Pub Date : 2002-01-01DOI: 10.1080/1362517022019793
M. Duffield
This essay addresses the new phenomenon of network warfare as a realisation of modernity's inner potential and surprising capacities rather than its failure. A feature of the complex capillaries of global governance, network warfare has been endemic for some time in many border regions of the world and reflects an increasing conflation of development and security.
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Pub Date : 2002-01-01DOI: 10.1080/1362517022019801
Jon Simons
Media technologies are an integral and vital element of democratic governance. The political public of representative democratic régimes are mediated publics, in that they exist and are constituted as publics through the mediation of technologies of mass media. The public sphere of democratic politics is part of, and central to, the mediated sphere of popular culture. There is a structural and necessary relation between the popularization of culture and the democratization of politics. A governmentalist approach understands political media technologies not as aberrations in the light of democratic theory but as the practices of “actually existing” representative democracy. Genuine popular democracy does not exist, fully formed, in the publics constituted by the media technologies but is most likely to flourish in popular culture and through media technologies.
{"title":"Governing the Public: Technologies of Mediation and Popular Culture","authors":"Jon Simons","doi":"10.1080/1362517022019801","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/1362517022019801","url":null,"abstract":"Media technologies are an integral and vital element of democratic governance. The political public of representative democratic régimes are mediated publics, in that they exist and are constituted as publics through the mediation of technologies of mass media. The public sphere of democratic politics is part of, and central to, the mediated sphere of popular culture. There is a structural and necessary relation between the popularization of culture and the democratization of politics. A governmentalist approach understands political media technologies not as aberrations in the light of democratic theory but as the practices of “actually existing” representative democracy. Genuine popular democracy does not exist, fully formed, in the publics constituted by the media technologies but is most likely to flourish in popular culture and through media technologies.","PeriodicalId":296129,"journal":{"name":"Cultural Values","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2002-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130265354","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2002-01-01DOI: 10.1080/1362517022019810
Aida A. Hozić
This paper explores the way in which America—a cultural space produced by the world's largest media corporations and not the political entity called the United States— constructs, both discursively and spatially, zones of violence and zones of safety, contributing in the process to the maintenance and acclamation of political/symbolic global order. Through “thick descriptions” of three zones—EPCOT Center in Walt Disney World in Florida, as the ultimate safe zone; a day of media coverage of the Kosovo intervention in 1999, the epitomy of a constructed zone of violence; and a reinterpretation of debates over media violence in the United States as the way of policing the zones of safety and zones of violence—the paper argues that zoning was the principal practice with which the self-content narrative of global economic success confronted the onslaught of alleged cultural violence in the 1990s. Zoning, to use Giorgio Agamben's analysis, is the forceful localization of an ever-expanding suspension of legal order; the practice that obfuscates the increasing frequency with which sovereign power encounters—and obliterates—bare life with impunity. Construction of boundaries between zones of safety and zones of violence is, therefore, more than performance of security—it is the way to affirm global order in face of its absence.
{"title":"Zoning, or, How to Govern (Cultural) Violence","authors":"Aida A. Hozić","doi":"10.1080/1362517022019810","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/1362517022019810","url":null,"abstract":"This paper explores the way in which America—a cultural space produced by the world's largest media corporations and not the political entity called the United States— constructs, both discursively and spatially, zones of violence and zones of safety, contributing in the process to the maintenance and acclamation of political/symbolic global order. Through “thick descriptions” of three zones—EPCOT Center in Walt Disney World in Florida, as the ultimate safe zone; a day of media coverage of the Kosovo intervention in 1999, the epitomy of a constructed zone of violence; and a reinterpretation of debates over media violence in the United States as the way of policing the zones of safety and zones of violence—the paper argues that zoning was the principal practice with which the self-content narrative of global economic success confronted the onslaught of alleged cultural violence in the 1990s. Zoning, to use Giorgio Agamben's analysis, is the forceful localization of an ever-expanding suspension of legal order; the practice that obfuscates the increasing frequency with which sovereign power encounters—and obliterates—bare life with impunity. Construction of boundaries between zones of safety and zones of violence is, therefore, more than performance of security—it is the way to affirm global order in face of its absence.","PeriodicalId":296129,"journal":{"name":"Cultural Values","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2002-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114220015","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2002-01-01DOI: 10.1080/1362517022019711
M. Dillon, J. Valentine
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Pub Date : 2001-10-01DOI: 10.1080/14797580109367244
J. Ojajärvi
Abstract This article considers the process of commodification (the extension of the realm of money, the spread of typically capitalist mechanisms like competition and consumption) as a cultural means of the reproduction of subjectivity. The particular aim is to highlight the psychic processes that are tempted by commodification. Thus, at the background of this essay, there is a psychoanalytical notion of the self that has been developed in an examination of subjectivity and play, a notion based especially on the thinking of D.W. Winnicott and Jessica Benjamin. These analysts see an ambivalent self‐destructiveness of the self reformulated in relation to the ‘potential space’ of play. In relation to this analysis, the influence of advanced capitalism on the self is discussed in some of its more competitive scenes of consumptions. The quiz show The Weakest Link, for example, is considered as a pale, commodified form of play. It is argued that the main seduction of the show is the dwindled and distorted potential space offered by its ultimate, destructive, and in the last analysis sado‐masochistic logic of exchange. In addition to The Weakest Link, a couple of relevant thematisations of commodified culture by contemporary Finnish literature are brought out. Moreover, the commodification of subjectivity by the means of play is loosely related to some general characterisations concerning the prevailing cultural situation (see Jameson 1999 and Rifkin, 2000).
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Pub Date : 2001-10-01DOI: 10.1080/14797580109367241
Jenny Edkins
Abstract This essay explores the contradiction that arises between the search for authenticity or historical accuracy and the attempt to ‘express the inexpressible’ in the memory and testimony of concentration camp survivors. Curators at Dachau Concentration Camp Memorial Site face an impossible demand to present the site as it was in the Nazi period while at the same time allowing for its use as a memorial. However, visitors interact with the exhibits and each other to produce a more open engagement than the designers anticipate and the exhibits themselves often have an unexpected impact. Artefacts in particular seem to have key emotional effects that exceed the impact of their authenticity, as do camp buildings, and the testimony of survivors can provide a disturbing challenge to the values of truth and authenticity.
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Pub Date : 2001-07-01DOI: 10.1080/14797580109367238
V. Bell
Abstract Modes of engagement. The reader may engage with this article in several different modes. It could be approached in straightforward, if quirky, sociological mode as an exploration of the idea that the literature on post‐divorce arrangements and step‐families, and especially literature, that attends to children's contact with their non‐resident fathers, can be re‐read in order to consider the issue of contact via communication technologies (predominantly the telephone but also other forms of communication), a form of parent‐child contact not captured in the ways that ‘contact’ is measured in present studies. Of interest in itself, perhaps, this point of entrance opens up onto further questions about the management of human affect, and how rearrangements in lines of affect have reverberations beyond those captured by an Oedipal model, insofar as they are not about contact and severance but are various kinds of displacement for all involved. In particular, I am concerned here with the rearrangement of affect for the fathers as their role becomes dispersed, shared and intermittent, a set of problematics that also includes the various ways in which the very body of the mother is removed or circumvented. On a second level the article speaks to a different literature, in that it is an elaboration of the notion of the network as a dispersed hybrid that entails both human and non‐human entities, within which any absolute distinction between human and non‐human is to be prob‐lematised but, I wish to argue, without losing the specificity of human interaction, that is, the questions of human emotion, human desire and human ethics. This elaboration moves toward a critique of the very ubiquity and endless utility of the network idea through the suggestion that its appeal may conceal moments and movements where more unexpected effects are taking place. Indeed, I suggest that there may be some twists in the familial dynamics of ‘households that no longer hold’, where some selected thoughts from a reading of Deleuze and Guattari, specifically around the notion of ‘becoming’, may lead one to read other stories than that proffered through the master trope of the network, ones that are maybe closer to some of the original impulses behind actor‐network theory. And thirdly, the article may be engaged as a reflection on contemporary ways in which familial life is governed in contemporary Britain. The family as both a site of economic arrangements and a site of the arrangement of human affect‐sexuality‐reproduction, are held together and in tension through forms of contemporary government of the family. Contemporary rationalities of familial morality seek to make its members responsible parents without intervening to the extent that they would seek to make them responsible spouses, seen here in the implication that fathers' economic responsibilities for children are not co‐extensive with their emotional connections to women.1 As opposed to any other familial fig
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Pub Date : 2001-07-01DOI: 10.1080/14797580109367233
S. Fullagar
Abstract This article draws upon the work of contemporary French feminist philosopher Luce Irigaray in developing a post‐structuralist analysis of travel within the autobiographies of the second wave feminist philosopher Simone de Beauvoir. Travel and the experience of wonder at the otherness of the world figure as important self shaping experiences within the four volumes of Beauvoir's life narrative (1958, 1960, 1963, 1972). Travel has a metonymic relation to the passage of Beauvoir's life, in which the existential extremes of anguish and ecstasy are played out in a (feminine) quest for self knowledge. Through a close reading of Beauvoir's writing I analyse the different formations of desire that structure the experience of wonder in relation to the otherness of the world and death. I also draw upon debates within feminist philosophy about the nature of subjectivity and knowledge that were, in Beauvoir's time, ordered around an Hegelian opposition between immanence and transcendence. I take up Irigaray's notion of the sensible transcendental to explore another way of conceptualising the feminine subject's desire to know and value the world differently.
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Pub Date : 2001-07-01DOI: 10.1080/14797580109367236
M. Bendle
Abstract The twentieth century saw the emergence of a new episteme of death that fundamentally revolutionized values relating to mortality and life. Previously this revolution has been seen primarily in terms of the sequestration and denial of death, but it is necessary to go farther and recognize that these are really just an aspect of the industrialization ‐the Fordism ‐ of death. This takes two major institutional forms: the militarization, and the medicalization of death. Both ensure that death is administered on an industrial scale and in accord with institutional and bureaucratic imperatives and values. The total mobilization of the Great War was the prototype that revealed the potential of this approach. With the subsequent medical revolution of the middle decades of the century the approach was quickly rationalized and refined into a new episteme of administered death, with ‘administer’ being understood in its twin senses of ‘to manage’ and ‘to dispense’ — the two characteristic orientations to death in contemporary society. This new episteme quickly displaced traditional values derived predominantly from religious, philosophical, mythological and traditional sources and has advanced far beyond their responsive capacity, as the many interminable debates around issues of bioethics reveal. While this new episteme might enhance the human condition, it also has great potential for the impoverishment of the human spirit, and for the further reduction of human beings to the status of mere components and functions to be administered within medico‐technological systems that are themselves parts of an increasingly globalized economic system.
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Pub Date : 2001-07-01DOI: 10.1080/14797580109367235
Catherine Kellogg
Abstract This paper argues that insofar as the ‘translation’ of deconstruction in America has become a discourse on the sacred, it mis‐recognizes what Derrida calls the trace, and identifies it as the radical outside to thought, or as ‘God’. The ‘trace’ on Derrida's account is indeed unknowable, but it is not the radical outside of thought. Rather, it is a disruptive force that is internal to thought. Reconstructive analyses investigate (among other things) the way that thought is breached, and necessarily so, by what thought cannot think. This breach, this unsignifiable opening, is intolerable to philosophical undertakings because philosophy must totalize; this is what philosophy does. Following Walter Benjamin, I argue that translation is possible, precisely because of this breach. Thus, just because this breach or opening is intolerable to thought or to philosophy does not prevent it from happening. On Jacques Derrida's analysis, this opening has a name: it is deconstruction. To this extent, those variants of ‘deconstruction in America’ which misrecognize the trace as God, miss the very political force of deconstruction in the first place, which is to say, a philosophical undertaking which thematizes the intolerability of refusing what philosophy does and must do. The breach in thought (or language) is precisely what Walter Benjamin suggests is untranslatable. It cannot be communicated by any sign. Notwithstanding the great difference between Benjamin and Hegel's political commitments, comparing Benjamin's work on the untranslatability of language's ‘languageness’ to Hegel's semiological theory (which requires that we forget’ this very uncommunicableness at the heart of language) is instructive. It establishes that both thinkers argue that the practice of language should be the practice of learning each word as though it were a proper name. Each argues in their own way that the practice of language should erase the trace. It is precisely this erasure — the identification of the trace as radically exterior to thought ‐ that covers over what is at stake, not simply philosophically, in an investigation into the breach of language, but what is at stake politically. What is at stake politically is what Derrida calls the ‘risk of absolute surprise’ which is nothing less than the risk of a political philosophy with no guarantee.
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