paper, we compare biodiversity governance in the United States and France to reflect more broadly on the factors shaping divergent trajectories of green developmental policies. Both countries have some form of biodiversity offsetting in place, but the major fault line of difference is the more extensive use of market‐based instruments (MBI) in the United States. Using a historical lens, we argue that one important reason for this variation lies in the different legal‐institutional definitions of biodiversity. A narrower definition in the United States focused on individual species, versus a broader definition in France focused on ecosystems, has facilitated a more standardized biodiversity governance arrangement in the United States. Leveraging this standardization, biodiversity markets have expanded in the United States while similar efforts to institutionalize market mechanisms have struggled in France. The comparison allows us to draw insights into the challenges in greening economic development, particularly in showing how historical scientific, legal, and institutional structures condition policy outcomes.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":"37 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2024-10-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142397992","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Mirko Heinzel, Bernhard Reinsberg, Giuseppe Zaccaria
Scholarship on the administration of international organizations (IOs) has extensively discussed how autonomy influences their performance. While some argue that autonomy increases performance through greater adaptability, others warn that it may increase the risk of agency slack. Authors typically distinguish between three types of performance: output, outcome, and impact performance. We focus on core funding as a key source of IO autonomy and argue that projects with more core funding show decreased output performance but an increased outcome and impact performance. Our empirical analysis relies on results from data on up to 3590 development projects run by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) in 128 recipient countries between 2004 and 2020. Subsequently, we test the impact of more core funding on project volumes (output performance), objectives achieved in individual projects (outcome performance), and their effects on sub-national human development in project regions (impact performance). Our findings suggest that, although reliance on core resources is associated with lower output performance (less funding), it may result in stronger outcome and impact performance, as reflected by more objectives achieved and a higher sub-national HDI where UNDP projects are implemented. Our findings have important implications for debates on the effectiveness of global governance.
{"title":"Core funding and the performance of international organizations: Evidence from UNDP projects","authors":"Mirko Heinzel, Bernhard Reinsberg, Giuseppe Zaccaria","doi":"10.1111/rego.12632","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12632","url":null,"abstract":"Scholarship on the administration of international organizations (IOs) has extensively discussed how autonomy influences their performance. While some argue that autonomy increases performance through greater adaptability, others warn that it may increase the risk of agency slack. Authors typically distinguish between three types of performance: output, outcome, and impact performance. We focus on core funding as a key source of IO autonomy and argue that projects with more core funding show decreased output performance but an increased outcome and impact performance. Our empirical analysis relies on results from data on up to 3590 development projects run by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) in 128 recipient countries between 2004 and 2020. Subsequently, we test the impact of more core funding on project volumes (output performance), objectives achieved in individual projects (outcome performance), and their effects on sub-national human development in project regions (impact performance). Our findings suggest that, although reliance on core resources is associated with lower output performance (less funding), it may result in stronger outcome and impact performance, as reflected by more objectives achieved and a higher sub-national HDI where UNDP projects are implemented. Our findings have important implications for debates on the effectiveness of global governance.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":"23 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2024-10-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142386291","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Martin B. Carstensen, Christian Lyhne Ibsen, Ida Marie Nyland Jensen
How can polycentric governance promote the development of ecosocial policies within existing policy systems? Through a study of green reforms of Danish vocational education, the paper argues that polycentric governance institutions are particularly useful at engaging constituent actors in innovation and constructive collaboration over reforming education programs to integrate ecological goals into vocational education. Combining significant autonomy for governance units and their nesting in a larger governance structure, polycentric governance helps address three key governance challenges: developing agreement among actors with clashing material interests about what green transformation entails; identifying how joint gains can be reached within a common vision of the development of the economy; and setting up an institutional structure that supports continuous adjustment to respond to technological advances and shifting social demands. Polycentric governance is, however, not a panacea. The state thus plays an important role in supporting autonomous governance units to develop ecosocial policies.
{"title":"Integrating ecosocial policies through polycentric governance: A study of the green transformation of Danish vocational education and training","authors":"Martin B. Carstensen, Christian Lyhne Ibsen, Ida Marie Nyland Jensen","doi":"10.1111/rego.12633","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12633","url":null,"abstract":"How can polycentric governance promote the development of ecosocial policies within existing policy systems? Through a study of green reforms of Danish vocational education, the paper argues that polycentric governance institutions are particularly useful at engaging constituent actors in innovation and constructive collaboration over reforming education programs to integrate ecological goals into vocational education. Combining significant autonomy for governance units and their nesting in a larger governance structure, polycentric governance helps address three key governance challenges: developing agreement among actors with clashing material interests about what green transformation entails; identifying how joint gains can be reached within a common vision of the development of the economy; and setting up an institutional structure that supports continuous adjustment to respond to technological advances and shifting social demands. Polycentric governance is, however, not a panacea. The state thus plays an important role in supporting autonomous governance units to develop ecosocial policies.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":"57 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2024-10-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142384876","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Trust is a key resource in financial transactions. Traditional financial institutions, and novel blockchain-based decentralized financial (DeFi) services rely on fundamentally different sources of trust and confidence. The former relies on heavy regulation, trusted intermediaries, clear rules (and restrictions) on market competition, and long-standing informal expectations on what banks and other financial intermediaries are supposed to do or not to do. The latter rely on blockchain technology to provide confidence in the outcome of rules encoded in protocols and smart contracts. Their main promise is to create confidence in the way the blockchain architecture enforces rules, rather than to trust banks, regulators, and markets. In this article, we compare the trust architectures surrounding these two financial systems. We provide a deeper analysis of how proposed regulation in the blockchain space affects the code- and confidence-based architectures which so far have underwrote DeFi. We argue that despite the solid safeguards and guarantees which code can offer, the confidence in DeFi is still very much dependent on more traditional trust-enhancing mechanisms, such as code governance, and antifraud regulation to address some of the issues which currently plague this domain, and which have no immediate, purely software-based solutions. What is more, given the risks of bugs or scams in the DeFi space, regulation and trusted intermediaries may need to play a more active role, in order for DeFi to gain the trust of the next generation of users.
{"title":"Trust in context: The impact of regulation on blockchain and DeFi","authors":"Balazs Bodo, Primavera de Filippi","doi":"10.1111/rego.12637","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12637","url":null,"abstract":"Trust is a key resource in financial transactions. Traditional financial institutions, and novel blockchain-based decentralized financial (DeFi) services rely on fundamentally different sources of trust and confidence. The former relies on heavy regulation, trusted intermediaries, clear rules (and restrictions) on market competition, and long-standing informal expectations on what banks and other financial intermediaries are supposed to do or not to do. The latter rely on blockchain technology to provide confidence in the outcome of rules encoded in protocols and smart contracts. Their main promise is to create confidence in the way the blockchain architecture enforces rules, rather than to trust banks, regulators, and markets. In this article, we compare the trust architectures surrounding these two financial systems. We provide a deeper analysis of how proposed regulation in the blockchain space affects the code- and confidence-based architectures which so far have underwrote DeFi. We argue that despite the solid safeguards and guarantees which code can offer, the confidence in DeFi is still very much dependent on more traditional trust-enhancing mechanisms, such as code governance, and antifraud regulation to address some of the issues which currently plague this domain, and which have no immediate, purely software-based solutions. What is more, given the risks of bugs or scams in the DeFi space, regulation and trusted intermediaries may need to play a more active role, in order for DeFi to gain the trust of the next generation of users.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":"78 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2024-10-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142383734","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The governance turn in political research has led to increased attention to informal institutions. For scholars of international relations this has contributed to recent scholarship that reveals a notable growth in the number of informal intergovernmental organizations (IIGOs). Many aspects of IIGOs remain unknown, including whether they involve transnational actors (TNAs). Yet, whether IIGOs are open to TNAs or not may affect their performance and legitimacy. Given the importance of TNA access to IIGOs, this article explores IIGOs openness to TNAs. We illustrate that IIGOs vary whether they are open or not and that arrangements for TNA access differ. Theoretically, we build on existing literature to posit that the political costs of involvement, TNA resources, and the institutional environment affect whether IIGO are open or closed to TNAs. Empirically, we present new data on TNA access to 94 IIGOs and examine the variation in IIGO openness to explore the validity of our theoretical expectations. We find that no single account can be offered to understand access across IIGOs, and our explanatory factors show variegated effects across different subgroups of the sample. Our findings have implications for debates on the rise of informal global governance and the openness of global governance.
{"title":"Informal governance and transnational access in world politics","authors":"Theresa Squatrito, Thomas Sommerer","doi":"10.1111/rego.12636","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12636","url":null,"abstract":"The governance turn in political research has led to increased attention to informal institutions. For scholars of international relations this has contributed to recent scholarship that reveals a notable growth in the number of informal intergovernmental organizations (IIGOs). Many aspects of IIGOs remain unknown, including whether they involve transnational actors (TNAs). Yet, whether IIGOs are open to TNAs or not may affect their performance and legitimacy. Given the importance of TNA access to IIGOs, this article explores IIGOs openness to TNAs. We illustrate that IIGOs vary whether they are open or not and that arrangements for TNA access differ. Theoretically, we build on existing literature to posit that the political costs of involvement, TNA resources, and the institutional environment affect whether IIGO are open or closed to TNAs. Empirically, we present new data on TNA access to 94 IIGOs and examine the variation in IIGO openness to explore the validity of our theoretical expectations. We find that no single account can be offered to understand access across IIGOs, and our explanatory factors show variegated effects across different subgroups of the sample. Our findings have implications for debates on the rise of informal global governance and the openness of global governance.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":"191 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2024-09-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142330095","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
How can decarbonization governance endure under increasing geoeconomic distress? Global tensions threaten to divert financial and political resources from the green transition toward national security issues. However, we lack the analytical tools to assess decarbonization governance in this age of global rivalries. To address this gap, we develop an analytical framework to study the effects of geoeconomic shocks through investment, operational, and political channels. Using macro- and company-level data and document analysis, we empirically test our framework using Germany's decarbonization governance following the cutoff of its Russian gas supply in 2022 as a case study. We find that this shock had negative short-term effects on decarbonization via the operational channel, mixed effects via the political channel, and positive long-term effects via the investment channel. Our framework and findings contribute to establishing climate change and energy politics as core issues for future political economy research.
{"title":"Decarbonization under geoeconomic distress? Energy shocks, carbon lock-ins, and Germany's pathway toward net zero","authors":"Milan Babić, Daniel Mertens","doi":"10.1111/rego.12634","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12634","url":null,"abstract":"How can decarbonization governance endure under increasing geoeconomic distress? Global tensions threaten to divert financial and political resources from the green transition toward national security issues. However, we lack the analytical tools to assess decarbonization governance in this age of global rivalries. To address this gap, we develop an analytical framework to study the effects of geoeconomic shocks through investment, operational, and political channels. Using macro- and company-level data and document analysis, we empirically test our framework using Germany's decarbonization governance following the cutoff of its Russian gas supply in 2022 as a case study. We find that this shock had negative short-term effects on decarbonization via the operational channel, mixed effects via the political channel, and positive long-term effects via the investment channel. Our framework and findings contribute to establishing climate change and energy politics as core issues for future political economy research.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2024-09-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142247172","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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