Eric Morrow, Casey Thompson, Payton Jones, Boleslaw Z. Kabala
What are the differences in how public and private institutions of higher education, with religious schools as a subset of private colleges and universities, approach on-campus protests in a framework of civic engagement? Unfortunately, public, private, and religious schools have all restricted opportunities of speech, assembly, and protest, despite in many cases state and federal courts ruling that this is against the law. With the goal of increasing the civic capacities of students at all institutions of higher education, we propose a mechanism of partial revocation of tax exemptions at universities that do not currently uphold a robust understanding of civic engagement opportunities for all students, which will apply to any college or university receiving federal funding, consistent with the constitutional tradition of free speech still exemplified by Brandenburg v. Ohio and the “national policy” test of Bob Jones University vs. United States. In doing so, we build on the critique of exemptions in the recent work of Vincent Phillip Munoz on religious liberty. By opting only for incentives and by not even incentivizing private institutions that continue to restrict civic engagement but that do not accept federal dollars, we affirm and support a mutually beneficial ongoing dialogue among public, private, and religious schools. This dialogue, as it is sharpened and maintained in place by our recommended policies, is also consistent with pluralism as conceptualized by Jacob Levy.
{"title":"Incentivizing Civic Engagement at Public and Private Universities: Tax Exemptions, Laws, and Critical Dialogues","authors":"Eric Morrow, Casey Thompson, Payton Jones, Boleslaw Z. Kabala","doi":"10.3390/laws13030032","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3390/laws13030032","url":null,"abstract":"What are the differences in how public and private institutions of higher education, with religious schools as a subset of private colleges and universities, approach on-campus protests in a framework of civic engagement? Unfortunately, public, private, and religious schools have all restricted opportunities of speech, assembly, and protest, despite in many cases state and federal courts ruling that this is against the law. With the goal of increasing the civic capacities of students at all institutions of higher education, we propose a mechanism of partial revocation of tax exemptions at universities that do not currently uphold a robust understanding of civic engagement opportunities for all students, which will apply to any college or university receiving federal funding, consistent with the constitutional tradition of free speech still exemplified by Brandenburg v. Ohio and the “national policy” test of Bob Jones University vs. United States. In doing so, we build on the critique of exemptions in the recent work of Vincent Phillip Munoz on religious liberty. By opting only for incentives and by not even incentivizing private institutions that continue to restrict civic engagement but that do not accept federal dollars, we affirm and support a mutually beneficial ongoing dialogue among public, private, and religious schools. This dialogue, as it is sharpened and maintained in place by our recommended policies, is also consistent with pluralism as conceptualized by Jacob Levy.","PeriodicalId":30534,"journal":{"name":"Laws","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2024-05-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141111400","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Human trafficking thrives in the shadows, and the rise of social media has provided traffickers with a powerful and unregulated tool. This paper delves into how these criminals exploit online platforms to target and manipulate vulnerable populations. A thematic analysis of existing research explores the tactics used by traffickers on social media, revealing how algorithms can be manipulated to facilitate exploitation. Furthermore, the paper examines the limitations of current regulations in tackling this online threat. The research underscores the urgent need for collaboration between governments and researchers to combat algorithmic exploitation. By harnessing data analysis and machine learning, proactive strategies can be developed to disrupt trafficking networks and protect those most at risk.
{"title":"Algorithmic Exploitation in Social Media Human Trafficking and Strategies for Regulation","authors":"Derek M. Moore","doi":"10.3390/laws13030031","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3390/laws13030031","url":null,"abstract":"Human trafficking thrives in the shadows, and the rise of social media has provided traffickers with a powerful and unregulated tool. This paper delves into how these criminals exploit online platforms to target and manipulate vulnerable populations. A thematic analysis of existing research explores the tactics used by traffickers on social media, revealing how algorithms can be manipulated to facilitate exploitation. Furthermore, the paper examines the limitations of current regulations in tackling this online threat. The research underscores the urgent need for collaboration between governments and researchers to combat algorithmic exploitation. By harnessing data analysis and machine learning, proactive strategies can be developed to disrupt trafficking networks and protect those most at risk.","PeriodicalId":30534,"journal":{"name":"Laws","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2024-05-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141120451","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article highlights a dilemma that we face when we turn to new tools that promise to improve on law’s imperfect governance. On the one hand, our discontent with law’s governance is both broad and deep, and much of it is rooted in the human nature of the legal enterprise. Yet, we remain attached to the essentially human nature of law’s governance. On the other hand, we recognise the potential benefits in technological governance but not without some displacement of the human element. Caught on the horns of this dilemma, we attempt to limit the loss of the human element by insisting that governance must be compatible with human rights or human dignity, or, more directly, that governance must limit the applications of technology so that they remain human-centric. Given a demand for human-centric applications of technologies, we consider how far humans might, and should, go in deploying new tools with a view to improving law’s imperfect governance. Should these tools be limited to assisting humans? Or, might they replace humans? Or might we even govern by technological management of places, products, and processes so that reliance on both humans and rules is reduced? It is concluded that, in all spheres of governance and in all human communities, the one thing that is essential is that the applications of new technologies are controlled so that they do not undermine the generic conditions which are presupposed by viable groups of human agents.
{"title":"Law, Technology, and Our Governance Dilemma","authors":"R. Brownsword","doi":"10.3390/laws13030030","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3390/laws13030030","url":null,"abstract":"This article highlights a dilemma that we face when we turn to new tools that promise to improve on law’s imperfect governance. On the one hand, our discontent with law’s governance is both broad and deep, and much of it is rooted in the human nature of the legal enterprise. Yet, we remain attached to the essentially human nature of law’s governance. On the other hand, we recognise the potential benefits in technological governance but not without some displacement of the human element. Caught on the horns of this dilemma, we attempt to limit the loss of the human element by insisting that governance must be compatible with human rights or human dignity, or, more directly, that governance must limit the applications of technology so that they remain human-centric. Given a demand for human-centric applications of technologies, we consider how far humans might, and should, go in deploying new tools with a view to improving law’s imperfect governance. Should these tools be limited to assisting humans? Or, might they replace humans? Or might we even govern by technological management of places, products, and processes so that reliance on both humans and rules is reduced? It is concluded that, in all spheres of governance and in all human communities, the one thing that is essential is that the applications of new technologies are controlled so that they do not undermine the generic conditions which are presupposed by viable groups of human agents.","PeriodicalId":30534,"journal":{"name":"Laws","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2024-05-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140992080","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Enforcing criminal tax law in Indonesia presents a critical yet challenging task, because of the intricate interplay between tax and criminal law interests. The Indonesian Government has introduced leniency in tax criminal law enforcement, guided by the ultimum remedium principle, where criminal sanctions are considered as a last resort. Under this policy, tax offenders can absolve themselves from legal liability. However, such leniency throughout the enforcement process can lead to perceptions of injustice within society. This research uses descriptive, evaluative, and normative juridical methods to examine Indonesia’s approach to enforcing criminal tax laws within the framework of tax and legal interests. Our findings reveal that the current policies heavily favor taxpayer interests by providing numerous concessions to offenders. This trend is concerning, as it may result in a surge of tax crime cases. Conversely, adopting the primum remedium principle, where criminal sanctions are the initial response, poses the risk of harsh legal consequences. In light of these challenges, we propose a balanced approach incorporating elements of both ultimum and primum remedium principles to establish clear boundaries and provisions within criminal tax law enforcement policies. By doing so, we aim to accommodate tax interests while upholding legal interests.
{"title":"Establishing Boundaries to Combat Tax Crimes in Indonesia","authors":"Dwi Nurferyanto, Yoshi Takahashi","doi":"10.3390/laws13030029","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3390/laws13030029","url":null,"abstract":"Enforcing criminal tax law in Indonesia presents a critical yet challenging task, because of the intricate interplay between tax and criminal law interests. The Indonesian Government has introduced leniency in tax criminal law enforcement, guided by the ultimum remedium principle, where criminal sanctions are considered as a last resort. Under this policy, tax offenders can absolve themselves from legal liability. However, such leniency throughout the enforcement process can lead to perceptions of injustice within society. This research uses descriptive, evaluative, and normative juridical methods to examine Indonesia’s approach to enforcing criminal tax laws within the framework of tax and legal interests. Our findings reveal that the current policies heavily favor taxpayer interests by providing numerous concessions to offenders. This trend is concerning, as it may result in a surge of tax crime cases. Conversely, adopting the primum remedium principle, where criminal sanctions are the initial response, poses the risk of harsh legal consequences. In light of these challenges, we propose a balanced approach incorporating elements of both ultimum and primum remedium principles to establish clear boundaries and provisions within criminal tax law enforcement policies. By doing so, we aim to accommodate tax interests while upholding legal interests.","PeriodicalId":30534,"journal":{"name":"Laws","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2024-05-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141014495","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Judges have long wrestled with the gigantean task of defining religion, with some describing the task as being ‘called upon to ponder the imponderable’, an impossible task, and even misguided. Despite these sentiments, and comments in almost every legal definition expressing the impossibility of the task, judges have, in fact, been able to come up with numerous legal definitions for religion. These have been applied in myriad circumstances to define the outer limits of the rights and responsibilities of states, religious communities, organisations, and individuals. By contrast, the term secular has rarely been judicially defined. However, it is no-less important in defining the rights and responsibilities of states and their citizens and residents, particularly in light of the number of states that claim, implicitly or explicitly, to be secular. This paper, therefore, (re)examines the definition of the secular as it pertains to the concept of the secular state. It considers the need for a legal definition of the secular with particular reference to constitutional and other legal instruments that include the term. It then examines the difference between the terms secular, secularisation and secularism, noting the often erroneous conflation as well as the inevitable interaction and overlap between these key concepts. Finally, drawing on existing classifications of legal definitions of religion, the paper classifies definitions of the secular into three overarching classifications, namely ‘historical’, ‘substantive’ and ‘characteristic’.
{"title":"The Challenge of Defining the Secular","authors":"Georgina Clarke, Renae Barker","doi":"10.3390/laws13030028","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3390/laws13030028","url":null,"abstract":"Judges have long wrestled with the gigantean task of defining religion, with some describing the task as being ‘called upon to ponder the imponderable’, an impossible task, and even misguided. Despite these sentiments, and comments in almost every legal definition expressing the impossibility of the task, judges have, in fact, been able to come up with numerous legal definitions for religion. These have been applied in myriad circumstances to define the outer limits of the rights and responsibilities of states, religious communities, organisations, and individuals. By contrast, the term secular has rarely been judicially defined. However, it is no-less important in defining the rights and responsibilities of states and their citizens and residents, particularly in light of the number of states that claim, implicitly or explicitly, to be secular. This paper, therefore, (re)examines the definition of the secular as it pertains to the concept of the secular state. It considers the need for a legal definition of the secular with particular reference to constitutional and other legal instruments that include the term. It then examines the difference between the terms secular, secularisation and secularism, noting the often erroneous conflation as well as the inevitable interaction and overlap between these key concepts. Finally, drawing on existing classifications of legal definitions of religion, the paper classifies definitions of the secular into three overarching classifications, namely ‘historical’, ‘substantive’ and ‘characteristic’.","PeriodicalId":30534,"journal":{"name":"Laws","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2024-05-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141018588","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The American university has been guided by classical liberalism in its defense of the freedom of speech and academic freedom. The idea is that a university is a place where all ideas and perspectives can be debated. However, this idea is increasingly being challenged by those who want the secular university to be a place that advances a social philosophy that promises to transform society by dismantling structural racism and providing for greater equity. In this article, I will argue that both of these models have been shaped by democratic legal ideals and both share a common skeptical assumption about the basic questions of meaning that each person must answer. The legal structures developed by Westphalian modernity attempt neutrality on questions about meaning. This can be seen even in recent Supreme Court decisions affirming the individual’s right to determine meaning for themselves. This skeptical root has produced the conflict between classical liberals and the social transformation that we are witnessing at our universities. I argue for a third option that I find in the Declaration of Independence, which affirms that we can and should know the answers to basic questions which then provide the foundation for education and law.
{"title":"Human and Divine Law at the Secular University: The Divide between Classical Liberalism and Post-Classical Liberalism","authors":"Owen Anderson","doi":"10.3390/laws13030025","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3390/laws13030025","url":null,"abstract":"The American university has been guided by classical liberalism in its defense of the freedom of speech and academic freedom. The idea is that a university is a place where all ideas and perspectives can be debated. However, this idea is increasingly being challenged by those who want the secular university to be a place that advances a social philosophy that promises to transform society by dismantling structural racism and providing for greater equity. In this article, I will argue that both of these models have been shaped by democratic legal ideals and both share a common skeptical assumption about the basic questions of meaning that each person must answer. The legal structures developed by Westphalian modernity attempt neutrality on questions about meaning. This can be seen even in recent Supreme Court decisions affirming the individual’s right to determine meaning for themselves. This skeptical root has produced the conflict between classical liberals and the social transformation that we are witnessing at our universities. I argue for a third option that I find in the Declaration of Independence, which affirms that we can and should know the answers to basic questions which then provide the foundation for education and law.","PeriodicalId":30534,"journal":{"name":"Laws","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2024-04-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140660705","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The conflicting objectives of the Energy Charter Treaty’s (ECT) protection of fossil fuel investments and climate change mitigation can reveal themselves in investor state dispute settlement (ISDS). As neither the modernization nor the termination of the ECT is likely, ECT arbitration will continue to exist. This article, therefore, examines the reconciling potential of integrative interpretation in climate relevant ECT arbitrations. An integrative interpretation is not only prescribed by the international rules of treaty interpretation, but can also be found in the practice of international dispute settlement. However, international climate law has not yet been taken into account by a single ECT tribunal. Although some hurdles and uncertainties remain in practice, examples of extraneous treaty use, as well as the reasoning of the judgments of recent climate litigation, show that ECT ISDS has the potential to reconcile climate change and energy investment interests in the future.
{"title":"Reconciling International Climate Law and the Energy Charter Treaty through the Use of Integrative Interpretation in Arbitration","authors":"Eike Hinrichsen","doi":"10.3390/laws13020024","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3390/laws13020024","url":null,"abstract":"The conflicting objectives of the Energy Charter Treaty’s (ECT) protection of fossil fuel investments and climate change mitigation can reveal themselves in investor state dispute settlement (ISDS). As neither the modernization nor the termination of the ECT is likely, ECT arbitration will continue to exist. This article, therefore, examines the reconciling potential of integrative interpretation in climate relevant ECT arbitrations. An integrative interpretation is not only prescribed by the international rules of treaty interpretation, but can also be found in the practice of international dispute settlement. However, international climate law has not yet been taken into account by a single ECT tribunal. Although some hurdles and uncertainties remain in practice, examples of extraneous treaty use, as well as the reasoning of the judgments of recent climate litigation, show that ECT ISDS has the potential to reconcile climate change and energy investment interests in the future.","PeriodicalId":30534,"journal":{"name":"Laws","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2024-04-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140677412","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
South African criminal law has no separate, distinct, or novel cultural defence. Such a defence could negate or mitigate an accused’s criminal liability for a culturally motivated crime. Whether South Africa’s criminal law could adopt such a defence requires understanding its influence on the requirements for criminal liability. This article evaluates the influence of the cultural defence on the elements of conduct and culpability. The first part deals with the cultural defence and voluntary conduct. The discussion then turns to culpability, which consists of criminal capacity and fault (mens rea). The third part considers the cultural defence’s influence on criminal capacity, while the fourth considers its influence on fault. More specifically, the article evaluates how the existing types of defence that can negate conduct and culpability in South Africa’s criminal law can accommodate arguments of an accused’s cultural background, values, and beliefs to determine whether there is a gap that only a separate, distinct, or novel cultural defence can fill. The article concludes that South Africa’s principles of conduct and culpability are already flexible enough to accommodate such arguments, obviating the need for introducing a separate, distinct, or novel cultural defence.
{"title":"Influence of the Cultural Defence on Conduct and Culpability in South African Criminal Law","authors":"Jacques Matthee","doi":"10.3390/laws13020023","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3390/laws13020023","url":null,"abstract":"South African criminal law has no separate, distinct, or novel cultural defence. Such a defence could negate or mitigate an accused’s criminal liability for a culturally motivated crime. Whether South Africa’s criminal law could adopt such a defence requires understanding its influence on the requirements for criminal liability. This article evaluates the influence of the cultural defence on the elements of conduct and culpability. The first part deals with the cultural defence and voluntary conduct. The discussion then turns to culpability, which consists of criminal capacity and fault (mens rea). The third part considers the cultural defence’s influence on criminal capacity, while the fourth considers its influence on fault. More specifically, the article evaluates how the existing types of defence that can negate conduct and culpability in South Africa’s criminal law can accommodate arguments of an accused’s cultural background, values, and beliefs to determine whether there is a gap that only a separate, distinct, or novel cultural defence can fill. The article concludes that South Africa’s principles of conduct and culpability are already flexible enough to accommodate such arguments, obviating the need for introducing a separate, distinct, or novel cultural defence.","PeriodicalId":30534,"journal":{"name":"Laws","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2024-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140769937","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The principal purpose of this article is to demonstrate how the precautionary principle can be included in the investor–state dispute settlement (ISDS) deliberative process by providing a legal solution that would permit the invocation and implementation of this concept within the ISDS operational framework. The precautionary principle has been widely applied in the environmental management field, yet its role within the ISDS framework has remained relatively underutilised. To analyse this issue, this paper first explores the operational justification of the precautionary principle and how decision-makers should endorse it in order to fully recognise and address environmental concerns on a legal level. Next, the article proceeds to examine recent ISDS cases in which the precautionary principle was invoked and compares various risk assessment techniques to illustrate how it may be incorporated into the deliberative process and harmonised with other standards. The paper suggests that the forward-looking nature of the precautionary principle has paramount importance in disputes involving oil and gas, particularly in cases where oil and gas activities are believed to contribute to greenhouse gas emissions that could worsen global warming. This paper advances the argument that a wider application of the principle could better equip ISDS tribunals to address the limitations of scientific knowledge, especially under circumstances where significant or irreversible environmental damage may occur.
{"title":"The Invocation of the Precautionary Principle within the Investor–State Dispute Settlement Mechanism: Not Seizing the Occasion","authors":"N. Masumy, Sara Hourani","doi":"10.3390/laws13020022","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3390/laws13020022","url":null,"abstract":"The principal purpose of this article is to demonstrate how the precautionary principle can be included in the investor–state dispute settlement (ISDS) deliberative process by providing a legal solution that would permit the invocation and implementation of this concept within the ISDS operational framework. The precautionary principle has been widely applied in the environmental management field, yet its role within the ISDS framework has remained relatively underutilised. To analyse this issue, this paper first explores the operational justification of the precautionary principle and how decision-makers should endorse it in order to fully recognise and address environmental concerns on a legal level. Next, the article proceeds to examine recent ISDS cases in which the precautionary principle was invoked and compares various risk assessment techniques to illustrate how it may be incorporated into the deliberative process and harmonised with other standards. The paper suggests that the forward-looking nature of the precautionary principle has paramount importance in disputes involving oil and gas, particularly in cases where oil and gas activities are believed to contribute to greenhouse gas emissions that could worsen global warming. This paper advances the argument that a wider application of the principle could better equip ISDS tribunals to address the limitations of scientific knowledge, especially under circumstances where significant or irreversible environmental damage may occur.","PeriodicalId":30534,"journal":{"name":"Laws","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2024-03-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140372271","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
When the critical legal studies (CLS) movement emerged in the United States, many in the legal community were shocked by the movement’s radical calls to remake legal education. But the movement also presented bold criticisms of quantitative legal scholarship and calculation in law that have proven remarkably prophetic. This article resuscitates the CLS movement’s concerns over “scientific law” in one of the movement’s most canonical works: the Critical Legal Studies Symposium issue of the Stanford Law Review in 1984. Along the way, this article explores the scope and limits of CLS admonitions regarding quantitative research and legal problem solving for the present day.
{"title":"Trashing the Tables: The Critical Legal Studies Symposium of the Stanford Law Review, Then and Now","authors":"Paul Baumgardner","doi":"10.3390/laws13020021","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3390/laws13020021","url":null,"abstract":"When the critical legal studies (CLS) movement emerged in the United States, many in the legal community were shocked by the movement’s radical calls to remake legal education. But the movement also presented bold criticisms of quantitative legal scholarship and calculation in law that have proven remarkably prophetic. This article resuscitates the CLS movement’s concerns over “scientific law” in one of the movement’s most canonical works: the Critical Legal Studies Symposium issue of the Stanford Law Review in 1984. Along the way, this article explores the scope and limits of CLS admonitions regarding quantitative research and legal problem solving for the present day.","PeriodicalId":30534,"journal":{"name":"Laws","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2024-03-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140380410","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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