Pub Date : 2005-04-01DOI: 10.1080/14613190500046197
E. Gordy
Maybe one reason why analyses of the rise and rule of Slobodan Milošević so often turn out to be unsatisfying is that they are forced to combine a small subject, an undistinguished bureaucrat who developed into the contemporary face of mass murder, with a large question, the genesis and nature of evil. The question is big enough that efforts to examine it independently, whether from philosophical, theological, social–psychological or historical perspectives are always bound to appear tendentious or incomplete. And Milošević as a personality, however many questions his brief tenure as a global attention-getter raise, is an utterly inadequate vehicle to carry the weight of the question. Any treatment that is not simply a bad book is forced to choose between highlighting the characteristics of the vehicle in a mystifying way or diverting attention to the road the vehicle travels and losing the vehicle in the process. These twin impulses are demonstrated in two recent analyses of the Milošević phenomenon. Vidosav Stevanović, a prominent Serbian novelist and poet, seeks to match Milošević’s psychological craving for power with mythological and authoritarian impulses in Serbian culture. Lenard Cohen, a respected American political scientist, tries to situate Milošević in the context of regional and global political developments, moving toward an explanation that sees his power interacting with a socio-cultural environment and the calculations of other political figures, both of which showed an unnerving tendency to play into the Serbian caudillo’s hands. A comparative examination of the two books shows, if nothing else, the relative strengths and weaknesses of the two perspectives. While Cohen’s work is undoubtedly, from the point of view of evidence, methodology and quality of analysis, the better book of the two, it may be that Stevanović offers a level of insight into the meaning of Milošević that Cohen lacks. At the end there remain
{"title":"Review Articles: Milošević: malicious lunatic, faulty product, or baffling enigma?","authors":"E. Gordy","doi":"10.1080/14613190500046197","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14613190500046197","url":null,"abstract":"Maybe one reason why analyses of the rise and rule of Slobodan Milošević so often turn out to be unsatisfying is that they are forced to combine a small subject, an undistinguished bureaucrat who developed into the contemporary face of mass murder, with a large question, the genesis and nature of evil. The question is big enough that efforts to examine it independently, whether from philosophical, theological, social–psychological or historical perspectives are always bound to appear tendentious or incomplete. And Milošević as a personality, however many questions his brief tenure as a global attention-getter raise, is an utterly inadequate vehicle to carry the weight of the question. Any treatment that is not simply a bad book is forced to choose between highlighting the characteristics of the vehicle in a mystifying way or diverting attention to the road the vehicle travels and losing the vehicle in the process. These twin impulses are demonstrated in two recent analyses of the Milošević phenomenon. Vidosav Stevanović, a prominent Serbian novelist and poet, seeks to match Milošević’s psychological craving for power with mythological and authoritarian impulses in Serbian culture. Lenard Cohen, a respected American political scientist, tries to situate Milošević in the context of regional and global political developments, moving toward an explanation that sees his power interacting with a socio-cultural environment and the calculations of other political figures, both of which showed an unnerving tendency to play into the Serbian caudillo’s hands. A comparative examination of the two books shows, if nothing else, the relative strengths and weaknesses of the two perspectives. While Cohen’s work is undoubtedly, from the point of view of evidence, methodology and quality of analysis, the better book of the two, it may be that Stevanović offers a level of insight into the meaning of Milošević that Cohen lacks. At the end there remain","PeriodicalId":313717,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116152110","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2005-04-01DOI: 10.1080/14613190500046262
M. Flores
One of the few serious and poised comments the Italian newspapers made on the substantial middle-term problems raised by Turkey’s potential accession to the EU, was Barbara Spinelli’s. Here, from among the process’ most relevant problems, she stresses the historical legacy. The article, published soon after the EU’s decision to choose October 2005 as the opening date of negotiations, reads as follows:
{"title":"Review Article: Turkey's entry into the EU: national identity, collective memory and the haunting ghost of the Armenian genocide","authors":"M. Flores","doi":"10.1080/14613190500046262","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14613190500046262","url":null,"abstract":"One of the few serious and poised comments the Italian newspapers made on the substantial middle-term problems raised by Turkey’s potential accession to the EU, was Barbara Spinelli’s. Here, from among the process’ most relevant problems, she stresses the historical legacy. The article, published soon after the EU’s decision to choose October 2005 as the opening date of negotiations, reads as follows:","PeriodicalId":313717,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124133911","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2005-04-01DOI: 10.1080/14613190500046213
R. McDonald
The book forms part of a series, produced by the Centre for European Union Studies at the University of Hull, that is designed to explore the inter-relationship between EU membership and the politics and policy-making of member and non-member states. Presently the series runs to six volumes including two on countries that are in (Poland and Greece); three on countries that are out (Norway, Iceland and Turkey); and, a sixth under the generic title The European Union and Democratisation. In the case of Turkey, the editors have identified as a major problem in the debate about that country’s EU aspirations a failure by foreign scholars and statesmen fully to appreciate the fundamental shift in the forces championing and promoting the cause of accession. Historically, the Kemalist, Republican elite was considered to be the main proponent of Westernization because of its insistence on secularism. However, the essayists argue, from varying perspectives, that Kemalism produced a nationalist, parochial and authoritarian regime that sought to preserve the rights and perquisites of the ruling elite even at the expense of the policy adjustment necessary to join the EU. Today, the authors argue, the true force for Europeanism in Turkey is a broad front of Islamists, business interests and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), who represent the public at large—up to 90 per cent of whom are said to support EU membership because of the liberalization and equality of opportunity anticipated through the creation of a political culture based on human rights and civil liberties and a business environment founded on free market principles and common rules. Islamists, who hitherto had seen all their efforts to assume power by democratic means thwarted by the military, envisage the EU as a bastion of civil liberties and pursue membership in the hope that it will facilitate, in the name of human rights, the recognition of Islamist demands that hitherto had been suppressed by the secular state. That is to say, both they and their business and social partners are looking for the creation of the classic ‘level playing field’ that will provide equal access for all to determine the course of political development and what is considered to be in the public interest. The problem with the volume is that, from internal evidence, the writing of all but one of the 12 essays, was concluded before March 2003, when Tayyip
{"title":"Review Article: Islamists to the fore in Turkey's pursuit of EU membership","authors":"R. McDonald","doi":"10.1080/14613190500046213","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14613190500046213","url":null,"abstract":"The book forms part of a series, produced by the Centre for European Union Studies at the University of Hull, that is designed to explore the inter-relationship between EU membership and the politics and policy-making of member and non-member states. Presently the series runs to six volumes including two on countries that are in (Poland and Greece); three on countries that are out (Norway, Iceland and Turkey); and, a sixth under the generic title The European Union and Democratisation. In the case of Turkey, the editors have identified as a major problem in the debate about that country’s EU aspirations a failure by foreign scholars and statesmen fully to appreciate the fundamental shift in the forces championing and promoting the cause of accession. Historically, the Kemalist, Republican elite was considered to be the main proponent of Westernization because of its insistence on secularism. However, the essayists argue, from varying perspectives, that Kemalism produced a nationalist, parochial and authoritarian regime that sought to preserve the rights and perquisites of the ruling elite even at the expense of the policy adjustment necessary to join the EU. Today, the authors argue, the true force for Europeanism in Turkey is a broad front of Islamists, business interests and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), who represent the public at large—up to 90 per cent of whom are said to support EU membership because of the liberalization and equality of opportunity anticipated through the creation of a political culture based on human rights and civil liberties and a business environment founded on free market principles and common rules. Islamists, who hitherto had seen all their efforts to assume power by democratic means thwarted by the military, envisage the EU as a bastion of civil liberties and pursue membership in the hope that it will facilitate, in the name of human rights, the recognition of Islamist demands that hitherto had been suppressed by the secular state. That is to say, both they and their business and social partners are looking for the creation of the classic ‘level playing field’ that will provide equal access for all to determine the course of political development and what is considered to be in the public interest. The problem with the volume is that, from internal evidence, the writing of all but one of the 12 essays, was concluded before March 2003, when Tayyip","PeriodicalId":313717,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121101722","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2005-04-01DOI: 10.1080/14613190500036693
Timothy Donais
After nearly a decade of concerted international effort, Bosnia-Herzegovina appears finally to have been coerced and cajoled onto an irreversible path towards sustainable peace and eventual European integration. The past several years have seen repeated breakthroughs on Bosnia’s peacebuilding front: a million war-displaced persons have now at least partially reversed the results of ethnic cleansing by returning home, while the elements of a functional Bosnian state—including a single army, state customs and border services, and even a European-style value-added tax—are slowly falling into place. At the same time, the forces of ethnic nationalism appear to be moderating, as not even the return to power of Bosnia’s main nationalist parties in the 2002 national elections has slowed the state-building momentum. Meanwhile, the country is edging closer towards the start of negotiations with the European Union on a Stabilization and Association Agreement. By the time Bosnia celebrates the 10th anniversary of the Dayton Peace Accords at the end of 2005, Europe’s powder keg may have become just another run-of-the-mill aspirant for EU membership. Despite this apparently good news, optimism about the future remains in short supply among Bosnians themselves. In one recent poll, fully 42 per cent of respondents agreed that the dominant trend in Bosnia is towards disintegration rather than integration, while a separate poll found a similar percentage ready to emigrate at the first opportunity. Voter turnout for the 2002 elections was dismal, and the results widely seen as a signal of popular discontent, if not outright disgust, with the political process. Thus, while Bosnia as a state appears to be doing better—at least in comparison with its near-death experience of the early 1990s—it is worth asking whether Bosnians themselves are benefiting from the advance of their country’s peace process. In other words, beyond the fact that Bosnians are no longer killing each other in large numbers—a far from insignificant accomplishment—where has the Dayton peace process left ordinary Bosnians, both as individuals and as members of the country’s major ethnic groups?
{"title":"A tale of two towns: human security and the limits of post-war normalization in Bosnia-Herzegovina","authors":"Timothy Donais","doi":"10.1080/14613190500036693","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14613190500036693","url":null,"abstract":"After nearly a decade of concerted international effort, Bosnia-Herzegovina appears finally to have been coerced and cajoled onto an irreversible path towards sustainable peace and eventual European integration. The past several years have seen repeated breakthroughs on Bosnia’s peacebuilding front: a million war-displaced persons have now at least partially reversed the results of ethnic cleansing by returning home, while the elements of a functional Bosnian state—including a single army, state customs and border services, and even a European-style value-added tax—are slowly falling into place. At the same time, the forces of ethnic nationalism appear to be moderating, as not even the return to power of Bosnia’s main nationalist parties in the 2002 national elections has slowed the state-building momentum. Meanwhile, the country is edging closer towards the start of negotiations with the European Union on a Stabilization and Association Agreement. By the time Bosnia celebrates the 10th anniversary of the Dayton Peace Accords at the end of 2005, Europe’s powder keg may have become just another run-of-the-mill aspirant for EU membership. Despite this apparently good news, optimism about the future remains in short supply among Bosnians themselves. In one recent poll, fully 42 per cent of respondents agreed that the dominant trend in Bosnia is towards disintegration rather than integration, while a separate poll found a similar percentage ready to emigrate at the first opportunity. Voter turnout for the 2002 elections was dismal, and the results widely seen as a signal of popular discontent, if not outright disgust, with the political process. Thus, while Bosnia as a state appears to be doing better—at least in comparison with its near-death experience of the early 1990s—it is worth asking whether Bosnians themselves are benefiting from the advance of their country’s peace process. In other words, beyond the fact that Bosnians are no longer killing each other in large numbers—a far from insignificant accomplishment—where has the Dayton peace process left ordinary Bosnians, both as individuals and as members of the country’s major ethnic groups?","PeriodicalId":313717,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133799670","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2004-12-01DOI: 10.1080/1461319042000296787
R. Crampton
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Pub Date : 2004-12-01DOI: 10.1080/1461319042000296831
Aleksandar Pavković
Yugoslavia, the State which Withered Away: The Rise, Crisis and Fall of Kardelj’s Yugoslavia (1974–1990), I shall argue, offers a very well-argued and coherent explanation of the political processes that led to Yugoslavia’s disintegration but not a conclusive answer to our question. The book—published in the same language both in Zagreb and in Belgrade—tells the story of a failed attempt to impose the Marxist conception of the withering away of the state to a multinational society of former Yugoslavia. According to the doctrine elaborated by Edvard Kardelj, Tito’s second in command, the state, during the socialist transition, should, in all of its non-coercive functions, be replaced by associations of workers who were referred to as ‘self-managing (or free) producers’. The two founding legal documents embodying this doctrine, the Yugoslav federal Constitution of 1974 and the Law on Associated Labour (1976) generated more than 5 million laws and regulations which were supposed to govern all aspects of public life in former Yugoslavia, both at the workplace and in the more traditional political sphere. More importantly, as Dejan Jović argues, this doctrine of socialist self-management shaped the ideological outlook of the Yugoslav communist elites well until the effective dissolution of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (the Yugoslav Communist Party), at its last and aborted extraordinary congress in January 1990. But the book offers not only a story of a failed communist experiment, but also an explanation of the disintegration of the federal Yugoslav state. Its author, in the first chapter, examines and partially rejects eight competing explanations of the disintegration each of which postulate one of the following as the dominant or decisive causal factor in the disintegration: the economic crisis, ancient hatreds among the peoples of Yugoslavia, nationalism/nationalist ideologies, cultural differences among the peoples of Yugoslavia, changes in international politics (the end of the cold war), the role of individual political
{"title":"Why did Yugoslavia disintegrate? Is there a conclusive answer?","authors":"Aleksandar Pavković","doi":"10.1080/1461319042000296831","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/1461319042000296831","url":null,"abstract":"Yugoslavia, the State which Withered Away: The Rise, Crisis and Fall of Kardelj’s Yugoslavia (1974–1990), I shall argue, offers a very well-argued and coherent explanation of the political processes that led to Yugoslavia’s disintegration but not a conclusive answer to our question. The book—published in the same language both in Zagreb and in Belgrade—tells the story of a failed attempt to impose the Marxist conception of the withering away of the state to a multinational society of former Yugoslavia. According to the doctrine elaborated by Edvard Kardelj, Tito’s second in command, the state, during the socialist transition, should, in all of its non-coercive functions, be replaced by associations of workers who were referred to as ‘self-managing (or free) producers’. The two founding legal documents embodying this doctrine, the Yugoslav federal Constitution of 1974 and the Law on Associated Labour (1976) generated more than 5 million laws and regulations which were supposed to govern all aspects of public life in former Yugoslavia, both at the workplace and in the more traditional political sphere. More importantly, as Dejan Jović argues, this doctrine of socialist self-management shaped the ideological outlook of the Yugoslav communist elites well until the effective dissolution of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (the Yugoslav Communist Party), at its last and aborted extraordinary congress in January 1990. But the book offers not only a story of a failed communist experiment, but also an explanation of the disintegration of the federal Yugoslav state. Its author, in the first chapter, examines and partially rejects eight competing explanations of the disintegration each of which postulate one of the following as the dominant or decisive causal factor in the disintegration: the economic crisis, ancient hatreds among the peoples of Yugoslavia, nationalism/nationalist ideologies, cultural differences among the peoples of Yugoslavia, changes in international politics (the end of the cold war), the role of individual political","PeriodicalId":313717,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2004-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127340097","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2004-12-01DOI: 10.1080/1461319042000296813
G. Kassimeris
The long history of 17N terrorism ended on 5 September 2002, when the group's leader of operations, Dimitris Koufodinas, turned himself in to the police after 2 months on the run. Koufodinas pulled...
{"title":"Fighting for revolution? The life and death of Greece's revolutionary organization 17 November, 1975–2002","authors":"G. Kassimeris","doi":"10.1080/1461319042000296813","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/1461319042000296813","url":null,"abstract":"The long history of 17N terrorism ended on 5 September 2002, when the group's leader of operations, Dimitris Koufodinas, turned himself in to the police after 2 months on the run. Koufodinas pulled...","PeriodicalId":313717,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2004-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124713137","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2004-12-01DOI: 10.1080/1461319042000296822
J. Bukowski
The European Union (EU), particularly since the signing of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and the implementation of the common currency among 12 EU member states, is increasingly important in the lives of European citizens. Indeed, a deeply entrenched level of government has gradually evolved at the supranational level, at times supplanting the decision-making authority of the national and/or sub-national levels. There is no shortage of studies which seek to understand policy making in the European ‘polity’. Several analysts see in the EU the emergence of a complex, multi-level system of decision making. Further, others have applied policy network analysis to develop explanations of policy making and implementation across levels. Many of these scholars are convinced that network governance is increasingly the norm within and beyond European states. While there is by no means agreement on the usefulness of this perspective, enough evidence has been presented to merit serious consideration of policy network analysis. And if policy networks are indeed in place across the EU, other questions arise; for example, what effects such networks may have on policy making and implementation. Moreover, as Peterson and O’Toole point out, it is important to ask what the effects of policy networks may be on democratic legitimacy. The current study seeks to explore this question. First, general arguments and evidence will be presented regarding the policy networks perspective and the hypothesized effects of such networks on democratic governance. Second, criteria will be developed to assess the democratic legitimacy of network decision making. Third, the multi-level network which appears to characterize environmental policy in the EU will be
{"title":"Multi‐level networks as a threat to democracy? The case of Portugal's Vasco da Gama bridge","authors":"J. Bukowski","doi":"10.1080/1461319042000296822","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/1461319042000296822","url":null,"abstract":"The European Union (EU), particularly since the signing of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and the implementation of the common currency among 12 EU member states, is increasingly important in the lives of European citizens. Indeed, a deeply entrenched level of government has gradually evolved at the supranational level, at times supplanting the decision-making authority of the national and/or sub-national levels. There is no shortage of studies which seek to understand policy making in the European ‘polity’. Several analysts see in the EU the emergence of a complex, multi-level system of decision making. Further, others have applied policy network analysis to develop explanations of policy making and implementation across levels. Many of these scholars are convinced that network governance is increasingly the norm within and beyond European states. While there is by no means agreement on the usefulness of this perspective, enough evidence has been presented to merit serious consideration of policy network analysis. And if policy networks are indeed in place across the EU, other questions arise; for example, what effects such networks may have on policy making and implementation. Moreover, as Peterson and O’Toole point out, it is important to ask what the effects of policy networks may be on democratic legitimacy. The current study seeks to explore this question. First, general arguments and evidence will be presented regarding the policy networks perspective and the hypothesized effects of such networks on democratic governance. Second, criteria will be developed to assess the democratic legitimacy of network decision making. Third, the multi-level network which appears to characterize environmental policy in the EU will be","PeriodicalId":313717,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2004-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117088381","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2004-12-01DOI: 10.1080/1461319042000296796
Gëzim Alpion
In the summer of 2003 an ‘unholy war’ broke out between the Albanians and the Macedonians over the filiation of a beatified woman. The decision of the Government of the Republic of Macedonia to erect a monument dedicated to Mother Teresa, not very far from the centre of Rome, aroused the Albanians’ suspicion and jealousy. This was not the first time the Albanians felt that they were being robbed of ‘their’ Mother Teresa; some of their neighbours had apparently tried to ‘appropriate’ her almost immediately after the Albanian Catholic nun was ‘discovered’ by the BBC’s Malcolm Muggeridge in 1968. By the time Mother Teresa was awarded the Nobel Prize for Peace in 1979, the competition of several Balkan countries to claim the celebrity nun as their own daughter began in earnest. According to Albert Ramaj, the Croats were the first to claim that she ‘belonged’ to them. The Croat government issued her with a Croat passport, which was handed on to her by the country’s ambassador in India in the early 1990s. The Croats base their argument mainly, if not exclusively, on the fact that Mother Teresa spoke Serbo-Croat better than Albanian. Several Slav reporters are keen to emphasize that, while she was fluent in Serbo-Croat, she spoke little or no Albanian; something strongly contested by the Albanians. Mother Teresa had a good command of Serbo-Croat because in India she was constantly in contact with Croatian and other Yugoslav priests. As for her knowledge of Albanian, argues Dr Lush Gjergji, the distinguished biographer and friend of Mother Teresa, who met her more than 50 times, she spoke her native tongue very well but was not very confident of her ability to use literary Albanian in public. Like the Croats, the Serbs have made some attempts to prove that Mother Teresa was originally from Serbia. Unlike the Croats, however, the Serbs have been less outspoken in their claim because Mother Teresa happened to be a Roman Catholic. Both the Croats and the Serbs, though, have suffixed her Albanian family name ‘Bojaxhiu’ to ‘Bojadžijević’, which has always enraged the Albanians.
{"title":"Media, ethnicity and patriotism—the Balkans ‘unholy war’ for the appropriation of Mother Teresa","authors":"Gëzim Alpion","doi":"10.1080/1461319042000296796","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/1461319042000296796","url":null,"abstract":"In the summer of 2003 an ‘unholy war’ broke out between the Albanians and the Macedonians over the filiation of a beatified woman. The decision of the Government of the Republic of Macedonia to erect a monument dedicated to Mother Teresa, not very far from the centre of Rome, aroused the Albanians’ suspicion and jealousy. This was not the first time the Albanians felt that they were being robbed of ‘their’ Mother Teresa; some of their neighbours had apparently tried to ‘appropriate’ her almost immediately after the Albanian Catholic nun was ‘discovered’ by the BBC’s Malcolm Muggeridge in 1968. By the time Mother Teresa was awarded the Nobel Prize for Peace in 1979, the competition of several Balkan countries to claim the celebrity nun as their own daughter began in earnest. According to Albert Ramaj, the Croats were the first to claim that she ‘belonged’ to them. The Croat government issued her with a Croat passport, which was handed on to her by the country’s ambassador in India in the early 1990s. The Croats base their argument mainly, if not exclusively, on the fact that Mother Teresa spoke Serbo-Croat better than Albanian. Several Slav reporters are keen to emphasize that, while she was fluent in Serbo-Croat, she spoke little or no Albanian; something strongly contested by the Albanians. Mother Teresa had a good command of Serbo-Croat because in India she was constantly in contact with Croatian and other Yugoslav priests. As for her knowledge of Albanian, argues Dr Lush Gjergji, the distinguished biographer and friend of Mother Teresa, who met her more than 50 times, she spoke her native tongue very well but was not very confident of her ability to use literary Albanian in public. Like the Croats, the Serbs have made some attempts to prove that Mother Teresa was originally from Serbia. Unlike the Croats, however, the Serbs have been less outspoken in their claim because Mother Teresa happened to be a Roman Catholic. Both the Croats and the Serbs, though, have suffixed her Albanian family name ‘Bojaxhiu’ to ‘Bojadžijević’, which has always enraged the Albanians.","PeriodicalId":313717,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2004-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125285128","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2004-12-01DOI: 10.1080/1461319042000296804
J. Sakkas
In the early hours of 21 April 1967 the constitutional government of Greece was overthrown and in its place a military regime was established, the first in Western Europe since World War II. The coup was masterminded by a group of hitherto unknown and insignificant colonels, some of whom had served in the Greek Intelligence Agency (KYP) and had been on the payroll of the CIA since the 1950s. For the next 7 years Greece would remain under authoritarian military rule, first under George Papadopoulos and later (November 1973) under Dimitris Ioannides. Greece before World War II was under the British sphere of influence. Its geographical position in the Mediterranean was regarded as vitally important for the sea communications between Britain and the Far East as well as for the oil supplies of the Middle East. In March 1947 the British were replaced by the Americans and Greece and Turkey were selected as the most appropriate test case for the USA’s cold war policy of containment. Greece was the only country in the Balkans not yet subject to Soviet hegemony. If it fell to the communists, Turkey would be the next victim of Soviet expansionism. Inevitably, the entire eastern Mediterranean would be sealed behind the Iron Curtain and the interests of the Western powers in the oil-rich Middle East would be severely damaged. The post-war Greek governments mainly concentrated on opposing com-
{"title":"The Greek dictatorship, the USA and the Arabs, 1967–1974","authors":"J. Sakkas","doi":"10.1080/1461319042000296804","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/1461319042000296804","url":null,"abstract":"In the early hours of 21 April 1967 the constitutional government of Greece was overthrown and in its place a military regime was established, the first in Western Europe since World War II. The coup was masterminded by a group of hitherto unknown and insignificant colonels, some of whom had served in the Greek Intelligence Agency (KYP) and had been on the payroll of the CIA since the 1950s. For the next 7 years Greece would remain under authoritarian military rule, first under George Papadopoulos and later (November 1973) under Dimitris Ioannides. Greece before World War II was under the British sphere of influence. Its geographical position in the Mediterranean was regarded as vitally important for the sea communications between Britain and the Far East as well as for the oil supplies of the Middle East. In March 1947 the British were replaced by the Americans and Greece and Turkey were selected as the most appropriate test case for the USA’s cold war policy of containment. Greece was the only country in the Balkans not yet subject to Soviet hegemony. If it fell to the communists, Turkey would be the next victim of Soviet expansionism. Inevitably, the entire eastern Mediterranean would be sealed behind the Iron Curtain and the interests of the Western powers in the oil-rich Middle East would be severely damaged. The post-war Greek governments mainly concentrated on opposing com-","PeriodicalId":313717,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2004-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133469846","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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