Making security has been Leviathan's home turf and its prime responsibility. Yet, while security states in advanced democracies share this uniform purpose, there is vast variation in how they legitimize and how they make security policies. First, the political authority of elected policy‐makers is sometimes superseded by the epistemic authority of experts. Second, states make security, in some instances, by drawing on their own capacities, whereas in other fields they rely on rules to manage non‐state actors. Based on this variation in authority foundations and policy instruments, we disentangle Leviathan into different types of (i) positive, (ii) managing, (iii) technocratic, and (iv) regulatory security states. Our typology helps better understand contemporary security policy‐making; it advances regulatory governance theory by conceptualizing the relationship between expertise and rules in a complex and contested issue area; and it provides insights into the “new economic security state” and the domestic underpinnings of weaponized interdependence.
{"title":"Disentangling Leviathan on its home turf: Authority foundations, policy instruments, and the making of security","authors":"Andreas Kruck, Moritz Weiss","doi":"10.1111/rego.12594","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12594","url":null,"abstract":"Making security has been <jats:italic>Leviathan's</jats:italic> home turf and its prime responsibility. Yet, while security states in advanced democracies share this uniform purpose, there is vast variation in how they legitimize and how they make security policies. First, the political authority of elected policy‐makers is sometimes superseded by the epistemic authority of experts. Second, states make security, in some instances, by drawing on their own capacities, whereas in other fields they rely on rules to manage non‐state actors. Based on this variation in authority foundations and policy instruments, we disentangle <jats:italic>Leviathan</jats:italic> into different types of (i) positive, (ii) managing, (iii) technocratic, and (iv) regulatory security states. Our typology helps better understand contemporary security policy‐making; it advances regulatory governance theory by conceptualizing the relationship between expertise and rules in a complex and contested issue area; and it provides insights into the “new economic security state” and the domestic underpinnings of weaponized interdependence.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2024-04-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140640237","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
How does regulatory statehood develop from the regulatory work which governments have always done? This article challenges conventional views that regulatory statehood is achieved by transition to arm's length agencies and that it replaces court‐based enforcement or displaces legislatures in favor of less accountable executive power. To do so, we examine the major 19th‐century surge in development of micro‐economic regulatory statehood in Britain, which had followed more gradual development in early modern times. We show that when the transformation of the Board of Trade is understood properly, a richer appreciation emerges of how regulatory statehood is institutionalized generally and of British state‐making in particular. To demonstrate this, we introduce a novel conceptual framework for analyzing and assessing change on multiple dimensions of regulatory statehood, distinguishing depth of regulatory capacity and regulatory capability along six dimensions.
{"title":"The Board of Trade and the regulatory state in the long 19th century, 1815–1914","authors":"Perri 6, Eva Heims","doi":"10.1111/rego.12593","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12593","url":null,"abstract":"How does regulatory statehood develop from the regulatory work which governments have always done? This article challenges conventional views that regulatory statehood is achieved by transition to arm's length agencies and that it replaces court‐based enforcement or displaces legislatures in favor of less accountable executive power. To do so, we examine the major 19th‐century surge in development of micro‐economic regulatory statehood in Britain, which had followed more gradual development in early modern times. We show that when the transformation of the Board of Trade is understood properly, a richer appreciation emerges of how regulatory statehood is institutionalized generally and of British state‐making in particular. To demonstrate this, we introduce a novel conceptual framework for analyzing and assessing change on multiple dimensions of regulatory statehood, distinguishing depth of regulatory capacity and regulatory capability along six dimensions.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2024-04-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140622869","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
As a result of policy growth, implementing agencies often face new mandates without the necessary capacity expansion to comply with, thus resorting to intermediaries. However, intermediaries are not innocuous to the implementation process, especially when they are expected to play the double role of target and intermediary, responsible for translating/interpreting regulation for beneficiaries. How does the interaction between beneficiaries and intermediaries-target shape policy implementation? I argue that such interaction is not only determined by the role the intermediary adopts, and their relation with the beneficiary, but also by the motivations beneficiaries have for engaging in the regulatory process, and their capacity to do so. I develop a theoretical framework for understanding their interaction and apply it to a new regulatory policy in Mexico to provide social security for paid domestic workers. I explore the mechanisms by which the interaction between intermediaries and beneficiaries affects the outcome of the regulatory process.
{"title":"Unraveling how intermediary-beneficiary interaction shapes policy implementation","authors":"Cynthia L. Michel","doi":"10.1111/rego.12592","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12592","url":null,"abstract":"As a result of policy growth, implementing agencies often face new mandates without the necessary capacity expansion to comply with, thus resorting to intermediaries. However, intermediaries are not innocuous to the implementation process, especially when they are expected to play the double role of target and intermediary, responsible for translating/interpreting regulation for beneficiaries. How does the interaction between beneficiaries and intermediaries-target shape policy implementation? I argue that such interaction is not only determined by the role the intermediary adopts, and their relation with the beneficiary, but also by the motivations beneficiaries have for engaging in the regulatory process, and their capacity to do so. I develop a theoretical framework for understanding their interaction and apply it to a new regulatory policy in Mexico to provide social security for paid domestic workers. I explore the mechanisms by which the interaction between intermediaries and beneficiaries affects the outcome of the regulatory process.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2024-04-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140552017","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
How data on individuals are gathered, analyzed, and stored remains largely ungoverned at both domestic and global levels. We address the unique governance problem posed by digital data to provide a framework for understanding why data governance remains elusive. Data are easily transferable and replicable, making them a useful tool. But this characteristic creates massive governance problems for all of us who want to have some agency and choice over how (or if) our data are collected and used. Moreover, data are co‐created: individuals are the object from which data are culled by an interested party. Yet, any data point has a marginal value of close to zero and thus individuals have little bargaining power when it comes to negotiating with data collectors. Relatedly, data follow the rule of winner take all—the parties that have the most can leverage that data for greater accuracy and utility, leading to natural oligopolies. Finally, data's value lies in combination with proprietary algorithms that analyze and predict the patterns. Given these characteristics, private governance solutions are ineffective. Public solutions will also likely be insufficient. The imbalance in market power between platforms that collect data and individuals will be reproduced in the political sphere. We conclude that some form of collective data governance is required. We examine the challenges to the data governance by looking a public effort, the EU's General Data Protection Regulation, a private effort, Apple's “privacy nutrition labels” in their App Store, and a collective effort, the First Nations Information Governance Centre in Canada.
{"title":"Why data about people are so hard to govern","authors":"Wendy H. Wong, Jamie Duncan, David A. Lake","doi":"10.1111/rego.12591","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12591","url":null,"abstract":"How data on individuals are gathered, analyzed, and stored remains largely ungoverned at both domestic and global levels. We address the unique governance problem posed by digital data to provide a framework for understanding why data governance remains elusive. Data are easily transferable and replicable, making them a useful tool. But this characteristic creates massive governance problems for all of us who want to have some agency and choice over how (or if) our data are collected and used. Moreover, data are co‐created: individuals are the object from which data are culled by an interested party. Yet, any data point has a marginal value of close to zero and thus individuals have little bargaining power when it comes to negotiating with data collectors. Relatedly, data follow the rule of winner take all—the parties that have the most can leverage that data for greater accuracy and utility, leading to natural oligopolies. Finally, data's value lies in combination with proprietary algorithms that analyze and predict the patterns. Given these characteristics, private governance solutions are ineffective. Public solutions will also likely be insufficient. The imbalance in market power between platforms that collect data and individuals will be reproduced in the political sphere. We conclude that some form of collective data governance is required. We examine the challenges to the data governance by looking a public effort, the EU's General Data Protection Regulation, a private effort, Apple's “privacy nutrition labels” in their App Store, and a collective effort, the First Nations Information Governance Centre in Canada.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2024-04-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140533215","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Regulators are increasingly concerned about deceptive, online choice architecture, including dark patterns and behavioral sludge. From a behavioral science perspective, fostering a regulatory environment which reduces the economic harm caused by deceptive designs, while safeguarding the benefits of well‐meaning behavioral insights, is essential. This article argues for a principles‐based approach and proposes behavioral audits as a tool to support this approach.
{"title":"Deceptive choice architecture and behavioral audits: A principles‐based approach","authors":"Stuart Mills","doi":"10.1111/rego.12590","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12590","url":null,"abstract":"Regulators are increasingly concerned about deceptive, online choice architecture, including dark patterns and behavioral sludge. From a behavioral science perspective, fostering a regulatory environment which reduces the economic harm caused by deceptive designs, while safeguarding the benefits of well‐meaning behavioral insights, is essential. This article argues for a principles‐based approach and proposes behavioral audits as a tool to support this approach.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2024-03-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140317230","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Bert de Graaff, Suzanne Rutz, Annemiek Stoopendaal, Hester van de Bovenkamp
The literature on responsive regulation argues that citizens should be involved in regulatory practices to avoid capture between regulator and regulatee. It also argues that including citizens can add an important perspective to regulatory practices. However, we know little about how citizens' perspectives are brought into regulatory practices. This paper draws on existing qualitative research to compare and analyze four cases of experimental participatory regulation in Dutch health care, focusing on the theoretical assumptions that citizen involvement (a) prevents capture, and (b) stimulates the inclusion of new perspectives. Our results show that involving citizens in regulation can increase transparency and trust in regulatory practices and familiarizes regulators with other perspectives. It is, however, up to the regulator to work on deriving benefits from that involvement—not only the practical work of organizing participatory regulation, but also the conceptual work of reflecting on their own assumptions and standards. We do find evidence for weak forms of capture and argue for the need to extend capture to involve multiple actors. We reflect on these results for theory development and regulatory practice.
{"title":"Involving citizens in regulation: A comparative qualitative study of four experimentalist cases of participatory regulation in Dutch health care","authors":"Bert de Graaff, Suzanne Rutz, Annemiek Stoopendaal, Hester van de Bovenkamp","doi":"10.1111/rego.12589","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12589","url":null,"abstract":"The literature on responsive regulation argues that citizens should be involved in regulatory practices to avoid capture between regulator and regulatee. It also argues that including citizens can add an important perspective to regulatory practices. However, we know little about how citizens' perspectives are brought into regulatory practices. This paper draws on existing qualitative research to compare and analyze four cases of experimental participatory regulation in Dutch health care, focusing on the theoretical assumptions that citizen involvement (a) prevents capture, and (b) stimulates the inclusion of new perspectives. Our results show that involving citizens in regulation can increase transparency and trust in regulatory practices and familiarizes regulators with other perspectives. It is, however, up to the regulator to work on deriving benefits from that involvement—not only the practical work of organizing participatory regulation, but also the conceptual work of reflecting on their own assumptions and standards. We do find evidence for weak forms of capture and argue for the need to extend capture to involve multiple actors. We reflect on these results for theory development and regulatory practice.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2024-03-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140317229","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Europe's crisis of legitimacy: Governing by rules and ruling by numbers in the eurozone. By Vivien A.Schmidt, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2020. pp. 385. USD 35.99 (paperback). ISBN: 9780198797050","authors":"Eva K. Lieberherr","doi":"10.1111/rego.12588","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12588","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2024-03-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140317224","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Regulating risk: How private information shapes global safety standards. By Rebecca L.Perlman, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, US$ 29.99. 2023. pp. 227. ISBN: 978‐1‐009‐29193‐4","authors":"Graeme Auld","doi":"10.1111/rego.12587","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12587","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2024-03-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140196183","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Regulatory intermediaries—organizations that operate between regulators (public and private) and target groups—perform a range of important functions. While most previous research has focused on intermediaries that have been delegated official authority, in this paper we focus on unofficial and informal intermediary functions aiming to advance the governance of per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS) chemicals. Chemical pollution is a growing environmental and health concern, leading to both public and private regulatory initiatives. By studying a particular segment—paperboard food packaging in Sweden—the study generates insights into critical functions performed by unofficial intermediaries (Svenskt Vatten and ChemSec) in this regulatory regime, which extend and expand regulatory reach in various ways. The study also shows the importance of different types of intermediaries that interact in dynamic ways, and the role of material artifacts in processes of intermediation. These unofficial functions are arguably important for the functioning of complex, hybrid forms of governance, but they also prompt critical questions about the effectiveness, legitimacy, and role of intermediaries in generating needed transformative change.
监管中介机构--在（公共和私营）监管机构与目标群体之间运作的组织--发挥着一系列重要功能。以往的研究大多集中于获得官方授权的中介机构，而本文则关注非官方和非正式中介机构的职能，旨在推进全氟和多氟烷基物质（PFAS）化学品的治理。化学污染是一个日益严重的环境和健康问题，导致了公共和私人监管措施的出台。通过对瑞典纸板食品包装这一特定领域的研究，我们深入了解了非官方中介机构（Svenskt Vatten 和 ChemSec）在这一监管制度中发挥的关键作用，它们以各种方式延伸和扩大了监管范围。研究还显示了以动态方式互动的不同类型中介的重要性，以及物质人工制品在中介过程中的作用。可以说，这些非官方功能对于复杂的混合治理形式的运作非常重要，但它们也引发了关于中介机构在产生所需的转型变革中的有效性、合法性和作用的关键问题。
{"title":"Unofficial intermediation in the regulatory governance of hazardous chemicals","authors":"Erik Hysing, Sabina Du Rietz Dahlström","doi":"10.1111/rego.12586","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12586","url":null,"abstract":"Regulatory intermediaries—organizations that operate between regulators (public and private) and target groups—perform a range of important functions. While most previous research has focused on intermediaries that have been delegated official authority, in this paper we focus on unofficial and informal intermediary functions aiming to advance the governance of per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS) chemicals. Chemical pollution is a growing environmental and health concern, leading to both public and private regulatory initiatives. By studying a particular segment—paperboard food packaging in Sweden—the study generates insights into critical functions performed by unofficial intermediaries (Svenskt Vatten and ChemSec) in this regulatory regime, which extend and expand regulatory reach in various ways. The study also shows the importance of different types of intermediaries that interact in dynamic ways, and the role of material artifacts in processes of intermediation. These unofficial functions are arguably important for the functioning of complex, hybrid forms of governance, but they also prompt critical questions about the effectiveness, legitimacy, and role of intermediaries in generating needed transformative change.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2024-03-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140097112","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Reini Schrama, Dorte Sindbjerg Martinsen, Ellen Mastenbroek
European administrative networks (EANs) are an increasingly prominent form of European Union (EU) governance. Although these networks are typically portrayed as important and flexible forms of organization, we lack knowledge of their temporal dimension, including their development in times of crisis. This paper provides a first analysis of network interaction as it unfolds before and during times of severe crisis for the EU internal market. Specifically, we examine interactions in the EU internal market network SOLVIT. This network offers member states both a formalized procedure for the bilateral resolution of cases of alleged misapplication of EU law, and an informal network for general discussions on internal market topics and SOLVIT-related matters beyond specific case-resolution. Based on unique three-wave survey data, we develop a continuous-time model (stochastic actor-oriented model) to analyze the evolution of SOLVIT's informal interactions over time. In explaining these developments, we reflect on the importance of two crises: the exit of a central SOLVIT member (the United Kingdom), which drove informal interactions to a great extent, and COVID-19, which led to great sudden uncertainty and challenges for the implementation of internal market law. Our results show that the network is remarkably stable and despite, or rather because of, these crises, has become denser over time.
{"title":"European administrative networks during times of crisis: Exploring the temporal development of the internal market network SOLVIT","authors":"Reini Schrama, Dorte Sindbjerg Martinsen, Ellen Mastenbroek","doi":"10.1111/rego.12585","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12585","url":null,"abstract":"European administrative networks (EANs) are an increasingly prominent form of European Union (EU) governance. Although these networks are typically portrayed as important and flexible forms of organization, we lack knowledge of their temporal dimension, including their development in times of crisis. This paper provides a first analysis of network interaction as it unfolds before and during times of severe crisis for the EU internal market. Specifically, we examine interactions in the EU internal market network SOLVIT. This network offers member states both a formalized procedure for the bilateral resolution of cases of alleged misapplication of EU law, and an informal network for general discussions on internal market topics and SOLVIT-related matters beyond specific case-resolution. Based on unique three-wave survey data, we develop a continuous-time model (stochastic actor-oriented model) to analyze the evolution of SOLVIT's informal interactions over time. In explaining these developments, we reflect on the importance of two crises: the exit of a central SOLVIT member (the United Kingdom), which drove informal interactions to a great extent, and COVID-19, which led to great sudden uncertainty and challenges for the implementation of internal market law. Our results show that the network is remarkably stable and despite, or rather because of, these crises, has become denser over time.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2024-03-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140076375","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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