Pub Date : 2022-04-03DOI: 10.1080/25765949.2022.2097730
Asif Mohiuddin
Abstract The question of religious authority strikes at the heart of the relationship between religion and politics in Egypt. Whoever may legally claim religious authority has the power to shape religion in a politicised and objectified manner. This is why, apart from Islamists, conservative initiatives to establish religious influence over public affairs are also advocated by other actors, such as state institutions who are generally more cautious about politicising religion. This paper focuses on the relationship between state and religious authority institutions in Egypt. It aims to show how the state-cooption of religious institutions like Al-Azhar has been useful for the purposes of political legitimisation. The paper discusses how the various tactics adopted by al-Sisi’s government to quell Islamist groups as well as the reforms of the Al-Azhar curriculum have strengthened the path of dependence in which Al-Azhar has been locked since 1961. These reforms have not only put the authenticity of Al-Azhar’s scholarly tradition into question but also tarnished the image of Al-Azhar as the leading centre of Islamic learning in the Muslim world. It is thus very important for Al-Azhar to maintain a balance in order to win a degree of legitimacy in the eyes of its supporters as well as critics.
{"title":"Islam, Religious Authority and The State: The Case of Egypt","authors":"Asif Mohiuddin","doi":"10.1080/25765949.2022.2097730","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/25765949.2022.2097730","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The question of religious authority strikes at the heart of the relationship between religion and politics in Egypt. Whoever may legally claim religious authority has the power to shape religion in a politicised and objectified manner. This is why, apart from Islamists, conservative initiatives to establish religious influence over public affairs are also advocated by other actors, such as state institutions who are generally more cautious about politicising religion. This paper focuses on the relationship between state and religious authority institutions in Egypt. It aims to show how the state-cooption of religious institutions like Al-Azhar has been useful for the purposes of political legitimisation. The paper discusses how the various tactics adopted by al-Sisi’s government to quell Islamist groups as well as the reforms of the Al-Azhar curriculum have strengthened the path of dependence in which Al-Azhar has been locked since 1961. These reforms have not only put the authenticity of Al-Azhar’s scholarly tradition into question but also tarnished the image of Al-Azhar as the leading centre of Islamic learning in the Muslim world. It is thus very important for Al-Azhar to maintain a balance in order to win a degree of legitimacy in the eyes of its supporters as well as critics.","PeriodicalId":29909,"journal":{"name":"Asian Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies","volume":"16 1","pages":"165 - 188"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44379520","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-04-03DOI: 10.1080/25765949.2022.2099025
Samer Bakkour
Abstract Daraa City is widely known as the birthplace of the Syrian uprising. The uprising, which was initially motivated by high-minded ideas and opposition to the arbitrary violence of an authoritarian state, rapidly degenerated into a civil war orientated by external agendas and priorities. In this paper, I want to situate Daraa governorate at the centre of this development, with the intention of highlighting how the course of events in this small part of Syria had vital implications for the development of the Syrian Civil War. In seeking to develop an analysis of the interplay of internal dynamics and external influences, i seek to ‘reconcile’ the ‘micro’ and ‘macro’ dimensions of civil war, and also draw on contributions to the peacebuilding literature, and this enables me to reconceptualise the relationship between ‘internal’ and ‘external’ drivers of conflict.
{"title":"Daraa and the Altered Trajectory of the Syrian Crisis","authors":"Samer Bakkour","doi":"10.1080/25765949.2022.2099025","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/25765949.2022.2099025","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Daraa City is widely known as the birthplace of the Syrian uprising. The uprising, which was initially motivated by high-minded ideas and opposition to the arbitrary violence of an authoritarian state, rapidly degenerated into a civil war orientated by external agendas and priorities. In this paper, I want to situate Daraa governorate at the centre of this development, with the intention of highlighting how the course of events in this small part of Syria had vital implications for the development of the Syrian Civil War. In seeking to develop an analysis of the interplay of internal dynamics and external influences, i seek to ‘reconcile’ the ‘micro’ and ‘macro’ dimensions of civil war, and also draw on contributions to the peacebuilding literature, and this enables me to reconceptualise the relationship between ‘internal’ and ‘external’ drivers of conflict.","PeriodicalId":29909,"journal":{"name":"Asian Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies","volume":"16 1","pages":"225 - 242"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47726025","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-04-03DOI: 10.1080/25765949.2022.2078601
Jiahua Tang, R. Pan
Abstract This article provides an overview of the recent US Iran policies by comparing the US Middle East strategy under the Biden administration to the Trump administration’s approach. Trump’s ‘maximum pressure’ campaign adopted various aggressive policies including withdrawing from the Iran nuclear agreement and escalating sanction measures against Iran. However, the campaign has proven a failure as it was impeded by Iran’s countermeasures and has damaged the US international reputations. The Biden administration has incentives to improve the US-Iran relations and restore the Iran nuclear deal. However, it faces constraints from both domestic politics and distrust of US alliances. Domestic hardliners have pressured the Biden administration to keep a tough stance on Iran and opposed the US to make concessions as it renegotiates the nuclear deal. Other related countries including the US allies are hesitant to comply with US. In terms of its Middle East strategy, Trump’s betrayal of the previous deal has brought credibility crisis to the US. Though the Iran nuclear talks have restarted, the future of Iran’s nuclear program remains bleak. Divergence is brewing among the US, Iran, and other related powers due to different national interests. Also, the newly elected Iranian presidency, led by ultra conservative leader Ebrahim Raisi’s, makes a new Iran nuclear deal more difficult to obtain. To revive the Iran nuclear agreement, this article suggests that the Biden administration ensure Iran’s interests through cooperation and pay more attention to the social development and people’s livelihood in Iran.
{"title":"Adjustments and Constraints: Biden Administration’s Iran Policy","authors":"Jiahua Tang, R. Pan","doi":"10.1080/25765949.2022.2078601","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/25765949.2022.2078601","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This article provides an overview of the recent US Iran policies by comparing the US Middle East strategy under the Biden administration to the Trump administration’s approach. Trump’s ‘maximum pressure’ campaign adopted various aggressive policies including withdrawing from the Iran nuclear agreement and escalating sanction measures against Iran. However, the campaign has proven a failure as it was impeded by Iran’s countermeasures and has damaged the US international reputations. The Biden administration has incentives to improve the US-Iran relations and restore the Iran nuclear deal. However, it faces constraints from both domestic politics and distrust of US alliances. Domestic hardliners have pressured the Biden administration to keep a tough stance on Iran and opposed the US to make concessions as it renegotiates the nuclear deal. Other related countries including the US allies are hesitant to comply with US. In terms of its Middle East strategy, Trump’s betrayal of the previous deal has brought credibility crisis to the US. Though the Iran nuclear talks have restarted, the future of Iran’s nuclear program remains bleak. Divergence is brewing among the US, Iran, and other related powers due to different national interests. Also, the newly elected Iranian presidency, led by ultra conservative leader Ebrahim Raisi’s, makes a new Iran nuclear deal more difficult to obtain. To revive the Iran nuclear agreement, this article suggests that the Biden administration ensure Iran’s interests through cooperation and pay more attention to the social development and people’s livelihood in Iran.","PeriodicalId":29909,"journal":{"name":"Asian Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies","volume":"16 1","pages":"189 - 208"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47530345","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-04-03DOI: 10.1080/25765949.2022.2090772
Mustafa Yetim, Rıdvan Kalayci
Abstract Discourses are politically-oriented realities that explain their selective and instrumental nature. That means discourses are mostly (re)produced by the political actors, and they conform to the changing agendas of these actors. The trajectory of the resistance discourse, which reflects Hezbollah’s ideological (religious) approach, seems to confirm this generalisation owing to its noticeable association with Hezbollah’s political motivations over time. This allegedly revisionist discourse has two intertwined dimensions: One dimension regards Hezbollah’s position towards internal affairs, while the other concerns its external orientation. Hezbollah often claimed to champion the revisionist camp in these two realms, albeit its pro-status quo policies unfolded during the Syrian civil war and the recent Lebanese protests. These two events further manifested the positioned nature of the resistance discourse. In this context, this article will attempt to illustrate the political nature of the resistance discourse by disputing its long-held revisionist claims. To empirically support our argument, the status-quo-based factors behind the regular practice of the resistance discourse during the Syrian civil war and the Lebanese protests will be deeply investigated.
{"title":"Tracing the Political Origins of The Hezbollah’s Resistance Discourse: From Revisionism to Status Quo","authors":"Mustafa Yetim, Rıdvan Kalayci","doi":"10.1080/25765949.2022.2090772","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/25765949.2022.2090772","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Discourses are politically-oriented realities that explain their selective and instrumental nature. That means discourses are mostly (re)produced by the political actors, and they conform to the changing agendas of these actors. The trajectory of the resistance discourse, which reflects Hezbollah’s ideological (religious) approach, seems to confirm this generalisation owing to its noticeable association with Hezbollah’s political motivations over time. This allegedly revisionist discourse has two intertwined dimensions: One dimension regards Hezbollah’s position towards internal affairs, while the other concerns its external orientation. Hezbollah often claimed to champion the revisionist camp in these two realms, albeit its pro-status quo policies unfolded during the Syrian civil war and the recent Lebanese protests. These two events further manifested the positioned nature of the resistance discourse. In this context, this article will attempt to illustrate the political nature of the resistance discourse by disputing its long-held revisionist claims. To empirically support our argument, the status-quo-based factors behind the regular practice of the resistance discourse during the Syrian civil war and the Lebanese protests will be deeply investigated.","PeriodicalId":29909,"journal":{"name":"Asian Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies","volume":"16 1","pages":"209 - 224"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48968240","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-04-03DOI: 10.1080/25765949.2022.2098582
A. Al-Asfour, J. Rajasekar, A. Charkasova
Abstract The discovery of oil in the Gulf countries brought strong economic growth and an influx of foreign workers for privately held companies. These countries have since maintained their growth by relying on expatriates from all over the world, particularly from South Asian countries. In contrast, locals were recruited for most of the public sector jobs. In response to significant population growth and high unemployment rates, these countries took on some initiatives, including the localisation of the workforce. This paper analyzes the current localisation effort, which is a process of replacing expatriates with local workers in six Gulf countries. A content analysis of literature is used to understand the challenges related to required skills, work hours, salary, language, and experience. Results indicate that these challenges have impeded localisation efforts in the private sector. This study has significant implications for global organisations and human resource development professionals seeking to localise a proportion of their workforce as a workforce management strategy.
{"title":"Challenges to The Workforce Localization in the Private Sector in Gulf Countries: Content Analysis","authors":"A. Al-Asfour, J. Rajasekar, A. Charkasova","doi":"10.1080/25765949.2022.2098582","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/25765949.2022.2098582","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The discovery of oil in the Gulf countries brought strong economic growth and an influx of foreign workers for privately held companies. These countries have since maintained their growth by relying on expatriates from all over the world, particularly from South Asian countries. In contrast, locals were recruited for most of the public sector jobs. In response to significant population growth and high unemployment rates, these countries took on some initiatives, including the localisation of the workforce. This paper analyzes the current localisation effort, which is a process of replacing expatriates with local workers in six Gulf countries. A content analysis of literature is used to understand the challenges related to required skills, work hours, salary, language, and experience. Results indicate that these challenges have impeded localisation efforts in the private sector. This study has significant implications for global organisations and human resource development professionals seeking to localise a proportion of their workforce as a workforce management strategy.","PeriodicalId":29909,"journal":{"name":"Asian Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies","volume":"16 1","pages":"148 - 164"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44649072","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-04-03DOI: 10.1080/25765949.2022.2061156
Achraf Haddad
Abstract The continuing emergence of sudden financial crises and the bankruptcy of Big banks audited by the ‘Big Four’ auditors confirms that the external audit quality (EAQ) always remains insufficient compared to the desired quality. The quality weakness is due either to the bad audit company choice, although their sizes, or to the disrespect of the good audit rules. Because there is a lack of comparative studies in the framework of conventional and Islamic banks, this paper aims to compare the impact of EAQ on the financial performance (FP) of 180 conventional banks and 180 Islamic banks. FP and EAQ variables are collected from 56 countries over the period (2010–2020). To overcome the mystery of the best EAQ selection based on its impact on FP, this paper relied on the GLS estimator. Consequently, this paper concluded that the EAQ affected the conventional banks’ FP, but it improved that of Islamic banks with a moderate impact.
{"title":"The Impact of the External Audit Quality on the Financial Performance of Conventional and Islamic Banks","authors":"Achraf Haddad","doi":"10.1080/25765949.2022.2061156","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/25765949.2022.2061156","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The continuing emergence of sudden financial crises and the bankruptcy of Big banks audited by the ‘Big Four’ auditors confirms that the external audit quality (EAQ) always remains insufficient compared to the desired quality. The quality weakness is due either to the bad audit company choice, although their sizes, or to the disrespect of the good audit rules. Because there is a lack of comparative studies in the framework of conventional and Islamic banks, this paper aims to compare the impact of EAQ on the financial performance (FP) of 180 conventional banks and 180 Islamic banks. FP and EAQ variables are collected from 56 countries over the period (2010–2020). To overcome the mystery of the best EAQ selection based on its impact on FP, this paper relied on the GLS estimator. Consequently, this paper concluded that the EAQ affected the conventional banks’ FP, but it improved that of Islamic banks with a moderate impact.","PeriodicalId":29909,"journal":{"name":"Asian Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies","volume":"16 1","pages":"127 - 147"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46804024","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-02DOI: 10.1080/25765949.2022.2057068
A. Esmaeili, Yuanxia Zhang
Abstract Iran’s nuclear program has been one of the most challenging international issues since the beginning of the 2010s. As an emerging superpower, China has sought to play an active role in international crises, including the Iranian nuclear case. China’s mainly focus was not whether to engage, but how to engage, and what proposals should be made when engaging to solve the dilemma in order to benefit multiple interests. This research tries to answer the question of what the components of China’s foreign policy towards Iran’s nuclear program are and how it is constructed within the framework of holistic constructivist theory. The methodology of this research is historical analysis as well as descriptive analytical methods. This paper proposes a categorisation of the six identity discourses that China exhibits on the Iranian nuclear issue. In this vein, the role of the international normative environment, which might have either aggressive or modifying impacts, should not be neglected. So China has sought to deal with Iran’s nuclear program peacefully through the framework of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in cooperation with the United States.
{"title":"Identity, China’s foreign policy and Iran’s nuclear program","authors":"A. Esmaeili, Yuanxia Zhang","doi":"10.1080/25765949.2022.2057068","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/25765949.2022.2057068","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Iran’s nuclear program has been one of the most challenging international issues since the beginning of the 2010s. As an emerging superpower, China has sought to play an active role in international crises, including the Iranian nuclear case. China’s mainly focus was not whether to engage, but how to engage, and what proposals should be made when engaging to solve the dilemma in order to benefit multiple interests. This research tries to answer the question of what the components of China’s foreign policy towards Iran’s nuclear program are and how it is constructed within the framework of holistic constructivist theory. The methodology of this research is historical analysis as well as descriptive analytical methods. This paper proposes a categorisation of the six identity discourses that China exhibits on the Iranian nuclear issue. In this vein, the role of the international normative environment, which might have either aggressive or modifying impacts, should not be neglected. So China has sought to deal with Iran’s nuclear program peacefully through the framework of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in cooperation with the United States.","PeriodicalId":29909,"journal":{"name":"Asian Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies","volume":"16 1","pages":"46 - 61"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45687961","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-02DOI: 10.1080/25765949.2022.2051936
Song Niu, Xueyan Li
Abstract Hajj is one of the ‘Five Pillars’ in Islam. However, the large-scale cross-border movement of pilgrims around the world poses huge challenges over health security. Saudi Hajj governance is not only a need to maintain health security, but also to a large extent the sharia considerations related to the prerequisites for Hajj. In recent years, Saudi Arabia has gained rich experience in dealing with the challenges of SARS, MERS and other infectious diseases on Hajj. With the spread of the COVID-19 to Mecca in February 2020, Saudi Arabia has been facing serious challenges. Based on domestic and global epidemic prevention considerations, the Saudi government finally introduced the new policy on 2020 Hajj, which for the first time halted the Hajj of overseas Muslims, and only selected a very limited number of pilgrims within Saudi territory to perform Hajj. Saudi actually balances three major structural contradictions between maintaining health security and fighting the epidemic, and to a certain extent ensuring the rights of Muslims around the world. With the easing of the epidemic in Saudi Arabia in 2021, how to ensure that the Hajj can be performed in 2021 under the COVID-19 has aroused great attention from the international community. For the current review, Saudi new Hajj policy in 2020 has achieved due results. Saudi Arabia continued the scaled-down Hajj policy in 2021 due to the constant mutations of the coronavirus. The formation of Saudi Hajj policy under COVID-19 directly comes from the rich experience of Saudi Arabia in effectively maintaining the Hajj health security during the spread of different global epidemics, and fundamentally rooted in the hygiene and cleanliness within the Islamic civilisation.
{"title":"Between Religious Obligation and Health Security: Saudi Hajj Governance Under COVID-19","authors":"Song Niu, Xueyan Li","doi":"10.1080/25765949.2022.2051936","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/25765949.2022.2051936","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Hajj is one of the ‘Five Pillars’ in Islam. However, the large-scale cross-border movement of pilgrims around the world poses huge challenges over health security. Saudi Hajj governance is not only a need to maintain health security, but also to a large extent the sharia considerations related to the prerequisites for Hajj. In recent years, Saudi Arabia has gained rich experience in dealing with the challenges of SARS, MERS and other infectious diseases on Hajj. With the spread of the COVID-19 to Mecca in February 2020, Saudi Arabia has been facing serious challenges. Based on domestic and global epidemic prevention considerations, the Saudi government finally introduced the new policy on 2020 Hajj, which for the first time halted the Hajj of overseas Muslims, and only selected a very limited number of pilgrims within Saudi territory to perform Hajj. Saudi actually balances three major structural contradictions between maintaining health security and fighting the epidemic, and to a certain extent ensuring the rights of Muslims around the world. With the easing of the epidemic in Saudi Arabia in 2021, how to ensure that the Hajj can be performed in 2021 under the COVID-19 has aroused great attention from the international community. For the current review, Saudi new Hajj policy in 2020 has achieved due results. Saudi Arabia continued the scaled-down Hajj policy in 2021 due to the constant mutations of the coronavirus. The formation of Saudi Hajj policy under COVID-19 directly comes from the rich experience of Saudi Arabia in effectively maintaining the Hajj health security during the spread of different global epidemics, and fundamentally rooted in the hygiene and cleanliness within the Islamic civilisation.","PeriodicalId":29909,"journal":{"name":"Asian Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies","volume":"16 1","pages":"1 - 16"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46656882","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-02DOI: 10.1080/25765949.2022.2057077
Ariel Admoni
Abstract There were many examples of Antisemitism in Qatar in the last decade and this trend was reflected especially in the Qatari media. The leadership of Al Thani was aware of the situation, but sometimes the royal house itself should be attributed to the Antisemitic approach. This attitude was against the background of the hosting of the World Cup in 2022 and internatiomal change in the area, mainly the Abraham Accords of 2020. Qatari objection to Israel appeared from the founding of the Jewish state. The Antisemitic views are reflected in demonstrations of the emirate’s population from an early stage. One notable action is the Qatari boycott against Israel. This policy has continued through the years until today. This attitude relied upon the population support in objection to the Jewish state. The Antisemitic feelings did not stop even when the leadership chose to improve the relations with Israel. the rapprochement between Qatar and Israel was only improvement of communication at the level of the authorities. Throughout the period in question, the Qatari people showed hostility towards the Jews in general, and the Israelis in particular. Qatari agenda towards the Jews and Israel has a direct connection to the US administration. The Arab world also had a major effect on the Qatari agenda.
{"title":"Political antisemitism: Qatar’s attitude towards Jews and Israel","authors":"Ariel Admoni","doi":"10.1080/25765949.2022.2057077","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/25765949.2022.2057077","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract There were many examples of Antisemitism in Qatar in the last decade and this trend was reflected especially in the Qatari media. The leadership of Al Thani was aware of the situation, but sometimes the royal house itself should be attributed to the Antisemitic approach. This attitude was against the background of the hosting of the World Cup in 2022 and internatiomal change in the area, mainly the Abraham Accords of 2020. Qatari objection to Israel appeared from the founding of the Jewish state. The Antisemitic views are reflected in demonstrations of the emirate’s population from an early stage. One notable action is the Qatari boycott against Israel. This policy has continued through the years until today. This attitude relied upon the population support in objection to the Jewish state. The Antisemitic feelings did not stop even when the leadership chose to improve the relations with Israel. the rapprochement between Qatar and Israel was only improvement of communication at the level of the authorities. Throughout the period in question, the Qatari people showed hostility towards the Jews in general, and the Israelis in particular. Qatari agenda towards the Jews and Israel has a direct connection to the US administration. The Arab world also had a major effect on the Qatari agenda.","PeriodicalId":29909,"journal":{"name":"Asian Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies","volume":"16 1","pages":"62 - 78"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45586610","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-02DOI: 10.1080/25765949.2022.2057718
Rahat Shah
Abstract This article uses the theoretical framework of constructivism to evaluate the political relationship between Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan. The leaders of the two states have begun to strengthen political relations in order to achieve the common goal of enhancing the image of Islamism in the western world. This paper explores the basic research question of why Imran Khan is getting closer to Tayyip Erdogan? What are the driving forces behind Imran Khan’s diplomacy to boost the image of Islamism? This paper argues that Imran’s pursuit of Naya Pakistan and his desire to explain Islam to the West need the support of other Islamic countries, which gravitates him to Erdogan. Imran’s foreign behaviour is inspired by his desire to maintain political power to stay in office, and therefore he is trying to create the state of Medina and explain Islam to the West. Ergo, Erdogan is a rational choice for Imran as both of them share the same idea to solve the Muslim problem by uniting Muslims and explaining Islam to the West. They agreed to set up a joint television channel and an Islamic bloc to address Islamophobia and Muslim problems.
{"title":"Explaining Pakistan-Turkish Relations: Islamism and Naya Pakistan","authors":"Rahat Shah","doi":"10.1080/25765949.2022.2057718","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/25765949.2022.2057718","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This article uses the theoretical framework of constructivism to evaluate the political relationship between Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan. The leaders of the two states have begun to strengthen political relations in order to achieve the common goal of enhancing the image of Islamism in the western world. This paper explores the basic research question of why Imran Khan is getting closer to Tayyip Erdogan? What are the driving forces behind Imran Khan’s diplomacy to boost the image of Islamism? This paper argues that Imran’s pursuit of Naya Pakistan and his desire to explain Islam to the West need the support of other Islamic countries, which gravitates him to Erdogan. Imran’s foreign behaviour is inspired by his desire to maintain political power to stay in office, and therefore he is trying to create the state of Medina and explain Islam to the West. Ergo, Erdogan is a rational choice for Imran as both of them share the same idea to solve the Muslim problem by uniting Muslims and explaining Islam to the West. They agreed to set up a joint television channel and an Islamic bloc to address Islamophobia and Muslim problems.","PeriodicalId":29909,"journal":{"name":"Asian Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies","volume":"16 1","pages":"113 - 125"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47346448","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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