In 2005 Hurricane Katrina posed an unprecedented set of challenges to formal and informal systems of disaster response and recovery. Informed by the Virginia School of Political Economy, the contributors to this study critically examine the public policy environment that led to both successes and failures in the post-Katrina disaster response and long-term recovery. Building from this perspective, this book lends critical insight into the nature of the social coordination problems disasters present, the potential for public policy to play a positive role, and the inherent limitations policymakers face in overcoming the myriad challenges that are a product of catastrophic disaster.
{"title":"The Road Home: Helping Homeowners in the Gulf After Katrina","authors":"Eileen Norcross, Anthony Skriba","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1350519","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1350519","url":null,"abstract":"In 2005 Hurricane Katrina posed an unprecedented set of challenges to formal and informal systems of disaster response and recovery. Informed by the Virginia School of Political Economy, the contributors to this study critically examine the public policy environment that led to both successes and failures in the post-Katrina disaster response and long-term recovery. Building from this perspective, this book lends critical insight into the nature of the social coordination problems disasters present, the potential for public policy to play a positive role, and the inherent limitations policymakers face in overcoming the myriad challenges that are a product of catastrophic disaster.","PeriodicalId":29865,"journal":{"name":"Connecticut Insurance Law Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-05-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86848448","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this report we examine the likely effects of an Optional Federal Charter (OFC) regulatory system on competition in the life insurance and annuities industry and related markets. Increasingly, many US insurers advocate the creation of an OFC and the associated regulatory framework for several reasons. Primarily, they believe that the adoption of an OFC would reduce the costs and impediments imposed by the current state-based regulatory system. Further, they believe that the adoption of an OFC structure will facilitate interstate operations and enhance the industry's competitiveness relative to other financial service providers and international insurers. The proposal of an OFC system has generated an intensive debate on a number of issues, including its implications for market competition and the associated effects on consumers. Based on our analysis, we conclude that the life insurance industry is structurally competitive based on its inherent characteristics but that many insurers have not fully achieved maximum efficiency due, at least in part, to the barriers and costs caused by state regulation. Our analysis further leads us to the opinion that the creation of an OFC, properly structured and implemented, would likely increase competition in the US life insurance industry, the broader market for financial services, and international insurance markets.
{"title":"The Effects of an Optional Federal Charter on Competition in the Life Insurance Industry","authors":"Martin Grace, R. Klein","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1027135","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1027135","url":null,"abstract":"In this report we examine the likely effects of an Optional Federal Charter (OFC) regulatory system on competition in the life insurance and annuities industry and related markets. Increasingly, many US insurers advocate the creation of an OFC and the associated regulatory framework for several reasons. Primarily, they believe that the adoption of an OFC would reduce the costs and impediments imposed by the current state-based regulatory system. Further, they believe that the adoption of an OFC structure will facilitate interstate operations and enhance the industry's competitiveness relative to other financial service providers and international insurers. The proposal of an OFC system has generated an intensive debate on a number of issues, including its implications for market competition and the associated effects on consumers. Based on our analysis, we conclude that the life insurance industry is structurally competitive based on its inherent characteristics but that many insurers have not fully achieved maximum efficiency due, at least in part, to the barriers and costs caused by state regulation. Our analysis further leads us to the opinion that the creation of an OFC, properly structured and implemented, would likely increase competition in the US life insurance industry, the broader market for financial services, and international insurance markets.","PeriodicalId":29865,"journal":{"name":"Connecticut Insurance Law Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-10-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83775040","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
G. Dionne, R. Gagné, Abdelhakim Nouira, J. Cummins
Corporate finance theory predicts that firms’ characteristics affect agency costs and hence their efficiency. Cummins et al (2006) have proposed a cost function specification that measures separately insurer efficiency in handling risk pooling, risk management, and financial intermediation functions. We investigate the insurer characteristics that determine these efficiencies. Our empirical results show that mutuals outperform stock insurers in handling the three functions. Independent agents and high capitalization reduce the cost efficiency of risk pooling. Certain characteristics such as being a group of affiliated insurers, handling a higher volume of business in commercial lines, assuming more reinsurance, or investing a higher proportion of assets in bonds, do significantly increase insurers’ efficiency in risk management and financial intermediation.
{"title":"Determinants of Insurers' Performance in Risk Pooling, Risk Management, and Financial Intermediation Activities","authors":"G. Dionne, R. Gagné, Abdelhakim Nouira, J. Cummins","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.988991","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.988991","url":null,"abstract":"Corporate finance theory predicts that firms’ characteristics affect agency costs and hence their efficiency. Cummins et al (2006) have proposed a cost function specification that measures separately insurer efficiency in handling risk pooling, risk management, and financial intermediation functions. We investigate the insurer characteristics that determine these efficiencies. Our empirical results show that mutuals outperform stock insurers in handling the three functions. Independent agents and high capitalization reduce the cost efficiency of risk pooling. Certain characteristics such as being a group of affiliated insurers, handling a higher volume of business in commercial lines, assuming more reinsurance, or investing a higher proportion of assets in bonds, do significantly increase insurers’ efficiency in risk management and financial intermediation.","PeriodicalId":29865,"journal":{"name":"Connecticut Insurance Law Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-09-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77310573","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
E. Schokkaert, Tom Van Ourti, D. De Graeve, A. Lecluyse, C. Van de Voorde
It has been suggested that the unequal coverage of different socio-economic groups by supplemental insurance could be a partial explanation for the inequality in access to health care in many countries. We analyse the situation in Belgium, a country with a very broad coverage in compulsory social health insurance and where supplemental insurance mainly refers to extra-billing in hospitals. We find that this institutional background is crucial for the explanation of the effects of supplemental insurance. We find no evidence of adverse selection in the coverage of supplemental health insurance, but strong effects of socio-economic background. A count model for hospital care shows that supplemental insurance has no significant effect on the number of spells, but a negative effect on the number of nights. This is in line with patterns of socio-economic stratification that have been well documented for Belgium. It is also in line with the regulation on extra-billing protecting patients in common rooms. For ambulatory care, we find a positive effect of supplemental insurance on visits to a dentist and on number of spells at a day centre but no effect on visits to a GP, on drugs consumption and on visits to a specialist.
{"title":"Supplemental Health Insurance and Equality of Access in Belgium","authors":"E. Schokkaert, Tom Van Ourti, D. De Graeve, A. Lecluyse, C. Van de Voorde","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.994803","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.994803","url":null,"abstract":"It has been suggested that the unequal coverage of different socio-economic groups by supplemental insurance could be a partial explanation for the inequality in access to health care in many countries. We analyse the situation in Belgium, a country with a very broad coverage in compulsory social health insurance and where supplemental insurance mainly refers to extra-billing in hospitals. We find that this institutional background is crucial for the explanation of the effects of supplemental insurance. We find no evidence of adverse selection in the coverage of supplemental health insurance, but strong effects of socio-economic background. A count model for hospital care shows that supplemental insurance has no significant effect on the number of spells, but a negative effect on the number of nights. This is in line with patterns of socio-economic stratification that have been well documented for Belgium. It is also in line with the regulation on extra-billing protecting patients in common rooms. For ambulatory care, we find a positive effect of supplemental insurance on visits to a dentist and on number of spells at a day centre but no effect on visits to a GP, on drugs consumption and on visits to a specialist.","PeriodicalId":29865,"journal":{"name":"Connecticut Insurance Law Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79212313","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2007-07-07DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511611179.017
M. Boardman
Boilerplate is often ambiguous or incomprehensible, yet long lasting, especially in insurance contracts. This alienates consumers and is increasingly punished by courts construing the language against the drafter. There must be some hidden allure to ambiguous boilerplate. The popular theory is trickery: drafters lure consumers in with promising language that comes to nothing in court. But this trick would require consumers to do three things they do not do - read the language, understand it, and take comfort in it. In insurance, there is a hidden allure to ambiguous boilerplate, but the trick lies in the courts, not the consumer. The trick is a private conversation between drafters and courts; excused from the table is the consumer, who could have no fair duty to understand and so has no duty to read. With the consumer out of the room, edits and additions to boilerplate are targeted to the courts alone. The new language need not make sense to a layman. It does not even need to make sense standing alone; a judge will read the language in the context of precedent, with the aid of briefing. This article reveals how the interaction of insurance drafting and court interpretation (including contra proferentem) forms a strong barrier to the creation and use of new clearer boilerplate language.
{"title":"Contra Proferentem: The Allure of Ambiguous Boilerplate","authors":"M. Boardman","doi":"10.1017/CBO9780511611179.017","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511611179.017","url":null,"abstract":"Boilerplate is often ambiguous or incomprehensible, yet long lasting, especially in insurance contracts. This alienates consumers and is increasingly punished by courts construing the language against the drafter. There must be some hidden allure to ambiguous boilerplate. The popular theory is trickery: drafters lure consumers in with promising language that comes to nothing in court. But this trick would require consumers to do three things they do not do - read the language, understand it, and take comfort in it. In insurance, there is a hidden allure to ambiguous boilerplate, but the trick lies in the courts, not the consumer. The trick is a private conversation between drafters and courts; excused from the table is the consumer, who could have no fair duty to understand and so has no duty to read. With the consumer out of the room, edits and additions to boilerplate are targeted to the courts alone. The new language need not make sense to a layman. It does not even need to make sense standing alone; a judge will read the language in the context of precedent, with the aid of briefing. This article reveals how the interaction of insurance drafting and court interpretation (including contra proferentem) forms a strong barrier to the creation and use of new clearer boilerplate language.","PeriodicalId":29865,"journal":{"name":"Connecticut Insurance Law Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-07-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89393290","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Thomas Post, Helmut Gründl, Lisa Schmidl, M. Dorfman
The European insurance industry is currently undergoing a substantial change in financial reporting requirements. Beginning in 2005, compliance with the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) has been required in the European Union. Substantial sections of the IFRS - leading to a market-oriented valuation of insurance contracts - are still under construction and will be introduced in the next few years. To date, assessment of the potential impact of the new IFRS accounting and reporting system is largely found in trade literature, and in insurance industry business leader and expert commentator statements. The tenor of opinion is that the IFRS will create a serious challenge for the European insurance industry. To evaluate the impact of IFRS more scientifically, this paper applies — where indicated — capital market theory and the concept of information efficiency. The paper suggests that concerns about the effects of IFRS are exaggerated, and reveals that the main area of IFRS impact on the European insurance industry is likely to be on insurance product design.
{"title":"Implications of IFRS for the European Insurance Industry - Insights from Capital Market Theory","authors":"Thomas Post, Helmut Gründl, Lisa Schmidl, M. Dorfman","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.906089","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.906089","url":null,"abstract":"The European insurance industry is currently undergoing a substantial change in financial reporting requirements. Beginning in 2005, compliance with the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) has been required in the European Union. Substantial sections of the IFRS - leading to a market-oriented valuation of insurance contracts - are still under construction and will be introduced in the next few years. To date, assessment of the potential impact of the new IFRS accounting and reporting system is largely found in trade literature, and in insurance industry business leader and expert commentator statements. The tenor of opinion is that the IFRS will create a serious challenge for the European insurance industry. To evaluate the impact of IFRS more scientifically, this paper applies — where indicated — capital market theory and the concept of information efficiency. The paper suggests that concerns about the effects of IFRS are exaggerated, and reveals that the main area of IFRS impact on the European insurance industry is likely to be on insurance product design.","PeriodicalId":29865,"journal":{"name":"Connecticut Insurance Law Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-06-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85433746","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Goldman [Sachs] should matter to outsiders . . . because it stands at the centre of a two-decade-long transformation of the financial markets and a new approach to risk. Business risks that were once seen as a lumpy fact of life are now routinely sliced up and packaged into combinations that generally suit issuers and investors alike. At the heart of this change has been the development of huge markets in swaps, derivatives and other complex and often opaque instruments that allow the transfer of risk from one party to another. From small beginnings in 1987, the face value of contracts in interest-rate and currency derivatives is now more than $200 trillion[,] 16 times America's GDP. A further $17 trillion is outstanding in (even newer) credit-default swaps, which allow bond investors to lay off the risk of issuers defaulting. I. INTRODUCTION Heralded as the "debutante of the suretyship world (pure as the wind-driven snow and virtually unsullied by the foul touch of litigation)," credit default swaps (CDS) have transformed banking.2 Lenders who once found themselves stuck with bundles of indivisible, illiquid risks can now carve out and hedge credit exposure to individual borrowers. And they do it on a massive scale. As last reported by FitchRatings, the notional amount of outstanding CDS stood at $3.5 trillion, representing two-thirds of the entire credit derivatives market and an 86% increase from the prior year's total of $2.8 trillion.3 Yet despite such rapid growth, use of credit derivatives was too small to be either noticed or recorded at any significant levels in 1996.4 As one would expect of a market that has gone from cradle to world phenomenon in less than a decade, CDS have attracted both supporters and detractors. Proponents extol the ability of CDS to spread risk and increase liquidity across credit markets, allowing participants to actively manage and protect credit portfolios.5 Sensational critics warn that a spike in interest rates could trigger a "derivatives tsunami" that would bring all of the major banks to their knees and cause a "blowup" in world credit markets.6 Experience in the past few years has shown that, if used responsibly, CDS have the ability to yield all of the promised benefits with few-if any-of the predicted catastrophes.7 Between the disparagers and the defenders of CDS stand the regulators. But who are the regulators of CDS markets, and what law applies? Since CDS are traded entirely over-the-counter (OTC), one could argue that the true regulators are market participants themselves. Banded together as members of the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA), derivatives markets participants have created a system of documenting and amending trade relationships that is both flexible and robust. Most members of ISDA are banks or groups of banks. Some outside regulators, however, worry that CDS markets are growing too quickly for any bank or group of banks to control.8 In judging who has authority t
{"title":"Risk Distribution in the Capital Markets: Credit Default Swaps, Insurance and a Theory of Demarcation","authors":"R. Schwartz","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3677277","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3677277","url":null,"abstract":"Goldman [Sachs] should matter to outsiders . . . because it stands at the centre of a two-decade-long transformation of the financial markets and a new approach to risk. Business risks that were once seen as a lumpy fact of life are now routinely sliced up and packaged into combinations that generally suit issuers and investors alike. At the heart of this change has been the development of huge markets in swaps, derivatives and other complex and often opaque instruments that allow the transfer of risk from one party to another. From small beginnings in 1987, the face value of contracts in interest-rate and currency derivatives is now more than $200 trillion[,] 16 times America's GDP. A further $17 trillion is outstanding in (even newer) credit-default swaps, which allow bond investors to lay off the risk of issuers defaulting. I. INTRODUCTION Heralded as the \"debutante of the suretyship world (pure as the wind-driven snow and virtually unsullied by the foul touch of litigation),\" credit default swaps (CDS) have transformed banking.2 Lenders who once found themselves stuck with bundles of indivisible, illiquid risks can now carve out and hedge credit exposure to individual borrowers. And they do it on a massive scale. As last reported by FitchRatings, the notional amount of outstanding CDS stood at $3.5 trillion, representing two-thirds of the entire credit derivatives market and an 86% increase from the prior year's total of $2.8 trillion.3 Yet despite such rapid growth, use of credit derivatives was too small to be either noticed or recorded at any significant levels in 1996.4 As one would expect of a market that has gone from cradle to world phenomenon in less than a decade, CDS have attracted both supporters and detractors. Proponents extol the ability of CDS to spread risk and increase liquidity across credit markets, allowing participants to actively manage and protect credit portfolios.5 Sensational critics warn that a spike in interest rates could trigger a \"derivatives tsunami\" that would bring all of the major banks to their knees and cause a \"blowup\" in world credit markets.6 Experience in the past few years has shown that, if used responsibly, CDS have the ability to yield all of the promised benefits with few-if any-of the predicted catastrophes.7 Between the disparagers and the defenders of CDS stand the regulators. But who are the regulators of CDS markets, and what law applies? Since CDS are traded entirely over-the-counter (OTC), one could argue that the true regulators are market participants themselves. Banded together as members of the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA), derivatives markets participants have created a system of documenting and amending trade relationships that is both flexible and robust. Most members of ISDA are banks or groups of banks. Some outside regulators, however, worry that CDS markets are growing too quickly for any bank or group of banks to control.8 In judging who has authority t","PeriodicalId":29865,"journal":{"name":"Connecticut Insurance Law Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88770686","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2007-02-18DOI: 10.3138/9781442670587-022
T. Lemmens, T. Archibald
In 2005, the Canadian Medical Association (CMA) adopted a motion at its annual meeting calling for the introduction of private health insurance in Canada, when "timely access to care cannot be provided in the public health care system." This motion followed a Canadian Supreme Court decision in Chaoulli, in which a majority of the Court recognized the existence, under the Quebec Charter of Rights and Freedoms, of a right to private health care in the absence of 'timely access to care' in the public health care system. Participation in public debates over health care fits the important policy role of a professional medical organization. However, the debate over the expansion of private health care services in Canada also reflects the potentially contradictory interests of these organizations. As many other professional medical organizations, the CMA has a double mandate, to both promote the interests of its members as well as the public's interests in the "highest standard of health and health care." This chapter first analyzes how the CMA's motion reflects a historical tendency of the organization to put the financial interests of its members ahead of the public's interest in a fair and affordable health care system. This clear commitment to its members' interests, we argue, raises concerns about the organization's significant influence on health care policy. The chapter further highlights some of the core ethical and professional problems that will increase as a result of the expansion of parallel private health care in Canada. Referring in particular to the challenges of regulating professional conflicts of interest within a private health care system as it exists in the United States, the authors argue that the CMA ought to critically analyze the potential impact of these changes on the professional obligations of its members rather than blindly support an expansion of parallel private health care.
{"title":"The CMA's Chaoulli Motion and the Myth of Promoting Fair Access to Health Care","authors":"T. Lemmens, T. Archibald","doi":"10.3138/9781442670587-022","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3138/9781442670587-022","url":null,"abstract":"In 2005, the Canadian Medical Association (CMA) adopted a motion at its annual meeting calling for the introduction of private health insurance in Canada, when \"timely access to care cannot be provided in the public health care system.\" This motion followed a Canadian Supreme Court decision in Chaoulli, in which a majority of the Court recognized the existence, under the Quebec Charter of Rights and Freedoms, of a right to private health care in the absence of 'timely access to care' in the public health care system. Participation in public debates over health care fits the important policy role of a professional medical organization. However, the debate over the expansion of private health care services in Canada also reflects the potentially contradictory interests of these organizations. As many other professional medical organizations, the CMA has a double mandate, to both promote the interests of its members as well as the public's interests in the \"highest standard of health and health care.\" This chapter first analyzes how the CMA's motion reflects a historical tendency of the organization to put the financial interests of its members ahead of the public's interest in a fair and affordable health care system. This clear commitment to its members' interests, we argue, raises concerns about the organization's significant influence on health care policy. The chapter further highlights some of the core ethical and professional problems that will increase as a result of the expansion of parallel private health care in Canada. Referring in particular to the challenges of regulating professional conflicts of interest within a private health care system as it exists in the United States, the authors argue that the CMA ought to critically analyze the potential impact of these changes on the professional obligations of its members rather than blindly support an expansion of parallel private health care.","PeriodicalId":29865,"journal":{"name":"Connecticut Insurance Law Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-02-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73720642","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this paper we explore whether increased coastal building standards imposed by federal and state level initiatives are effective in mitigating losses to coastal property. We first examine if the coastal building code regime under which a property is constructed affects the likelihood of hurricane induced residential property damage. Then, for those properties which incur hurricane damage, we examine whether the extent of damage is explained by the relevant coastal building code regime. Our analysis shows that those properties built following coastal building code changes associated with the National Flood Insurance Program were more likely to sustain damage relative to similarly located pre-National Flood Insurance Program construction. For those damaged properties, we find the extent of damage is greater for post-National Flood Insurance Program construction, where damage is increasing in the required base flood elevation. Further investigation suggests wind, flood or a combination of both perils as the likely causes of damage for post-National Flood Insurance Program construction. Our findings raise concern regarding the effectiveness of federal and state mandated coastal building codes as ex-ante mitigation of property losses from hurricanes.
{"title":"Do Coastal Building Codes Mitigate Hurricane Damage to Residential Property?","authors":"Carolyn A. Dehring, Martin Halek","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.928009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.928009","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper we explore whether increased coastal building standards imposed by federal and state level initiatives are effective in mitigating losses to coastal property. We first examine if the coastal building code regime under which a property is constructed affects the likelihood of hurricane induced residential property damage. Then, for those properties which incur hurricane damage, we examine whether the extent of damage is explained by the relevant coastal building code regime. Our analysis shows that those properties built following coastal building code changes associated with the National Flood Insurance Program were more likely to sustain damage relative to similarly located pre-National Flood Insurance Program construction. For those damaged properties, we find the extent of damage is greater for post-National Flood Insurance Program construction, where damage is increasing in the required base flood elevation. Further investigation suggests wind, flood or a combination of both perils as the likely causes of damage for post-National Flood Insurance Program construction. Our findings raise concern regarding the effectiveness of federal and state mandated coastal building codes as ex-ante mitigation of property losses from hurricanes.","PeriodicalId":29865,"journal":{"name":"Connecticut Insurance Law Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82111262","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
While several studies have examined rates of malpractice claims at state levels, there is little systematic work looking at variations of claiming rates within a state. This study reports on small area variations in malpractice claims rates within New York State over a 14 year period. Counties with high rates generally had high rates over the entire period, while counties with low rates maintained low rates. Rates across counties varied considerably, with an almost 5 times difference between the rates for the lowest county and the highest county. In a multivariate analysis of potential factors influencing a county's rate, median family income was one of the strongest factors positively associated with the claims rate. A measure of the risk of hospital admissions for an adverse outcome also had a strong association with the county's malpractice claims rate, but the risk factor was negatively associated with high claims rates, perhaps suggesting an association with quality of care and malpractice claims. The number of lawyers per capita was weakly, but positively, associated with the claims rate.
{"title":"Cultures of Claiming: Local Variation in Malpractice Claim Frequency","authors":"K. Hart, Philip G. Peters Jr.","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.945714","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.945714","url":null,"abstract":"While several studies have examined rates of malpractice claims at state levels, there is little systematic work looking at variations of claiming rates within a state. This study reports on small area variations in malpractice claims rates within New York State over a 14 year period. Counties with high rates generally had high rates over the entire period, while counties with low rates maintained low rates. Rates across counties varied considerably, with an almost 5 times difference between the rates for the lowest county and the highest county. In a multivariate analysis of potential factors influencing a county's rate, median family income was one of the strongest factors positively associated with the claims rate. A measure of the risk of hospital admissions for an adverse outcome also had a strong association with the county's malpractice claims rate, but the risk factor was negatively associated with high claims rates, perhaps suggesting an association with quality of care and malpractice claims. The number of lawyers per capita was weakly, but positively, associated with the claims rate.","PeriodicalId":29865,"journal":{"name":"Connecticut Insurance Law Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-11-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81879545","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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