Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.22618/tp.pjcv.20215.2.114004
Corentin Voisin
The polis, as a gathering of various citizens, may be threatened by discord and finally may collapse because of the stasis, the internal conflict between different groups of people with diverging interests. This scheme is tackled by Plato in Gorgias, and more thoroughly in the Republic. Both dialogues were a source of inspiration for the pseudo-Pythagorean writings which flourished between the second half of the 4th century B.C. and the Hellenistic period. Among them, the treaties attributed to Kleinias, Metopus, Theages, Lysis and Hippodamus frequently use the concept of stasis and pleonexia to describe how a city may be governed and what kind of danger may appear if the citizens’ behavior is not controlled. In general, these treaties adapt the vision of Plato concerning conflict to some Pythagorean images and teachings. By mingling both influences, they blur the frontier between Platonism and Pythagoreanism and create a genre of intertwined literature which may be qualified as bricolage, according to Lévi-Strauss’s concept. These philosophical texts use a range of material mostly traced back to the Hellenistic period, but also some fragments related to the conception of conflicts and violence in early Pythagoreanism.
{"title":"The Conception of stasis and pleonexia in Pseudo-Pythagorean Writings: Platonic Influences and Bricolages","authors":"Corentin Voisin","doi":"10.22618/tp.pjcv.20215.2.114004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22618/tp.pjcv.20215.2.114004","url":null,"abstract":"The polis, as a gathering of various citizens, may be threatened by discord and finally may collapse because of the stasis, the internal conflict between different groups of people with diverging interests. This scheme is tackled by Plato in Gorgias, and more thoroughly in the Republic. Both dialogues were a source of inspiration for the pseudo-Pythagorean writings which flourished between the second half of the 4th century B.C. and the Hellenistic period. Among them, the treaties attributed to Kleinias, Metopus, Theages, Lysis and Hippodamus frequently use the concept of stasis and pleonexia to describe how a city may be governed and what kind of danger may appear if the citizens’ behavior is not controlled. In general, these treaties adapt the vision of Plato concerning conflict to some Pythagorean images and teachings. By mingling both influences, they blur the frontier between Platonism and Pythagoreanism and create a genre of intertwined literature which may be qualified as bricolage, according to Lévi-Strauss’s concept. These philosophical texts use a range of material mostly traced back to the Hellenistic period, but also some fragments related to the conception of conflicts and violence in early Pythagoreanism.","PeriodicalId":220201,"journal":{"name":"The Philosophical Journal of Conflict and Violence","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114412687","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.22618/tp.pjcv.20215.2.114001
Magali Année
“To speak in a harmful way (τὸ μὴ καλῶς λέγειν) is not only a false note towards language itself (εἰς αὐτὸ τοῦτο πλημμελές), it is also to infuse some evil within souls.” This worrisome statement in the Phaedo (115 e 5–7) should be considered as a key of Plato’s dialogues. But how shall we understand the harmfulness of a “false note” inside the very language thought of as having its own autonomy? Does it have to do with “stasis between names” (Cratylus 438 d 2), and if so, where to find, inside language, the “right note” capable of preventing the disaster of souls?
“用一种有害的方式说话(τ - μ - καλ λ ς λ)不仅是对语言本身的一种错误的注意(ε - ς α - τ - τ το το πλημμε)，也是在灵魂中注入一些邪恶。”《斐多篇》(115 e 5-7)中这段令人担忧的陈述应该被视为柏拉图对话录的关键。但是，我们该如何理解一种被认为具有自身自主性的语言内部的“假音符”的危害呢?它是否与“名字之间的停滞”(克拉提罗斯438 d 2)有关，如果是这样，在语言内部，哪里可以找到能够防止灵魂灾难的“正确音符”?
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Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.22618/tp.pjcv.20226.1.127.001
Andreas Herberg‐Rothe
In Clausewitz’s own view his work is akin to a philosophical structure of the art of war. This philosophical structure is most visible in his elaborations concerning the relation between theory and praxis— elaborations which make his work a treatise of practical philosophy. According to him, theory has to: (1) reveal the nature or essence of war; (2) reflect the difference between theory and practice; (3) provide recommendations for military action in war; (4) educate and cultivate the mind of the political and military leaders as well as that of the army; (5) follow the footsteps of Kantian critique. Last but not least, this article also offers an account of Clausewitz’s novel position regarding the dialectical thinking of its time.
{"title":"Philosophy and Methodology in Clausewitz’s Work","authors":"Andreas Herberg‐Rothe","doi":"10.22618/tp.pjcv.20226.1.127.001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22618/tp.pjcv.20226.1.127.001","url":null,"abstract":"In Clausewitz’s own view his work is akin to a philosophical structure of the art of war. This philosophical structure is most visible in his elaborations concerning the relation between theory and praxis— elaborations which make his work a treatise of practical philosophy. According to him, theory has to: (1) reveal the nature or essence of war; (2) reflect the difference between theory and practice; (3) provide recommendations for military action in war; (4) educate and cultivate the mind of the political and military leaders as well as that of the army; (5) follow the footsteps of Kantian critique. Last but not least, this article also offers an account of Clausewitz’s novel position regarding the dialectical thinking of its time.","PeriodicalId":220201,"journal":{"name":"The Philosophical Journal of Conflict and Violence","volume":"159 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114631627","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.22618/tp.pjcv.20226.1.127.004
Bilgehan Emeklier, Nihal Emeklier
Clausewitz introduced an inclusive equation between emotionality and rationality with regards to the debates on the causality and practice of war in modern strategic thought. In Clausewitz’s theory of war, war is a process of governmentality composed by three types of actors: states directing war (leaders and decision-makers), armies executing war (combatants), and people supporting war financially and morally (societies). In this trinitarian scheme, war is a continuous, mutually constitutive interactional process with emotional and rational components both between conflicting parties, and within each side. The aim of this article is to discuss how Clausewitz integrated the emotion-reason equation in his theory of war, to explain through an actor-level analysis how emotions affect, change, and transform war, and lastly to discuss the mutual constitutive relationship between wars and emotions in the contemporary global durable disorder.
{"title":"Emotions in War: The Emotionality-Rationality Equation in Clausewitz’s Theory of War","authors":"Bilgehan Emeklier, Nihal Emeklier","doi":"10.22618/tp.pjcv.20226.1.127.004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22618/tp.pjcv.20226.1.127.004","url":null,"abstract":"Clausewitz introduced an inclusive equation between emotionality and rationality with regards to the debates on the causality and practice of war in modern strategic thought. In Clausewitz’s theory of war, war is a process of governmentality composed by three types of actors: states directing war (leaders and decision-makers), armies executing war (combatants), and people supporting war financially and morally (societies). In this trinitarian scheme, war is a continuous, mutually constitutive interactional process with emotional and rational components both between conflicting parties, and within each side. The aim of this article is to discuss how Clausewitz integrated the emotion-reason equation in his theory of war, to explain through an actor-level analysis how emotions affect, change, and transform war, and lastly to discuss the mutual constitutive relationship between wars and emotions in the contemporary global durable disorder.","PeriodicalId":220201,"journal":{"name":"The Philosophical Journal of Conflict and Violence","volume":"22 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121739414","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.22618/tp.pjcv.20215.2.114005
Corentin Tresnie
While Neoplatonists have little to say on the topic of conflict and violence in their ethics or political philosophy, they use these concepts in order to discuss other issues. Plotinus considers violence as a way of testing one’s alignment with the cosmic order set by Providence. Porphyry and Iamblichus shift the emphasis to withdrawal from the body and universal cosmodicy, neutralizing the special role of violence. Proclus walks in their footsteps, but also gives a new epistemological meaning to conflict: civil war within the soul is a necessary condition for learning and doing philosophy.
{"title":"Conflict and Violence in Neoplatonism: From Cosmic Justice to Cognitive Step","authors":"Corentin Tresnie","doi":"10.22618/tp.pjcv.20215.2.114005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22618/tp.pjcv.20215.2.114005","url":null,"abstract":"While Neoplatonists have little to say on the topic of conflict and violence in their ethics or political philosophy, they use these concepts in order to discuss other issues. Plotinus considers violence as a way of testing one’s alignment with the cosmic order set by Providence. Porphyry and Iamblichus shift the emphasis to withdrawal from the body and universal cosmodicy, neutralizing the special role of violence. Proclus walks in their footsteps, but also gives a new epistemological meaning to conflict: civil war within the soul is a necessary condition for learning and doing philosophy.","PeriodicalId":220201,"journal":{"name":"The Philosophical Journal of Conflict and Violence","volume":"67 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130289003","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.22618/tp.pjcv.020204.1.203005
Sabeen Ahmed
Inspired by the pioneering work of Robert R. Williams and Axel Honneth, this article offers a new lens through which to consider Hegel’s infamous ‘rabble problem.’ By rethinking the conflict between the rabble and the State as a conflict between intersubjective and institutional recognition—generating a failure of reciprocal recognition—I suggest that there is embedded in Hegel’s right of necessity a right of resistance that the rabble may justifiably claim in their struggle for recognition. The existence of the rabble, I ultimately suggest, is therefore not an inevitable consequence of the State, but an indication that the State has itself failed to concretize the universal consciousness of Spirit.
受Robert R. Williams和Axel Honneth开创性工作的启发，本文提供了一个新的视角来思考黑格尔臭名昭著的“乌合之众问题”。通过将乌合之众与国家之间的冲突重新思考为主体间认同和制度性认同之间的冲突——产生了相互认同的失败——我认为，在黑格尔的必要性权利中，隐含着一种反抗的权利，乌合之众在争取认同的斗争中可以合理地要求这种权利。因此，我最终认为，乌合之众的存在并不是国家的必然结果，而是表明国家本身未能将普遍的精神意识具体化。
{"title":"Universality, Resistance, and the Struggle for Recognition: Challenging the Inevitability of Hegel’s Rabble","authors":"Sabeen Ahmed","doi":"10.22618/tp.pjcv.020204.1.203005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22618/tp.pjcv.020204.1.203005","url":null,"abstract":"Inspired by the pioneering work of Robert R. Williams and Axel Honneth, this article offers a new lens through which to consider Hegel’s infamous ‘rabble problem.’ By rethinking the conflict between the rabble and the State as a conflict between intersubjective and institutional recognition—generating a failure of reciprocal recognition—I suggest that there is embedded in Hegel’s right of necessity a right of resistance that the rabble may justifiably claim in their struggle for recognition. The existence of the rabble, I ultimately suggest, is therefore not an inevitable consequence of the State, but an indication that the State has itself failed to concretize the universal consciousness of Spirit.","PeriodicalId":220201,"journal":{"name":"The Philosophical Journal of Conflict and Violence","volume":"52 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133800963","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.22618/tp.pjcv.020204.1.203004
B. Besana
Conflicts can only be solved if the conflicting parties find common ground, and making peace achieved only by stressing what these parties have in common. And yet every conflict always already implies that there is something “in common”: the fight takes place on a common ground and the opponents are united by the same will to possess, by a common object around which their opposed needs come to clash. It might therefore be rather through the absolute elimination of everything held “in common” that conflicts can be overcome, or rather put to work in a constructive manner. Through the works of Rancière, Glissant, Blanchot, and Esposito, the idea emerges that conflicts can be transformed into a positive occurrence through a common struggle to invalidate the logic that determines the nature of the object up for dispute, the existence of the place from which to fight for it, and the role that opponents play in a common political arena. But this perspective ultimately demands that those who fight this logic renounce having anything “in common,” save for the constant work of destroying their common identity.
{"title":"Emptying Conflicts: Expropriation of the Common and Commonality of the Void","authors":"B. Besana","doi":"10.22618/tp.pjcv.020204.1.203004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22618/tp.pjcv.020204.1.203004","url":null,"abstract":"Conflicts can only be solved if the conflicting parties find common ground, and making peace achieved only by stressing what these parties have in common. And yet every conflict always already implies that there is something “in common”: the fight takes place on a common ground and the opponents are united by the same will to possess, by a common object around which their opposed needs come to clash. It might therefore be rather through the absolute elimination of everything held “in common” that conflicts can be overcome, or rather put to work in a constructive manner. Through the works of Rancière, Glissant, Blanchot, and Esposito, the idea emerges that conflicts can be transformed into a positive occurrence through a common struggle to invalidate the logic that determines the nature of the object up for dispute, the existence of the place from which to fight for it, and the role that opponents play in a common political arena. But this perspective ultimately demands that those who fight this logic renounce having anything “in common,” save for the constant work of destroying their common identity.","PeriodicalId":220201,"journal":{"name":"The Philosophical Journal of Conflict and Violence","volume":"34 3","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"120917343","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.22618/tp.pjcv.020204.1.203003
Elad Lapidot
This article shows how Schmitt’s work is animated by a fundamental conflict between two concepts of conflict: the one is Schmitt’s own, war, polemos, and the other one is discussion, dialogue, conversation or polemics, which may be said, accordingly, to be Schmitt’s foe. Schmitt’s project is thus described as a conflict between war and discussion: polemos vs polemics, an inner war within the notion of war. The article contemplates this basic configuration and points at some of its major significations for Schmitt’s political theology and theory of state and international law.
{"title":"Schmitt’s Warring Wars On the Political Epistemology of Political Theology","authors":"Elad Lapidot","doi":"10.22618/tp.pjcv.020204.1.203003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22618/tp.pjcv.020204.1.203003","url":null,"abstract":"This article shows how Schmitt’s work is animated by a fundamental conflict between two concepts of conflict: the one is Schmitt’s own, war, polemos, and the other one is discussion, dialogue, conversation or polemics, which may be said, accordingly, to be Schmitt’s foe. Schmitt’s project is thus described as a conflict between war and discussion: polemos vs polemics, an inner war within the notion of war. The article contemplates this basic configuration and points at some of its major significations for Schmitt’s political theology and theory of state and international law.","PeriodicalId":220201,"journal":{"name":"The Philosophical Journal of Conflict and Violence","volume":"245 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123147754","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.22618/tp.pjcv.20226.1.127.006
M. Witkowski
Carl von Clausewitz distinguished two fundamental aspects of war — political and existential. These aspects are present in the philosophy of Carl Schmitt too. He used Clausewitz to build a theory of Man and his political nature that also aimed at understanding the German defeat in World War I. In this article, I interpret Schmitt's philosophy as an instance of a modern re-appropriation of Clausewitz's legacy. I aim to show that even though Schmitt’s philosophy might be outdated, his way of reading Clausewitz may be inspiring today. There is a need for a ‘new Schmitt’ who would be able to create a system that would integrate Clausewitz’s intuitions into a modern paradigm.
{"title":"Clausewitz, Schmitt and the Relationship Between War and Politics in the Interwar Period and Today","authors":"M. Witkowski","doi":"10.22618/tp.pjcv.20226.1.127.006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22618/tp.pjcv.20226.1.127.006","url":null,"abstract":"Carl von Clausewitz distinguished two fundamental aspects of war — political and existential. These aspects are present in the philosophy of Carl Schmitt too. He used Clausewitz to build a theory of Man and his political nature that also aimed at understanding the German defeat in World War I. In this article, I interpret Schmitt's philosophy as an instance of a modern re-appropriation of Clausewitz's legacy. I aim to show that even though Schmitt’s philosophy might be outdated, his way of reading Clausewitz may be inspiring today. There is a need for a ‘new Schmitt’ who would be able to create a system that would integrate Clausewitz’s intuitions into a modern paradigm.","PeriodicalId":220201,"journal":{"name":"The Philosophical Journal of Conflict and Violence","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115139719","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.22618/tp.pjcv.20226.1.127.007
Olivia A. Garard
Allies and alliances are deeply embedded in Clausewitz’s theory of war. Allies are a live and reactive means that may shift throughout a war. Alliances, often responsive to the balance of power, harness allies as a dynamic means. Both problematize Clausewitz’s initial, dual conception of war; they embody uncertainty and inject Politik. To account for allies and alliances entails reevaluating three fundamental Clausewitzian premises: that the defense is the stronger form of war; that the status quo has inertia; and that war has duration. Ultimately, any comprehensive view of Clausewitz’s theory of war demands the inclusion of allies and alliances.
{"title":"Accounting for Alliances in Clausewitz’s Theory of War","authors":"Olivia A. Garard","doi":"10.22618/tp.pjcv.20226.1.127.007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22618/tp.pjcv.20226.1.127.007","url":null,"abstract":"Allies and alliances are deeply embedded in Clausewitz’s theory of war. Allies are a live and reactive means that may shift throughout a war. Alliances, often responsive to the balance of power, harness allies as a dynamic means. Both problematize Clausewitz’s initial, dual conception of war; they embody uncertainty and inject Politik. To account for allies and alliances entails reevaluating three fundamental Clausewitzian premises: that the defense is the stronger form of war; that the status quo has inertia; and that war has duration. Ultimately, any comprehensive view of Clausewitz’s theory of war demands the inclusion of allies and alliances.","PeriodicalId":220201,"journal":{"name":"The Philosophical Journal of Conflict and Violence","volume":"75 3","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114093763","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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