Pub Date : 2007-12-01DOI: 10.1080/14613190701690132
S. Verney
For several years, an air of crisis has been hanging over European integration. Ambitious plans for political deepening have run into trouble while monetary cooperation has not opened the way to political union. The European institutional structures are under strain after the recent Enlargement. The latter added some difficult new partners, not all committed to the cause of integration. Meanwhile, steps towards a common foreign policy have yet to significantly enhance Europe’s global weight. Economic pressures, encouraging calls for national protectionism, seem to be undermining popular support for the fundamental bargain at the heart of integration—the opening of borders. And as if all of this is not enough, the European club is faced with the candidacy of an economically weak applicant with an unstable political past, located on the geographical periphery of Europe. One may well ask, given these circumstances, how was it possible for Greece to enter the European Community? In the first decade of the 21st century, with a heated debate raging over Turkish accession and the future of Europe, the situation outlined above may sound distinctly familiar. But in actual fact, the climate described is that of a period 30 years in the past, when the Enlargement which was proving so difficult to digest was not the Fifth but the First. In the mid-1970s, all the member states’ economies were in recession following the 1973 oil price rise. The latter had also triggered the collapse of the Snake, the EC’s first attempt at monetary cooperation. With economic malaise weakening support for deeper integration, the aim of achieving European Union by the end of the decade, optimistically proclaimed at the Paris summit of 1972 and examined in the Tindemans Report, was quietly dropped. Meanwhile, in launching European Political Cooperation (EPC) in 1973, the EC had taken its first steps towards a common external identity. But the unanimity requirement encouraged agreement at the level of the lowest common denominator. When the EC managed to speak with one voice, during the summer 1974 Cyprus crisis, no-one appeared to be listening. The Greek accession application of June 1975 was thus submitted in an atmosphere of crisis, when the future of the integration process itself was presented as being under threat. In January 1976, the Report on European Union,
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Pub Date : 2007-12-01DOI: 10.1080/14613190701689977
E. Kalaycıoğlu
Since the 1960s, Turkey has experienced an increasing variety of political acts carried out to influence, hinder or protest decisions taken by the political authorities. As acts of protest, they ha...
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Pub Date : 2007-07-03DOI: 10.1080/14613190701414426
L. Quaglia
The intersection of watershed events in international politics (first and foremost the end of the cold war), and in domestic politics (namely, the transition from the First to the Second Republic), induced a redefinition of Italy’s relationship with Europe in the 1990s. On the one hand, the Italian political and economic systems were profoundly transformed in that decade. However, the European Union (EU) was also transformed by both ‘deepening’, mainly through the establishment of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) in 1999, and ‘widening’, through embarking on enlargement, a process completed in 2004. Several different perspectives could be adopted in order to analyse the relationship between Italy and the EU. For a long time, the traditional ‘foreign policy’ approach prevailed, considering Italy’s EU policy as a component of Italy’s foreign policy tout court. Subsequently, the literature on Europeanization explored the domestic impact of the EU in Italy, making distinctions between the attitudes of the elites and masses, the effects on national institutions and policies and politics (see the burgeoning literature on Euroscepticism). Some of these works have focused on the impacts major EU policies, such as EMU, have had on the Italian state. More recently, a public policy approach has been adopted by those considering Italy’s European
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Pub Date : 2007-07-03DOI: 10.1080/14613190701414095
M. Carbone
The role of Italy in the international arena has received increasing attention in academic and public debates. This recent interest is a consequence of the new opportunities for middle powers arising from the end of the cold war, but it also results from the radical transformations in its domestic political system. During the first 40 years of its Republican history, Italy kept a low profile in foreign policy. The presence of the strongest communist party in Western Europe, the Partito Comunista Italiano (PCI), obliged the ruling party, Democrazia Cristiana (DC), and its allies to ‘insulate’ Italy from the external environment. The twin pillars of its foreign policy—Atlanticism and Europeanism—were rarely questioned. Atlanticism implied a passive and uncritical relationship with the USA, whereas Europeanism entailed a strong as well as a rhetorical commitment to the construction of the European Union (EU). The imperfect bipartisan foreign policy that emerged in the 1970s when the PCI—which however was excluded from any governmental coalition—accepted the ‘Western option’ did not significantly affect the Atlanticism–Europeanism equilibrium, though it produced some independent action in the Mediterranean. Since the end of the cold war, Italy has becomemore active in the international arena, not least by participating in a number of military and humanitarian missions, in some cases even with a leading role (e.g. Somalia, Albania, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon). At the domestic level, the early 1990s were characterized by the alleged end of the First Republic, its corrupt party system and the introduction of a quasi-majoritarian electoral law. Two heterogonous coalitions have alternated in power since: centre-right between 1994 and 1995; centre-left between 1996 and 2001; centre-right between 2001 and 2006; centre-left since 2006. While this is an issue of contention in the literature—and all the papers in this volume deal with it—the two coalitions seem to hold different views on the role of Italy in the international arena, particularly on the balance between Atlanticism and Europeanism. The centre-right coalition promotes a more pragmatic approach, based on a special bilateral relationship with the USA. The centre-left coalition supports a multilateral approach, which is reflected in a renewed commitment to the EU and its role on the world stage. As a result of these differences, continuity and discontinuity becomes a central issue in the public debates, but at times affects the relationship with other countries. This special issue of Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans sheds light on how much the ‘policy pendulum’ has swung between Atlanticism and Europeanism since the early 1990s and the extent to which that movement is affected by the particular coalition in power. Elisabetta Brighi argues that two
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Pub Date : 2007-07-03DOI: 10.1080/14613190701414483
A. Missiroli
It is, and it is bound to remain, a moot point whether the end of the cold war contributed to the end of Italy’s ‘First Republic’—and, if so, exactly how and how much. Yet it is a fact that, starting in 1992, the old party system of the post-war era crumbled and a new and still highly unstable one—born out of the new electoral law(s) enforced since 1994—took shape. Its main features have been a distinctly bipolar structure characterized by fragmented and fractious coalitions; a high degree of political litigiousness both across and inside political camps; and a growing role for their respective leaders as temporary ‘federators’. Silvio Berlusconi on the centre-right and Romano Prodi on the centre-left have emerged as such leaders, albeit with significant differences between them. This period (1994–), now labelled as Italy’s ‘Second Republic’, has basically coincided with the first steps of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the European Union (EU), as outlined in the Treaty of Maastricht, signed in early 1992 and later perfected through successive revisions (in 1997 and 2000). Italy’s own foreign, security and defence policy has been confronted with multiple challenges: first, not unlike many other European countries, it had to adapt to the broader post-cold war environment and its unknowns; second, it had to strike a new balance between its traditional Atlanticist and European inclinations, more or less neatly separated between the USA and NATO link on the one hand, and the European Community link on the other, which until then had neither really clashed nor connected; third, it had to adjust its new and shaky internal set-up to the new international and regional developments; fourth, it also had to cope with the ever growing risk of being marginalized and excluded from the various exclusive ‘clubs’ that seemed to take shape on certain policy areas: dedicated Contact Groups, the euro-zone, Schengen, permanent membership of the UN Security Council and others. The first Berlusconi government in 1994 was too short-lived to make a lasting impact on Italian attitudes and priorities, although it managed to send around some unconventional messages. Albeit briefly, the traditional bipartisan consensus on European policy, that dated back to 1977, seemed to be put into question. Berlusconi-I was soon followed by a series of governments—led by Lamberto Dini (1995–1996) and then Romano Prodi (1996–1998)—that tried to rehash the foreign policy traditions of the First Republic, possibly with an even stronger European flavour and focus. This was certainly due also to the centrality of the launching of European Monetary Union and its domestic implications: it is not by accident that the positive outcome of Italy’s quest for EMU membership, in the spring of 1998, was soon followed by the collapse of the Prodi government,
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Pub Date : 2007-07-03DOI: 10.1080/14613190701414376
O. Croci
A number of academics have argued that the last two governments headed by Silvio Berlusconi have attempted to strengthen the relationship with the USA on a bilateral basis and, in so doing, have weakened Italy’s traditional support for the process of European integration. Thus, Roberto Aliboni has contended that Berlusconi has pursued a foreign policy ‘solidly linked to a priority and preferential relationship with the US’. Piero Ignazi has characterized what he has described as Berlusconi’s ‘progressive and growing alignment with the international choices of the Republican administration’ as ‘extreme Americaphilism’. Filippo Andreatta and Elisabetta Brighi have written that the Berlusconi government has embraced an ‘increasingly Americanophile position’ while exhibiting ‘a lack of enthusiasm in European affairs’. Even stronger claims have appeared in the daily and weekly press linked with, or sympathetic to, the centreleft. Thus, Ezio Mauro has written that Italy ended up in the Iraqi quagmire because of Berlusconi’s ‘fanciful ambition of turning himself into Bush’s privileged partner and Italy into a . . . support rider of the US’. Left-wing public intellectual Massimo Cacciari has charged that, under Berlusconi, Italian foreign policy ‘has simply been delegated to the US’. The new centre-left government headed by Romano Prodi, immediately upon taking office, announced that it would embark upon a new course in foreign policy. As the new Minister of Foreign Affairs Massimo D’Alema put it, the new government would revive Europeanism and reinvigorate multilateralism. As it was preparing to ask Parliament for its approval to extend the Italian mission in Afghanistan, President of the Council of Ministers Prodi affirmed that ‘in eight months, his government had led Italy to change pace in foreign policy’. At the same time,
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Pub Date : 2007-07-03DOI: 10.1080/14613190701414541
M. Pedrazzi
The USA and Italy are two protagonists in the endless debate on the reform of the United Nations (UN) Security Council. The prominent role of the USA, not only a permanent member since the UN foundation, but the one which, in the current international reality, is de facto endowed with more power and influence, is due to the weight that its positions inevitably have, more than to the energy displayed to support them. Italy, a country with a limited, albeit not irrelevant, international role, and a non-permanent member of the Security Council for the biennium 2007–2008, has, on the contrary, played an active role in a vigorous attempt to foster its own proposals and, even more, to counter the reform models which it perceived to be against its fundamental interests. Italy and the USA are driven in this debate by diverging needs, and they pursue different objectives. Their departure points were, in fact, in direct opposition with one another. The USA advocated the attribution of new permanent seats to its biggest allies, Germany and Japan. Italy strongly opposed any concept involving the addition of new permanent seats, especially in favour of Germany, and supported the creation of a new category of non-permanent, but ‘more frequently rotating’ seats, to the benefit of all medium powers, while at the same time subscribing to the idea of providing a seat for the European Union (EU). The international situation, however, has evolved, and this paper will try to demonstrate that, while not abandoning their basic premises, the two countries have shortened their distances, meeting in a middle ground, as they happen to fight against the same ‘enemies’. In other words, the efforts of both seem to be focused on avoiding a bad reform more than on promoting the preferred model of each: and a bad reform for both is, for different reasons, the one which has gained the strongest support on the international scene.
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Pub Date : 2007-07-03DOI: 10.1080/14613190701414103
E. Brighi
At the turn of the 20th century, after a few decades of turbulence, Italian foreign policy oscillated between two poles. On the one hand was the alliance with the rising power of the time, Germany, which Italy signed in 1882 and which had been strongly advocated at home by conservatives to both counter French influence and contain democratic sentiments. On the other was the informal alignment with England and France, the soon-to-be Entente Powers, which materialized after the rapprochement of 1902–1903, and promised to be especially advantageous in colonial matters. Until the breakout of the First World War (and indeed a few months into the war), Italy entertained good relations with both alignments, despite the obvious, mounting tension between Germany and England. Curiously, Italy’s multiple diplomatic allegiances were simply considered ‘complementary’ at the time, with Italy supposedly gaining security on the continent (thanks to the Triple Alliance) and in the Mediterranean (thanks to the Entente). It took the crisis of July 1914 to bring Rome’s diplomatic oscillation to an end, and make many realize how contradictory and ill-advised this ambivalent policy had been. Writing in the 1980s, the former Italian Ambassador to Washington Rinaldo Petrignani compared the wavering, oscillatory behaviour of liberal Italy’s foreign policy to the trajectory of a pendulum, periodically swinging from proFrench/English to pro-German/Austrian policies. To explain this curious trajectory, Petrignani considers international and geopolitical factors, as well as domestic issues, but finally settles for a third explanation which echoes Federico Chabod’s own positions, arguing that it was the alternation of pro-French and proGerman ideas, more than anything else, which accounted for the swinging from one alignment to the other. Strategic and domestic factors were of course important, but ideas were just as much, if not more, to explain Italy’s oscillatory foreign policy.
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Pub Date : 2007-07-03DOI: 10.1080/14613190701414517
M. Carbone
The relationship between the European Union (EU) and the developing world has undergone a number of significant changes since the end of the cold war. Following a lengthy discussion on the future of the Lomé Convention, the Cotonou Agreement marked the beginning of a new partnership between the European Community (EC) and the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) group of states. Moreover, EC development policy has gradually become global, with substantial programmes being started in the Mediterranean, Latin America and Central and Eastern Europe. Meanwhile, not only have resources managed at the EC level increased, but Member States have also taken various initiatives to coordinate their bilateral policies. The commitments made in March 2002 and May 2005 to boost quantity and enhance quality of aid and the adoption of the European Consensus on Development in December 2005 are two tangible signs of a desire to improve the effectiveness and visibility of EU aid. From a theoretical point of view, the conventional position is that development policy in the EU reflects the preferences of France and the UK, and the policy entrepreneurship of the European Commission. More generally, two broad tendencies have dominated the Member States’ attitudes to European development cooperation: ‘regionalist’—initially promoted by France and Belgium and then by Portugal and Spain—which has recognized the strategic links with former colonies; ‘globalist’—initially supported by Germany and the Netherlands and then by the UK and the Nordic countries—which has been more concerned with poverty levels. The role of Italy in EU development policy is generally overlooked in these analyses. This omission would seem unjustified, considering that Italy has progressively increased the share of resources channelled through the EU. Similarly, the literature on Italy in the EU concentrates on few issues, namely, the common agricultural policy (CAP), regional policy, economic and monetary
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Pub Date : 2007-04-01DOI: 10.1080/14613190701217019
V. Fouskas
In his doctoral dissertation published by I. B. Tauris in 1997 as: A Clash of Empires; Turkey between Russian Bolshevism and British Imperialism, 1918–1923, Gökay, managing a vast amount of primary and secondary sources, presented an elegant international history thesis on the shaping of modern Turkey. One is tempted to say that a sociological equivalent of Gökay’s earlier work can be found in the work by Niyazi Berkes, The Development of Secularism in Turkey, first published in 1964 by McGill University Press. Whereas Berkes, a sociologist of Cypriot origin, is focusing on the social, economic and cultural/religious processes of the transformation of the late Ottoman Empire and early modern Turkey in an international and interactive context, Gökay masterfully analyses the geo-political dynamics of the First World War in relation to the Eastern Question. The argument is that the settlements produced after the Kemalist victory in Anatolia over imperial Britain’s proxy, Greece, represented not merely an arrangement between Greece and Turkey, but rather a much broader geo-political understanding over the fate of the Middle East and Central Asia. In effect, the Clash of Empires established that modern Turkey arose out of a decades-long fierce geo-political struggle between Britain and Russia in the Balkans, the Middle East and Central Asia and that this is the locus in which the Eastern Question and the ‘Great Game’ cross each other. Moreover, it argued that early Soviet policy towards early modern Turkey had, in the main, followed the general foreign policy principles of the Russian Empire towards the Eastern Mediterranean, the Straits and the Caucasus/Central Asia. Soviet Eastern Policy and Turkey, as the author acknowledges in the Introduction, is a sequel of this earlier work, although in between there has been a significant corpus of intellectual production, ranging from edited volumes on the issue of Caspian oil, to monographs on Eastern Europe and US neo-imperial foreign policy. Soviet Eastern Policy and Turkey looks at the ways in which the USSR attempted to manipulate Turkish elites (to a lesser extent) and Turkish communism (to a greater extent) for geo-political purposes and in order
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