Pub Date : 2006-04-01DOI: 10.1080/14613190600595903
V. Fouskas
{"title":"Why Zones of Conflict is so annoying to some: a response to Bruce Kuniholm and others","authors":"V. Fouskas","doi":"10.1080/14613190600595903","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14613190600595903","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":313717,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126121055","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2006-04-01DOI: 10.1080/14613190600595721
Alina Mungiu‐Pippidi
On 15 December 1989, in the Romanian city of Timisoara, a huge crowd waiting for the chronically late tramway caught word of a nearby altercation between dictator Nicolae Ceauşescu’s secret service, Securitate, and a few Hungarian parishioners protesting the arrest of their priest. Although they were mostly Romanians, they allied with the parishioners against the Securitate. The altercation turned into an uprising after shots were fired by the Army. After a couple of days of escalation, by which time the whole city had joined the insurgents and had occupied the official buildings, Ceauşescu denounced it as the work of ‘foreign terrorists’. To counteract, he convoked the usual formal meeting of support in the capital Bucharest. However, a part of the crowd turned against him. He fled the city the next day, only to be found and shot in the midst of national panic created by sniper fire and collective hysteria. The regime which followed after him, resulting from the first free though unfair elections (1990), took a care to seal the archives concerning these events by means of a National Security Law passed in 1991. People have been left since puzzling over who were the alleged ‘Arab terrorists’. As the Western media originally reported a huge death toll the mere 1000 actually certified dead, although the highest of Eastern European revolutions, has been viewed since with some disappointment and suspicion. In Andijan, a small city in post-Soviet authoritarian Uzbekistan, where the monopoly of power of President Islam Karimov had still been unshaken, violence broke out on 13 May 2005. A small armed mob, Islamic ‘terrorists’ by government accounts, attacked the jail and set free the prisoners, then occupied the main official buildings. The local people gathered in the main square, according to some sources answering a call from the President who had flown in to address them as Ceauşescu had done, according to others by curiosity only. By late afternoon the square was surrounded by security forces. The government
{"title":"Doubtful revolutions and counter-revolutions deconstructed","authors":"Alina Mungiu‐Pippidi","doi":"10.1080/14613190600595721","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14613190600595721","url":null,"abstract":"On 15 December 1989, in the Romanian city of Timisoara, a huge crowd waiting for the chronically late tramway caught word of a nearby altercation between dictator Nicolae Ceauşescu’s secret service, Securitate, and a few Hungarian parishioners protesting the arrest of their priest. Although they were mostly Romanians, they allied with the parishioners against the Securitate. The altercation turned into an uprising after shots were fired by the Army. After a couple of days of escalation, by which time the whole city had joined the insurgents and had occupied the official buildings, Ceauşescu denounced it as the work of ‘foreign terrorists’. To counteract, he convoked the usual formal meeting of support in the capital Bucharest. However, a part of the crowd turned against him. He fled the city the next day, only to be found and shot in the midst of national panic created by sniper fire and collective hysteria. The regime which followed after him, resulting from the first free though unfair elections (1990), took a care to seal the archives concerning these events by means of a National Security Law passed in 1991. People have been left since puzzling over who were the alleged ‘Arab terrorists’. As the Western media originally reported a huge death toll the mere 1000 actually certified dead, although the highest of Eastern European revolutions, has been viewed since with some disappointment and suspicion. In Andijan, a small city in post-Soviet authoritarian Uzbekistan, where the monopoly of power of President Islam Karimov had still been unshaken, violence broke out on 13 May 2005. A small armed mob, Islamic ‘terrorists’ by government accounts, attacked the jail and set free the prisoners, then occupied the main official buildings. The local people gathered in the main square, according to some sources answering a call from the President who had flown in to address them as Ceauşescu had done, according to others by curiosity only. By late afternoon the square was surrounded by security forces. The government","PeriodicalId":313717,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121723717","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2006-04-01DOI: 10.1080/14613190600595598
D. Jović
This article analyzes the relationship between the Croatian accession to the EU issue, especially after 2000. The author concludes that the transformation of the political scene since 2000 to 2004. had a decisive influence on the process of Croatian EU accession.
{"title":"Croatia and the European Union: a long delayed journey","authors":"D. Jović","doi":"10.1080/14613190600595598","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14613190600595598","url":null,"abstract":"This article analyzes the relationship between the Croatian accession to the EU issue, especially after 2000. The author concludes that the transformation of the political scene since 2000 to 2004. had a decisive influence on the process of Croatian EU accession.","PeriodicalId":313717,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126017910","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2006-04-01DOI: 10.1080/14613190600595549
P. Hare
For the present paper, Southeast Europe refers to the following list of states: Albania, Bulgaria, Romania; from the former Yugoslavia: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (often referred to as FYR Macedonia, or FYROM; or simply as the Republic of Macedonia), and the federation of Serbia and Montenegro; and Moldova. These states have experienced extremely diverse histories since the fall of communism, including the most severe ethnic conflict seen in Europe since the Second World War, various degrees of economic collapse and recovery, and rather mixed fortunes in terms of building stable and effective states. Given this background, the international community, together with these eight countries, has established a Stability Pact to foster a long-term conflict prevention strategy in the region. Table 1 presents a summary set of recent macroeconomic statistics for each country. Though currently growing rather faster than the CEB countries (Central Europe and the Baltics) that joined the EU in May 2004, the political strife and economic policy failures of the 1990s are clearly visible in the column of Table 1 showing real GDP in 2003 as a percentage of that in 1989. To a significant extent, current high growth might simply reflect recovery from the initial postcommunist economic collapse (and subsequent crises). It is debatable how sustainable it is unless accompanied by large increases in new investment. There is evidently much catching up to be done, with the exception of Albania which bounced back very rapidly from its mid-1990s economic and political crisis. On most of the other economic indicators shown in Table 1, other than the general government balance, the SEE countries are generally in a rather less favourable position than the CEB countries. It is important to bear these very significant differences in performance in mind in the subsequent discussion.
{"title":"The business sector in Southeast Europe–stimulating activity vs. conforming to EU norms","authors":"P. Hare","doi":"10.1080/14613190600595549","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14613190600595549","url":null,"abstract":"For the present paper, Southeast Europe refers to the following list of states: Albania, Bulgaria, Romania; from the former Yugoslavia: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (often referred to as FYR Macedonia, or FYROM; or simply as the Republic of Macedonia), and the federation of Serbia and Montenegro; and Moldova. These states have experienced extremely diverse histories since the fall of communism, including the most severe ethnic conflict seen in Europe since the Second World War, various degrees of economic collapse and recovery, and rather mixed fortunes in terms of building stable and effective states. Given this background, the international community, together with these eight countries, has established a Stability Pact to foster a long-term conflict prevention strategy in the region. Table 1 presents a summary set of recent macroeconomic statistics for each country. Though currently growing rather faster than the CEB countries (Central Europe and the Baltics) that joined the EU in May 2004, the political strife and economic policy failures of the 1990s are clearly visible in the column of Table 1 showing real GDP in 2003 as a percentage of that in 1989. To a significant extent, current high growth might simply reflect recovery from the initial postcommunist economic collapse (and subsequent crises). It is debatable how sustainable it is unless accompanied by large increases in new investment. There is evidently much catching up to be done, with the exception of Albania which bounced back very rapidly from its mid-1990s economic and political crisis. On most of the other economic indicators shown in Table 1, other than the general government balance, the SEE countries are generally in a rather less favourable position than the CEB countries. It is important to bear these very significant differences in performance in mind in the subsequent discussion.","PeriodicalId":313717,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126940894","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2006-04-01DOI: 10.1080/14613190600595499
D. Phinnemore
Enlargement is widely regarded as the most successful external relations’ tool of the European Union (EU). By offering the prospect of membership to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe in the 1990s, the EU not only responded to their desires for closer integration but also bought itself considerable political influence over domestic and international policy developments in the region. As a consequence, it has claimed a leading role in promoting and providing direction to the political and economic reform processes that governments have been pursuing. It has also contributed to regional stability and security. In the light of this success, faced with the need to respond to other countries’ aspirations for membership and conscious of the need to play a role in addressing security challenges in the wider Europe, the EU has since held out the prospect of membership to other, but not all, European countries. Currently there are eight countries, all in South-Eastern Europe, whose relations with the EU are developing within a perspective of possible membership. Two of these—Bulgaria and Romania—are scheduled to join in either 2007 or 2008. Others—Croatia and Turkey—have recently opened accession negotiations and according to projections could enter the EU in 2010 and 2014, respectively. Macedonia has applied for EU membership having concluded, like Croatia, a Stabilization and Association Agreement, and accession negotiations are expected to be opened soon following a positive avis from the Commission in November 2005. Negotiations on a Stabilization and Association Agreement are underway with Albania, began with Serbia and Montenegro in October 2005 and are imminent with Bosnia-Herzegovina. Other countries in the region and beyond have also signalled their interest in acceding to the EU. Moldova has membership aspirations, as do Ukraine and Georgia. And analysts as well as representatives and members of the EU’s various institutions have advocated offering these countries a membership perspective too. Given the considerable expansion of the EU since the end of the cold war— first from 12 to 15 member states in 1995 and then to 25 member states in 2004— casual observers of the EU could be forgiven for thinking that almost any European country can, should and will be offered the perspective of eventual membership and that further enlargement of the EU is inevitable. With the EU setting out the conditions that candidates must meet in order to succeed, monitoring progress on a regular basis, concluding Accession Partnerships,
{"title":"Beyond 25—the changing face of EU enlargement: commitment, conditionality and the Constitutional Treaty","authors":"D. Phinnemore","doi":"10.1080/14613190600595499","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14613190600595499","url":null,"abstract":"Enlargement is widely regarded as the most successful external relations’ tool of the European Union (EU). By offering the prospect of membership to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe in the 1990s, the EU not only responded to their desires for closer integration but also bought itself considerable political influence over domestic and international policy developments in the region. As a consequence, it has claimed a leading role in promoting and providing direction to the political and economic reform processes that governments have been pursuing. It has also contributed to regional stability and security. In the light of this success, faced with the need to respond to other countries’ aspirations for membership and conscious of the need to play a role in addressing security challenges in the wider Europe, the EU has since held out the prospect of membership to other, but not all, European countries. Currently there are eight countries, all in South-Eastern Europe, whose relations with the EU are developing within a perspective of possible membership. Two of these—Bulgaria and Romania—are scheduled to join in either 2007 or 2008. Others—Croatia and Turkey—have recently opened accession negotiations and according to projections could enter the EU in 2010 and 2014, respectively. Macedonia has applied for EU membership having concluded, like Croatia, a Stabilization and Association Agreement, and accession negotiations are expected to be opened soon following a positive avis from the Commission in November 2005. Negotiations on a Stabilization and Association Agreement are underway with Albania, began with Serbia and Montenegro in October 2005 and are imminent with Bosnia-Herzegovina. Other countries in the region and beyond have also signalled their interest in acceding to the EU. Moldova has membership aspirations, as do Ukraine and Georgia. And analysts as well as representatives and members of the EU’s various institutions have advocated offering these countries a membership perspective too. Given the considerable expansion of the EU since the end of the cold war— first from 12 to 15 member states in 1995 and then to 25 member states in 2004— casual observers of the EU could be forgiven for thinking that almost any European country can, should and will be offered the perspective of eventual membership and that further enlargement of the EU is inevitable. With the EU setting out the conditions that candidates must meet in order to succeed, monitoring progress on a regular basis, concluding Accession Partnerships,","PeriodicalId":313717,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134646445","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2006-04-01DOI: 10.1080/14613190600595572
Gulnur Aybet
Turkey has come a long way in the past 10 years in terms of becoming a more liberal democracy, and has completed significant reforms in the run up to the December 2004 decision by the EU to open accession negotiations with Turkey on the 3 October 2005. However, while ‘getting a date’ from the EU had undoubtedly been a watershed in Turkey–EU relations, it has also opened a new era in Turkish foreign policy which must now face the serious challenges of reconciling internal and external policy priorities. While the political reforms that Turkey has carried out make headway in reconciling these two strands, it is important to note that during the Cold War, Turkey's sense of belonging in the ‘West’ was not challenged by its internal upheavals from civil unrest to military coups.1 In the post-Cold War era, Turkey has had to adjust its policy outlook through finding a way to come to terms with traditionally sensitive issues that have direct bearing on its national security but which also impact upon its accession process with the EU. Turkey's path towards the EU has not been a straightforward one, in contrast to the recently admitted EU members. While its geo-strategic position and its membership of NATO place it in a unique position in terms of European security, it is also an active participant in transatlantic cooperation to bring stability to the Balkans and the Broader Middle East.2 Turkey not only participates in various peace building missions but also provides training for NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP) countries in peace building exercises. As the Balkans become a disparate entity with regards to the EU as new members, pending members and probable members, it is clear that the EU's role will increase as a catalyst for political and economic reform and transformation throughout the region. With Turkey's present involvement in the region, as well as its bilateral ties with neighbouring countries, and its own accession process into the EU, there is no doubt that a higher EU profile in the Balkans can predominantly have a positive impact on Turkey–EU relations rather than a negative one. However, the hurdles that Turkey still has to go through in its accession process coupled with the next EU enlargement to Romania and Bulgaria, can have repercussions on Turkey's relations with countries of the region. The first part of this paper presents a brief background to the long and winding road of Turkey's bid for EU membership. Subsequent sections look at the December 2004 decision of the EU to open accession negotiations with Turkey and the problems that lie ahead which can impact the accession process. The final section looks at Turkey's role in the Balkans.
{"title":"Turkey's long and winding road to the EU: implications for the Balkans","authors":"Gulnur Aybet","doi":"10.1080/14613190600595572","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14613190600595572","url":null,"abstract":"Turkey has come a long way in the past 10 years in terms of becoming a more liberal democracy, and has completed significant reforms in the run up to the December 2004 decision by the EU to open accession negotiations with Turkey on the 3 October 2005. However, while ‘getting a date’ from the EU had undoubtedly been a watershed in Turkey–EU relations, it has also opened a new era in Turkish foreign policy which must now face the serious challenges of reconciling internal and external policy priorities. While the political reforms that Turkey has carried out make headway in reconciling these two strands, it is important to note that during the Cold War, Turkey's sense of belonging in the ‘West’ was not challenged by its internal upheavals from civil unrest to military coups.1 In the post-Cold War era, Turkey has had to adjust its policy outlook through finding a way to come to terms with traditionally sensitive issues that have direct bearing on its national security but which also impact upon its accession process with the EU. Turkey's path towards the EU has not been a straightforward one, in contrast to the recently admitted EU members. While its geo-strategic position and its membership of NATO place it in a unique position in terms of European security, it is also an active participant in transatlantic cooperation to bring stability to the Balkans and the Broader Middle East.2 Turkey not only participates in various peace building missions but also provides training for NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP) countries in peace building exercises. As the Balkans become a disparate entity with regards to the EU as new members, pending members and probable members, it is clear that the EU's role will increase as a catalyst for political and economic reform and transformation throughout the region. With Turkey's present involvement in the region, as well as its bilateral ties with neighbouring countries, and its own accession process into the EU, there is no doubt that a higher EU profile in the Balkans can predominantly have a positive impact on Turkey–EU relations rather than a negative one. However, the hurdles that Turkey still has to go through in its accession process coupled with the next EU enlargement to Romania and Bulgaria, can have repercussions on Turkey's relations with countries of the region. The first part of this paper presents a brief background to the long and winding road of Turkey's bid for EU membership. Subsequent sections look at the December 2004 decision of the EU to open accession negotiations with Turkey and the problems that lie ahead which can impact the accession process. The final section looks at Turkey's role in the Balkans.","PeriodicalId":313717,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128965809","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2006-04-01DOI: 10.1080/14613190600700529
The University of Stirling is located on an extensive campus close to the City of Stirling in central Scotland, equidistant from the capital (Edinburgh) and the industrial and business centre (Glasgow). It is consistently highly rated for both teaching and research. The city has a growing reputation as one of the most attractive places to live in the UK and offers a wide range of arts, cultural and social venues to the student population. The University has 9,000 students from over 80 countries. More than 2,000 of these are postgraduates.
{"title":"MSc in International Conflict and Cooperation","authors":"","doi":"10.1080/14613190600700529","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14613190600700529","url":null,"abstract":"The University of Stirling is located on an extensive campus close to the City of Stirling in central Scotland, equidistant from the capital (Edinburgh) and the industrial and business centre (Glasgow). It is consistently highly rated for both teaching and research. The city has a growing reputation as one of the most attractive places to live in the UK and offers a wide range of arts, cultural and social venues to the student population. The University has 9,000 students from over 80 countries. More than 2,000 of these are postgraduates.","PeriodicalId":313717,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123180840","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2006-04-01DOI: 10.1080/14613190600595408
G. Timmins, D. Jović
The completion of the Central and Eastern European accession process into the European Union (EU) in 2004 can in broad terms be taken to have been a considerable success in generating an enlarged European zone of peace and stability. But the experience of post-communist transformation within this region is in stark contrast to that in Southeast Europe where the collapse of the Yugoslav Federation at the end of the cold war unleashed a bloody and devastating conflict which necessitated the military engagement of the international community and culminated in a NATO-led military intervention into Kosovo in 1999. Although the EU has aspirations to develop a military dimension to its external identity, its international presence continues to be articulated predominantly through soft power, for example, diplomatic, economic and normative foreign policy instruments. The next wave of EU enlargement—if and when it happens— therefore represents a crucial contribution both to the continued creation of a stable European Order and the credibility of the EU as an effective international actor. The then still European Community (EC) had demonstrated a high degree of misplaced confidence at the start of the 1990s in relation to responsibility for managing the emerging crisis in the Balkans when Jacques Poos, the Luxembourg Foreign Minister speaking on behalf of the European Council Presidency, announced in 1991 that ‘the hour of Europe has dawned’. This statement had come at a time when the EC was negotiating the Treaty on European Union and which would lead to the creation of a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). By the end of the decade and in light of Kosovo, the EU’s ability to manage conflict in its own backyard had been exposed as a myth and Europe’s continued reliance upon a US military presence was clear for all to see. Lessons have been learned. The European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) established at the Cologne European Council summit in June 1999 acknowledged the need to develop an autonomous military capacity to support its international presence and the policy of common strategies agreed two years previously at the Amsterdam European Council summit in June 1997 recognised the need for greater coherence in EU foreign policy statements and the behaviour which flowed from them. The creation of a High Representative for the CFSP in 1999 as a means of coordinating the foreign policy positions of member states was a further step forward in this direction as was the European Security Strategy
{"title":"Introduction: The Next Wave of Enlargement: The European Union and Southeast Europe after 2004","authors":"G. Timmins, D. Jović","doi":"10.1080/14613190600595408","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14613190600595408","url":null,"abstract":"The completion of the Central and Eastern European accession process into the European Union (EU) in 2004 can in broad terms be taken to have been a considerable success in generating an enlarged European zone of peace and stability. But the experience of post-communist transformation within this region is in stark contrast to that in Southeast Europe where the collapse of the Yugoslav Federation at the end of the cold war unleashed a bloody and devastating conflict which necessitated the military engagement of the international community and culminated in a NATO-led military intervention into Kosovo in 1999. Although the EU has aspirations to develop a military dimension to its external identity, its international presence continues to be articulated predominantly through soft power, for example, diplomatic, economic and normative foreign policy instruments. The next wave of EU enlargement—if and when it happens— therefore represents a crucial contribution both to the continued creation of a stable European Order and the credibility of the EU as an effective international actor. The then still European Community (EC) had demonstrated a high degree of misplaced confidence at the start of the 1990s in relation to responsibility for managing the emerging crisis in the Balkans when Jacques Poos, the Luxembourg Foreign Minister speaking on behalf of the European Council Presidency, announced in 1991 that ‘the hour of Europe has dawned’. This statement had come at a time when the EC was negotiating the Treaty on European Union and which would lead to the creation of a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). By the end of the decade and in light of Kosovo, the EU’s ability to manage conflict in its own backyard had been exposed as a myth and Europe’s continued reliance upon a US military presence was clear for all to see. Lessons have been learned. The European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) established at the Cologne European Council summit in June 1999 acknowledged the need to develop an autonomous military capacity to support its international presence and the policy of common strategies agreed two years previously at the Amsterdam European Council summit in June 1997 recognised the need for greater coherence in EU foreign policy statements and the behaviour which flowed from them. The creation of a High Representative for the CFSP in 1999 as a means of coordinating the foreign policy positions of member states was a further step forward in this direction as was the European Security Strategy","PeriodicalId":313717,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126503359","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2006-04-01DOI: 10.1080/14613190600595515
D. Bechev
Regional cooperation is, no doubt, one of the buzzwords in Southeast Europe (SEE). One comes across it in every official speech, policy paper andmedia piece dealing with the politics and economics of the area. The growth of different schemes has been a defining feature of the Balkan political landscape since the Dayton peace. Local diplomatic jargon abounds with barely pronounceable acronyms such as SEECP, SECI or TTFSEE. Social scientists and policy analysts indulge in lengthy discussions about the actual contribution and prospects of regional schemes across various policy-areas. Regional cooperation, to a large degree, is a process driven by powerful extra-Balkan actors such as the EU, NATO, USA and the international financial institutions (IFIs). Back in the mid-1990s, it was still questionable which external power called the shots. Both the USA and the EU launched parallel initiatives: the Southeast Cooperative Initiative (SECI) and Royaumont process. With the inauguration of the postKosovo Stability Pact, the German presidency of the EU could boast that ‘the hour of Europe’, ill-fatedly heralded by Jacques Poos at the outset of the wars of Yugoslav succession, had finally arrived. Yet, the Pact relied on the concerted effort of other multiple donors, including the World Bank and various Western governments. Five years down the road, there could be little doubt that the EU is the main stakeholder and driving force behind the regionalisation effort. This is
{"title":"Carrots, sticks and norms: the EU and regional cooperation in Southeast Europe","authors":"D. Bechev","doi":"10.1080/14613190600595515","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14613190600595515","url":null,"abstract":"Regional cooperation is, no doubt, one of the buzzwords in Southeast Europe (SEE). One comes across it in every official speech, policy paper andmedia piece dealing with the politics and economics of the area. The growth of different schemes has been a defining feature of the Balkan political landscape since the Dayton peace. Local diplomatic jargon abounds with barely pronounceable acronyms such as SEECP, SECI or TTFSEE. Social scientists and policy analysts indulge in lengthy discussions about the actual contribution and prospects of regional schemes across various policy-areas. Regional cooperation, to a large degree, is a process driven by powerful extra-Balkan actors such as the EU, NATO, USA and the international financial institutions (IFIs). Back in the mid-1990s, it was still questionable which external power called the shots. Both the USA and the EU launched parallel initiatives: the Southeast Cooperative Initiative (SECI) and Royaumont process. With the inauguration of the postKosovo Stability Pact, the German presidency of the EU could boast that ‘the hour of Europe’, ill-fatedly heralded by Jacques Poos at the outset of the wars of Yugoslav succession, had finally arrived. Yet, the Pact relied on the concerted effort of other multiple donors, including the World Bank and various Western governments. Five years down the road, there could be little doubt that the EU is the main stakeholder and driving force behind the regionalisation effort. This is","PeriodicalId":313717,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129992955","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2005-12-01DOI: 10.1080/14613190500345342
M. Andretta, M. Caiani
Social movements have been one of the main actors which influenced the process of nation-building, by shaping and promoting national citizenship and by building a critical public sphere for discussing public matters, testing governmental decisions and making collective claims. At the same time the process of nation-state building has affected many features of social movements, providing both restrictions and opportunities. Today social movements face different challenges, which force them to adapt their strategies and to even change their identities. Neo-liberal policies, often justified by the process of globalisation, are eroding the acquired social rights, supranational institutions and intergovernmental organisations are reducing the sovereignty of democratic nation-states, the executives dominate elected parliaments, and parties are less and less able to channel citizens’ demands. In this context, European integration, by filtering the mentioned trends, and by reconfiguring the process of political representation within the nation-state, challenges social movements’ strategies and preferences. While the process of Europeanisation opens up new opportunities, it also provides new constraints and difficulties for collective mobilisation. Social movements may also be important promoters of a European identity and citizenship needed for stronger and more democratic European institutions.
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