This essay outlines the big-picture aspects of capitalism and socialism, and uses this overview to discuss human liberty and economic liberty in each system. Additionally, I note that some have argued that capitalism is unfair or immoral and so I consider three specific and common moral standards in this regard. They are: (i) “From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs;” (ii) “People should get what they earn;” and (iii) “’Agreement without conformity’ or ‘conformity without agreement.’” Capitalism is centered on individual rights and private ownership, while socialism awards decision-making powers to government. The former is consistent with human and economic liberty while the latter is not. Moreover, socialism fares poorly in comparison to capitalism regarding the three moral standards.
{"title":"Some Basics of Capitalism and Socialism and Implications for Human Liberty, Morality, and Fairness","authors":"John Garen","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3711696","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3711696","url":null,"abstract":"This essay outlines the big-picture aspects of capitalism and socialism, and uses this overview to discuss human liberty and economic liberty in each system. Additionally, I note that some have argued that capitalism is unfair or immoral and so I consider three specific and common moral standards in this regard. They are: (i) “From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs;” (ii) “People should get what they earn;” and (iii) “’Agreement without conformity’ or ‘conformity without agreement.’” Capitalism is centered on individual rights and private ownership, while socialism awards decision-making powers to government. The former is consistent with human and economic liberty while the latter is not. Moreover, socialism fares poorly in comparison to capitalism regarding the three moral standards.","PeriodicalId":226815,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy & Methodology of Economics eJournal","volume":"60 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121471921","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The myth, that R. Kahn developed the mathematical and logical theory of the multiplier and then taught J M Keynes about the technical and mathematical properties of the multiplier concept is a myth deeply inbedded in the economics profession. It then leads to another myth that without Kahn’s contribution, there would have been no possibility of Keynes having been able to write and publish the General Theory in February, 1936. This myth, like the myth that there is no IS-LM mathematical model in the General Theory, can be traced directly to deliberate canards originally made up by Joan Robinson repeatedly in her life time and also presented many times by G L S Shackle in his publications. The historical facts are quite different from the concocted mythology. The technical and mathematical properties of the multiplier concept were first developed and applied by Keynes in 1921 in chapter 26 of the A Treatise on Probability in section seven on page 315 in footnote 1. Kahn himself made it quite clear in his 1936 response to H. Neisser in the Review of Economics and Statistics that he had gotten most of his ideas from Mr. J.M Keynes!!!! In 2007. Kent showed that Keynes had constructed an arithmetical, numerical, multiplier example in May,1929. This analysis follows directly from the mathematical and technical exposition contained in 1921 in chapter 26 of the A Treatise on Probability in section seven on page 315 in footnote one, which Kent had and has no inkling of. The current universal belief among economists that Kahn developed the theory of the multiplier himself before he explained it to Keynes in 1932 is simply a fable agreed upon unanimously by an economics profession that has been “played” for ninety years by the fairy tales, yarns, fables, canards, claims, and stories spun by Joan Robinson and supported by the Pseudo Kynesians (Joan Robinson, Austin Robinson, Richard Kahn and Roy Harrod). The appearance of these myths as historical facts in the 2019 book published by Edward Elgar, titled The Elgar Companion to John Maynard Keynes, seriously calls into question the claims of economists to being a science. By definition, there can’t be any myths in a scientific enterprise. That these myths have endured for so many decades does provide evidence that economics is not a science, but simply a type of rhetoric based on the accepted “wisdom” of fairy tales or stories made up by Joan Robinson. The economics profession has incorporated these myths into their official history of economic thought and macroeconomic history, as can easily be seen by visiting Investopedia or Wikipedia. These myths go hand in glove with other myths about Keynes, such as the myth that an 18 year old Frank Ramsey showed up in Cambridge in 1921 and convinced Keynes that his logical theory of probability, based directly on the work of the greatest mathematical logician in history, George Boole, was full of errors and mistakes that then led Keynes to renounce his
卡恩发展了乘数的数学和逻辑理论，然后教凯恩斯乘数概念的技术和数学性质，这是一个深深扎根于经济学专业的神话。这就引出了另一个神话:如果没有卡恩的贡献，凯恩斯就不可能在1936年2月写出并出版《通论》。这个神话和《通论》中没有is - lm数学模型的神话一样，可以直接追溯到琼·罗宾逊生前反复编造的故意编造的谣言，也可以追溯到G·L·S·沙克尔在他的出版物中多次提出的谣言。历史事实与编造的神话大不相同。乘数概念的技术和数学性质首先由凯恩斯在1921年在《概率论》第26章第315页第7节的脚注1中提出和应用。卡恩本人在1936年的《经济学与统计评论》中对H. Neisser的回应中明确表示，他的大部分思想都来自于j.m.凯恩斯!!!!在2007年。肯特指出，凯恩斯在1929年5月构建了一个算术、数值、乘数的例子。这种分析直接来源于1921年《概率论》第26章的数学和技术论述，在第315页的第1脚注中，第7节中，肯特有过，但没有暗示过。目前经济学家普遍认为，在1932年卡恩向凯恩斯解释乘数理论之前，卡恩自己就已经提出了这个理论，这只不过是一个被经济学专业人士一致认同的寓言，这个寓言已经被琼·罗宾逊编造的童话、纱线、寓言、谣言、主张和故事“玩弄”了90年，并得到了伪凯恩斯主义者(琼·罗宾逊、奥斯汀·罗宾逊、理查德·卡恩和罗伊·哈罗德)的支持。爱德华·埃尔加(Edward Elgar)在2019年出版的《约翰·梅纳德·凯恩斯的埃尔加同伴》(The Elgar Companion to John Maynard Keynes)一书中，将这些神话作为历史事实出现，这严重质疑了经济学家自称是一门科学的说法。根据定义，科学事业中不可能有任何神话。这些神话流传了这么多年，确实提供了证据，证明经济学不是一门科学，而只是一种基于童话或琼•罗宾逊(Joan Robinson)编造的故事中公认的“智慧”的修辞。经济学专业已经将这些神话纳入了他们的官方经济思想史和宏观经济史，通过访问Investopedia或Wikipedia可以很容易地看到这一点。这些神话与其他关于凯恩斯的神话密切相关，比如，1921年，18岁的弗兰克·拉姆齐(Frank Ramsey)出现在剑桥大学，让凯恩斯相信，他的逻辑概率论(直接基于历史上最伟大的数理逻辑学家乔治·布尔(George Boole)的作品)充满了错误和错误，这导致凯恩斯放弃了他的理论，接受了拉姆齐方法的某种版本。
{"title":"The 1931 Kahn Multiplier Creation Myth: Its Incorporation in the 2019 Elgar Companion to John Maynard Keynes Demonstrates the Universal Belief of the Economics Profession in Mythology","authors":"M. E. Brady","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3691905","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3691905","url":null,"abstract":"The myth, that R. Kahn developed the mathematical and logical theory of the multiplier and then taught J M Keynes about the technical and mathematical properties of the multiplier concept is a myth deeply inbedded in the economics profession. \u0000 \u0000It then leads to another myth that without Kahn’s contribution, there would have been no possibility of Keynes having been able to write and publish the General Theory in February, 1936. This myth, like the myth that there is no IS-LM mathematical model in the General Theory, can be traced directly to deliberate canards originally made up by Joan Robinson repeatedly in her life time and also presented many times by G L S Shackle in his publications. \u0000 \u0000The historical facts are quite different from the concocted mythology. The technical and mathematical properties of the multiplier concept were first developed and applied by Keynes in 1921 in chapter 26 of the A Treatise on Probability in section seven on page 315 in footnote 1. Kahn himself made it quite clear in his 1936 response to H. Neisser in the Review of Economics and Statistics that he had gotten most of his ideas from Mr. J.M Keynes!!!! \u0000 \u0000In 2007. Kent showed that Keynes had constructed an arithmetical, numerical, multiplier example in May,1929. This analysis follows directly from the mathematical and technical exposition contained in 1921 in chapter 26 of the A Treatise on Probability in section seven on page 315 in footnote one, which Kent had and has no inkling of. \u0000 \u0000The current universal belief among economists that Kahn developed the theory of the multiplier himself before he explained it to Keynes in 1932 is simply a fable agreed upon unanimously by an economics profession that has been “played” for ninety years by the fairy tales, yarns, fables, canards, claims, and stories spun by Joan Robinson and supported by the Pseudo Kynesians (Joan Robinson, Austin Robinson, Richard Kahn and Roy Harrod). \u0000 \u0000The appearance of these myths as historical facts in the 2019 book published by Edward Elgar, titled The Elgar Companion to John Maynard Keynes, seriously calls into question the claims of economists to being a science. By definition, there can’t be any myths in a scientific enterprise. That these myths have endured for so many decades does provide evidence that economics is not a science, but simply a type of rhetoric based on the accepted “wisdom” of fairy tales or stories made up by Joan Robinson. \u0000 \u0000The economics profession has incorporated these myths into their official history of economic thought and macroeconomic history, as can easily be seen by visiting Investopedia or Wikipedia. These myths go hand in glove with other myths about Keynes, such as the myth that an 18 year old Frank Ramsey showed up in Cambridge in 1921 and convinced Keynes that his logical theory of probability, based directly on the work of the greatest mathematical logician in history, George Boole, was full of errors and mistakes that then led Keynes to renounce his","PeriodicalId":226815,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy & Methodology of Economics eJournal","volume":"23 2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134036968","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Very severe contradictions, inconsistencies, and confusions exist in the exchanges between two Heterodox economists, who are considered to be the top Heterodox experts on Keynes’s A Treatise on Probability, logical theory of probability, and of the connections between the A Treatise on Probability and Keynes’s General Theory.
The exchanges between Sheila Dow and Anna Carabelli in 2015 show that they had no coherent understanding about the meaning of incommensurability (non comparability, nonmeasurability, incomparability) as was discussed by Keynes on pp. 30-34 of the A Treatise on Probability in 1921.
The standard assessment ,accepted by SIPTA and all philosophers who have written on Keynes’s contributions since 1921, with the exceptions of F Y Edgeworth, Bertrand Russell, and C D Broad, was made in 1999 by H E Kyburg in the initial SIPTA conference volume in 1999. He stressed that Keynes’s discussions imply a partial order, which means comparability based on measurement by a single precise probability is impossible in many cases. However, imprecise (interval valued probabilities with upper and lower bounds) probability can be used to deal with both cases where there is partial and/or conflicting evidence.
However, while acknowledging that Keynes had a number of valuable “notions ,intuitions, ideas, suggestions, hints or insights” about imprecise probability that were represented by Keynes’s term, ”non numerical probabilities”, Kyburg and SIPTA members argue that Keynes never provided any mathematical or logical modeling of any type in the A Treatise on Probability at all that would allow a decision maker to specify interval valued probabilities.
I have argued continuously since 1979 that Keynes did provide a clear cut mathematical structure for his ‘non numerical‘ probabilities in Parts II, III, IV, and V of the A Treatise on Probability. A study of the Dow and Carabelli exchanges (1) of 2015 show that Dow and Carabelli do not even accept the Kyburg-SIPTA position.
(1) I want to thank a student at Cambridge University,England,for making the Dow-Carabelli exchange available to me. I could not have written the paper without this information.
在凯恩斯的《概率论》、概率论的逻辑理论、《概率论》与凯恩斯的《通论》之间的联系方面，两位非正统经济学家的交流中存在着非常严重的矛盾、不一致和混淆。希拉·道(Sheila Dow)和安娜·卡拉贝利(Anna Carabelli)在2015年的交流表明，她们对凯恩斯在1921年《概率论》(A Treatise on Probability)第30-34页所讨论的不可通约性(不可比比性、不可测量性、不可比比性)的含义没有一致的理解。标准的评估，被SIPTA和所有自1921年以来写过凯恩斯贡献的哲学家所接受，除了F·Y·埃奇沃斯，伯特兰·罗素和C·D·布罗德，是1999年由H·E·Kyburg在1999年SIPTA会议的初始卷中做出的。他强调，凯恩斯的讨论暗示了部分顺序，这意味着在许多情况下，基于单一精确概率测量的可比性是不可能的。然而，不精确概率(有上限和下限的区间值概率)可以用于处理存在部分和/或冲突证据的两种情况。然而，尽管承认凯恩斯对“非数值概率”这一术语所代表的不精确概率有许多有价值的“概念、直觉、想法、建议、暗示或见解”，但Kyburg和SIPTA成员认为，凯恩斯从未在《概率论》中提供任何类型的数学或逻辑模型，这些模型将允许决策者指定区间值概率。自1979年以来，我一直认为凯恩斯确实在《概率论》的第二、三、四、五部分中为他的“非数值”概率提供了一个清晰的数学结构。2015年对道琼斯指数和卡拉贝利交易所的研究(1)表明，道琼斯指数和卡拉贝利甚至不接受Kyburg-SIPTA的立场。(1)我要感谢英国剑桥大学的一名学生，他让我有机会进行道琼斯-卡拉贝利交易所。如果没有这些信息，我就写不出论文。
{"title":"On the Very Severe Contradictions, Inconsistencies, and Confusions in the Assessment of Keynes’s Logical Theory of Probability in the A Treatise on Probability by Heterodox Economists: J.M. Keynes Showed That Incommensurability Is Dealt with by Interval Valued Probability","authors":"M. E. Brady","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3683053","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3683053","url":null,"abstract":"Very severe contradictions, inconsistencies, and confusions exist in the exchanges between two Heterodox economists, who are considered to be the top Heterodox experts on Keynes’s A Treatise on Probability, logical theory of probability, and of the connections between the A Treatise on Probability and Keynes’s General Theory. <br><br> The exchanges between Sheila Dow and Anna Carabelli in 2015 show that they had no coherent understanding about the meaning of incommensurability (non comparability, nonmeasurability, incomparability) as was discussed by Keynes on pp. 30-34 of the A Treatise on Probability in 1921.<br><br>The standard assessment ,accepted by SIPTA and all philosophers who have written on Keynes’s contributions since 1921, with the exceptions of F Y Edgeworth, Bertrand Russell, and C D Broad, was made in 1999 by H E Kyburg in the initial SIPTA conference volume in 1999. He stressed that Keynes’s discussions imply a partial order, which means comparability based on measurement by a single precise probability is impossible in many cases. However, imprecise (interval valued probabilities with upper and lower bounds) probability can be used to deal with both cases where there is partial and/or conflicting evidence. <br><br>However, while acknowledging that Keynes had a number of valuable “notions ,intuitions, ideas, suggestions, hints or insights” about imprecise probability that were represented by Keynes’s term, ”non numerical probabilities”, Kyburg and SIPTA members argue that Keynes never provided any mathematical or logical modeling of any type in the A Treatise on Probability at all that would allow a decision maker to specify interval valued probabilities. <br><br>I have argued continuously since 1979 that Keynes did provide a clear cut mathematical structure for his ‘non numerical‘ probabilities in Parts II, III, IV, and V of the A Treatise on Probability. A study of the Dow and Carabelli exchanges (1) of 2015 show that Dow and Carabelli do not even accept the Kyburg-SIPTA position.<br><br>(1) I want to thank a student at Cambridge University,England,for making the Dow-Carabelli exchange available to me. I could not have written the paper without this information. <br><br><br>","PeriodicalId":226815,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy & Methodology of Economics eJournal","volume":"7 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-08-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123954189","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This Essay explores the relationship between normative law and economics and legal theory. We claim that legal theory must account for law’s coerciveness, its normativity, and its institutional structure. Economic analyses that engage these features are an integral part of legal theory, rather than external observations about law from an economic perspective. These analyses, or economic analysis in law, play a crucial role in understanding the law and in developing legal policy arguments. After establishing its terminology, the Essay maps out three contributions of economic analysis in law: prescriptive recommendations in areas amenable to preference satisfaction as a normative criterion; analyzing efficiency as one aspect of a broader normative inquiry; and exposing feasibility constraints. Finally, the Essay turns to an exploration of possibilities for extending economic analysis in law beyond its comfort zone. It suggests that economic analysis might expand into areas where values other than preference satisfaction are or ought to be dominant considerations.
{"title":"Economic Analysis in Law","authors":"Hanoch Dagan, Roy Kreitner","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3680686","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3680686","url":null,"abstract":"This Essay explores the relationship between normative law and economics and legal theory. We claim that legal theory must account for law’s coerciveness, its normativity, and its institutional structure. Economic analyses that engage these features are an integral part of legal theory, rather than external observations about law from an economic perspective. These analyses, or economic analysis in law, play a crucial role in understanding the law and in developing legal policy arguments. After establishing its terminology, the Essay maps out three contributions of economic analysis in law: prescriptive recommendations in areas amenable to preference satisfaction as a normative criterion; analyzing efficiency as one aspect of a broader normative inquiry; and exposing feasibility constraints. Finally, the Essay turns to an exploration of possibilities for extending economic analysis in law beyond its comfort zone. It suggests that economic analysis might expand into areas where values other than preference satisfaction are or ought to be dominant considerations.","PeriodicalId":226815,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy & Methodology of Economics eJournal","volume":"194 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-08-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122970301","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Lionel Robbins’s 'An Essay on the Nature and Significance of Economic Science' is frequently cited as one of the most influential works on economic methodology of the twentieth century. Yet, paradoxically, Robbins’s Essay is also generally acknowledged to have been significantly influenced by the controversial and widely rejected methodological views of Ludwig von Mises. This article examines a number of subtle but significant areas in which Robbins’s Essay can be seen to diverge from Mises’s methodological writings, in order to not only clarify both men’s views, but also to gain some insight into the causes behind the widely divergent extent to which their works have been adopted into the canon of economic orthodoxy.
莱昂内尔·罗宾斯(Lionel Robbins)的《论经济科学的性质和意义》(An Essay on the Nature and Significance of Economic Science)经常被引用为20世纪最具影响力的经济方法论著作之一。然而，矛盾的是，罗宾斯的论文也被普遍认为受到了路德维希·冯·米塞斯有争议且被广泛拒绝的方法论观点的重大影响。本文考察了一些微妙但重要的领域，在这些领域中，罗宾斯的论文可以被视为与米塞斯的方法论著作不同，这不仅是为了澄清两人的观点，也是为了深入了解他们的作品被采纳为经济学正统经典的广泛分歧程度背后的原因。
{"title":"Dehomogenizing Robbins and Mises on Methodology","authors":"G. Pickering","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3677530","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3677530","url":null,"abstract":"Lionel Robbins’s 'An Essay on the Nature and Significance of Economic Science' is frequently cited as one of the most influential works on economic methodology of the twentieth century. Yet, paradoxically, Robbins’s Essay is also generally acknowledged to have been significantly influenced by the controversial and widely rejected methodological views of Ludwig von Mises. This article examines a number of subtle but significant areas in which Robbins’s Essay can be seen to diverge from Mises’s methodological writings, in order to not only clarify both men’s views, but also to gain some insight into the causes behind the widely divergent extent to which their works have been adopted into the canon of economic orthodoxy.","PeriodicalId":226815,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy & Methodology of Economics eJournal","volume":"33 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-08-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121305147","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper is continuation of a tradition of human development that has existed almost for all human existence. Building better ideas that enable better management of circumstance. Ideas adopted more fit for the purpose of living. Conceptually it is the shift from ‘philosophy’ on a subject, to a tighter intellectual position usually referred as ‘science’. Natural philosophy, alchemy, and religious explanation of environmental events have all been discarded as empirical evidence, theory and research provided better explanation and thus adopted as better ideas to manage circumstance. Specifically, this paper provides an original intellectual base whereby humanity better understands itself and all outputs and characteristics of the system under study, namely a-person-in-their-environment. In finalizing this base (circa 2014) all historical writing on all aspects of humanity must be called into question, and this new paradigm applied as the ‘lens’ via which we enable greater understanding of ourselves, thus enabling improved decisions on how to manage ourselves both individually and socially such all people enjoy improved life experience. The dualist (mind and brain separate) science of humanity was first proposed by Descartes circa 1650. It has never been proved, and the world adopted monism (mind and brain the same) version of humanity not because it proved correct, but due none could prove it incorrect and prove dualism correct. Until now. From 1974, to today, Graham Little has identified and resolved every conceivable issue implicated in proving dualism correct and monism wrong. This paper provides an overview of the dualism science of people. It underlines the major changes that will occur when dualism is finally adopted ss the correct science of people, with major gains in personal well-being, changes in social and economic policy, depth of insight into social development including how to ensure improved wealth creation and wealth distribution, reduced suicides, reduced social tension and violence, better mental health, deepening social respect and understanding of the real nature of a diverse society and how to live effectively in such a society. This paper also outlines the plan for proving dualism to the highest intellectual quality standard making it an irresistible scientific proposition that must be adopted as the cornerstone of humanity’s intellectual position.
{"title":"Modern Science: Proof Dualism As the Correct Science of People Derived From the Work of Graham Little","authors":"G. Little","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3674700","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3674700","url":null,"abstract":"This paper is continuation of a tradition of human development that has existed almost for all human existence. Building better ideas that enable better management of circumstance. Ideas adopted more fit for the purpose of living. \u0000 \u0000Conceptually it is the shift from ‘philosophy’ on a subject, to a tighter intellectual position usually referred as ‘science’. Natural philosophy, alchemy, and religious explanation of environmental events have all been discarded as empirical evidence, theory and research provided better explanation and thus adopted as better ideas to manage circumstance. \u0000 \u0000Specifically, this paper provides an original intellectual base whereby humanity better understands itself and all outputs and characteristics of the system under study, namely a-person-in-their-environment. In finalizing this base (circa 2014) all historical writing on all aspects of humanity must be called into question, and this new paradigm applied as the ‘lens’ via which we enable greater understanding of ourselves, thus enabling improved decisions on how to manage ourselves both individually and socially such all people enjoy improved life experience. \u0000 \u0000The dualist (mind and brain separate) science of humanity was first proposed by Descartes circa 1650. It has never been proved, and the world adopted monism (mind and brain the same) version of humanity not because it proved correct, but due none could prove it incorrect and prove dualism correct. Until now. \u0000From 1974, to today, Graham Little has identified and resolved every conceivable issue implicated in proving dualism correct and monism wrong. \u0000 \u0000This paper provides an overview of the dualism science of people. It underlines the major changes that will occur when dualism is finally adopted ss the correct science of people, with major gains in personal well-being, changes in social and economic policy, depth of insight into social development including how to ensure improved wealth creation and wealth distribution, reduced suicides, reduced social tension and violence, better mental health, deepening social respect and understanding of the real nature of a diverse society and how to live effectively in such a society. \u0000 \u0000This paper also outlines the plan for proving dualism to the highest intellectual quality standard making it an irresistible scientific proposition that must be adopted as the cornerstone of humanity’s intellectual position.","PeriodicalId":226815,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy & Methodology of Economics eJournal","volume":"39 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-08-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114570599","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Over 2000 years ago, Jesus faced nearly the same kind of economic, institutional, political, and social problems that confronted Socrates over 400 years earlier in Athens, Greece. A certain segment of the upper income class in Jerusalem, called Sadducees, who were allied with Israel’s aristocrats, were engaging in practices that were damaging the economic and social health of Israel.
Jesus was a teacher of ethics and moral philosophy in Israel. Ethics dealt with the self (starting with those actions that provided security and safety through prudent behavior for the individual) while moral behavior concentrated on the interactions between one’s self and other selves (benevolence). Jesus’s main philosophical concern was teaching, applying, and living virtue ethics. Jesus’s main teaching tool was the parable, which was usually a short, fictitious story that made a clear cut ethical or moral point.
Jesus’s version of virtue ethics was very concise, brief, and to the point. Jesus taught that there were only two laws or rules, not many laws or rules that had to be practiced in order to obtain salvation. These two laws were to a)love your God and b) love your neighbor as yourself or as you love yourself. Either law implies the other either directly or indirectly. If you love yourself as you love your neighbor, then you are also loving God. If you love your God, then you will love others as you love yourself. The crucial word here, that is reflected in all of his teachings, is Jesus Christ’s emphasis on the word love, although sometimes what is required is “tough love”. Christian love is benevolence from those who have to those who do not have, where we are dealing with needs, not wants. Needs must be fulfilled or the person in need will be unable to have a fulfilling life.
Jesus‘s emphasis on only two laws also put him in direct conflict intellectually with the Pharisees, who accepted the standard conclusion that there were 619 laws that were directly descendant from Moses. The Pharisees, like Jesus, understood that the Sadducees were misusing the Temple in Jerusalem to amass great wealth. The definition of a good Jew for a Pharisee meant that one knew all the laws, as well as their correct interpretation, or always was carrying or had available for immediate personal use documents containing the written laws that one could then consult and implement as needed. Jesus and the Pharisees split over this issue of knowing precisely and exactly what the written law entailed as well as knowing how to correctly interpret the law.
{"title":"Jesus As a Philosopher: At the interface between Ethics, Economics, Politics, and Civics over 2000 years ago","authors":"M. E. Brady, Donald Fling, C. Tang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3673759","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3673759","url":null,"abstract":"Over 2000 years ago, Jesus faced nearly the same kind of economic, institutional, political, and social problems that confronted Socrates over 400 years earlier in Athens, Greece. A certain segment of the upper income class in Jerusalem, called Sadducees, who were allied with Israel’s aristocrats, were engaging in practices that were damaging the economic and social health of Israel.<br><br>Jesus was a teacher of ethics and moral philosophy in Israel. Ethics dealt with the self (starting with those actions that provided security and safety through prudent behavior for the individual) while moral behavior concentrated on the interactions between one’s self and other selves (benevolence). Jesus’s main philosophical concern was teaching, applying, and living virtue ethics. Jesus’s main teaching tool was the parable, which was usually a short, fictitious story that made a clear cut ethical or moral point.<br><br>Jesus’s version of virtue ethics was very concise, brief, and to the point. Jesus taught that there were only two laws or rules, not many laws or rules that had to be practiced in order to obtain salvation. These two laws were to a)love your God and b) love your neighbor as yourself or as you love yourself. Either law implies the other either directly or indirectly. If you love yourself as you love your neighbor, then you are also loving God. If you love your God, then you will love others as you love yourself. The crucial word here, that is reflected in all of his teachings, is Jesus Christ’s emphasis on the word love, although sometimes what is required is “tough love”. Christian love is benevolence from those who have to those who do not have, where we are dealing with needs, not wants. Needs must be fulfilled or the person in need will be unable to have a fulfilling life.<br><br>Jesus‘s emphasis on only two laws also put him in direct conflict intellectually with the Pharisees, who accepted the standard conclusion that there were 619 laws that were directly descendant from Moses. The Pharisees, like Jesus, understood that the Sadducees were misusing the Temple in Jerusalem to amass great wealth. The definition of a good Jew for a Pharisee meant that one knew all the laws, as well as their correct interpretation, or always was carrying or had available for immediate personal use documents containing the written laws that one could then consult and implement as needed. Jesus and the Pharisees split over this issue of knowing precisely and exactly what the written law entailed as well as knowing how to correctly interpret the law.<br>","PeriodicalId":226815,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy & Methodology of Economics eJournal","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-08-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129053461","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
There is no Theory of the “Invisible Hand of the Market” in either of Adam Smith’s two major works, The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759) or The Wealth of Nations (1776). Smith uses the terms on one page each of The Theory of Moral Sentiments and The Wealth of Nations as a literary devise only, as pointed out repeatedly by Gavin Kennedy over a twenty year period. None of the two references refers to market prices and wages moving up and down to clear markets.
The Invisible Hand appears one time in The Theory of Moral Sentiments as a metaphorical device used to explain why the rich nobles must supply their mass of servants with the necessities of life because, if they did not do so, then they would not have any servants to serve them on a daily basis in a wide variety of tasks. This has been pointed out numerous times by Gavin Kennedy. The Invisible Hand appears one time in The Wealth of Nations, again as a purely metaphorical devise to explain why merchants choose the domestic or home trade as opposed to the international or foreign trade, given equal or nearly equal returns, where, according to Benthamite utilitarian criteria, they should be indifferent between the domestic and international trade. The answer, given by Smith, was that the merchants choose the home trade over the foreign trade because they have a greater knowledge of, and expertise and experience in, the home trade relative to the international trade. They have greater confidence in their decisions in the home markets because they have greater knowledge of the home trade and far less knowledge in the foreign trade. This argument is an early version of J M Keynes’s weight of the argument analysis in his A Treatise on Probability (1921) in chapters 6 and 26. Thus, merchants benefit the home country through their desire to avoid the risk, ambiguities and uncertainties of the foreign trade, although that was never their intention, which was strictly a private concern. Thus, the home country gains greater GDP, as if by an Invisible Hand, by decisions made by private merchants who never planned to benefit the home country by their decisions. Again, as pointed out by Gavin Kennedy, there is no Invisible Hand of the Market operating here to equilibrate returns at the margin, since Smith had already made it clear that the returns were equal or nearly equal in both the domestic and foreign sectors.
Other quotations taken from the Wealth of Nation/Theory of Moral Sentiments to support the Invisible Hand of the Market claim fail to recognize that Smith’s rationale for maximizing behavior by the “sober” people is Smith’s Virtue Ethics approach, based on the Virtue of Prudence and not Jeremy Bentham’s Utilitarian view of the maximization of utility. In other words, just as a runner in The Theory of Moral Sentiments is planning on winning the racing competition contest and the first prize, so the sober people are planning to win the economic competition.
{"title":"On the Need for a Major Revision of Investopedia’s Article on Adam Smith","authors":"M. E. Brady","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3668794","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3668794","url":null,"abstract":"There is no Theory of the “Invisible Hand of the Market” in either of Adam Smith’s two major works, The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759) or The Wealth of Nations (1776). Smith uses the terms on one page each of The Theory of Moral Sentiments and The Wealth of Nations as a literary devise only, as pointed out repeatedly by Gavin Kennedy over a twenty year period. None of the two references refers to market prices and wages moving up and down to clear markets.<br><br>The Invisible Hand appears one time in The Theory of Moral Sentiments as a metaphorical device used to explain why the rich nobles must supply their mass of servants with the necessities of life because, if they did not do so, then they would not have any servants to serve them on a daily basis in a wide variety of tasks. This has been pointed out numerous times by Gavin Kennedy. The Invisible Hand appears one time in The Wealth of Nations, again as a purely metaphorical devise to explain why merchants choose the domestic or home trade as opposed to the international or foreign trade, given equal or nearly equal returns, where, according to Benthamite utilitarian criteria, they should be indifferent between the domestic and international trade. The answer, given by Smith, was that the merchants choose the home trade over the foreign trade because they have a greater knowledge of, and expertise and experience in, the home trade relative to the international trade. They have greater confidence in their decisions in the home markets because they have greater knowledge of the home trade and far less knowledge in the foreign trade. This argument is an early version of J M Keynes’s weight of the argument analysis in his A Treatise on Probability (1921) in chapters 6 and 26. Thus, merchants benefit the home country through their desire to avoid the risk, ambiguities and uncertainties of the foreign trade, although that was never their intention, which was strictly a private concern. Thus, the home country gains greater GDP, as if by an Invisible Hand, by decisions made by private merchants who never planned to benefit the home country by their decisions. Again, as pointed out by Gavin Kennedy, there is no Invisible Hand of the Market operating here to equilibrate returns at the margin, since Smith had already made it clear that the returns were equal or nearly equal in both the domestic and foreign sectors.<br><br>Other quotations taken from the Wealth of Nation/Theory of Moral Sentiments to support the Invisible Hand of the Market claim fail to recognize that Smith’s rationale for maximizing behavior by the “sober” people is Smith’s Virtue Ethics approach, based on the Virtue of Prudence and not Jeremy Bentham’s Utilitarian view of the maximization of utility. In other words, just as a runner in The Theory of Moral Sentiments is planning on winning the racing competition contest and the first prize, so the sober people are planning to win the economic competition.<br><br>So who is the creat","PeriodicalId":226815,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy & Methodology of Economics eJournal","volume":"13 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-08-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116845059","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The heart of the Chicago School’s attack on the antitrust laws was a skepticism about the ability of government to improve upon unregulated market outcomes. Although the attack failed to eliminate regulation or antitrust entirely, it has proven so enduringly devastating as an intellectual matter that virtually no proposal for government regulation or increased antitrust enforcement is put forward today without an attempt either to justify the proposed departure from an assumed-legitimate free market baseline or to dismiss Chicago School skepticism as an intellectual plot bankrolled by business elites. Chicago School skepticism has been so devastating because it draws sustenance from an inapt metaphor for the economy: that of evolution through natural selection. The free market is, for the Chicago School, nature itself, and all the glories of life suggest that evolution does just fine when left to its own devices, creating a powerful basis for skepticism regarding the need for government intervention in the economy. Except that evolution never did do anything to promote economic growth, so much as theft, a fact that human beings know well given their status as predators of unparalleled success. Humanity did not escape from the subsistence economics that characterizes all of evolved life until humanity started to exert control over the forces of evolution, which is to say: to regulate. A better metaphor for the economy than natural selection is that of a computer running a machine learning algorithm engineered to channel evolutionary forces away from theft and toward growth. The first such algorithm embraced by humanity set evolution aside almost entirely, in favor of identifying optimal productive behaviors directly. That was central planning, which flourished throughout the ancient world and was practiced globally right up to the 19th century. The second such algorithm embraced evolution, but sought to improve upon it by imposing a rule against theft. That was the economic liberalism practiced in the West in the late 19th century. It is also the regime favored by the Chicago School. Approached from the metaphor of the algorithm, the Chicago School’s program appears retrograde, rather than foundational, because it amounts to the position that there should be no version 2.0, no further tweaks to the algorithm. But the antitrust laws, in prohibiting behavior that degrades competitors’ products, even when the behavior does not amount to theft, improves upon the algorithm that is economic liberalism, better channeling life’s evolutionary forces toward productivity and growth, rather than destructive forms of competition.
{"title":"A Critique of the Chicago School of Antitrust from the Perspective of the History of Life on Earth","authors":"Ramsi Woodcock","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3661971","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3661971","url":null,"abstract":"The heart of the Chicago School’s attack on the antitrust laws was a skepticism about the ability of government to improve upon unregulated market outcomes. Although the attack failed to eliminate regulation or antitrust entirely, it has proven so enduringly devastating as an intellectual matter that virtually no proposal for government regulation or increased antitrust enforcement is put forward today without an attempt either to justify the proposed departure from an assumed-legitimate free market baseline or to dismiss Chicago School skepticism as an intellectual plot bankrolled by business elites. Chicago School skepticism has been so devastating because it draws sustenance from an inapt metaphor for the economy: that of evolution through natural selection. The free market is, for the Chicago School, nature itself, and all the glories of life suggest that evolution does just fine when left to its own devices, creating a powerful basis for skepticism regarding the need for government intervention in the economy. Except that evolution never did do anything to promote economic growth, so much as theft, a fact that human beings know well given their status as predators of unparalleled success. Humanity did not escape from the subsistence economics that characterizes all of evolved life until humanity started to exert control over the forces of evolution, which is to say: to regulate. A better metaphor for the economy than natural selection is that of a computer running a machine learning algorithm engineered to channel evolutionary forces away from theft and toward growth. The first such algorithm embraced by humanity set evolution aside almost entirely, in favor of identifying optimal productive behaviors directly. That was central planning, which flourished throughout the ancient world and was practiced globally right up to the 19th century. The second such algorithm embraced evolution, but sought to improve upon it by imposing a rule against theft. That was the economic liberalism practiced in the West in the late 19th century. It is also the regime favored by the Chicago School. Approached from the metaphor of the algorithm, the Chicago School’s program appears retrograde, rather than foundational, because it amounts to the position that there should be no version 2.0, no further tweaks to the algorithm. But the antitrust laws, in prohibiting behavior that degrades competitors’ products, even when the behavior does not amount to theft, improves upon the algorithm that is economic liberalism, better channeling life’s evolutionary forces toward productivity and growth, rather than destructive forms of competition.","PeriodicalId":226815,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy & Methodology of Economics eJournal","volume":"97 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115547690","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The myth that R. Kahn taught J M Keynes the multiplier,so that without Kahn’s contribution,there would have been no possibility of Keynes having written the General Theory in 1936,like the myth that there is no IS-LM mathematical model in the General Theory , can be traced to deliberate canards made by Joan Robinson repeatedly in her life time.
Keynes exposed Robinson as an intellectual fraud in late 1936 in correspondence with her in the months of September through November when he discovered that she did not have the slightest idea about his liquidity preference theory of the rate of interest, which is impossible to analyze in (r,Y) space except with an IS-LM model.
The economics profession has incorporated these myths into the official history of economic thought and macroeconomic history, as can easily be seen by visiting Investopedia or Wikipedia.
These myths go hand in glove with other myths about Keynes, such as the myth that an 18 year old Frank Ramsey showed up in Cambridge and convinced Keynes that his logical theory of probability ,based directly on the work of the greatest mathematical logician in history, George Boole, was full of errors and mistakes that then led Keynes to renounce his theory and accept some version of Ramsey’s approach.
One can see how these myths end up taking on a life of themselves when one realizes that the myth of Adam Smith’s theory of the Invisible Hand of the market is universally taught in all principles courses to lower division undergraduates in all economics courses, even though Smith himself completely rejected any such theory in both the Theory of Moral Sentiments and the Wealth of Nations.
{"title":"The Myth of Richard Kahn and the Multiplier: Keynes, Not Kahn, Created the Multiplier Concept in 1921 in His a Treatise on Probability and Taught Kahn How to Write His June, 1931 Economic Journal Paper","authors":"M. E. Brady","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3659745","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3659745","url":null,"abstract":"The myth that R. Kahn taught J M Keynes the multiplier,so that without Kahn’s contribution,there would have been no possibility of Keynes having written the General Theory in 1936,like the myth that there is no IS-LM mathematical model in the General Theory , can be traced to deliberate canards made by Joan Robinson repeatedly in her life time.<br><br>Keynes exposed Robinson as an intellectual fraud in late 1936 in correspondence with her in the months of September through November when he discovered that she did not have the slightest idea about his liquidity preference theory of the rate of interest, which is impossible to analyze in (r,Y) space except with an IS-LM model.<br><br>The economics profession has incorporated these myths into the official history of economic thought and macroeconomic history, as can easily be seen by visiting Investopedia or Wikipedia. <br><br>These myths go hand in glove with other myths about Keynes, such as the myth that an 18 year old Frank Ramsey showed up in Cambridge and convinced Keynes that his logical theory of probability ,based directly on the work of the greatest mathematical logician in history, George Boole, was full of errors and mistakes that then led Keynes to renounce his theory and accept some version of Ramsey’s approach.<br><br>One can see how these myths end up taking on a life of themselves when one realizes that the myth of Adam Smith’s theory of the Invisible Hand of the market is universally taught in all principles courses to lower division undergraduates in all economics courses, even though Smith himself completely rejected any such theory in both the Theory of Moral Sentiments and the Wealth of Nations.","PeriodicalId":226815,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy & Methodology of Economics eJournal","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128429137","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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