J M Keynes stated the following on p.xii of his General Theory on December 13,1935: “I have also had much help from Mrs. Joan Robinson….who have read the whole of the proof-sheets.” (Keynes,1936, p.xii).
In the course of an extensive correspondence with J. Robinson in the months of September, October, and November,1936, over one of her books that she had sent him for review and comment, Keynes discovered that Joan Robinson had (a) no knowledge of basic undergraduate, lower division level training in international trade and exchange rates between two countries and, much, much more seriously, (b) had a serious lack of knowledge about his Liquidity Preference theory of the rate of interest that occupied all or some of chapters 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18 and 21 of the General Theory.
It was now quite clear to Keynes that Joan Robinson had not understood what was in the final draft copy of the General Theory that he had given to her to read and comment on in June, 1935 and to which she replied in four days time:
“Given Keynes’s ambitions, limitations, and expectations, she could be useful, perhaps even valuable, in finishing the book. As in so many instances, events proved Keynes’s judgment sound even if not precisely in the way he anticipated. Within four days of receiving the second set of galleys, Robinson sent him an extensive and detailed set of comments as well as her general impressions of the book (Keynes 1973a, 638–45). How was this extraordinarily swift and thorough response possible? Keynes sent Harrod the galleys on June 5 but did not hear from him until July 31 (see Keynes 1973a, 526–27). Hawtrey’s set was sent on June 12, and he replied by the end of the month (1973a, 567). In four days, how could Robinson read a difficult and confusing book, digest it, and write elaborate and carefully crafted suggestions, many of which Keynes adopted?”(Aslanbeigui and Oakes, 2009, p.205; boldface added).
The correct answer to the question posed by Aslanbeigui and Oakes in 2009, which was “In four days, how could Robinson read a difficult and confusing book, digest it, and write elaborate and carefully crafted suggestions, many of which Keynes adopted?” (Aslanbeigui and Oakes, 2009, p.205; boldface added), in light of her extremely poor performance in the Keynes-Robinson exchanges of September-November, 1936, is that she was not the author who wrote the “…elaborate and carefully crafted suggestions” on the General Theory in four days. The true authors were Richard Kahn and Austin Robinson, just as they were most probably the true authors of The Economics of Imperfect Competition,1933.
Keynes now realized that Joan Robinson’s reply to him in 1935 was not her own. This conclusion follows directly from the first two sentences of Keynes’s letter of November 9th,1936 to Joan Robinson:
“I beg you not to publish. For your argument, as it stands, is most certainly nonsense.” (Keynes, 1936, CWJMK, Vol. 14, p.147; boldface ad
1935年12月13日，凯恩斯在他的《通论》第十二页写道:“我也从琼·罗宾逊夫人那里得到了很多帮助....他们已经看了所有的校样。(凯恩斯，1936年，第12页)。1936年9月，10月和11月，凯恩斯与j·罗宾逊进行了广泛的通信，讨论了她寄给他审查和评论的一本书，凯恩斯发现琼·罗宾逊(a)没有基本的本科知识，在国际贸易和两国汇率方面的较低级别培训，更严重的是，(b)严重缺乏对他的利率流动性偏好理论的了解，该理论占据了通论第13、14、15、16、17、18和21章的全部或部分内容。1935年6月，凯恩斯把《通论》的最终稿交给了琼·罗宾逊，让她阅读和评论，她在四天后回复说:“考虑到凯恩斯的野心、局限性和期望，她在完成这本书方面可能是有用的，甚至可能是有价值的。”正如在许多情况下一样，事实证明凯恩斯的判断是正确的，即使不是完全按照他预期的方式。在收到第二套厨房的四天内，罗宾逊给他发了一份广泛而详细的评论，以及她对这本书的总体印象(凯恩斯1973a, 638-45)。这种异常迅速和彻底的反应是如何可能的?6月5日，凯恩斯派哈罗德去了厨房，但直到7月31日才收到他的消息(见凯恩斯1973a, 526-27)。霍特雷的那一套是在6月12日寄出的，他在月底就回复了。在四天的时间里，罗宾逊是如何读完一本难懂的、令人困惑的书，消化它，并写出精心设计的建议，凯恩斯采纳了其中的许多建议的?(Aslanbeigui and Oakes, 2009, p.205;黑体)补充道。2009年，阿斯兰贝吉和奥克斯提出了一个问题，正确答案是“在四天内，罗宾逊如何读完一本难懂的、令人困惑的书，消化它，写出精心设计的建议，凯恩斯采纳了其中的许多建议?”(Aslanbeigui and Oakes, 2009, p.205;鉴于她在1936年9月至11月的凯恩斯-罗宾逊交流中表现极其糟糕，她不是在四天内就《通论》写下“……精心设计的建议”的作者。真正的作者是理查德•卡恩(Richard Kahn)和奥斯汀•罗宾逊(Austin Robinson)，正如他们最有可能是1933年《不完全竞争经济学》(The Economics of incomplete Competition)的真正作者一样。凯恩斯现在意识到，1935年琼·罗宾逊给他的回信不是她自己写的。这个结论直接来自凯恩斯1936年11月9日写给琼·罗宾逊的信的前两句:“我请求你不要发表。因为你的论点，就其本身而言，无疑是无稽之谈。(凯恩斯，1936年，《中国共产党》，第14卷，第147页;黑体)补充道。
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Keynes’s very negative reaction to J. Robinson’s misuse of Keynes’s initial, beginning, introductory, preliminary exposition of liquidity preference in chapter 13 of the General Theory is explained by the fact that J. Robinson was repeating the same identical error made by R. Hawtrey, D. Robertson, and H. Henderson, which was to simply ignore Keynes’s M=L(r,Y) analyzed by Keynes on p.199-209 of the General Theory and incorporated on page 298 as part of his formal IS-LM(LP) model presented on pp. 298-299 in chapter 21 in Part IV of the General Theory.
Instead, she used M=L( r) and/or M=L2(r). It is impossible to present an analysis of Keynes’s theory of liquidity preference unless (Y,r) space is used.
Nowhere in Robinson’s 1935 comments on the final draft of the General Theory, sent to her by Keynes for review and comment, is there the slightest criticism/mention/discussion/query of a conflict between the two functions M=L( r ) and M=L( r,Y). Keynes had made it clear in his exposition in chapter 15 of the General Theory that the exposition in chapter 13 was the alpha, while the exposition in chapter 15 was the omega, with Keynes’s analysis on pp. 179-182 being the equivalent material he used in his tutoring of R. Harrod in the July -September, 1935 time period, after which Harrod acknowledged to Keynes in his letter of August 30th,1935, that the I=S equilibrium was simply a single, downwardly sloping line in (r,Y) space that intersected NOTHING, so that Keynes’s LM curve, M=L(r,Y), was absolutely required for an equilibrium to exist in (r,Y) space. Harrod was very clear. In this letter Harrod credited Keynes with making a fundamental, 'radical reconstitution’ of the theory of the rate of interest.
Keynes now realized that Robinson had NEVER EVER understood what he had done in the General Theory, since the M=L(r ) curve could, at best, only be “interpreted “as a single, upward sloping line in (r,Y) space. Robinson’s misinterpretation is repeated in all heterodox, Post Keynesian and Institutionalist discussions such as Tily, who is a good example of the faithful continuing to put forth Robinson’s erroneous claims about Keynes’s theory of the rate of interest being a purely monetary one and as being what Keynes meant in the General Theory.
{"title":"J M Keynes’s Very Severe criticism ( '…your argument…is most certainly nonsense.') of J. Robinson in Keynes’s Letter of November 9th,1936 was due to Robinson’s Use of the Incorrect M=L(r) Instead of the Correct M=L(Y,r)","authors":"M. E. Brady","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3726778","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3726778","url":null,"abstract":"Keynes’s very negative reaction to J. Robinson’s misuse of Keynes’s initial, beginning, introductory, preliminary exposition of liquidity preference in chapter 13 of the General Theory is explained by the fact that J. Robinson was repeating the same identical error made by R. Hawtrey, D. Robertson, and H. Henderson, which was to simply ignore Keynes’s M=L(r,Y) analyzed by Keynes on p.199-209 of the General Theory and incorporated on page 298 as part of his formal IS-LM(LP) model presented on pp. 298-299 in chapter 21 in Part IV of the General Theory.<br><br>Instead, she used M=L( r) and/or M=L2(r). It is impossible to present an analysis of Keynes’s theory of liquidity preference unless (Y,r) space is used.<br><br>Nowhere in Robinson’s 1935 comments on the final draft of the General Theory, sent to her by Keynes for review and comment, is there the slightest criticism/mention/discussion/query of a conflict between the two functions M=L( r ) and M=L( r,Y). Keynes had made it clear in his exposition in chapter 15 of the General Theory that the exposition in chapter 13 was the alpha, while the exposition in chapter 15 was the omega, with Keynes’s analysis on pp. 179-182 being the equivalent material he used in his tutoring of R. Harrod in the July -September, 1935 time period, after which Harrod acknowledged to Keynes in his letter of August 30th,1935, that the I=S equilibrium was simply a single, downwardly sloping line in (r,Y) space that intersected NOTHING, so that Keynes’s LM curve, M=L(r,Y), was absolutely required for an equilibrium to exist in (r,Y) space. Harrod was very clear. In this letter Harrod credited Keynes with making a fundamental, 'radical reconstitution’ of the theory of the rate of interest.<br><br>Keynes now realized that Robinson had NEVER EVER understood what he had done in the General Theory, since the M=L(r ) curve could, at best, only be “interpreted “as a single, upward sloping line in (r,Y) space. Robinson’s misinterpretation is repeated in all heterodox, Post Keynesian and Institutionalist discussions such as Tily, who is a good example of the faithful continuing to put forth Robinson’s erroneous claims about Keynes’s theory of the rate of interest being a purely monetary one and as being what Keynes meant in the General Theory.","PeriodicalId":226815,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy & Methodology of Economics eJournal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-11-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116745428","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Keynes‘s first paragraph in his letter of the 9th of November,1936, is the following two lines: “I beg you not to publish. For your argument as it stands is most certainly nonsense.”
Anyone who reads this correspondence will soon realize that it was simply impossible for Joan Robinson to have aided or contributed in any way to the development of the General Theory between 1930 and February, 1936, given the nature of these exchanges.
Keynes is very specific as regards his Liquidity preference theory of the rate of interest:
“You do not seem to realize that if you are right the whole theory of liquidity preference has to be thrown overboard…Such a conclusion cannot be brought in as a tacit inference from an unargued obiter dictum,”(Keynes,1936,CWJMK,Vol.14, p.146).
Over the course of the two month correspondence from September 8th, 1936 till November 13th 1936, Keynes spent a great deal of time and effort trying to correct her many errors about his Liquidity Preference Theory of the Rate of Interest. J. Robinson compounded her original errors by making more additional errors due to her attempt to argue that Keynes was mistaken. Keynes finally realized that J. Robinson simply did not know what she was talking about.
R. Skidelsky accused Roy Harrod of covering up certain aspects of Keynes’s life in his 1951 biography of Keynes in order to ”protect” Keynes’s reputation. This is correct, although Skidelsky overlooked Harrod’s additional failure to cover Keynes’s original multiplier-accelerator model of August, 1938 and Keynes’s careful tutoring of Harrod in correspondence, between July and September, 1935, of Keynes’s IS-LM model, which is presented by Keynes formally in the General Theory in chapter 21 in Part IV on pages 298-299.
Unfortunately, Skidelsky has done exactly what he condemned R. Harrod of doing in 1951. Skidelsky never covered these exchanges between J M Keynes and Joan Robinson in the period between September and November, 1936 in any published work of his in the 20th or 21st centuries.
It is then straightforward to show that other claims related to the General Theory made by Robinson can’t possibly follow ,given her complete and total ignorance of Keynes’s Liquidity preference theory of the rate of interest.
{"title":"Joan Robinson Never Understood Any Part of Keynes’s Liquidity Preference Theory of the Rate of Interest in the General Theory","authors":"M. E. Brady","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3725978","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3725978","url":null,"abstract":"Keynes‘s first paragraph in his letter of the 9th of November,1936, is the following two lines: “I beg you not to publish. For your argument as it stands is most certainly nonsense.”<br><br>Anyone who reads this correspondence will soon realize that it was simply impossible for Joan Robinson to have aided or contributed in any way to the development of the General Theory between 1930 and February, 1936, given the nature of these exchanges.<br><br>Keynes is very specific as regards his Liquidity preference theory of the rate of interest:<br><br>“You do not seem to realize that if you are right the whole theory of liquidity preference has to be thrown overboard…Such a conclusion cannot be brought in as a tacit inference from an unargued obiter dictum,”(Keynes,1936,CWJMK,Vol.14, p.146).<br><br>Over the course of the two month correspondence from September 8th, 1936 till November 13th 1936, Keynes spent a great deal of time and effort trying to correct her many errors about his Liquidity Preference Theory of the Rate of Interest. J. Robinson compounded her original errors by making more additional errors due to her attempt to argue that Keynes was mistaken. Keynes finally realized that J. Robinson simply did not know what she was talking about.<br><br>R. Skidelsky accused Roy Harrod of covering up certain aspects of Keynes’s life in his 1951 biography of Keynes in order to ”protect” Keynes’s reputation. This is correct, although Skidelsky overlooked Harrod’s additional failure to cover Keynes’s original multiplier-accelerator model of August, 1938 and Keynes’s careful tutoring of Harrod in correspondence, between July and September, 1935, of Keynes’s IS-LM model, which is presented by Keynes formally in the General Theory in chapter 21 in Part IV on pages 298-299.<br><br>Unfortunately, Skidelsky has done exactly what he condemned R. Harrod of doing in 1951. Skidelsky never covered these exchanges between J M Keynes and Joan Robinson in the period between September and November, 1936 in any published work of his in the 20th or 21st centuries.<br><br>It is then straightforward to show that other claims related to the General Theory made by Robinson can’t possibly follow ,given her complete and total ignorance of Keynes’s Liquidity preference theory of the rate of interest.<br>","PeriodicalId":226815,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy & Methodology of Economics eJournal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-11-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127658013","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In the Wealth of Nations in 1776, Smith gave two clearly worked out mathematical examples involving a comparison- contrast examining the concepts of precise probability (exact, definite, linear, numerical) and imprecise probability(inexact, indefinite, nonlinear, non numerical) that must incorporate uncertainty, which means there is missing or unavailable evidence that is not available to the decision maker at the time that he must make a choice between two or more different alternative options or alternatives.
Smith’s analysis is carefully presented on pp. 106-113 and pp. 419-423 of the Modern Library edition of the Wealth of Nations edited by Cannon with the foreword by Max Lerner. It is interesting that there has not been a single academic economist, philosopher, historian, sociologist, psychologist, political scientist, social scientist or decision theorist in the 244 years since Smith published the Wealth of Nations in 1776 to note this fact.
The fact that Smith believed that the use of precise probability, as advocated by Jeremy Bentham, who was Smith’s great intellectual opponent and adversary, was possible only under very special conditions, explains why Smith rejected utilitarianism as an ethical system and foundation for the science of economics-the requirement for precise probabilities and precise outcomes was, in general, not possible, due to the fact of missing or unavailable relevant information data ,knowledge or evidence that the decision maker would need to estimate the consequences in the future of his present decision to act. An example of this severe misunderstanding and confusion of Smith’s approach to decision making can be seen, for just one instance, in the 2016 paper by Hollander
Thus, discussions about whether Smith was a utilitarian ,partly a utilitarian, whatever that may mean, not a utilitarian or anti-utilitarian are all besides the point once it is realized that Smith completely rejected the additivity and linearity of the probability calculus upon which Bentham based his utilitarianism on, that all men can calculate. Smith realized that Bentham’s belief in the ability to calculate future consequences was extremely limited.
Apparently, economists can’t read the English Language that Smith used to express his mathematical analysis of his approach to decision making in the Wealth of Nations. The belief that Smith did not use mathematical analysis in the Wealth of Nations can only be a conclusion reached by economists who are themselves mathematically illiterate, inept, innumerate or severely confused about how mathematical arguments and analysis can be presented.
This leads to the conclusion that the M. Friedman, G. Becker, and G. Stigler school of economics, that is taught at the University of Chicago, can have nothing to do at all with Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations because they base all of their economic analysis on precise probability, which is an approach that is identical
{"title":"Adam Smith as an Example of Samuelson’s 1952 Point That Mathematics Can Be Written Out in the English Language: On Smith’s Anti-Utilitarianism Based on the Differences Between Precise and Imprecise Probability Presented in 1776 in the Wealth of Nations","authors":"M. E. Brady","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3723176","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3723176","url":null,"abstract":"In the Wealth of Nations in 1776, Smith gave two clearly worked out mathematical examples involving a comparison- contrast examining the concepts of precise probability (exact, definite, linear, numerical) and imprecise probability(inexact, indefinite, nonlinear, non numerical) that must incorporate uncertainty, which means there is missing or unavailable evidence that is not available to the decision maker at the time that he must make a choice between two or more different alternative options or alternatives. <br><br>Smith’s analysis is carefully presented on pp. 106-113 and pp. 419-423 of the Modern Library edition of the Wealth of Nations edited by Cannon with the foreword by Max Lerner. It is interesting that there has not been a single academic economist, philosopher, historian, sociologist, psychologist, political scientist, social scientist or decision theorist in the 244 years since Smith published the Wealth of Nations in 1776 to note this fact. <br><br>The fact that Smith believed that the use of precise probability, as advocated by Jeremy Bentham, who was Smith’s great intellectual opponent and adversary, was possible only under very special conditions, explains why Smith rejected utilitarianism as an ethical system and foundation for the science of economics-the requirement for precise probabilities and precise outcomes was, in general, not possible, due to the fact of missing or unavailable relevant information data ,knowledge or evidence that the decision maker would need to estimate the consequences in the future of his present decision to act. An example of this severe misunderstanding and confusion of Smith’s approach to decision making can be seen, for just one instance, in the 2016 paper by Hollander <br><br>Thus, discussions about whether Smith was a utilitarian ,partly a utilitarian, whatever that may mean, not a utilitarian or anti-utilitarian are all besides the point once it is realized that Smith completely rejected the additivity and linearity of the probability calculus upon which Bentham based his utilitarianism on, that all men can calculate. Smith realized that Bentham’s belief in the ability to calculate future consequences was extremely limited. <br><br> Apparently, economists can’t read the English Language that Smith used to express his mathematical analysis of his approach to decision making in the Wealth of Nations. The belief that Smith did not use mathematical analysis in the Wealth of Nations can only be a conclusion reached by economists who are themselves mathematically illiterate, inept, innumerate or severely confused about how mathematical arguments and analysis can be presented.<br><br>This leads to the conclusion that the M. Friedman, G. Becker, and G. Stigler school of economics, that is taught at the University of Chicago, can have nothing to do at all with Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations because they base all of their economic analysis on precise probability, which is an approach that is identical ","PeriodicalId":226815,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy & Methodology of Economics eJournal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-11-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116783373","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper provides my reflections on the state of economic methodology and philosophy of economics as of the beginning of 2020 following the end a fifteen year co-editorship of the Journal of Economic Methodology with Wade Hands. It looks at how economic methodology and philosophy of economics, as a meta-field type of research, has changed since it emerged as a distinct subfield in economics in the 1980s. Using an evolution of technology analysis, it distinguishes two different possible scenarios for the field’s future according to environmental factors operating upon it and how specialization in research may affect both it and economics, and then makes a crossdisciplinarity argument for its further development as a diverse, pluralistic domain of research.
本文提供了我在与韦德·汉兹(Wade Hands)共同担任《经济方法论杂志》(Journal of economic methodology) 15年编辑之后，截至2020年初对经济方法论和经济学哲学状况的思考。它着眼于经济方法论和经济学哲学，作为一种元领域类型的研究，自20世纪80年代作为经济学的一个独特的子领域出现以来，是如何变化的。通过对技术演进的分析，它根据影响该领域的环境因素，以及研究专业化如何影响该领域和经济学，区分了该领域未来的两种不同可能情景，然后为其作为一个多样化、多元化的研究领域的进一步发展提出了跨学科的论点。
{"title":"Change and Continuity in Economic Methodology and Philosophy of Economics","authors":"John B. Davis","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3719161","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3719161","url":null,"abstract":"This paper provides my reflections on the state of economic methodology and philosophy of economics as of the beginning of 2020 following the end a fifteen year co-editorship of the Journal of Economic Methodology with Wade Hands. It looks at how economic methodology and philosophy of economics, as a meta-field type of research, has changed since it emerged as a distinct subfield in economics in the 1980s. Using an evolution of technology analysis, it distinguishes two different possible scenarios for the field’s future according to environmental factors operating upon it and how specialization in research may affect both it and economics, and then makes a crossdisciplinarity argument for its further development as a diverse, pluralistic domain of research.","PeriodicalId":226815,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy & Methodology of Economics eJournal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-10-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115964838","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper explores the relationship between two recently advanced research programs: the Creative Dynamics and the Entangled Political Economy. The two frameworks share some significant commonalities: both approach coordination as a process and not as a state, both focus on explanation as opposed to prediction, both work with open-ended models, and both follow the Hayekian tradition of treating knowledge as subjective, dispersed, and in need of discovery. However, the connection between the two approaches is not always clear as they seem to be created for different goals. Creative Dynamics is focused primarily on explaining novelty. Entangled Political Economy seeks to offer a uniform approach to understanding social coordination, treating political and economic activities as more similar than different. My paper serves three purposes. First, I provide a primer on the two distinct theories. Second, I explore their shared origins and common features. Third, I sketch three possible directions for future research.
{"title":"Creative Dynamics and Entangled Political Economy","authors":"Marta Podemska-Mikluch","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3715819","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3715819","url":null,"abstract":"This paper explores the relationship between two recently advanced research programs: the Creative Dynamics and the Entangled Political Economy. The two frameworks share some significant commonalities: both approach coordination as a process and not as a state, both focus on explanation as opposed to prediction, both work with open-ended models, and both follow the Hayekian tradition of treating knowledge as subjective, dispersed, and in need of discovery. However, the connection between the two approaches is not always clear as they seem to be created for different goals. Creative Dynamics is focused primarily on explaining novelty. Entangled Political Economy seeks to offer a uniform approach to understanding social coordination, treating political and economic activities as more similar than different. My paper serves three purposes. First, I provide a primer on the two distinct theories. Second, I explore their shared origins and common features. Third, I sketch three possible directions for future research.","PeriodicalId":226815,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy & Methodology of Economics eJournal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-10-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123111555","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
F. Y. Edgeworth made the only correct assessment of Keynes’s Logical Theory of Probability in his A Treatise on Probability among philosophers in the 100 years between 1921 and 2020. The reason is that he actually read the entire book, with the exception of Part II, which he was able to assess through his very careful reading of Part I. The major problem confronting any philosopher, who wants to take into consideration the various different aspects of Keynes’s A Treatise on Probability, is the unfortunate fact that there is no philosopher,with the one exception of Edgeworth (Bertrand Russell did not read Part V), who has read beyond chapters 1-4 plus some parts of chapter 6 of the A Treatise on Probability. This assessment includes every philosopher associated with SIPTA, as well as B. Koopman, I. J. Good, T. L. Fine, P. Suppes, H.E. Kyburg, I.Levi, S. Zabell, as well as younger philosophers, such as B. Weatherson, D. Rowbottom, R.Bradley, S. Bradley, J. Williamson, T. Siedenfeld, G. Wheeler, etc. The conclusion reached is that after 100 years there is only one sure path currently available to philosophers who want to know what it was that Keynes actually accomplished in the A Treatise on Probability-read and reread the two reviews made by Edgeworth. A reader is then in a good position to grasp what it was that Keynes had erected in 1921-the first mathematically and technically advanced interval valued approach to probability in history. Kyburg’s claim, that he was the first to have put forth a detailed interval valued approach for a logical theory of probability, is simply a major oversight made by Kyburg. Edwin B. Wilson's conclusion, that Edgeworth was by the far the most qualified academic to review Keynes's A Treatise on Probability, still holds good 100 years after he published his reviews of Keynes's book.
埃奇沃斯在《概率论》一书中对凯恩斯的逻辑概率论做出了1921年至2020年100年间哲学家中唯一正确的评价。原因是他实际上读了整本书，除了第二部分，他可以通过非常仔细地阅读第一部分来评估第二部分。任何哲学家，如果想要考虑凯恩斯的《概论》的各个不同方面，面临的主要问题是一个不幸的事实，除了埃奇沃斯(伯特兰·罗素没有读第五部分)，他已经读过了《概率论》第1-4章和第6章的部分内容。这一评估包括与SIPTA相关的每一位哲学家，以及B. Koopman, I. J. Good, T. L. Fine, P. Suppes, H.E. Kyburg, I. levi, S. Zabell，以及年轻的哲学家，如B. Weatherson, D. Rowbottom, R.Bradley, S. Bradley, J. Williamson, T. Siedenfeld, G. Wheeler等。得出的结论是，100年后，对于那些想知道凯恩斯在《概率论》中真正完成了什么的哲学家来说，目前只有一条可靠的途径——反复阅读埃奇沃斯的两篇评论。这样，读者就能很好地理解凯恩斯在1921年建立的是什么——历史上第一个在数学和技术上先进的区间值概率方法。Kyburg声称他是第一个为概率逻辑理论提出详细的区间值方法的人，这只是Kyburg的一个重大疏忽。埃德温·b·威尔逊(Edwin B. Wilson)的结论是，埃奇沃斯是迄今为止最有资格评论凯恩斯《概率论》(A Treatise on Probability)的学者。在他发表了对凯恩斯著作的评论100年后，这一结论仍然成立。
{"title":"One Hundred Years After Keynes Published His 'A Treatise on Probability' in 1921, Edgeworth’s Two Reviews Still Stand Out As Being Vastly Superior to the Assessments Made by Any Other Philosopher of the Logical Theory of Probability","authors":"M. E. Brady","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3699834","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3699834","url":null,"abstract":"F. Y. Edgeworth made the only correct assessment of Keynes’s Logical Theory of Probability in his A Treatise on Probability among philosophers in the 100 years between 1921 and 2020. The reason is that he actually read the entire book, with the exception of Part II, which he was able to assess through his very careful reading of Part I. \u0000 \u0000The major problem confronting any philosopher, who wants to take into consideration the various different aspects of Keynes’s A Treatise on Probability, is the unfortunate fact that there is no philosopher,with the one exception of Edgeworth (Bertrand Russell did not read Part V), who has read beyond chapters 1-4 plus some parts of chapter 6 of the A Treatise on Probability. This assessment includes every philosopher associated with SIPTA, as well as B. Koopman, I. J. Good, T. L. Fine, P. Suppes, H.E. Kyburg, I.Levi, S. Zabell, as well as younger philosophers, such as B. Weatherson, D. Rowbottom, R.Bradley, S. Bradley, J. Williamson, T. Siedenfeld, G. Wheeler, etc. \u0000 \u0000The conclusion reached is that after 100 years there is only one sure path currently available to philosophers who want to know what it was that Keynes actually accomplished in the A Treatise on Probability-read and reread the two reviews made by Edgeworth. A reader is then in a good position to grasp what it was that Keynes had erected in 1921-the first mathematically and technically advanced interval valued approach to probability in history. Kyburg’s claim, that he was the first to have put forth a detailed interval valued approach for a logical theory of probability, is simply a major oversight made by Kyburg. \u0000 \u0000Edwin B. Wilson's conclusion, that Edgeworth was by the far the most qualified academic to review Keynes's A Treatise on Probability, still holds good 100 years after he published his reviews of Keynes's book.","PeriodicalId":226815,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy & Methodology of Economics eJournal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115417291","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper reiterates and clarifies the heterodox economic assumption of exogenous distribution. It discusses Sraffa's analysis of the laws of returns and extends to the metaphysical questions of justice and adjustment in political economy. The laws of returns show the outcome of economic production from inputs to outputs. Returns have to be paid to the sources of production. In other words, returns are justice served to the works of capital and labor. However, there is a problem of knowledge and methodology about distributive justice in the measurement of capital. This paper applies Sraffa's critique of economic theory to capital accumulation, technological progress, and the distribution of income. Adjustment to the natural physical expansion of the system has a problem of knowledge and cannot be determined a priori external to the system. The paper argues about the adjustment and determination of the distribution of income according to the history of economic thought tradition of theory of value and capital. Capital is the metaphysical measurement and adjustment variable of our moral science and physical science. Without human conscience, it is impossible to measure systemic growth and quantify capital.
{"title":"The Laws of Returns and Exogenous Distribution: The Metaphysics of Justice and Adjustment in Political Economy","authors":"Up Sira Nukulkit","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3703406","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3703406","url":null,"abstract":"This paper reiterates and clarifies the heterodox economic assumption of exogenous distribution. It discusses Sraffa's analysis of the laws of returns and extends to the metaphysical questions of justice and adjustment in political economy. The laws of returns show the outcome of economic production from inputs to outputs. Returns have to be paid to the sources of production. In other words, returns are justice served to the works of capital and labor. However, there is a problem of knowledge and methodology about distributive justice in the measurement of capital. This paper applies Sraffa's critique of economic theory to capital accumulation, technological progress, and the distribution of income. Adjustment to the natural physical expansion of the system has a problem of knowledge and cannot be determined a priori external to the system. The paper argues about the adjustment and determination of the distribution of income according to the history of economic thought tradition of theory of value and capital. Capital is the metaphysical measurement and adjustment variable of our moral science and physical science. Without human conscience, it is impossible to measure systemic growth and quantify capital.","PeriodicalId":226815,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy & Methodology of Economics eJournal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130270777","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Ramsey’s 1922 and 1926 critiques about Keynes’s logical ,objective probability relations overlooked Keynes’s already specified response that Keynes had incorporated on pp. 35-36 of chapter III of the A Treatise on Probability FIVE YEARS before Ramsey made his critique .This fact calls into question (a) whether Ramsey ever actually read the book he claimed to be reviewing and (b) whether those adhering to Ramsey’s “critique “ ever read the A Treatise on Probability either. It is bizarre that these same unsupportable claims are being rehashed again in C. Misak’s autobiography on Ramsey in 2020.
{"title":"Keynes Had Already Answered Ramsey’s 1922 and 1926 Critiques Concerning Objective, Logical Probability Relations on Pages 35–36 of the A Treatise on Probability","authors":"M. E. Brady","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3697924","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3697924","url":null,"abstract":"Ramsey’s 1922 and 1926 critiques about Keynes’s logical ,objective probability relations overlooked Keynes’s already specified response that Keynes had incorporated on pp. 35-36 of chapter III of the A Treatise on Probability FIVE YEARS before Ramsey made his critique .This fact calls into question (a) whether Ramsey ever actually read the book he claimed to be reviewing and (b) whether those adhering to Ramsey’s “critique “ ever read the A Treatise on Probability either. It is bizarre that these same unsupportable claims are being rehashed again in C. Misak’s autobiography on Ramsey in 2020.","PeriodicalId":226815,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy & Methodology of Economics eJournal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114351860","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Keynes had already answered Ramsey’s incoherent( bizarre?) criticism that “… the obvious one is that there really do not seem to be any such things as the probability relations he describes ..."on page 36 of the A Treatise on Probability BEFORE Ramsey ever made his criticism. Keynes pointed out that the “…analogy between orders of similarity and probability is so great that its apprehension will greatly assist that of the ideas I wish to convey.” Ramsey completely failed to grasp the analogy between similarity and probability before criticizing Keynes. No where does Ramsey show that he understands the analogy between probability and similarity that Keynes is using. Nor has any philosopher, economist, psychologist, sociologist, historian or decision theorist demonstrated any understanding of Keynes’s argument in the 20th or 21st century. Only in the writings of cognitive psychologists and cognitive scientists is their evidence that Keynes’s position has been understood. I know of NO such specialist who has critiqued Keynes’s position. This means that Ramsey’s critique is based on ignorance on his part.
Before one can rationally criticize any argument of any type, the person doing the critique MUST demonstrate that he understands the position he is critiquing.
Keynes’s introductory comments on p.36 were then explored in Part III of the A Treatise on Probability in far, far, far greater depth and detail by Keynes. Keynes’s objective probability relations are simply objective similarity relations existing between old known situations and new unknown situations. Human pattern recognition skills involve using resemblance functions based on past memory that projects past knowledge of old situations into new situations, where there are similarities that are seen to exist between the old, known situation and a new, unexplored situation by SOME researchers. One then can come up with a rational degree of belief regarding how some new situation will play out, given the similarities between the old and new situations.
Herbert Simon independently rediscovered some parts of Keynes’s Part III analysis in the A Treatise on Probability that dealt with the connection between intuition and induction when he started to analyze the decision making capabilities of tournament chess players in Over the Board competition, where the players must make decisions under time constrain(a clock),in the 1950’s. Simon was a part of the developing fields of Cognitive Science and cognitive psychology that started in the 1950’s.Keynes ‘s positions on intuition, induction, similarity (dissimilarity), resemblances, analogy and pattern recognition are all accepted basic conclusions in these fields. Ramsey’s concept that supposed humans were capable of calculating exact, precise probabilities, using the purely mathematical laws of the probability calculus to make decisions, is completely rejected except as very special case. One very special case would be correspond
凯恩斯已经回答了拉姆齐不连贯(奇怪?)的批评:“……显而易见的一点是，他所描述的概率关系似乎真的不存在……在拉姆齐提出批评之前，在《概率论》的第36页。凯恩斯指出，“……相似性和概率之间的相似性是如此之大，以至于对它的理解将极大地帮助我想要传达的思想。”在批评凯恩斯之前，拉姆齐完全没有把握相似性和概率之间的类比。拉姆齐没有在任何地方表明他理解凯恩斯所使用的概率和相似性之间的类比。在20世纪或21世纪，也没有任何哲学家、经济学家、心理学家、社会学家、历史学家或决策理论家对凯恩斯的观点有任何理解。只有在认知心理学家和认知科学家的著作中，才有证据表明凯恩斯的观点得到了理解。据我所知，没有这样的专家批评过凯恩斯的立场。这意味着拉姆齐的批评是基于他自己的无知。在一个人能够理性地批评任何类型的论点之前，进行批评的人必须证明他理解他所批评的立场。凯恩斯在第36页的介绍性评论在《概率论》的第三部分中进行了更深入、更详细的探讨。凯恩斯的客观概率关系就是存在于旧的已知情况和新的未知情况之间的客观相似关系。人类模式识别技能包括使用基于过去记忆的相似性函数，将过去对旧情况的了解投射到新情况中，一些研究人员认为旧的、已知的情况和新的、未探索的情况之间存在相似之处。然后，考虑到新旧情况之间的相似性，人们可以对一些新情况将如何发展产生合理程度的信念。20世纪50年代，赫伯特·西蒙(Herbert Simon)在《概率论》(A Treatise on Probability)中开始分析棋手在Over the Board比赛中的决策能力时，独立地重新发现了凯恩斯第三部分分析的一些部分，这些分析处理了直觉和归纳之间的联系。在Over the Board比赛中，棋手必须在时间限制(时钟)下做出决策。西蒙是认知科学和认知心理学发展领域的一员，这些领域始于20世纪50年代。凯恩斯关于直觉、归纳法、相似(不相似)、相似、类比和模式识别的立场都是这些领域公认的基本结论。拉姆齐的概念认为人类有能力计算精确的概率，利用概率微积分的纯数学定律来做决定，除了非常特殊的情况，这个概念完全被拒绝了。一个非常特殊的例子是通信(邮政)象棋，游戏可以持续数年。另一个特殊的例子是象棋计算机，比如深蓝，它们可以把它们关于开局、中局和终局的“书本”知识带到棋盘上(游戏邦注:这是一个巨大的库，包含了所有已知的过去玩过的游戏的变化)。当时的国际象棋世界冠军加里·卡斯帕罗夫(Garry Kasparov)在1996年以4比2击败深蓝，并在1997年以2.5比3.5输掉了复赛。没有认知科学家或认知心理学家会接受拉姆齐关于人类决策的主张，无论是在1950年还是2020年，因为所有的经验和实验证据都完全反对拉姆齐关于人类使用精确概率能力的立场。在最近对米萨克的书的评论中，包括米萨克自己对拉姆齐的评论中，我们很讨厌地发现，他们依赖于凯恩斯在技术上完全无知的艺术家朋友克莱夫·贝尔(Clive Bell)，他不知道凯恩斯在《概率论》(a Treatise on Probability)中做了什么。原因很简单，因为他完全不懂数学、统计、逻辑和概率论。我觉得奇怪的是，他被认为是一个合法的来源，据说可以证实拉姆齐关于凯恩斯“客观概率关系”的愚蠢、无知的评论。论点似乎是这样的，(a)，(b)和(c)是论点的前提，(d)是论点的结论:(a)拉姆齐是一位伟大的数学和逻辑天才(b)克莱夫·贝尔与凯恩斯生活和交谈过(c)克莱夫·贝尔说拉姆齐的批判推翻了凯恩斯的逻辑概率论(d)拉姆齐的批判推翻了凯恩斯的逻辑概率论。这就是米萨克的论点。
{"title":"Why Is Clive Bell, an Artist With No Training in Logic, Mathematics, Statistics or Probability, Being Cited as an Expert on J M Keynes’s a Treatise on Probability?","authors":"M. E. Brady","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3693582","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3693582","url":null,"abstract":"Keynes had already answered Ramsey’s incoherent( bizarre?) criticism that “… the obvious one is that there really do not seem to be any such things as the probability relations he describes ...\"on page 36 of the A Treatise on Probability BEFORE Ramsey ever made his criticism. Keynes pointed out that the “…analogy between orders of similarity and probability is so great that its apprehension will greatly assist that of the ideas I wish to convey.” Ramsey completely failed to grasp the analogy between similarity and probability before criticizing Keynes. No where does Ramsey show that he understands the analogy between probability and similarity that Keynes is using. Nor has any philosopher, economist, psychologist, sociologist, historian or decision theorist demonstrated any understanding of Keynes’s argument in the 20th or 21st century. Only in the writings of cognitive psychologists and cognitive scientists is their evidence that Keynes’s position has been understood. I know of NO such specialist who has critiqued Keynes’s position. This means that Ramsey’s critique is based on ignorance on his part. <br><br>Before one can rationally criticize any argument of any type, the person doing the critique MUST demonstrate that he understands the position he is critiquing.<br><br>Keynes’s introductory comments on p.36 were then explored in Part III of the A Treatise on Probability in far, far, far greater depth and detail by Keynes. Keynes’s objective probability relations are simply objective similarity relations existing between old known situations and new unknown situations. Human pattern recognition skills involve using resemblance functions based on past memory that projects past knowledge of old situations into new situations, where there are similarities that are seen to exist between the old, known situation and a new, unexplored situation by SOME researchers. One then can come up with a rational degree of belief regarding how some new situation will play out, given the similarities between the old and new situations.<br><br>Herbert Simon independently rediscovered some parts of Keynes’s Part III analysis in the A Treatise on Probability that dealt with the connection between intuition and induction when he started to analyze the decision making capabilities of tournament chess players in Over the Board competition, where the players must make decisions under time constrain(a clock),in the 1950’s. Simon was a part of the developing fields of Cognitive Science and cognitive psychology that started in the 1950’s.Keynes ‘s positions on intuition, induction, similarity (dissimilarity), resemblances, analogy and pattern recognition are all accepted basic conclusions in these fields. Ramsey’s concept that supposed humans were capable of calculating exact, precise probabilities, using the purely mathematical laws of the probability calculus to make decisions, is completely rejected except as very special case. One very special case would be correspond","PeriodicalId":226815,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy & Methodology of Economics eJournal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116208383","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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