In September, 1936, Keynes started reviewing materials sent to him by Joan Robinson for publication as a book, titled” Essays in the Theory of Employment”, which was published in 1937 .Keynes discovered some significant misunderstandings on J. Robinson’s part regarding exchange rate and price adjustments of foreign securities between two countries. However, the much more severe problem, from Keynes’s point of view, was that, in the course of the exchanges, J. Robinson demonstrated her complete failure to grasp Keynes’s liquidity preference theory of the rate of interest, as presented by Keynes using his original IS-LM (LP) model discussed extensively in chapter 21 in Parts IV -VI on pages 298-306 of the General Theory.
This was due to Robinson’s having latched on to the initial, introductory, beginning discussions of liquidity preference in chapter 13 on page 168, where Keynes defined M=L(r). M=L(r) is what Joan Robinson over her entire life believed determined the rate of interest. It is impossible to combine this equation with Keynes’s IS equation from p.63, that I=S, as analyzed further by Keynes on p.115 and p.137 of the General Theory, which leads to the equations C=f(Y ) ,or S=h(Y), and I=g(r) ,where one can conduct an analysis in Keynes’s (r,Y) space. Only the equation on p.199 of the General Theory, M=L(r,Y) ,can be combined in (r,Y ) space with the IS equation to form Keynes’s version of IS-LM(LP),which Keynes based on the D-Z model of chapter 20. This equilibrium then determines the nominal, long run rate of interest.If the nominal, long run rate of interest falls to 2 % or less, monetary policy will in totally ineffective because the intersection of the IS equation will fall in the elasticity range of the LM equation that exhibited virtually absolute liquidity preference
Robinson did not have the mathematical training needed to grasp what Keynes was doing in chapters 15 and 21(20) of the General Theory. The problem of her mathematical illiteracy, that had originally shown up in 1932-1933 regarding Pigou’s seeking some clarification from her about mathematical work that had actually been performed for her by either A.Robinson or Richard Kahn in her 1933 book, the Theory of Imperfect Competition,reared its head again in 1936. However, this time neither R. Kahn nor A. Robinson would be able to save her from the intellectual mess she had made out of the General Theory. J. Robinson never raised any concerns to Keynes in 1935 when she was reviewing the Second draft copy of the General Theory regarding chapters 15,20 and 21. However, in 1936, Keynes discovered that Robinson actually had no better idea about his liquidity theory of the rate of interest than R. Harrod, D. Robertson and R.Hawtrey.
Her total failure to grasp Keynes’s theory of the rate of interest was on complete display in these exchanges. This is why adherents of heterodox economics have sought to cover up these exchanges because anyone reading them in the
{"title":"On Heterodox Attempts to Cover Up Joan Robinson’s Failure to Comprehend Keynes’s Liquidity Preference Theory of the Rate of Interest and Keynes’s IS-LM Model in Their Correspondence of September through November,1936","authors":"M. E. Brady","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3652997","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3652997","url":null,"abstract":"In September, 1936, Keynes started reviewing materials sent to him by Joan Robinson for publication as a book, titled” Essays in the Theory of Employment”, which was published in 1937 .Keynes discovered some significant misunderstandings on J. Robinson’s part regarding exchange rate and price adjustments of foreign securities between two countries. However, the much more severe problem, from Keynes’s point of view, was that, in the course of the exchanges, J. Robinson demonstrated her complete failure to grasp Keynes’s liquidity preference theory of the rate of interest, as presented by Keynes using his original IS-LM (LP) model discussed extensively in chapter 21 in Parts IV -VI on pages 298-306 of the General Theory. <br><br>This was due to Robinson’s having latched on to the initial, introductory, beginning discussions of liquidity preference in chapter 13 on page 168, where Keynes defined M=L(r). M=L(r) is what Joan Robinson over her entire life believed determined the rate of interest. It is impossible to combine this equation with Keynes’s IS equation from p.63, that I=S, as analyzed further by Keynes on p.115 and p.137 of the General Theory, which leads to the equations C=f(Y ) ,or S=h(Y), and I=g(r) ,where one can conduct an analysis in Keynes’s (r,Y) space. Only the equation on p.199 of the General Theory, M=L(r,Y) ,can be combined in (r,Y ) space with the IS equation to form Keynes’s version of IS-LM(LP),which Keynes based on the D-Z model of chapter 20. This equilibrium then determines the nominal, long run rate of interest.If the nominal, long run rate of interest falls to 2 % or less, monetary policy will in totally ineffective because the intersection of the IS equation will fall in the elasticity range of the LM equation that exhibited virtually absolute liquidity preference<br><br>Robinson did not have the mathematical training needed to grasp what Keynes was doing in chapters 15 and 21(20) of the General Theory. The problem of her mathematical illiteracy, that had originally shown up in 1932-1933 regarding Pigou’s seeking some clarification from her about mathematical work that had actually been performed for her by either A.Robinson or Richard Kahn in her 1933 book, the Theory of Imperfect Competition,reared its head again in 1936. However, this time neither R. Kahn nor A. Robinson would be able to save her from the intellectual mess she had made out of the General Theory. J. Robinson never raised any concerns to Keynes in 1935 when she was reviewing the Second draft copy of the General Theory regarding chapters 15,20 and 21. However, in 1936, Keynes discovered that Robinson actually had no better idea about his liquidity theory of the rate of interest than R. Harrod, D. Robertson and R.Hawtrey.<br><br>Her total failure to grasp Keynes’s theory of the rate of interest was on complete display in these exchanges. This is why adherents of heterodox economics have sought to cover up these exchanges because anyone reading them in the","PeriodicalId":226815,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy & Methodology of Economics eJournal","volume":"2008 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125598411","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Philosophers, historians, economists, decision theorists, and psychologists have been repeating a very severe error of omission for nearly a hundred years that was originally made by the French mathematician Emile Borel in his 1924 review of the A Treatise on Probability, 1921. Borel decided to skip Parts II through V of the A treatise on Probability. He explicitly apologized to Keynes at the beginning of his review for his decision involved in skipping Part II, acknowledging to Keynes, correctly, that Part II was the most important part of the A Treatise on Probability.
Borel’s acknowledgment and apology are, in fact, an understatement, because without an understanding of Part II,it is impossible to understand Keynes’s theory of decision making and the role played by that theory in the General Theory(1936). This all comes out in the Keynes-Townshend exchanges of 1937 and 1938, where Keynes makes it crystal clear to Townshend that his theory of liquidity preference is built on his non numerical probabilities, which a reading of Part II makes clear are interval valued probabilities, each with an upper bound and a lower bound. These probabilities are non additive. Keynes’s definition of uncertainty on page 148 of chapter 12 in footnote 1 defines uncertainty as an inverse function of Keynes’s evidential weight of the argument, defined on the unit interval between 0 and 1. Any probability with a w < 1 is an interval valued probability that is non additive. The only way to discuss Keynesian uncertainty is by non additive, interval valued probability or by decision weights like Keynes’s c coefficient.
D. P. Rowbottom attempts a defense of Keynes’s position against J. Williamson’s intellectual attacks which I view as correct. However, Rowbottom badly handicaps himself by providing a defense of Keynes’s position that is limited to the use of Part I of the A Treatise on Probability. Rowbottom could have presented an overwhelming counter argument against Williamson if he had understood Keynes’s concepts of interval valued, non additive theory of imprecise probability from Part II of the A Treatise on Probability, Keynes’s finite probabilities from Part III, Keynes’s decision weight translation of imprecise probability in chapter 26 of Part IV and Keynes’s inexact, approximation approach to statistics in Part V that Keynes combined with his application of Chebyshev’s Inequality for establishing the lower bound of a probability estimate.
Starting with the 1940 work of Koopman and continuing through the work of,for example H. Kyburg,Jr.,I. Levi, I. J. Good,and then on to the work of for example, B.Weatherson, D. Rowbottom, B. Hill, S. Bradley and practically all other academics who have written on Keynes and imprecise probability, the exact same error of omission has kept on repeating itself over and over again for a 100 years.
近一百年来，哲学家、历史学家、经济学家、决策理论家和心理学家一直在重复一个非常严重的遗漏错误，这个错误最初是由法国数学家埃米尔·博雷尔(Emile Borel)在1924年对《概率论》(a Treatise on Probability, 1921)的评论中提出的。博雷尔决定跳过《概率论》的第二到第五部分。他在评论一开始就明确地向凯恩斯道歉，因为他决定跳过第二部分，并正确地向凯恩斯承认，第二部分是《概率论》中最重要的部分。事实上，博雷尔的承认和道歉是轻描淡写的，因为不理解第二部分，就不可能理解凯恩斯的决策理论以及该理论在《通论》(1936)中所扮演的角色。这一切都出现在1937年和1938年的凯恩斯-汤森交流中，凯恩斯向汤森清楚地表明，他的流动性偏好理论是建立在他的非数值概率之上的，第二部分的阅读清楚地表明，这是区间值概率，每个概率都有上限和下限。这些概率是非加性的。凯恩斯在脚注1第12章第148页对不确定性的定义将不确定性定义为凯恩斯论证的证据权重的反函数，定义在0和1之间的单位间隔上。任何带有w <的概率;1是一个非加性的区间值概率。讨论凯恩斯不确定性的唯一方法是通过非加性、区间值概率或像凯恩斯的c系数这样的决策权重。P. Rowbottom试图为凯恩斯的立场辩护，反对J. Williamson的智力攻击，我认为这是正确的。然而，Rowbottom为凯恩斯的立场提供的辩护，仅限于使用《概率论》(a Treatise on Probability)的第一部分，这严重阻碍了他自己的观点。如果Rowbottom理解了凯恩斯的区间值概念，《概率论》第二部分中不精确概率的非加性理论，《概率论》第三部分中凯恩斯的有限概率，《概率论》第四部分第26章中凯恩斯对不精确概率的决策权重翻译，以及凯恩斯的不精确，在第五部分中，凯恩斯将近似方法与切比雪夫不等式的应用相结合，建立了概率估计的下界。从1940年Koopman的工作开始，一直到H. Kyburg,Jr.，I。Levi, I. J. Good，再到B. weatherson, D. Rowbottom, B. Hill, S. Bradley以及几乎所有写过凯恩斯和不精确概率的学者的作品，同样的遗漏错误在100年里一遍又一遍地重复。
{"title":"A Comparison of J. M. Keynes’s Logical Approach to Probability and Any ‘Objective Bayesian’ Approach to Probability Needs to Incorporate All Five Parts of Keynes’s a Treatise on Probability, Not Just Part I","authors":"M. E. Brady","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3609624","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3609624","url":null,"abstract":"Philosophers, historians, economists, decision theorists, and psychologists have been repeating a very severe error of omission for nearly a hundred years that was originally made by the French mathematician Emile Borel in his 1924 review of the A Treatise on Probability, 1921. Borel decided to skip Parts II through V of the A treatise on Probability. He explicitly apologized to Keynes at the beginning of his review for his decision involved in skipping Part II, acknowledging to Keynes, correctly, that Part II was the most important part of the A Treatise on Probability.<br><br>Borel’s acknowledgment and apology are, in fact, an understatement, because without an understanding of Part II,it is impossible to understand Keynes’s theory of decision making and the role played by that theory in the General Theory(1936). This all comes out in the Keynes-Townshend exchanges of 1937 and 1938, where Keynes makes it crystal clear to Townshend that his theory of liquidity preference is built on his non numerical probabilities, which a reading of Part II makes clear are interval valued probabilities, each with an upper bound and a lower bound. These probabilities are non additive. Keynes’s definition of uncertainty on page 148 of chapter 12 in footnote 1 defines uncertainty as an inverse function of Keynes’s evidential weight of the argument, defined on the unit interval between 0 and 1. Any probability with a w < 1 is an interval valued probability that is non additive. The only way to discuss Keynesian uncertainty is by non additive, interval valued probability or by decision weights like Keynes’s c coefficient.<br><br>D. P. Rowbottom attempts a defense of Keynes’s position against J. Williamson’s intellectual attacks which I view as correct. However, Rowbottom badly handicaps himself by providing a defense of Keynes’s position that is limited to the use of Part I of the A Treatise on Probability. Rowbottom could have presented an overwhelming counter argument against Williamson if he had understood Keynes’s concepts of interval valued, non additive theory of imprecise probability from Part II of the A Treatise on Probability, Keynes’s finite probabilities from Part III, Keynes’s decision weight translation of imprecise probability in chapter 26 of Part IV and Keynes’s inexact, approximation approach to statistics in Part V that Keynes combined with his application of Chebyshev’s Inequality for establishing the lower bound of a probability estimate.<br><br>Starting with the 1940 work of Koopman and continuing through the work of,for example H. Kyburg,Jr.,I. Levi, I. J. Good,and then on to the work of for example, B.Weatherson, D. Rowbottom, B. Hill, S. Bradley and practically all other academics who have written on Keynes and imprecise probability, the exact same error of omission has kept on repeating itself over and over again for a 100 years.","PeriodicalId":226815,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy & Methodology of Economics eJournal","volume":"56 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-05-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128099264","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Keynes recognized that there were a few cases where his rational analysis of decision making under conditions of uncertainty and risk using:
(a) interval valued probability in Parts II and III of the A Treatise on Probability,
(b) decision weights in Part IV of the A Treatise on Probability ,or
(c) safety first, based on the use of Chebyshev’s Inequality, in Part V of the A Treatise on Probability, would result in a stalemate.
Although Keynes introduced his concept of caprice to deal with this problem in Part I in chapter III on p.30 of the A Treatise on Probability, a complete understanding requires a mastery of his mathematical analysis in Chapter XV, where Keynes presented part of his mathematical analysis of his Boolean based theory of imprecise, indeterminate interval valued probability. Once the link between page 30 of Chapter III and Pages 160-163 of Chapter XV is understood, then Keynes’s use of caprice in the General Theory and the Keynes-Townshend correspondence can be seen to be an important, but small, part of his general decision theory of the A Treatise on Probability which he applied as a specific decision theory in economics in the General Theory and after.
{"title":"The Restricted Role of Caprice (Whim) in J M Keynes’s Interval Valued Theory of Probability in the A Treatise on Probability, General Theory, and in the Keynes-Townshend Correspondence of 1937–1938","authors":"M. E. Brady","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3590871","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3590871","url":null,"abstract":"Keynes recognized that there were a few cases where his rational analysis of decision making under conditions of uncertainty and risk using: <br><br>(a) interval valued probability in Parts II and III of the A Treatise on Probability,<br><br>(b) decision weights in Part IV of the A Treatise on Probability ,or <br><br>(c) safety first, based on the use of Chebyshev’s Inequality, in Part V of the A Treatise on Probability, would result in a stalemate. <br><br>Although Keynes introduced his concept of caprice to deal with this problem in Part I in chapter III on p.30 of the A Treatise on Probability, a complete understanding requires a mastery of his mathematical analysis in Chapter XV, where Keynes presented part of his mathematical analysis of his Boolean based theory of imprecise, indeterminate interval valued probability. Once the link between page 30 of Chapter III and Pages 160-163 of Chapter XV is understood, then Keynes’s use of caprice in the General Theory and the Keynes-Townshend correspondence can be seen to be an important, but small, part of his general decision theory of the A Treatise on Probability which he applied as a specific decision theory in economics in the General Theory and after.","PeriodicalId":226815,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy & Methodology of Economics eJournal","volume":"79 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-05-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127725339","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Behavioral economics rejects the Samuelsonian concept of revealed preferences, which, in turn, is a cornerstone for the development of modern neoclassical micro theory. This paper aims at criticizing the behavioral charge against revealed preferences, arguing that, while accepting the fact that neoclassical micro theory is in part not plausible, the behavioral critique is misleading and thus does not solve the problem of neoclassical microeconomics stemmed from its essence. This paper also develops a case for the Austrian concept of demonstrated preference as a middle ground between neoclassical micro theory and behavioral economics.
{"title":"Demonstrated Preferences as the Middle Ground Between Revealed Preferences and Modern Behaviorism","authors":"Haibien Nguyen","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3595872","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3595872","url":null,"abstract":"Behavioral economics rejects the Samuelsonian concept of revealed preferences, which, in turn, is a cornerstone for the development of modern neoclassical micro theory. This paper aims at criticizing the behavioral charge against revealed preferences, arguing that, while accepting the fact that neoclassical micro theory is in part not plausible, the behavioral critique is misleading and thus does not solve the problem of neoclassical microeconomics stemmed from its essence. This paper also develops a case for the Austrian concept of demonstrated preference as a middle ground between neoclassical micro theory and behavioral economics.","PeriodicalId":226815,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy & Methodology of Economics eJournal","volume":"39 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-04-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125343590","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Although Herbert Simon never read J M Keynes’s A Treatise on Probability (1921) or understood the necessary connections between the General Theory (1936) and the A Treatise on Probability, he independently discovered an alternate formulation that was equivalent to Keynes’s approach, but nowhere as technically advanced. Simon’s approach thus leads to the same kind of conclusions and results that Keynes provided in the A Treatise on Probability in 1921. On p.xii, Shiozawa correctly states that “Bounded rationality is the basis of all evolutions of economic entities…” and “Because of bounded rationality, any existing entities are not optimal at any time.”, it will be necessary to connect Keynes’s degree of logical probability, P(a/h) =α, where α is a degree of rational belief, which is defined on the unit interval between 0 and 1, to Simon’s work. Keynes’s interval valued probability is always bounded below and above by lower and upper probabilities. This is what Keynes meant by uncertainty, which requires the evidential weight of the argument, V (a/h)=w, also defined on the unit interval between 0 and 1, to almost always be less than 1, so that risk assessments can’t, in general, be made about future outcomes unless one is dealing with the short run or immediate or near future. As noted by Keynes in chapter 5 of the General Theory, these short run expectations are usually fulfilled most of the time, so that w is close to, near, or approximately 1, unless negatively impacted by changes in long run expectations regarding fixed investment/technical Innovation,which have low to very low w values. Therefore, simple three to six day moving average models can be reliably used to forecast short run production, inventory, stockout, buffer stock, and consumption activities (see chapters 4 and 5 by Morioka and his construction of “ … a dynamic and multisector model of the multiplier theory…” first theoretically developed by Keynes in the A Treatise on Probability in 1921 in chapter 26 on page 315 in footnote 1, which was then applied by Kahn and Kalecki later in the 1930’s. Taniguchi provides valuable mathematical and applied analysis of Operations Management, Production Management, and Supply Chain subjects and issues, that are used in the quantity adjustment process of the firm. This point was originally introduced by Shiozawa in an earlier chapter in the book. However, in the case of total ignorance (Shackle’s complete and total uncertainty or fundamental uncertainty, w=0, which he developed based on the ideas of Joan Robinson), Post Keynesians argue that such mathematical models ,as used by Shiozawa, Morioka, and Taniuchi, would not be applicable. This is precisely Joan Robinson’s claim, that mathematics can not be used in economics because no one ever knows anything about the future, be it near or far; hence, the mathematical equations and functions do not, and can’t, exist. However, for Keynes, this type of argument, about the impact of total igno
{"title":"Can Shiozawa’s, Morioka’s and Taniuchi’s Microfoundations for Evolutionary Economics (2019) Serve As the Microfoundations for “… Post-Keynesian Economics “ (2019, p.vii)? The Answer Is Definitely Yes if Post –Keynesians Can Break Away From Joan Robinson’s Anti-Mathematical, Anti-Formalist Views","authors":"M. E. Brady","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3557716","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3557716","url":null,"abstract":"Although Herbert Simon never read J M Keynes’s A Treatise on Probability (1921) or understood the necessary connections between the General Theory (1936) and the A Treatise on Probability, he independently discovered an alternate formulation that was equivalent to Keynes’s approach, but nowhere as technically advanced. Simon’s approach thus leads to the same kind of conclusions and results that Keynes provided in the A Treatise on Probability in 1921. \u0000 \u0000On p.xii, Shiozawa correctly states that “Bounded rationality is the basis of all evolutions of economic entities…” and “Because of bounded rationality, any existing entities are not optimal at any time.”, it will be necessary to connect Keynes’s degree of logical probability, P(a/h) =α, where α is a degree of rational belief, which is defined on the unit interval between 0 and 1, to Simon’s work. Keynes’s interval valued probability is always bounded below and above by lower and upper probabilities. This is what Keynes meant by uncertainty, which requires the evidential weight of the argument, V (a/h)=w, also defined on the unit interval between 0 and 1, to almost always be less than 1, so that risk assessments can’t, in general, be made about future outcomes unless one is dealing with the short run or immediate or near future. As noted by Keynes in chapter 5 of the General Theory, these short run expectations are usually fulfilled most of the time, so that w is close to, near, or approximately 1, unless negatively impacted by changes in long run expectations regarding fixed investment/technical Innovation,which have low to very low w values. Therefore, simple three to six day moving average models can be reliably used to forecast short run production, inventory, stockout, buffer stock, and consumption activities (see chapters 4 and 5 by Morioka and his construction of “ … a dynamic and multisector model of the multiplier theory…” first theoretically developed by Keynes in the A Treatise on Probability in 1921 in chapter 26 on page 315 in footnote 1, which was then applied by Kahn and Kalecki later in the 1930’s. Taniguchi provides valuable mathematical and applied analysis of Operations Management, Production Management, and Supply Chain subjects and issues, that are used in the quantity adjustment process of the firm. This point was originally introduced by Shiozawa in an earlier chapter in the book. \u0000 \u0000However, in the case of total ignorance (Shackle’s complete and total uncertainty or fundamental uncertainty, w=0, which he developed based on the ideas of Joan Robinson), Post Keynesians argue that such mathematical models ,as used by Shiozawa, Morioka, and Taniuchi, would not be applicable. This is precisely Joan Robinson’s claim, that mathematics can not be used in economics because no one ever knows anything about the future, be it near or far; hence, the mathematical equations and functions do not, and can’t, exist. However, for Keynes, this type of argument, about the impact of total igno","PeriodicalId":226815,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy & Methodology of Economics eJournal","volume":"50 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-03-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127263248","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The rise of the “New History of Capitalism” as a subfield of historical studies has magnified differences between economists and historians which started to grow during the 1970s. We describe what is and what is not new about the “New History of Capitalism,” and explain how the different methodologies of economists and historians often causes confusion about their fields’ respective advantages and disadvantages. Yet we also emphasize that these different methodologies allow ample room for collaboration between the disciplines.
{"title":"The New History of Capitalism and the Methodologies of Economic History","authors":"Vincent J. Geloso, J. Glock","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3557570","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3557570","url":null,"abstract":"The rise of the “New History of Capitalism” as a subfield of historical studies has magnified differences between economists and historians which started to grow during the 1970s. We describe what is and what is not new about the “New History of Capitalism,” and explain how the different methodologies of economists and historians often causes confusion about their fields’ respective advantages and disadvantages. Yet we also emphasize that these different methodologies allow ample room for collaboration between the disciplines.","PeriodicalId":226815,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy & Methodology of Economics eJournal","volume":"56 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-03-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133145702","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Keynes spent a tremendous amount of time and energy attempting to tutor Harrod on the mechanics of his IS-LM model between July to September, 1935. Keynes’s painstaking slow attempts finally led Keynes in desperation to write a three point postscript to his letter of August, 1935, that is written at a grammar school level of exposition. Only after reading Keynes’s three point postscript, written at a grammar school level of exposition, did Harrod finally grasp the point that Keynes was making, which is that it is impossible for there to be any equilibrium in Aggregate (Effective) Demand, Y, interest rate, r, space of Investment(I) and Savings(S) because the IS curve was a SINGLE, downward sloping line in (Y,r) space. There is ,obviously, a missing equation.
Harrod’s continual resort to ceteris paribus assumptions about a constant or fixed level of aggregate income ,Y, in order to support the existing classical (neoclassical ) theory of the rate of interest in (r;I,S ) space, is very similar to Pigou’s assumption of ceteris paribus in his 1933 The Theory of Unemployment, so that he could apply his Marshallian apparatus of partial equilibrium. Keynes’s main point in the appendix to Chapter 19 of his General Theory (1936) was that Pigou had no IS-LM model.
The critical problem is that Harrod, starting with his January,1937 Econometrica article, sought to cover up Keynes’s IS-LM model, just as he attempted to cover up Keynes’s multiplier – accelerator model provided by Keynes to Harrod in correspondence in August,1938.
The unanimous belief among economists that Hicks was the inventor of the IS-LM model in his April, 1937 Econometrica article is simply a myth that is easily falsified by any economist who reads the correspondence of August 27th and August 30th, 1935 between Harrod and Keynes.
{"title":"On Keynes’s Painstaking Slow Instruction of Harrod on the Technical Aspects of His IS-LM Model in July-September, 1935:Harrod Only Finally Understood Keynes’s IS-LM Model After He Had Read the Postscript to Keynes’s Letter of August 27th, 1935 to Harrod","authors":"M. E. Brady","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3550652","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3550652","url":null,"abstract":"Keynes spent a tremendous amount of time and energy attempting to tutor Harrod on the mechanics of his IS-LM model between July to September, 1935. Keynes’s painstaking slow attempts finally led Keynes in desperation to write a three point postscript to his letter of August, 1935, that is written at a grammar school level of exposition. Only after reading Keynes’s three point postscript, written at a grammar school level of exposition, did Harrod finally grasp the point that Keynes was making, which is that it is impossible for there to be any equilibrium in Aggregate (Effective) Demand, Y, interest rate, r, space of Investment(I) and Savings(S) because the IS curve was a SINGLE, downward sloping line in (Y,r) space. There is ,obviously, a missing equation.<br><br>Harrod’s continual resort to ceteris paribus assumptions about a constant or fixed level of aggregate income ,Y, in order to support the existing classical (neoclassical ) theory of the rate of interest in (r;I,S ) space, is very similar to Pigou’s assumption of ceteris paribus in his 1933 The Theory of Unemployment, so that he could apply his Marshallian apparatus of partial equilibrium. Keynes’s main point in the appendix to Chapter 19 of his General Theory (1936) was that Pigou had no IS-LM model.<br><br>The critical problem is that Harrod, starting with his January,1937 Econometrica article, sought to cover up Keynes’s IS-LM model, just as he attempted to cover up Keynes’s multiplier – accelerator model provided by Keynes to Harrod in correspondence in August,1938.<br><br>The unanimous belief among economists that Hicks was the inventor of the IS-LM model in his April, 1937 Econometrica article is simply a myth that is easily falsified by any economist who reads the correspondence of August 27th and August 30th, 1935 between Harrod and Keynes.","PeriodicalId":226815,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy & Methodology of Economics eJournal","volume":"77 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-03-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115202626","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The major approaches Walrasianism, Keynesianism, Marxianism, Austrianism, MMT are mutually contradictory, axiomatically false, materially/formally inconsistent and all got the foundational concept of the subject matter profit wrong. What we have is the pluralism of provably false theories. Criticism and marginal improvements are pointless. It takes a new theory to beat an old theory.
{"title":"Stop Recycling Dead Economic Theories, Start the Paradigm Shift","authors":"Egmont Kakarot-Handtke","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3544936","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3544936","url":null,"abstract":"The major approaches Walrasianism, Keynesianism, Marxianism, Austrianism, MMT are mutually contradictory, axiomatically false, materially/formally inconsistent and all got the foundational concept of the subject matter profit wrong. What we have is the pluralism of provably false theories. Criticism and marginal improvements are pointless. It takes a new theory to beat an old theory.","PeriodicalId":226815,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy & Methodology of Economics eJournal","volume":"36 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-02-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134229725","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
G. Meeks’s original analysis of the diagram on Page 39 (Page 42 of the CWJMK version in 1973) in chapter III of the A Treatise on Probability in 1976 erred in claiming that Keynes was illustrating ordinal,or rank order, probability measurement. Keynes was actually illustrating interval valued probability, not ordinal probability. Keynes made this very clear in chapter 15 of the A Treatise on Probability in Part II on pp.160-163, as well as in chapters 17, 20, 22, 26, 29, and 30, which all deal with Keynes’s method of inexact measurement and approximation, using lower and upper bounds.
Meeks never read Part II or Chapter 15 of the A Treatise on Probability. Meeks’s work was then passed down to R. Skidelsky, A. Carabelli, R. O’Donnell, and many, many other academics, who were attending or were associated with Cambridge University. From this stage, her erroneous work was passed down to S. Dow and V. Chick, and finally to S. Bradley.
This erroneous and mistaken view of Keynes’s operational approach to using probability in applications had never appeared in the work of any philosopher until it showed up in April of 2019 in an article published by S. Bradley for the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
{"title":"A Historical Summary of How a Severe Misinterpretation of the only Diagram in Keynes’s A Treatise on Probability in Chapter III on Page 39 Spread to Philosophers: From G. Meeks (1976) to S.Dow and V.Chick (2012) to S.Bradley(2019)","authors":"M. E. Brady","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3532241","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3532241","url":null,"abstract":"G. Meeks’s original analysis of the diagram on Page 39 (Page 42 of the CWJMK version in 1973) in chapter III of the A Treatise on Probability in 1976 erred in claiming that Keynes was illustrating ordinal,or rank order, probability measurement. Keynes was actually illustrating interval valued probability, not ordinal probability. Keynes made this very clear in chapter 15 of the A Treatise on Probability in Part II on pp.160-163, as well as in chapters 17, 20, 22, 26, 29, and 30, which all deal with Keynes’s method of inexact measurement and approximation, using lower and upper bounds. <br><br>Meeks never read Part II or Chapter 15 of the A Treatise on Probability. Meeks’s work was then passed down to R. Skidelsky, A. Carabelli, R. O’Donnell, and many, many other academics, who were attending or were associated with Cambridge University. From this stage, her erroneous work was passed down to S. Dow and V. Chick, and finally to S. Bradley. <br><br>This erroneous and mistaken view of Keynes’s operational approach to using probability in applications had never appeared in the work of any philosopher until it showed up in April of 2019 in an article published by S. Bradley for the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. <br>","PeriodicalId":226815,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy & Methodology of Economics eJournal","volume":"27 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-02-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115839108","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Mario Arturo Ruiz Estrada, Donghyun Park, Evangelos Koutronas, Alam Khan, M. Tahir, Minsoo Lee, S. Cohen, M. Staniewski, S. Nagaraj, V. Govindaraju, P. Moug, Su-Fei Yap, Rashid Ating
The rationale of hybrid economic models revolves around the efficacy of multidimensional mathematical modeling and graphs as the most effective tools to understand any economic problem from a multidimensional view. The main motivation behind the creation of hybrid economic models is to evaluate multidimensional mathematical modeling and graphs evolved so far in economics and to develop new types of multidimensional models and graphs to facilitate the study of socio-economic problems, as well as finance and business. In doing so, the mission of hybrid economic models is to offer academics, researchers and policy makers an alternative multidimensional mathematical modeling and graphical modeling approach for the research and teaching-learning process of economics, finance, and business. Hence, this alternative multidimensional mathematical modeling and graphical modeling approach offers a set of models to build different types of multidimensional mathematical economic modeling and graphs to study and solve any socio-economic problem.
{"title":"An Introduction to The Hybrid Economics Models","authors":"Mario Arturo Ruiz Estrada, Donghyun Park, Evangelos Koutronas, Alam Khan, M. Tahir, Minsoo Lee, S. Cohen, M. Staniewski, S. Nagaraj, V. Govindaraju, P. Moug, Su-Fei Yap, Rashid Ating","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3505892","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3505892","url":null,"abstract":"The rationale of hybrid economic models revolves around the efficacy of multidimensional mathematical modeling and graphs as the most effective tools to understand any economic problem from a multidimensional view. The main motivation behind the creation of hybrid economic models is to evaluate multidimensional mathematical modeling and graphs evolved so far in economics and to develop new types of multidimensional models and graphs to facilitate the study of socio-economic problems, as well as finance and business. In doing so, the mission of hybrid economic models is to offer academics, researchers and policy makers an alternative multidimensional mathematical modeling and graphical modeling approach for the research and teaching-learning process of economics, finance, and business. Hence, this alternative multidimensional mathematical modeling and graphical modeling approach offers a set of models to build different types of multidimensional mathematical economic modeling and graphs to study and solve any socio-economic problem.","PeriodicalId":226815,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy & Methodology of Economics eJournal","volume":"42 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-12-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121499717","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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