For many advocates of European integration in the late 1940s and early 1950s, the seeming example of technocratic independence under the New Deal offered a justification for the delegation of regulatory power to autonomous supranational bodies. The New Deal represented, from this perspective, the triumph of “functionalist” governance--that is, governance that evolved as a function of the problems it sought to address, rather than being determined by seemingly outdated constitutional categories (“separation of powers” in the purported case of the New Deal, “national sovereignty” in European integration). The irony, of course, was that Roosevelt’s New Deal was much less receptive, both in principle and practice, to the sort of technocratic independence that these advocates believed to be inevitable and desirable in the case of integration. Indeed, consistent with a more nuanced understanding of the New Deal model, European integration would eventually secure a durable institutional existence only after being brought more directly under the shared control and oversight of the national executives of the member states. Contrary to expectations of functionalist (and later so-called neofunctionalist) theorists, governance beyond the state in postwar Western Europe did not evolve merely as a consequence of functional demands for technocratic independence. Rather, two additional dimensions of change also proved decisive: the political--or the defense of existing institutional advantages and/or the struggle to realize new ones; and the cultural--or the mobilization of conceptions of “right” or legitimate governance in the face of purported functional and political pressures for change. As a consequence of the interplay of all three dimensions--functional, political, and cultural--European integration ultimately settled on a form of governance in which the political oversight and control of national executives played a decisive role, a feature of European supranationalism that persists to this day. Even if a measure of supranational technocratic autonomy was broadly recognized as functionally necessary to the European project, national executives worked successfully to preserve significant institutional advantages in the integration process by mobilizing conceptions of legitimacy that, for better or worse, remain wedded to national institutions to a significant degree. It was through national executive oversight--eventually supplemented by national parliamentary and national judicial oversight--that integration has been able to maintain a connection to conceptions of democratic and constitutional legitimacy on the national level, even as functional pressures seemed to warrant a shift in governance to autonomous supranational bodies.
{"title":"Transatlantic Functionalism: New Deal Models and European Integration","authors":"Peter L. Lindseth","doi":"10.33137/cal.v2i1.22516","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.33137/cal.v2i1.22516","url":null,"abstract":"For many advocates of European integration in the late 1940s and early 1950s, the seeming example of technocratic independence under the New Deal offered a justification for the delegation of regulatory power to autonomous supranational bodies. The New Deal represented, from this perspective, the triumph of “functionalist” governance--that is, governance that evolved as a function of the problems it sought to address, rather than being determined by seemingly outdated constitutional categories (“separation of powers” in the purported case of the New Deal, “national sovereignty” in European integration). The irony, of course, was that Roosevelt’s New Deal was much less receptive, both in principle and practice, to the sort of technocratic independence that these advocates believed to be inevitable and desirable in the case of integration. Indeed, consistent with a more nuanced understanding of the New Deal model, European integration would eventually secure a durable institutional existence only after being brought more directly under the shared control and oversight of the national executives of the member states. Contrary to expectations of functionalist (and later so-called neofunctionalist) theorists, governance beyond the state in postwar Western Europe did not evolve merely as a consequence of functional demands for technocratic independence. Rather, two additional dimensions of change also proved decisive: the political--or the defense of existing institutional advantages and/or the struggle to realize new ones; and the cultural--or the mobilization of conceptions of “right” or legitimate governance in the face of purported functional and political pressures for change. As a consequence of the interplay of all three dimensions--functional, political, and cultural--European integration ultimately settled on a form of governance in which the political oversight and control of national executives played a decisive role, a feature of European supranationalism that persists to this day. Even if a measure of supranational technocratic autonomy was broadly recognized as functionally necessary to the European project, national executives worked successfully to preserve significant institutional advantages in the integration process by mobilizing conceptions of legitimacy that, for better or worse, remain wedded to national institutions to a significant degree. It was through national executive oversight--eventually supplemented by national parliamentary and national judicial oversight--that integration has been able to maintain a connection to conceptions of democratic and constitutional legitimacy on the national level, even as functional pressures seemed to warrant a shift in governance to autonomous supranational bodies.","PeriodicalId":296326,"journal":{"name":"International Institutions: European Union eJournal","volume":"87 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-01-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128783999","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The role and impact of institutions on policy-making have been receiving a lot of attention in the academic literature on the European Union (EU). The current special issue aims to contribute to this broader institutionalist debate in the EU literature by paying attention to institutional dynamics within and across EU institutions and different levels of governance. In this quest, it feeds into the broader political and academic debate on (changing) institutional balance and policy coherence. The contributions to this special issue reflect that a wide range of institutional mechanisms for intra- and inter-institutional cooperation have been developed. Most importantly, the contributions allow us to get a better insight into the factors that explain the success or failure of the cooperation. This introduction to the special issue provides the backdrop for the contributions and an overview of the individual articles.
{"title":"Dynamics of Institutional Cooperation in the European Union: Dimensions and Effects. An Introduction","authors":"S. Vanhoonacker, C. Neuhold","doi":"10.1695/2015001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1695/2015001","url":null,"abstract":"The role and impact of institutions on policy-making have been receiving a lot of attention in the academic literature on the European Union (EU). The current special issue aims to contribute to this broader institutionalist debate in the EU literature by paying attention to institutional dynamics within and across EU institutions and different levels of governance. In this quest, it feeds into the broader political and academic debate on (changing) institutional balance and policy coherence. The contributions to this special issue reflect that a wide range of institutional mechanisms for intra- and inter-institutional cooperation have been developed. Most importantly, the contributions allow us to get a better insight into the factors that explain the success or failure of the cooperation. This introduction to the special issue provides the backdrop for the contributions and an overview of the individual articles.","PeriodicalId":296326,"journal":{"name":"International Institutions: European Union eJournal","volume":"12 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-01-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123941342","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Decision-making between the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament is characterized by a paradox. On the one hand, there is a high potential for inter-institutional conflict. Historically, the EP and the Council have been opponents in the struggle for power. In addition, both institutions can be said to fulfill different representational roles within the political system of the EU, with the Council representing the member states and the Parliament representing the citizens. Furthermore, agreement between the two is complicated by decision rules posing high thresholds for agreement and actors with often diverging preferences. On the other hand, in day-to-day policy-making, the Council and the European Parliament display a high level of consensus and decision-making efficiency. Most legislation is decided in first reading, and early agreements provide a shortcut for cumbersome inter-institutional negotiations. To shed light on this paradox, we conceptualize the mechanisms and dynamics underlying inter-institutional cooperation and conflict by taking recourse to factors derived from historical, sociological and rational choice institutionalisms. We argue that the same logics which account for conflict also contain the explanation for cooperation. Furthermore, we demonstrate that each of the theoretical approaches is particularly well suited to highlight a certain aspect of the paradox.
{"title":"The Council, the European Parliament, and the Paradox of Inter-Institutional Cooperation","authors":"M. Mühlböck, Berthold Rittberger","doi":"10.1695/2015004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1695/2015004","url":null,"abstract":"Decision-making between the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament is characterized by a paradox. On the one hand, there is a high potential for inter-institutional conflict. Historically, the EP and the Council have been opponents in the struggle for power. In addition, both institutions can be said to fulfill different representational roles within the political system of the EU, with the Council representing the member states and the Parliament representing the citizens. Furthermore, agreement between the two is complicated by decision rules posing high thresholds for agreement and actors with often diverging preferences. On the other hand, in day-to-day policy-making, the Council and the European Parliament display a high level of consensus and decision-making efficiency. Most legislation is decided in first reading, and early agreements provide a shortcut for cumbersome inter-institutional negotiations. To shed light on this paradox, we conceptualize the mechanisms and dynamics underlying inter-institutional cooperation and conflict by taking recourse to factors derived from historical, sociological and rational choice institutionalisms. We argue that the same logics which account for conflict also contain the explanation for cooperation. Furthermore, we demonstrate that each of the theoretical approaches is particularly well suited to highlight a certain aspect of the paradox.","PeriodicalId":296326,"journal":{"name":"International Institutions: European Union eJournal","volume":"50 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-01-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131551054","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Hongyul Han, Park Joung-Ho, Sungwook Yoon, Hyekyung Cho
Korean Abstract: 푸틴 대통령은 집권 이후 강대국 러시아 건설에 매진해왔다. 특히 푸틴은 CIS 지역에서 러시아의 세력권 복원에 대외정책의 우선순위를 두었다. 이를 반영하듯 집권 3기에 들어서 포스트-소비에트 공간(Post-Soviet Space)을 둘러싼 국제관계의 재편성 작업이 더욱 활발하게 진행되고 있다. 이는 유라시아 지역 전체의 세력판도를 좌우할 수 있는 국제관계의 핵심 사안이나 마찬가지다. 탈소비에트 국가들은 독립 이후 국가 건설과 대외정책 추진과정에서 자신들의 정치적･경제적･군사 안보적 이해관계를 충족시킬 목적 아래 다양한 형태의 CIS 지역 통합운동(CIS, EURASEC, GUAM, CES, CSTO, SCO, CU, EEU 등)에 참여 해왔다. 포스 트-소비에트 공간의 경우 탈러시아 및 친유럽 성향의 다자협력 기구와 친러시아 성향의 지역 통합 조직이 동시에 존재하는 전략적 경쟁 지대였다. 이곳에서는 미국을 위시한 서방세력의 개입 작업과 러시아의 세력권 복원운동이 동시다발적으로 전개되고 있었다. 러시아 지도부는 탈소비에트 공간에서 서방의 세력 확산을 차단하고 자신의 영향력을 확산시킨다는 차원에서 CIS 지역 통합 작업을 적극 추진해왔던 것이다. 2014년 러시아 정부는 3대 외교정책 과제를 선정했다. 그중 하나가 바로 유라시아 대륙에서 러시아 주도의 지역 통합작업을 강화하는 것이다. 2015년에 야심차게 출범하는 유라시아 경제연합(Eurasian Economic Union)은 CIS 지역 통합운동의 완결판이라는 국제정치적 함의를 지니고 있다. 푸틴 정부는 CIS 지역 통합 프로젝트를 통해 탈소비에트 공간에서 러시아의 주도적 역할과 정치적 입지 강화를 적극 도모해 나가고 있는 중이다. 본 연구의 목적은 크게 세 가지이다. 첫째, 글로벌화와 세계경제의 공간적 재편이라는 관점에서 유라시아 경제연합이 갖는 경제적 의의를 평가한다. 둘째, 러시아의 세계전략이라는 관점에서 유라시아 경제연합이 갖는 국제정치적 함의를 분석한다. 셋째, 강대국(미국, 유럽연합, 중국)과 CIS 지역 경제권 국가의 유라시아 경제연합에 대한 기본 입장을 고찰해보고자 한다. 이를 토대로 본고는 최근 한국 사회에서 제기되고 있는 유라시아 이니셔티브, 즉 대유라시아 정책과의 접점을 파악하고 향후 관련 정책 방향과 시사점을 제시하는 데 연구의 초점을 맞추고 있다. 2장에서는 세계경제의 지역적 구도 변화의 배경과 현황을 다루고 있다. 20세기 후반 세계경제를 지배한 세계화 현상은 국민경제간의 깊은 통합(deep integration)을 이끌어낼 것으로 기대되었다. 그러나 세계시장의 통합이 가져올 규모의 경제와 효율성에 대한 기대는 작금에 발생한 다양한 부작용에 의해 좌절되고 말았다. EEU 출범의 배경이 되는 세계경제의 지역구도화 관련 이론은 다음과 같다. 첫째, 세계화 또는 세계경제의 통합과정에서 글로벌 거버넌스가 중요한 제약조건으로 작용한다는 것이며, 이는 소위 세계화 트릴레마로 설명된다. 둘째, 세계화는 기업 공정의 세계화(globalization of production process)를 촉진하는데, 이는 결과적으로 생산 활동의 집적화로 이어졌다. 이러한 현상은 경제활동에 있어서 국경의 의미를 크게 희석시키고 있으며, 특정 지역을 중심으로 경제활동이 긴밀하게 통합되는 현상을 통해 세계경제의 지역적 구도화를 촉진하고 있다. 셋째, 이러한 제반 현상은 Krugman류 New Economic Geography 이론의 현실정합성을 뒷받침해주고 있다. 생산 활동의 집적화는 시장접근에 대한 수요를 증대시킴과 동시에, 국가간 제도적 경제통합의 수요를 증가시킨다. 이는 지역간 협정의 확산이라는 현상으로 나타나고 있다. 이러한 관점에 기초할 때, EEU의 경제적 동인은 크다고 정의할 수 없을 것이다. 유라시아 지역의 제조업 생산비중은 상대적으로 미약할 뿐만 아니라 역내 국가들간의 생산활동 분업도 활발한 수준이 아니다. EEU는 규범적 관점에서 높은 수준의 경제통합을 지향하고 있으나, 이를 현실적으로 이행하기에는 각 회원국의 시장이 충분한 성숙단계에 도달하지 않았다. 경제정책적 측면에서 EEU의 발전 가능성에 대해 긍정적인 전망을 내리기는 아직 이른 시점이다. EEU는 적어도 단기적으로는 경제적 관점이 아니라 이 지역을 중심으로 한 공동체 형성이라는 규범적 관점에서 이해할 필요성이 있다. 향후 EEU가 순조롭게 발전하기 위해서는 경제적 측면의 동력을 확보해야 한다. 러시아는 EEU 주도국으로서 일정한 수준의 산업 생산력을 확보함은 물론이고, 이를 바탕으로 역내 생산 분업구조를 구축해나가야 한다. EEU 추진에 있어서 정책적 공조의 필요성이 매우 중요한 이유이다. 3장은 러시아의 세계전략과 EEU 확장정책에 대한 평가 문제를 분석하고 있다. 러시아는 역사적･정치적･경제적･문화적･영토적으로 유라시아 대륙의 국제관계에서 자신의 명확한 이해를 보유하고 있는 국가이다. 푸틴 집권 이후 러시아 정부는 미국의 일방주의를 대체할 수 있는 새로운 다극체제의 구축이라는 세계전략의 핵심 목표를 설정한 바 있다. 푸틴 정부가 제시한 ‘21세기 강대국 러시아 건설’ 전략이란 새로운 다극체제에서 하나의 극을 담당하는 지역 강대국을 건설하는 것이었다. 그 연장선상에서 푸틴 대통령은 CIS 지역을 러시아의 배타적 세력권으로 상정했으며, 그 공간에서 러시아의 영향력 강화를 위한 일명 ‘CIS 프로젝트’를 적극 추진해왔다. 특히 CIS 지역에서 러시아의 주도권 복원 작업은 2008년 조지아 전쟁에서 승리한 이후 더욱 적극적으로 추진될 수 있었다. 게다가 러시아의 최근 ‘외교정책 개념’에도 잘 나타나 있듯이, 러시아 주도의 CIS 지역 통합 프로젝트는 세계전략의 최우선적인 목표나 다름없다. 이는 러시아의 지역 패권 확보와 강대국 건설작업의 성패 여부는 물론, 탈소비에트 공간의 미래 전망과 직결된 중대한 문제이기에 더욱 그렇다. 2015년 출범 계획인 유라시아 경제연합은 러시아의 세계전략 구상과 밀접하게 연결되어 있는 중차대한 국가 프로젝트이다. 유라시아 경제연합이 러시아·벨라루스·카자흐스탄 등 옛 소비에트 연방국을 주축으로 한
Korean Abstract:普京总统执政以后一直致力于建设强国俄罗斯。特别是，普京把对外政策的重点放在了恢复俄罗斯在CIS地区的势力范围上。似乎反映了这一点，进入执政第3期后，围绕后苏维埃空间(Post-Soviet Space)的国际关系重组工作更加活跃。这是可以左右欧亚地区整体势力版图的国际关系核心问题。脱苏维埃国家在独立后的国家建设和对外政策推进过程中，为了满足自己的政治、经济、军事安全利益，参与了各种形式的CIS地区统一运动(CIS、EURASEC、GUAM、CES、CSTO、SCO、CU、EEU等)。poste -苏维埃空间是同时存在脱俄罗斯及亲欧洲倾向的多方合作机构和亲俄罗斯倾向的地区统合组织的战略性竞争地带。在这里，以美国为首的西方势力的介入和俄罗斯的势力范围复原运动同时展开。俄罗斯领导层从阻止西方势力在脱苏维埃空间扩散并扩大自己影响力的角度出发，一直积极推进CIS地区整合工作。2014年俄罗斯政府选定了三大外交政策课题。其中之一就是在欧亚大陆加强俄罗斯主导的地区整合工作。雄心勃勃于2015年成立的欧亚经济联盟(Eurasian Economic Union)具有CIS地区统合运动完结版的国际政治含义。普京政府正在通过CIS地区统合项目，积极谋求俄罗斯在脱苏维埃空间的主导作用和加强政治地位。本研究的目的大致有三个。第一，从全球化和世界经济空间重组的观点出发，评价欧亚经济联盟具有的经济意义。第二，从俄罗斯的世界战略观点出发，分析欧亚经济联盟具有的国际政治含义。第三，考察一下强国(美国、欧盟、中国)和CIS地区经济圈国家对欧亚经济联盟的基本立场。以此为基础，本高中掌握了最近在韩国社会上被提出的欧亚倡议，即大尤拉西亚政策的接点，将研究的焦点放在了提示以后的相关政策方向和启示上。第2章介绍了世界经济地区格局变化的背景和现状。人们期待，20世纪后期支配世界经济的全球化现象将带动国民经济之间的深度整合(deep integration)。但是，对世界市场的整合将带来的规模经济和效率性的期待因最近发生的各种副作用而破灭。成为EEU成立背景的世界经济地区化相关理论如下。第一，在全球化或世界经济的统合过程中，全球管理起到重要的制约条件作用，这可以用所谓的全球化趋势来解释。第二，全球化促进了企业工程的全球化(globalization of production process)，最终导致了生产活动的集成化。这种现象在经济活动中大幅淡化了国境的意义，并通过以特定地区为中心的经济活动紧密融合的现象，促进了世界经济的地区构图化。第三，这些现象支持了Krugman类新Economic Geography理论的现实合成。生产活动的集成化增加了对市场准入的需求，同时也增加了国家间制度性经济整合的需求。这体现出了地区间协定扩散的现象。基于这一观点，EEU的经济动因不能定义为大。欧亚地区制造业生产比重相对较弱，区域内国家间的生产活动分工也不活跃。EEU从规范观点出发，追求高水平的经济一体化，但各成员国的市场尚未达到充分的成熟阶段，以实现这一目标。从经济政策的角度来看，对EEU的发展可能性做出肯定预测为时尚早。EEU至少在短期内有必要从以该地区为中心形成共同体的规范性观点来理解，而不是从经济观点。今后EEU要想顺利发展，必须确保经济方面的动力。俄罗斯作为EEU的主导国，不仅要确保一定水平的产业生产力，还要以此为基础构建区域内生产分工结构。因此，在推进EEU的过程中，政策性合作的必要性非常重要。第三章分析了俄罗斯对世界战略和EEU扩张政策的评价问题。俄罗斯是一个在历史、政治、经济、文化、领土上对欧亚大陆国际关系有着明确理解的国家普京执政以后，俄罗斯政府曾设定了构建可以代替美国单边主义的新多极体制的世界战略核心目标。普京政府提出的“建设21世纪强国俄罗斯”战略是指，在新的多极体制下，建设一个担当一极的地区强国。在此基础上，普京将CIS地区列入俄罗斯的排他性势力范围，并在这个空间积极推进旨在加强俄罗斯影响力的所谓“CIS计划”。尤其是在CIS地区，俄罗斯的主导权复原工作在2008年乔治亚战争中获胜之后，得以更加积极地推进。而且，正如俄罗斯最近提出的“外交政策概念”所体现的那样，俄罗斯主导的CIS地区整合计划无疑是世界战略的首要目标。这不仅关系到俄罗斯确保地区霸权和建设强国工作的成败，而且关系到脱苏维埃空间的未来前景。2015年成立的欧亚经济联盟是与俄罗斯的世界战略构想密切相关的重大国家项目。因为欧亚经济联盟是以俄罗斯、白俄罗斯、哈萨克斯坦等前苏联联邦国家为主轴的经济共同体，志向于建立可以与欧盟相媲美的联合组织。而且，欧亚经济联合项目今后的目标不仅是建立覆盖土耳其和印度的经济共同体，还将创造同欧盟之间的共同市场。由此可见，欧亚经济联盟的成立和发展很有可能成为重组欧亚势力格局的重大变数。在第4章中，考察了地球村主要强国(EU、中国、美国)的对EEU战略。从最近的乌克兰事件中可以看出，俄罗斯的EEU推进战略不仅对周边国家，对全世界其他国家也引起了高度关注。特别是与俄罗斯相邻的欧盟,过去在冷战时代,苏联曾与两极体制的美国,正在成为新的强国是中国的大eeu应对战略在欧亚地区安全及能源霸权格局等方面,建立韩国对eeu应对战略非常重要,可以提供有用的启示。首先，欧盟的基本立场如下。欧盟因地理位置相近，在地区安全及能源供需等问题上与欧洲联盟有直接关系。欧盟高度警惕俄罗斯扩大影响力的可能性，正在致力于制定应对战略。在能源安全方面，俄罗斯和中亚是欧盟对外政策中重要的战略空间。欧盟对两个地区的重要性非常关注，因此很难对EEU展开有效的牵制政策。与此同时，在推进欧盟对外政策方面，存在成员国之间的权限分配问题。这可能会成为欧盟对EEU制定应对政策过程中的重大制约因素。从中国的战略观点来看，俄罗斯的EEU构想可能会和正在中亚地区追求扩大影响力的中国的西向战略发生冲突。围绕中亚地区，中国和俄罗斯之间可能会展开主导权竞争，但中国政府从未正式表明立场，采取旁观者的态度。其背景是中国的乐观判断，即EEU的成立不会威胁中国对中亚地区的经济主导权或成为推进西向战略的绊脚石。因为在经济、通商方面，中国的影响力已经超过了俄罗斯，虽然俄罗斯进行了牵制，但中国的经济地位今后可能会进一步加强。另外，如果EEU为促进中亚地区的地区稳定和经济发展做出贡献，EEU的成立和发展反而会有助于中国的西向战略。美国公然批评俄罗斯建立EEU的意图是“苏联的复活”。但从美国的情况来看，没有政治、经济上的名分反对由俄罗斯主导的EEU成立对此，如何有效地介入该地区并维持美国的影响力是美国对EEU战略的核心问题。特别是从美国的立场上看，俄罗斯和中国将致力于排除美国在该地区的影响力，并考虑到美军从阿富汗撤军后美国对该地区的影响力有所缩小，制定应对战略。因此，过去集中在阿富汗的援助将加强给中亚国家，特别是不参与EEU的国家，以谋求关系的发展。第5章是关于前苏联地区经济圈的对EEU战略的内容。可以说，俄罗斯主导推进的欧亚经济联盟的未来原则上取决于参与国家的数量、这些国家的政治、经济比重以及成员国是否积极展开活动。因此，有必要考察相关国家对欧亚经济联盟的基本立场。首先是自动加入欧亚经济联盟的
{"title":"EEU 출범과 유라시아 국제관계 변화 (The Establishment of the EEU and Changes in International Relations in Eurasia)","authors":"Hongyul Han, Park Joung-Ho, Sungwook Yoon, Hyekyung Cho","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2639952","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2639952","url":null,"abstract":"Korean Abstract: 푸틴 대통령은 집권 이후 강대국 러시아 건설에 매진해왔다. 특히 푸틴은 CIS 지역에서 러시아의 세력권 복원에 대외정책의 우선순위를 두었다. 이를 반영하듯 집권 3기에 들어서 포스트-소비에트 공간(Post-Soviet Space)을 둘러싼 국제관계의 재편성 작업이 더욱 활발하게 진행되고 있다. 이는 유라시아 지역 전체의 세력판도를 좌우할 수 있는 국제관계의 핵심 사안이나 마찬가지다. 탈소비에트 국가들은 독립 이후 국가 건설과 대외정책 추진과정에서 자신들의 정치적･경제적･군사 안보적 이해관계를 충족시킬 목적 아래 다양한 형태의 CIS 지역 통합운동(CIS, EURASEC, GUAM, CES, CSTO, SCO, CU, EEU 등)에 참여 해왔다. 포스 트-소비에트 공간의 경우 탈러시아 및 친유럽 성향의 다자협력 기구와 친러시아 성향의 지역 통합 조직이 동시에 존재하는 전략적 경쟁 지대였다. 이곳에서는 미국을 위시한 서방세력의 개입 작업과 러시아의 세력권 복원운동이 동시다발적으로 전개되고 있었다. 러시아 지도부는 탈소비에트 공간에서 서방의 세력 확산을 차단하고 자신의 영향력을 확산시킨다는 차원에서 CIS 지역 통합 작업을 적극 추진해왔던 것이다. 2014년 러시아 정부는 3대 외교정책 과제를 선정했다. 그중 하나가 바로 유라시아 대륙에서 러시아 주도의 지역 통합작업을 강화하는 것이다. 2015년에 야심차게 출범하는 유라시아 경제연합(Eurasian Economic Union)은 CIS 지역 통합운동의 완결판이라는 국제정치적 함의를 지니고 있다. 푸틴 정부는 CIS 지역 통합 프로젝트를 통해 탈소비에트 공간에서 러시아의 주도적 역할과 정치적 입지 강화를 적극 도모해 나가고 있는 중이다. 본 연구의 목적은 크게 세 가지이다. 첫째, 글로벌화와 세계경제의 공간적 재편이라는 관점에서 유라시아 경제연합이 갖는 경제적 의의를 평가한다. 둘째, 러시아의 세계전략이라는 관점에서 유라시아 경제연합이 갖는 국제정치적 함의를 분석한다. 셋째, 강대국(미국, 유럽연합, 중국)과 CIS 지역 경제권 국가의 유라시아 경제연합에 대한 기본 입장을 고찰해보고자 한다. 이를 토대로 본고는 최근 한국 사회에서 제기되고 있는 유라시아 이니셔티브, 즉 대유라시아 정책과의 접점을 파악하고 향후 관련 정책 방향과 시사점을 제시하는 데 연구의 초점을 맞추고 있다. 2장에서는 세계경제의 지역적 구도 변화의 배경과 현황을 다루고 있다. 20세기 후반 세계경제를 지배한 세계화 현상은 국민경제간의 깊은 통합(deep integration)을 이끌어낼 것으로 기대되었다. 그러나 세계시장의 통합이 가져올 규모의 경제와 효율성에 대한 기대는 작금에 발생한 다양한 부작용에 의해 좌절되고 말았다. EEU 출범의 배경이 되는 세계경제의 지역구도화 관련 이론은 다음과 같다. 첫째, 세계화 또는 세계경제의 통합과정에서 글로벌 거버넌스가 중요한 제약조건으로 작용한다는 것이며, 이는 소위 세계화 트릴레마로 설명된다. 둘째, 세계화는 기업 공정의 세계화(globalization of production process)를 촉진하는데, 이는 결과적으로 생산 활동의 집적화로 이어졌다. 이러한 현상은 경제활동에 있어서 국경의 의미를 크게 희석시키고 있으며, 특정 지역을 중심으로 경제활동이 긴밀하게 통합되는 현상을 통해 세계경제의 지역적 구도화를 촉진하고 있다. 셋째, 이러한 제반 현상은 Krugman류 New Economic Geography 이론의 현실정합성을 뒷받침해주고 있다. 생산 활동의 집적화는 시장접근에 대한 수요를 증대시킴과 동시에, 국가간 제도적 경제통합의 수요를 증가시킨다. 이는 지역간 협정의 확산이라는 현상으로 나타나고 있다. 이러한 관점에 기초할 때, EEU의 경제적 동인은 크다고 정의할 수 없을 것이다. 유라시아 지역의 제조업 생산비중은 상대적으로 미약할 뿐만 아니라 역내 국가들간의 생산활동 분업도 활발한 수준이 아니다. EEU는 규범적 관점에서 높은 수준의 경제통합을 지향하고 있으나, 이를 현실적으로 이행하기에는 각 회원국의 시장이 충분한 성숙단계에 도달하지 않았다. 경제정책적 측면에서 EEU의 발전 가능성에 대해 긍정적인 전망을 내리기는 아직 이른 시점이다. EEU는 적어도 단기적으로는 경제적 관점이 아니라 이 지역을 중심으로 한 공동체 형성이라는 규범적 관점에서 이해할 필요성이 있다. 향후 EEU가 순조롭게 발전하기 위해서는 경제적 측면의 동력을 확보해야 한다. 러시아는 EEU 주도국으로서 일정한 수준의 산업 생산력을 확보함은 물론이고, 이를 바탕으로 역내 생산 분업구조를 구축해나가야 한다. EEU 추진에 있어서 정책적 공조의 필요성이 매우 중요한 이유이다. 3장은 러시아의 세계전략과 EEU 확장정책에 대한 평가 문제를 분석하고 있다. 러시아는 역사적･정치적･경제적･문화적･영토적으로 유라시아 대륙의 국제관계에서 자신의 명확한 이해를 보유하고 있는 국가이다. 푸틴 집권 이후 러시아 정부는 미국의 일방주의를 대체할 수 있는 새로운 다극체제의 구축이라는 세계전략의 핵심 목표를 설정한 바 있다. 푸틴 정부가 제시한 ‘21세기 강대국 러시아 건설’ 전략이란 새로운 다극체제에서 하나의 극을 담당하는 지역 강대국을 건설하는 것이었다. 그 연장선상에서 푸틴 대통령은 CIS 지역을 러시아의 배타적 세력권으로 상정했으며, 그 공간에서 러시아의 영향력 강화를 위한 일명 ‘CIS 프로젝트’를 적극 추진해왔다. 특히 CIS 지역에서 러시아의 주도권 복원 작업은 2008년 조지아 전쟁에서 승리한 이후 더욱 적극적으로 추진될 수 있었다. 게다가 러시아의 최근 ‘외교정책 개념’에도 잘 나타나 있듯이, 러시아 주도의 CIS 지역 통합 프로젝트는 세계전략의 최우선적인 목표나 다름없다. 이는 러시아의 지역 패권 확보와 강대국 건설작업의 성패 여부는 물론, 탈소비에트 공간의 미래 전망과 직결된 중대한 문제이기에 더욱 그렇다. 2015년 출범 계획인 유라시아 경제연합은 러시아의 세계전략 구상과 밀접하게 연결되어 있는 중차대한 국가 프로젝트이다. 유라시아 경제연합이 러시아·벨라루스·카자흐스탄 등 옛 소비에트 연방국을 주축으로 한 ","PeriodicalId":296326,"journal":{"name":"International Institutions: European Union eJournal","volume":"586 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-12-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122764638","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In June 2014 the European Council promulgated the directive on criminal sanctions for market abuse 2014/57/EU forcing the European member states to criminalize particular acts related to market manipulation and insider trading. In the same month the directive also entered into force. As a result of this directive the traditional freedom that member states had to decide the ways in which they would implement a directive on market manipulation and insider trading has finished. With this important step the European institutions make use of the new powers that were allocated to them to force member states to the use of the criminal law in particular areas. Previously the European institutions made use of this inter alia with respect to environmental criminal law. However, this is the first time that the European institutions not only force member states towards criminalisation, but moreover, even impose a minimum level of specific penalties, something which was equally made possible with the treaty of Lisbon.The enclosed paper describes the way in which the European institutions have addressed the enforcement of the insider trading prohibition and the role of the criminal law in this respect. Moreover, in the paper we critically question whether criminalisation and more particularly the imposition of criminal law at EU-level are appropriate tools.In order to address those questions we use an economic approach and a legal theory approach to the criminalisation of insider trading and market manipulation. Economic theory has indicated that criminalisation may only be needed in specific (exceptional) circumstances, more particularly where the gain to the perpetrator would be relatively high, the potential damage to society high and the probability of detection low. We argue that although there may be circumstances in which these conditions are fulfilled, there can also be many situations where the probability of detection is not that low and where gains to the perpetrator are not substantial. In those circumstances alternatives such as civil remedies or administrative sanctions could suffice. It is striking that the European Commission pays a lot of attention to private enforcement in other policy domains like e.g. competition policy. In the domain of enforcement of insider trading and market manipulation there is, contrary to the situation in the US, no attention to the possibilities of private enforcements. To the contrary, differently than the suggestions from economic theory, the European institutions strongly believe in the need for criminal sanctions.Not only the choice for the criminal law can be critically assessed. One can equally wonder why this criminalisation necessarily had to be imposed at EU-level. In fact, from the twenty-eight European member states only Bulgaria lacked criminal sanctions. That hence also justifies the question whether there really was a need to impose a criminalisation of insider trading and market manipulation at EU-le
2014年6月，欧洲理事会颁布了2014/57/EU关于市场滥用刑事制裁的指令，迫使欧洲成员国将与市场操纵和内幕交易有关的特定行为定为刑事犯罪。同月，该指令也开始生效。这一指令的结果是，成员国必须决定以何种方式执行针对市场操纵和内幕交易的指令的传统自由终结了。通过这一重要步骤，欧洲机构利用分配给它们的新权力，迫使成员国在特定领域使用刑法。以前，欧洲各机构在环境刑法方面特别利用了这一点。然而，这是欧洲机构第一次不仅迫使成员国将其定为刑事犯罪，而且甚至施加最低限度的具体惩罚，这在《里斯本条约》(treaty of Lisbon)中同样成为可能。随附的文件描述了欧洲机构如何解决内幕交易禁令的执行问题，以及刑法在这方面的作用。此外，在本文中，我们批判性地质疑刑事定罪，特别是在欧盟层面实施刑法是否是适当的工具。为了解决这些问题，我们使用经济方法和法律理论方法来将内幕交易和市场操纵定为刑事犯罪。经济理论表明，刑事定罪可能只在特定(例外)情况下才需要，特别是在犯罪者的收益相对较高，对社会的潜在损害较高而被发现的可能性较低的情况下。我们认为，尽管可能存在满足这些条件的情况，但也可能存在许多情况，其中发现的可能性并不那么低，并且犯罪者的收益并不大。在这种情况下，民事补救或行政制裁等备选办法就足够了。令人惊讶的是，欧盟委员会对竞争政策等其他政策领域的私人执法给予了大量关注。与美国的情况相反，在内幕交易和市场操纵的执法领域，中国没有关注私人执法的可能性。相反，与经济理论的建议不同，欧洲机构强烈认为有必要实施刑事制裁。不仅刑法的选择可以被批判性地评估。人们同样会想知道，为什么这种刑事定罪必须在欧盟层面实施。事实上，在28个欧洲成员国中，只有保加利亚没有刑事制裁。因此，这也证明了这样一个问题是合理的:是否真的有必要在欧盟层面将内幕交易和市场操纵定为刑事犯罪，而不是尊重辅助原则，从而允许成员国对内幕交易和市场操纵采取适当的补救措施(民事、行政或刑事)。因此，本文的目的是批判性地讨论这一最近的欧洲指令，迫使成员国从经济角度将内幕交易和市场操纵定为刑事犯罪。本文批判性地分析了2014/57/EU关于市场滥用刑事制裁的指令，并讨论了支持刑事定罪的论点，以及是否如指令所指示的那样，在欧盟层面强制刑事定罪的问题。
{"title":"Towards a Harmonization of Insider Trading Criminal Law at EU Level?","authors":"M. Faure, C. Leger","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2543964","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2543964","url":null,"abstract":"In June 2014 the European Council promulgated the directive on criminal sanctions for market abuse 2014/57/EU forcing the European member states to criminalize particular acts related to market manipulation and insider trading. In the same month the directive also entered into force. As a result of this directive the traditional freedom that member states had to decide the ways in which they would implement a directive on market manipulation and insider trading has finished. With this important step the European institutions make use of the new powers that were allocated to them to force member states to the use of the criminal law in particular areas. Previously the European institutions made use of this inter alia with respect to environmental criminal law. However, this is the first time that the European institutions not only force member states towards criminalisation, but moreover, even impose a minimum level of specific penalties, something which was equally made possible with the treaty of Lisbon.The enclosed paper describes the way in which the European institutions have addressed the enforcement of the insider trading prohibition and the role of the criminal law in this respect. Moreover, in the paper we critically question whether criminalisation and more particularly the imposition of criminal law at EU-level are appropriate tools.In order to address those questions we use an economic approach and a legal theory approach to the criminalisation of insider trading and market manipulation. Economic theory has indicated that criminalisation may only be needed in specific (exceptional) circumstances, more particularly where the gain to the perpetrator would be relatively high, the potential damage to society high and the probability of detection low. We argue that although there may be circumstances in which these conditions are fulfilled, there can also be many situations where the probability of detection is not that low and where gains to the perpetrator are not substantial. In those circumstances alternatives such as civil remedies or administrative sanctions could suffice. It is striking that the European Commission pays a lot of attention to private enforcement in other policy domains like e.g. competition policy. In the domain of enforcement of insider trading and market manipulation there is, contrary to the situation in the US, no attention to the possibilities of private enforcements. To the contrary, differently than the suggestions from economic theory, the European institutions strongly believe in the need for criminal sanctions.Not only the choice for the criminal law can be critically assessed. One can equally wonder why this criminalisation necessarily had to be imposed at EU-level. In fact, from the twenty-eight European member states only Bulgaria lacked criminal sanctions. That hence also justifies the question whether there really was a need to impose a criminalisation of insider trading and market manipulation at EU-le","PeriodicalId":296326,"journal":{"name":"International Institutions: European Union eJournal","volume":"52 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-12-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130225832","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The aim of the paper is to analyze the state of the art of macroprudential policies (MAP) with a focus on the case of the European Union. To this end the institutional framework of MAP is introduced and discussed with regard to several issues: the relationships and/or the conflicts with other policies and among the different institutional bodies involved, their mandate, accountability and governance. The operative framework - intermediate and final targets and toolkit - is specifically analyzed with regard to the case of the European Union and the introduction, in 2011, of a macroprudential supervisory pillar based on the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB). Finally the main features of the new European supervisory architecture are addressed: the organization of MAP within the Single Supervisory Mechanisms (SSM), the definition of the role of the European Central Bank (ECB) and of the ESRB as far as macroprudential policy is concerned. In the conclusions, we evaluate the new architecture which is quite complex and cumbersome, and the challenge that the SSM is facing: to achieve comprehensive, rational, effective and efficient supervision, avoiding overlapping of competences and clarifying the specific roles of different bodies while keeping away additional burdens for the institutions supervised.
{"title":"Towards a Macroprudential Policy in the EU: Main Issues","authors":"E. Gualandri, Mario Noera","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2534450","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2534450","url":null,"abstract":"The aim of the paper is to analyze the state of the art of macroprudential policies (MAP) with a focus on the case of the European Union. To this end the institutional framework of MAP is introduced and discussed with regard to several issues: the relationships and/or the conflicts with other policies and among the different institutional bodies involved, their mandate, accountability and governance. The operative framework - intermediate and final targets and toolkit - is specifically analyzed with regard to the case of the European Union and the introduction, in 2011, of a macroprudential supervisory pillar based on the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB). Finally the main features of the new European supervisory architecture are addressed: the organization of MAP within the Single Supervisory Mechanisms (SSM), the definition of the role of the European Central Bank (ECB) and of the ESRB as far as macroprudential policy is concerned. In the conclusions, we evaluate the new architecture which is quite complex and cumbersome, and the challenge that the SSM is facing: to achieve comprehensive, rational, effective and efficient supervision, avoiding overlapping of competences and clarifying the specific roles of different bodies while keeping away additional burdens for the institutions supervised.","PeriodicalId":296326,"journal":{"name":"International Institutions: European Union eJournal","volume":"162 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-12-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116394802","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this article we argue that the European Union directive on “the right to be forgotten” is unrealistic and suggest instead a series of principles that can protect us from the potentially harmful publication of private information. The dissemination of personal information through public and private databases as well as social media is gradually educating humanity about reality: humans are weak; everyone misbehaves; and we need to learn to accept public knowledge of the imperfections of ourselves and others.
{"title":"The Right to Be Forgotten: Its Weaknesses and Alternatives","authors":"Martha A. Garcia-Murillo, I. MacInnes","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2529396","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2529396","url":null,"abstract":"In this article we argue that the European Union directive on “the right to be forgotten” is unrealistic and suggest instead a series of principles that can protect us from the potentially harmful publication of private information. The dissemination of personal information through public and private databases as well as social media is gradually educating humanity about reality: humans are weak; everyone misbehaves; and we need to learn to accept public knowledge of the imperfections of ourselves and others.","PeriodicalId":296326,"journal":{"name":"International Institutions: European Union eJournal","volume":"27 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-11-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133899588","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In the spring of 2014, the Greek presidency of the Council of the EU tabled a revised version of a 2010 proposal that promises to allow Member States to restrict or prohibit the commercial cultivation of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) on whole or part of their territory. This study seeks to answer the question: does the proposal for partial renationalisation of the EU’s regulatory regime for the cultivation of GMOs provide an adequate solution to its current problems? It finds that the EU’s GMO regime has to this day failed to accommodate national diversity prior to authorisation through central deliberation and that it does not provide Member States with opportunities for substantial differentiation post-authorisation. An in-depth legal analysis of the Greek proposal, however, shows that the proposal is unlikely to fill this legal vacuum by empowering Member States to impose cultivation bans after authorisation, while the exercise of their newfound autonomy may well be restricted by EU internal market and international WTO law. Whereas this study makes recommendations for a more adequate redistribution of competences, it also calls into question whether renationalisation is the best solution for the regime’s problems. It thus examines the practical consequences of re-emphasising national frontiers when dealing with a cross-boundary issue like GMO cultivation, and briefly discusses underexplored opportunities to improve the inclusiveness of the EU’s centralised risk-assessment and risk-management procedures.
{"title":"A Growing Impasse: The Future of the EU's GMO Regime","authors":"M. Geelhoed","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2524340","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2524340","url":null,"abstract":"In the spring of 2014, the Greek presidency of the Council of the EU tabled a revised version of a 2010 proposal that promises to allow Member States to restrict or prohibit the commercial cultivation of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) on whole or part of their territory. This study seeks to answer the question: does the proposal for partial renationalisation of the EU’s regulatory regime for the cultivation of GMOs provide an adequate solution to its current problems? It finds that the EU’s GMO regime has to this day failed to accommodate national diversity prior to authorisation through central deliberation and that it does not provide Member States with opportunities for substantial differentiation post-authorisation. An in-depth legal analysis of the Greek proposal, however, shows that the proposal is unlikely to fill this legal vacuum by empowering Member States to impose cultivation bans after authorisation, while the exercise of their newfound autonomy may well be restricted by EU internal market and international WTO law. Whereas this study makes recommendations for a more adequate redistribution of competences, it also calls into question whether renationalisation is the best solution for the regime’s problems. It thus examines the practical consequences of re-emphasising national frontiers when dealing with a cross-boundary issue like GMO cultivation, and briefly discusses underexplored opportunities to improve the inclusiveness of the EU’s centralised risk-assessment and risk-management procedures.","PeriodicalId":296326,"journal":{"name":"International Institutions: European Union eJournal","volume":"38 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-11-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114378966","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The decision adopted by the 28 European Union (EU) Member States in June 2012 on the establishment of the banking union expresses clear political support to the idea of common Europe. Is such a pretentious EU project an important historic step towards further integration, particularly in terms of the financial sector? Will the banking union reconsolidate the connections within the economic and monetary union and create better conditions for economic growth? After three decades of deregulation of monetary policy, which has taken the European financial situation to the verge of a precipice, it is above all important to take precautions to avoid in the future any destructive developments similar to those that occurred in the years after 2008.
{"title":"EU Banking Union. Introductory Thoughts on the Current Situation","authors":"M. Hennies, Matti Raudjärv","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2543973","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2543973","url":null,"abstract":"The decision adopted by the 28 European Union (EU) Member States in June 2012 on the establishment of the banking union expresses clear political support to the idea of common Europe. Is such a pretentious EU project an important historic step towards further integration, particularly in terms of the financial sector? Will the banking union reconsolidate the connections within the economic and monetary union and create better conditions for economic growth? After three decades of deregulation of monetary policy, which has taken the European financial situation to the verge of a precipice, it is above all important to take precautions to avoid in the future any destructive developments similar to those that occurred in the years after 2008.","PeriodicalId":296326,"journal":{"name":"International Institutions: European Union eJournal","volume":"53 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-10-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116744964","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper considers how lay theory and perceptions of issue ownership affect voters’ expectations of political and economic developments. These expectations are likely to mediate the effects on subjective well-being of specific developments. Estimates employing a panel of 29 European countries observed between 1975 and 2011 suggest that problems within an issue attributed to the ideological side of the incumbent government exerts much stronger well-being effects than when similar problems arise with ideologically opposite governments. The evidence suggests a ‘Nixon goes to China’ effect in well-being.
{"title":"When Does Government Ideology Matter? Evidence from Subjective Well-Being in Europe","authors":"C. Bjørnskov","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2505617","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2505617","url":null,"abstract":"This paper considers how lay theory and perceptions of issue ownership affect voters’ expectations of political and economic developments. These expectations are likely to mediate the effects on subjective well-being of specific developments. Estimates employing a panel of 29 European countries observed between 1975 and 2011 suggest that problems within an issue attributed to the ideological side of the incumbent government exerts much stronger well-being effects than when similar problems arise with ideologically opposite governments. The evidence suggests a ‘Nixon goes to China’ effect in well-being.","PeriodicalId":296326,"journal":{"name":"International Institutions: European Union eJournal","volume":"492 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-10-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134140586","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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