Pub Date : 2020-10-01DOI: 10.1080/25765949.2020.1841990
Zishi Yang, Le Du, Liping Ding
Abstract Saudi Arabia is the largest economy in West Asia and North Africa which plays an important role in politics, economy and other fields in the Middle East and the whole world. Since 2016, high-level visits between China and Saudi Arabia are more frequent. China and Saudi Arabia have established a comprehensive strategic partnership and established a comprehensive, high-level and institutional cooperation platform – the China Saudi high-level joint committee. Under the overall coordination of this mechanism, the economic and trade cooperation between China and Saudi Arabia, which focuses on energy sources, industrial cooperation, trade and investment is in an unprecedented period of strategic opportunities. The China-Saudi Arabia (Jizan) Industrial Park is a major investment project to deepen production capacity cooperation between China and Saudi Arabia. At present, it has made positive progress in communication and coordination mechanisms, infrastructure construction and introduction of enterprises into the park. Therefore, this paper argues that under the guidance of the Belt and Road Initiative, China and Saudi Arabia should accelerate the docking of development strategies, facilitate the construction of overseas industrial parks such as the Jizan Industrial Park, attract more investment of manufacturing enterprises from China and third market countries, endeavour to build the Jizan Industrial Park as a landmark project of practical cooperation between China and Saudi Arabia, boost the implementation of Saudi Arabia’s ‘Vision 2030’, and promote the industrialization process of Arab countries.
{"title":"The China-Saudi Arabia (Jizan) Industrial Park under the Belt and Road Initiative","authors":"Zishi Yang, Le Du, Liping Ding","doi":"10.1080/25765949.2020.1841990","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/25765949.2020.1841990","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Saudi Arabia is the largest economy in West Asia and North Africa which plays an important role in politics, economy and other fields in the Middle East and the whole world. Since 2016, high-level visits between China and Saudi Arabia are more frequent. China and Saudi Arabia have established a comprehensive strategic partnership and established a comprehensive, high-level and institutional cooperation platform – the China Saudi high-level joint committee. Under the overall coordination of this mechanism, the economic and trade cooperation between China and Saudi Arabia, which focuses on energy sources, industrial cooperation, trade and investment is in an unprecedented period of strategic opportunities. The China-Saudi Arabia (Jizan) Industrial Park is a major investment project to deepen production capacity cooperation between China and Saudi Arabia. At present, it has made positive progress in communication and coordination mechanisms, infrastructure construction and introduction of enterprises into the park. Therefore, this paper argues that under the guidance of the Belt and Road Initiative, China and Saudi Arabia should accelerate the docking of development strategies, facilitate the construction of overseas industrial parks such as the Jizan Industrial Park, attract more investment of manufacturing enterprises from China and third market countries, endeavour to build the Jizan Industrial Park as a landmark project of practical cooperation between China and Saudi Arabia, boost the implementation of Saudi Arabia’s ‘Vision 2030’, and promote the industrialization process of Arab countries.","PeriodicalId":29909,"journal":{"name":"Asian Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies","volume":"14 1","pages":"528 - 537"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2020-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/25765949.2020.1841990","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45396208","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-10-01DOI: 10.1080/25765949.2020.1847853
Chuchu Zhang
Abstract China has a stake in Tunisia, both strategic and economic. The situation of the county, as a Mediterranean, Arab-Muslim and African hub, is of great interest, and represents an important gateway for China to expand its economic interests in Africa and Europe. Compared with its neighbours, including Algeria, Egypt, Libya and Morocco, Tunisia has more transparent legal systems, better-established financial institutions and easier visa procedures. Nonetheless, these advantages have not yet translated into significant investment by and trade with China. This article analyses the factors for the historically tepid relations between China and Tunisia, what Tunisia means to China today in the context of the latter’s promotion of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the prospects for the development of bilateral relations.
{"title":"Potential to Leap Forward? Interrogating the Relations between China and Tunisia","authors":"Chuchu Zhang","doi":"10.1080/25765949.2020.1847853","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/25765949.2020.1847853","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract China has a stake in Tunisia, both strategic and economic. The situation of the county, as a Mediterranean, Arab-Muslim and African hub, is of great interest, and represents an important gateway for China to expand its economic interests in Africa and Europe. Compared with its neighbours, including Algeria, Egypt, Libya and Morocco, Tunisia has more transparent legal systems, better-established financial institutions and easier visa procedures. Nonetheless, these advantages have not yet translated into significant investment by and trade with China. This article analyses the factors for the historically tepid relations between China and Tunisia, what Tunisia means to China today in the context of the latter’s promotion of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the prospects for the development of bilateral relations.","PeriodicalId":29909,"journal":{"name":"Asian Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies","volume":"14 1","pages":"594 - 606"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2020-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/25765949.2020.1847853","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46201102","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-10-01DOI: 10.1080/25765949.2020.1841989
Mo Chen
Abstract President Xi Jinping defined energy cooperation as the ‘core of cooperation’ between China and Arab states, as he addressed the opening ceremony of China-Arab States Cooperation Forum (CASCF) Ministerial Meeting in 2014. 1 China and Saudi Arabia, respectively the world’s most important oil importer and exporter, recognise the pivotal status of energy cooperation in bilateral ties. In 2018, Saudi Arabia exported 61.2 million ton of oil (crude oil and oil products) to China, representing the second largest source of supply of China and 11.2% of China’s total oil imports, while China represented the largest oil export market, absorbing 14.4% of Saudi oil export of 2018. The bilateral investment has also started. Saudi Arabia has already constructed and is planning to construct five major petrochemical projects while China and Saudi Arabia have jointly constructed a refinery in Saudi Arabia. New trends are occurring in the global oil market. On the one hand, a tendency of long-term over-supply and low prices has emerged; on the other hand, the competition of oil supply is shifting to Asia. However, these market changes would not weaken China-Saudi energy cooperation. On the contrary, they give more reasons for both sides to strengthen cooperation, so as to address common challenges, especially to promote peace and stability of the Middle East, rationalisation of oil prices, diversification of oil trade denominated currencies, mutual investment in energy field and joint development of renewables. These trends have also indicated the direction for bilateral cooperation to address the challenges. It would be advisable for both countries to open up new prospects in energy cooperation based on the new concept of a community of energy security.
{"title":"Reflections on New Trends in the Oil Market and China-Saudi Arabia Energy Cooperation","authors":"Mo Chen","doi":"10.1080/25765949.2020.1841989","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/25765949.2020.1841989","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract President Xi Jinping defined energy cooperation as the ‘core of cooperation’ between China and Arab states, as he addressed the opening ceremony of China-Arab States Cooperation Forum (CASCF) Ministerial Meeting in 2014. 1 China and Saudi Arabia, respectively the world’s most important oil importer and exporter, recognise the pivotal status of energy cooperation in bilateral ties. In 2018, Saudi Arabia exported 61.2 million ton of oil (crude oil and oil products) to China, representing the second largest source of supply of China and 11.2% of China’s total oil imports, while China represented the largest oil export market, absorbing 14.4% of Saudi oil export of 2018. The bilateral investment has also started. Saudi Arabia has already constructed and is planning to construct five major petrochemical projects while China and Saudi Arabia have jointly constructed a refinery in Saudi Arabia. New trends are occurring in the global oil market. On the one hand, a tendency of long-term over-supply and low prices has emerged; on the other hand, the competition of oil supply is shifting to Asia. However, these market changes would not weaken China-Saudi energy cooperation. On the contrary, they give more reasons for both sides to strengthen cooperation, so as to address common challenges, especially to promote peace and stability of the Middle East, rationalisation of oil prices, diversification of oil trade denominated currencies, mutual investment in energy field and joint development of renewables. These trends have also indicated the direction for bilateral cooperation to address the challenges. It would be advisable for both countries to open up new prospects in energy cooperation based on the new concept of a community of energy security.","PeriodicalId":29909,"journal":{"name":"Asian Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies","volume":"14 1","pages":"505 - 515"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2020-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/25765949.2020.1841989","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42610246","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-10-01DOI: 10.1080/25765949.2020.1847855
T. Niblock
Abstract China’s growing importance in the global order, and the increasing assertiveness with which it pursues its global objectives, raise questions as to how the Middle East fits within China’s global strategy. There has been much speculation, in particular, as to whether China is seeking to replace the United States as a key guarantor of security for some Middle Eastern states and regimes. This no doubt is partly dependent on whether the United States will draw back its commitment to the region, and whether Middle Eastern states will seek an alternative guarantor. But it also depends critically on whether China has any interest in playing, and capacity to play, such a role. An understanding of the dynamics of China’s global strategy, and of how the Middle East relates to the parameters around which the strategy is conceived, needs to be the starting point in such an assessment. The aim of this article is to provide a realistic appraisal of the strategy, and then to draw conclusions relative to the present and future role of China in the Middle Eastern region. The analysis concludes that the relationship with Middle Eastern countries is indeed significant to China, but is nonetheless secondary to the interests which are most critical for the Chinese state.
{"title":"China and the Middle East: A Global Strategy Where the Middle East has a Significant but Limited Place","authors":"T. Niblock","doi":"10.1080/25765949.2020.1847855","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/25765949.2020.1847855","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract China’s growing importance in the global order, and the increasing assertiveness with which it pursues its global objectives, raise questions as to how the Middle East fits within China’s global strategy. There has been much speculation, in particular, as to whether China is seeking to replace the United States as a key guarantor of security for some Middle Eastern states and regimes. This no doubt is partly dependent on whether the United States will draw back its commitment to the region, and whether Middle Eastern states will seek an alternative guarantor. But it also depends critically on whether China has any interest in playing, and capacity to play, such a role. An understanding of the dynamics of China’s global strategy, and of how the Middle East relates to the parameters around which the strategy is conceived, needs to be the starting point in such an assessment. The aim of this article is to provide a realistic appraisal of the strategy, and then to draw conclusions relative to the present and future role of China in the Middle Eastern region. The analysis concludes that the relationship with Middle Eastern countries is indeed significant to China, but is nonetheless secondary to the interests which are most critical for the Chinese state.","PeriodicalId":29909,"journal":{"name":"Asian Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies","volume":"14 1","pages":"481 - 504"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2020-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/25765949.2020.1847855","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49507183","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-10-01DOI: 10.1080/25765949.2020.1847854
M. Alsudairi, Tingyi Wang
Abstract The article examines a window of opportunity that emerged between 1955 and 1957 and which could have resulted in the normalisation of Saudi Arabia’s relations with the People’s Republic of China, along with a few other states from the communist bloc. As the article will show, this possibility emerged as a by-product of the Kingdom’s national security challenges during that juncture, and which in turn contributed towards its embrace of a strategy playing both sides of the Cold War divide against one another. This strategy elicited the desired American response which, hand in hand with changing Saudi assessments of regional threats by late 1956, consolidated the American-Saudi security partnership and foreclosed Sino-Saudi normalisation. While the Kingdom had ‘moved on’ by 1957, a reading of open Chinese sources from the late 1950s suggests that Beijing continued to harbour the hope that formal relations could be established.
{"title":"A Near-Normalisation? Sino-Saudi Diplomatic Flirtations between 1955 and 1957","authors":"M. Alsudairi, Tingyi Wang","doi":"10.1080/25765949.2020.1847854","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/25765949.2020.1847854","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The article examines a window of opportunity that emerged between 1955 and 1957 and which could have resulted in the normalisation of Saudi Arabia’s relations with the People’s Republic of China, along with a few other states from the communist bloc. As the article will show, this possibility emerged as a by-product of the Kingdom’s national security challenges during that juncture, and which in turn contributed towards its embrace of a strategy playing both sides of the Cold War divide against one another. This strategy elicited the desired American response which, hand in hand with changing Saudi assessments of regional threats by late 1956, consolidated the American-Saudi security partnership and foreclosed Sino-Saudi normalisation. While the Kingdom had ‘moved on’ by 1957, a reading of open Chinese sources from the late 1950s suggests that Beijing continued to harbour the hope that formal relations could be established.","PeriodicalId":29909,"journal":{"name":"Asian Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies","volume":"14 1","pages":"567 - 580"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2020-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/25765949.2020.1847854","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49536056","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-07-02DOI: 10.1080/25765949.2020.1802560
C. Owen
Abstract This article explores the new political subjectivities that are emerging in disadvantaged communities in Kyrgyzstan following post-Soviet state transformation and retreat. It explores the ways in which the collapse of the Soviet-era bureaucracy and emergence of a marketising yet rent-seeking state bureaucracy has facilitated the emergence of ‘active citizens’ in self-built shanty towns in two locations in Kyrgyzstan – the capital, Bishkek, and the Issyk Kul resort region in the east. Based on participant observation and research interviews with members of so-called ‘self-help groups’ in post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan, in which residents co-organise to lobby local government for basic amenities and pool funds to raise money for community infrastructure and services in the absence of a functioning state, the paper makes two contributions to understanding the nature of citizenship in the context of weak, post-Soviet states. First, it suggests that, rather than seeing self-organised citizens as a threat to stability – a perspective common to non-liberal governments – these initiatives are supported and encouraged by the Kyrgyz authorities, since they perform tasks and provide services in lieu of the weak state. Autonomous citizens who can take responsibility for their own welfare are useful when the state cannot provide adequate services. Hence, leaders of weak states are able to recontextualise global neoliberal discourses of active citizenship, which emphasise autonomous, rational citizens, in order to legitimise their functional inabilities. Second, it seeks to problematise the binary distinction between the ‘passive Soviet citizen’ and the modern, post-Soviet active citizen, evident in government and international NGO discourses, and suggests that the idea of the ‘passive Soviet citizen’ is a discursive trope utilised to distinguish desirable from undesirable subjectivity in the post-Soviet market state.
{"title":"Active Citizens in a Weak State: ‘Self-Help’ Groups and the Post-Soviet Neoliberal Subject in Contemporary Kyrgyzstan","authors":"C. Owen","doi":"10.1080/25765949.2020.1802560","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/25765949.2020.1802560","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This article explores the new political subjectivities that are emerging in disadvantaged communities in Kyrgyzstan following post-Soviet state transformation and retreat. It explores the ways in which the collapse of the Soviet-era bureaucracy and emergence of a marketising yet rent-seeking state bureaucracy has facilitated the emergence of ‘active citizens’ in self-built shanty towns in two locations in Kyrgyzstan – the capital, Bishkek, and the Issyk Kul resort region in the east. Based on participant observation and research interviews with members of so-called ‘self-help groups’ in post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan, in which residents co-organise to lobby local government for basic amenities and pool funds to raise money for community infrastructure and services in the absence of a functioning state, the paper makes two contributions to understanding the nature of citizenship in the context of weak, post-Soviet states. First, it suggests that, rather than seeing self-organised citizens as a threat to stability – a perspective common to non-liberal governments – these initiatives are supported and encouraged by the Kyrgyz authorities, since they perform tasks and provide services in lieu of the weak state. Autonomous citizens who can take responsibility for their own welfare are useful when the state cannot provide adequate services. Hence, leaders of weak states are able to recontextualise global neoliberal discourses of active citizenship, which emphasise autonomous, rational citizens, in order to legitimise their functional inabilities. Second, it seeks to problematise the binary distinction between the ‘passive Soviet citizen’ and the modern, post-Soviet active citizen, evident in government and international NGO discourses, and suggests that the idea of the ‘passive Soviet citizen’ is a discursive trope utilised to distinguish desirable from undesirable subjectivity in the post-Soviet market state.","PeriodicalId":29909,"journal":{"name":"Asian Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies","volume":"14 1","pages":"464 - 479"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2020-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/25765949.2020.1802560","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47055192","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-07-02DOI: 10.1080/25765949.2020.1808375
Mark C. Thompson
Abstract The 2020 coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic has wreaked havoc with national economies globally. In Saudi Arabia, the combination of the pandemic’s ramifications coupled with low oil prices had an immediate negative impact on the Saudi economy as well as jeopardising the future plans of many young nationals. Yet, in a country with approximately 60% of the population under 30 years of age, many of whom are increasingly well-educated, constructive youth engagement is a necessity for the socioeconomic development of Saudi Arabia. The fallout from the pandemic could hinder this development as well as exacerbating existing socioeconomic problems for young Saudis, in particular employment issues. This paper considers to what extent the impact of the pandemic has changed mentalities and attitudes amongst young Saudis towards education, employment, and social interactions. In sum, the paper argues that because of the effect of the coronavirus pandemic on the Saudi socioeconomic environment, a renegotiation of the social contract will be necessary.
{"title":"The Impact of the Coronavirus Pandemic on the Socioeconomic Future of Young Saudis","authors":"Mark C. Thompson","doi":"10.1080/25765949.2020.1808375","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/25765949.2020.1808375","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The 2020 coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic has wreaked havoc with national economies globally. In Saudi Arabia, the combination of the pandemic’s ramifications coupled with low oil prices had an immediate negative impact on the Saudi economy as well as jeopardising the future plans of many young nationals. Yet, in a country with approximately 60% of the population under 30 years of age, many of whom are increasingly well-educated, constructive youth engagement is a necessity for the socioeconomic development of Saudi Arabia. The fallout from the pandemic could hinder this development as well as exacerbating existing socioeconomic problems for young Saudis, in particular employment issues. This paper considers to what extent the impact of the pandemic has changed mentalities and attitudes amongst young Saudis towards education, employment, and social interactions. In sum, the paper argues that because of the effect of the coronavirus pandemic on the Saudi socioeconomic environment, a renegotiation of the social contract will be necessary.","PeriodicalId":29909,"journal":{"name":"Asian Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies","volume":"14 1","pages":"358 - 382"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2020-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/25765949.2020.1808375","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49483406","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-07-02DOI: 10.1080/25765949.2020.1802561
Liangxiang Jin
Abstract Iran has been one of the most seriously hit victims of the COVID-19 pandemic, and its fight against the virus is one critical part of the global fight against the disease. The internal and external implications of the fight are very complicated, and some of them are already visible, though these implications depend on how soon and how effectively Iran finally brings the disease under control. Iran is economically in a very serious situation due to covid-19 and domestic and international shutdowns. But compared with other major oil producers, Iran could potentially be less affected by the global depression as sanctions had already made it less dependent on oil revenue. Furthermore Iran might become a centre of production of medical materials and facilities. Politically, the virus fight has created an opportunity for the temporary soft landing of the political tensions as a result of a series of accidents in the last two years and particularly in the first two months of 2020, though the crisis did produce new political pressures. The pandemic has also produced opportunities for Iran to temporarily improve its neighbouring security environment and its standing in the nuclear issue by criticising inhumane US sanctions. Finally, the fight against the virus has witnessed the joint efforts of Iran and China, which has contributed to a maturing of the Iran-China Comprehensive Strategic Partnership.
{"title":"Iran’s Covid-19 Fight: Domestic and External Implications","authors":"Liangxiang Jin","doi":"10.1080/25765949.2020.1802561","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/25765949.2020.1802561","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Iran has been one of the most seriously hit victims of the COVID-19 pandemic, and its fight against the virus is one critical part of the global fight against the disease. The internal and external implications of the fight are very complicated, and some of them are already visible, though these implications depend on how soon and how effectively Iran finally brings the disease under control. Iran is economically in a very serious situation due to covid-19 and domestic and international shutdowns. But compared with other major oil producers, Iran could potentially be less affected by the global depression as sanctions had already made it less dependent on oil revenue. Furthermore Iran might become a centre of production of medical materials and facilities. Politically, the virus fight has created an opportunity for the temporary soft landing of the political tensions as a result of a series of accidents in the last two years and particularly in the first two months of 2020, though the crisis did produce new political pressures. The pandemic has also produced opportunities for Iran to temporarily improve its neighbouring security environment and its standing in the nuclear issue by criticising inhumane US sanctions. Finally, the fight against the virus has witnessed the joint efforts of Iran and China, which has contributed to a maturing of the Iran-China Comprehensive Strategic Partnership.","PeriodicalId":29909,"journal":{"name":"Asian Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies","volume":"14 1","pages":"345 - 357"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2020-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/25765949.2020.1802561","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48512049","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-07-02DOI: 10.1080/25765949.2020.1808376
Meng Shu, Aftab Hussain
Abstract Algeria is currently at a crossroads in its transformation, and the outbreak of the coronavirus pandemic has had a great impact on this country. The Algerian government responded relatively quickly to the pandemic, adopting strict prevention and control measures to contain the virus from spreading, economic measures to maintain stability, and preventive measures for post-pandemic problems. It firmly supported China in the pandemic and in return received a lot of assistance. Algeria has been facing political turbulence since early 2019. With the pandemic and turbulence intertwined, there are advantages and disadvantages for the Algerian government. On the one hand, the isolation caused by the pandemic suspended the protest movement and gave the Algerian government greater powers, including strengthening control of the country and strengthening surveillance. On the other hand, the pandemic has impacted Algeria’s economy and foreign trade, and highlighted social inequality. Although the leaders and government of Algeria have already been changed, its deep-rooted structural problems, which are both political and economic in nature, have not been resolved, the economic structure remains unbalanced, and the subsidy policy is still difficult to adjust.
{"title":"Political Turbulence Converged with Covid-19 – Algeria’s Structural Development Dilemma","authors":"Meng Shu, Aftab Hussain","doi":"10.1080/25765949.2020.1808376","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/25765949.2020.1808376","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Algeria is currently at a crossroads in its transformation, and the outbreak of the coronavirus pandemic has had a great impact on this country. The Algerian government responded relatively quickly to the pandemic, adopting strict prevention and control measures to contain the virus from spreading, economic measures to maintain stability, and preventive measures for post-pandemic problems. It firmly supported China in the pandemic and in return received a lot of assistance. Algeria has been facing political turbulence since early 2019. With the pandemic and turbulence intertwined, there are advantages and disadvantages for the Algerian government. On the one hand, the isolation caused by the pandemic suspended the protest movement and gave the Algerian government greater powers, including strengthening control of the country and strengthening surveillance. On the other hand, the pandemic has impacted Algeria’s economy and foreign trade, and highlighted social inequality. Although the leaders and government of Algeria have already been changed, its deep-rooted structural problems, which are both political and economic in nature, have not been resolved, the economic structure remains unbalanced, and the subsidy policy is still difficult to adjust.","PeriodicalId":29909,"journal":{"name":"Asian Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies","volume":"14 1","pages":"383 - 395"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2020-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/25765949.2020.1808376","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45296792","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-07-02DOI: 10.1080/25765949.2020.1808380
B. Sultan, Amna Mehmood
Abstract China proposed the idea of ‘BRICS Plus’ in 2017. However, this hint exasperated India owing to its diverse political and strategic preferences. Conspicuously, the reason for India’s disapproval relates to a probable role for Pakistan through the BRICS plus. Particularly, in the backdrop is China’s progress on regional integration through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the significance extended to the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). In fact, inimical impulses for Pakistan were also felt when India attempted to label Pakistan as a country ‘promoting state-sponsored terrorism’ through a BRICS summit held in Goa in 2016; the move was later vetoed both by China and Russia. Meanwhile, India’s bilateral relations with China also lacked synergy, which sometimes impact their interaction within the BRICS framework. If viewed through the Neo-Functionalism framework and its concept of ‘spill-over,’ BRICS plus can reinforce incentives of cooperation in various sectors within a larger group of countries. Interest groups will begin to flourish at a regional level and domestically these groups will lobby their governments to further integrate. This will be overall critical for BRICS in order to steadily engage the world order as a multilateral forum. The question is, will India let go of bilateralism and accept the role of regional countries, particularly Pakistan? This article intends to explore the very concept of the transregional organisation of BRICS and the impact of the nature of relations between India and China. It also illustrates how states in the region, specifically Pakistan, have an intrinsic potential to complement the transregional agenda of BRICS and BRICS plus, particularly through its strategic geographic location and CPEC. For the persistent rise of BRICS, members will have to let go of bilateralism and allow the countries on the periphery to play their role.
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