Pub Date : 2023-05-24DOI: 10.3389/fpos.2023.1122439
Lara Kobilke, A. Kulichkina, Ani Baghumyan, Christian Pipal
Introduction Since social media has become a significant tool for conflict communication amid the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine, researchers have grown more interested in the digital content citizens are exposed to. Methods To further investigate the role of social media in the ongoing invasion, we conducted a manual content analysis to examine tweets in English, Russian, and German that explicitly mentioned NATO in the context of the full-scale invasion during February to May 2022. Our analysis explored how these language-specific Twitter communities framed NATO's role in the conflict. Results We found that English-speaking tweeters were more likely to hold NATO responsible for finding a solution and least likely to blame NATO for the war compared to German and Russian speakers. We also observed that the Russian-speaking Twitter community exhibits a comparatively lower tendency to hold NATO accountable for the ongoing war as compared to their German-speaking counterparts, and they are also notably the least likely to expect NATO to bring an end to the war. Finally, English-speaking Twitter users who attribute blame to NATO for the ongoing war tend to adhere to a preconceived notion, rather than arriving at an interpretation based on the situation at hand. This is in contrast to the Russian-speaking community, where the opposite is true. German-speaking users fall somewhere in between these two perspectives. Discussion Our research contributes to the literature by providing a novel integration of conceptual and methodological perspectives on the framing and stance-taking of social media users during wartime, addressing known research gaps in the comparative analysis of these discussions, i.e., adding “non-English” perspectives. It also highlights the importance of cultural and linguistic sensitivity when addressing responsibility in armed conflicts and the need to consider the diverse perspectives derived from divergent problem definitions and evaluative standards.
{"title":"Blaming it on NATO? Framing the role of NATO in the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine on Twitter","authors":"Lara Kobilke, A. Kulichkina, Ani Baghumyan, Christian Pipal","doi":"10.3389/fpos.2023.1122439","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3389/fpos.2023.1122439","url":null,"abstract":"Introduction Since social media has become a significant tool for conflict communication amid the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine, researchers have grown more interested in the digital content citizens are exposed to. Methods To further investigate the role of social media in the ongoing invasion, we conducted a manual content analysis to examine tweets in English, Russian, and German that explicitly mentioned NATO in the context of the full-scale invasion during February to May 2022. Our analysis explored how these language-specific Twitter communities framed NATO's role in the conflict. Results We found that English-speaking tweeters were more likely to hold NATO responsible for finding a solution and least likely to blame NATO for the war compared to German and Russian speakers. We also observed that the Russian-speaking Twitter community exhibits a comparatively lower tendency to hold NATO accountable for the ongoing war as compared to their German-speaking counterparts, and they are also notably the least likely to expect NATO to bring an end to the war. Finally, English-speaking Twitter users who attribute blame to NATO for the ongoing war tend to adhere to a preconceived notion, rather than arriving at an interpretation based on the situation at hand. This is in contrast to the Russian-speaking community, where the opposite is true. German-speaking users fall somewhere in between these two perspectives. Discussion Our research contributes to the literature by providing a novel integration of conceptual and methodological perspectives on the framing and stance-taking of social media users during wartime, addressing known research gaps in the comparative analysis of these discussions, i.e., adding “non-English” perspectives. It also highlights the importance of cultural and linguistic sensitivity when addressing responsibility in armed conflicts and the need to consider the diverse perspectives derived from divergent problem definitions and evaluative standards.","PeriodicalId":34431,"journal":{"name":"Frontiers in Political Science","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-05-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45668080","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-05-19DOI: 10.3389/fpos.2023.1112311
M. van Asseldonk, E. Girvetz, H. Pamuk, C. Wattel, R. Ruben
There is a large and growing literature on the potential use of policy instruments for stimulating the adoption of Climate-Smart Agriculture (CSA) practices amongst smallholders. The objective of this article is to review and understand how the array of potential policy incentives can serve as mechanisms for enhancing adoption and upscaling of potential CSA practices by small-scale farmers in low-income countries. The review follows a matrix approach capturing where specific CSA practices (rows) are supported by typical policy instruments (columns) for enhancing widespread adoption. We first identify six key CSA practices, namely water management, soil and nutrient management, crop tolerance to stress, agroforestry and intercropping, crop rotation and mixed systems, and pest and disease management. Then we discuss the impact of those typical policy instruments, namely market prices, taxes and subsidies, land rights, rural finance, training and information, and certification and labeling. The review finds that most studies on this subject have a rather narrow focus on functional properties of a specific policy instrument and a particular CSA practice, thereby ignoring substitution, complementary or conditional effects between policy measures and CSA practices. Consequently, previous studies identify few incentives, particularly effective on their own. Wider perspectives on impact pathways point to the importance of sequencing and scaling for enhancing farmers' CSA adoption. We therefore advocate for more integrated approaches that also consider indirect effects of policy instruments on CSA adoption and pursue their systematic anchoring through successful policies that enhance widespread adoption.
{"title":"Policy incentives for smallholder adoption of climate-smart agricultural practices","authors":"M. van Asseldonk, E. Girvetz, H. Pamuk, C. Wattel, R. Ruben","doi":"10.3389/fpos.2023.1112311","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3389/fpos.2023.1112311","url":null,"abstract":"There is a large and growing literature on the potential use of policy instruments for stimulating the adoption of Climate-Smart Agriculture (CSA) practices amongst smallholders. The objective of this article is to review and understand how the array of potential policy incentives can serve as mechanisms for enhancing adoption and upscaling of potential CSA practices by small-scale farmers in low-income countries. The review follows a matrix approach capturing where specific CSA practices (rows) are supported by typical policy instruments (columns) for enhancing widespread adoption. We first identify six key CSA practices, namely water management, soil and nutrient management, crop tolerance to stress, agroforestry and intercropping, crop rotation and mixed systems, and pest and disease management. Then we discuss the impact of those typical policy instruments, namely market prices, taxes and subsidies, land rights, rural finance, training and information, and certification and labeling. The review finds that most studies on this subject have a rather narrow focus on functional properties of a specific policy instrument and a particular CSA practice, thereby ignoring substitution, complementary or conditional effects between policy measures and CSA practices. Consequently, previous studies identify few incentives, particularly effective on their own. Wider perspectives on impact pathways point to the importance of sequencing and scaling for enhancing farmers' CSA adoption. We therefore advocate for more integrated approaches that also consider indirect effects of policy instruments on CSA adoption and pursue their systematic anchoring through successful policies that enhance widespread adoption.","PeriodicalId":34431,"journal":{"name":"Frontiers in Political Science","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-05-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44726139","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-05-19DOI: 10.3389/fpos.2023.1117550
R. S. Foa, C. Welzel
Introduction The global coronavirus pandemic offers a quasi-experimental setting for understanding the impact of sudden exposure to heightened existential risk upon both individual and societal values. Methods We examined the effect of the pandemic on political attitudes by comparing data from eight countries surveyed before and after the worldwide spread of COVID-19 in March 2020 with continuous weekly polling tracker data from the United Kingdom from 2019 to 2021. Multilevel models were used to explore the drivers of change, and the results indicated that reported emotions of fear and stress were positively associated with institutional approval during periods of greater pathogen risk. Results Our findings revealed that support for political and technocratic authority, as well as satisfaction with political institutions, rose significantly above long-term historical baselines during the pandemic. Discussion The results support the hypothesis that exposure to existential risk results in greater support for authority and that individual feelings of insecurity may be linked to less critical citizen orientations.
{"title":"Existential insecurity and deference to authority: the pandemic as a natural experiment","authors":"R. S. Foa, C. Welzel","doi":"10.3389/fpos.2023.1117550","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3389/fpos.2023.1117550","url":null,"abstract":"Introduction The global coronavirus pandemic offers a quasi-experimental setting for understanding the impact of sudden exposure to heightened existential risk upon both individual and societal values. Methods We examined the effect of the pandemic on political attitudes by comparing data from eight countries surveyed before and after the worldwide spread of COVID-19 in March 2020 with continuous weekly polling tracker data from the United Kingdom from 2019 to 2021. Multilevel models were used to explore the drivers of change, and the results indicated that reported emotions of fear and stress were positively associated with institutional approval during periods of greater pathogen risk. Results Our findings revealed that support for political and technocratic authority, as well as satisfaction with political institutions, rose significantly above long-term historical baselines during the pandemic. Discussion The results support the hypothesis that exposure to existential risk results in greater support for authority and that individual feelings of insecurity may be linked to less critical citizen orientations.","PeriodicalId":34431,"journal":{"name":"Frontiers in Political Science","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-05-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45083019","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-05-19DOI: 10.3389/fpos.2023.1149865
Saori Ono, Takashi Sekiyama
This study examined the impact of Official Development Assistance (ODA) on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) by aid type, which has been largely overlooked in previous studies. Using the Generalized Method of Moments with a gravity model, five major donor countries (France, Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States) and 63 recipient country pairs from 1996 to 2020 were analyzed. Granger causality tests, impulse response analyses and variance decomposition analyses using a panel vector autoregressive model were conducted to identify causal relationships in the time series and to quantitatively capture the impact. The results suggest that ODA Loans from Germany, Japan, and the United Kingdom promote FDI. Their ODA Loans have a high proportion of economic infrastructure and productive-sector support. Hence, their ODA Loans may attract FDI to recipient countries by developing infrastructure in recipient countries such as transportation, telecommunications, energy, and finance. This study contributes to an academic community by highlighting the differences of aid type in attracting FDI and provides practical implications for policymakers and practitioners in the field of international development.
{"title":"Differences in impact of official development assistance on foreign direct investment by aid types","authors":"Saori Ono, Takashi Sekiyama","doi":"10.3389/fpos.2023.1149865","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3389/fpos.2023.1149865","url":null,"abstract":"This study examined the impact of Official Development Assistance (ODA) on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) by aid type, which has been largely overlooked in previous studies. Using the Generalized Method of Moments with a gravity model, five major donor countries (France, Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States) and 63 recipient country pairs from 1996 to 2020 were analyzed. Granger causality tests, impulse response analyses and variance decomposition analyses using a panel vector autoregressive model were conducted to identify causal relationships in the time series and to quantitatively capture the impact. The results suggest that ODA Loans from Germany, Japan, and the United Kingdom promote FDI. Their ODA Loans have a high proportion of economic infrastructure and productive-sector support. Hence, their ODA Loans may attract FDI to recipient countries by developing infrastructure in recipient countries such as transportation, telecommunications, energy, and finance. This study contributes to an academic community by highlighting the differences of aid type in attracting FDI and provides practical implications for policymakers and practitioners in the field of international development.","PeriodicalId":34431,"journal":{"name":"Frontiers in Political Science","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-05-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47104683","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-05-18DOI: 10.3389/fpos.2023.1032470
R. Sata
Hungary has become the leader of democratic backsliding within Europe, with Prime Minister Viktor Orbán turning into the staunchest critic of the EU, despite a consistent support for the European project among the wider public and Hungary being a net benefiter of EU membership. Using a systematic analysis of all speeches, statements and interviews of the PM for his three consecutive governments 2010–2022, I claim the radicalization of this Eurosceptic discourse is a direct consequence of a continuous populist performance of crisis that demands the creation of images of friends and foes to unite and mobilize people. Orbán relies on discursive processes of othering to construct to his liking both “the good people” and its enemies, who are to be blamed for the crises. Anybody can become an enemy in the various crises that follow each other. At the same time, discursive conceptions of Europe vs. the EU remain in the center of the discourse to establish Hungary's European belonging as well as opposition to EU for policies that allegedly people reject. While the economic crisis pits an economic “us” against the former socialist political elite, foreign capital, and the EU and IMF that are all blamed for Hungary's near-bankruptcy situation. The refugee crisis redefines both “us” and “others”, the “self” is distinguished using ethno-linguistic criteria and identitarian Christianity to signal the cultural distance from the Muslim migrant “other” as well as multicultural EU. The pandemic crisis is performed only to further exacerbate the conflict between the illiberal “self” and the liberal “others”, where supranational EU, promoting multiculturalism, gender ideology or neoliberal policies not only threatens the very existence of traditional-national lifestyles but endangers the people themselves. With each crisis performed, newer and newer conflict lines between various “European self's” and “threatening EU” are identified, each adding to the radicalization of Orbán's discourse. The demonization of the EU and the pretext of saving Europe using these false discursive constructs enables Orbán strengthen his grip of power and drift to authoritarianism.
{"title":"Performing crisis to create your enemy: Europe vs. the EU in Hungarian populist discourse","authors":"R. Sata","doi":"10.3389/fpos.2023.1032470","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3389/fpos.2023.1032470","url":null,"abstract":"Hungary has become the leader of democratic backsliding within Europe, with Prime Minister Viktor Orbán turning into the staunchest critic of the EU, despite a consistent support for the European project among the wider public and Hungary being a net benefiter of EU membership. Using a systematic analysis of all speeches, statements and interviews of the PM for his three consecutive governments 2010–2022, I claim the radicalization of this Eurosceptic discourse is a direct consequence of a continuous populist performance of crisis that demands the creation of images of friends and foes to unite and mobilize people. Orbán relies on discursive processes of othering to construct to his liking both “the good people” and its enemies, who are to be blamed for the crises. Anybody can become an enemy in the various crises that follow each other. At the same time, discursive conceptions of Europe vs. the EU remain in the center of the discourse to establish Hungary's European belonging as well as opposition to EU for policies that allegedly people reject. While the economic crisis pits an economic “us” against the former socialist political elite, foreign capital, and the EU and IMF that are all blamed for Hungary's near-bankruptcy situation. The refugee crisis redefines both “us” and “others”, the “self” is distinguished using ethno-linguistic criteria and identitarian Christianity to signal the cultural distance from the Muslim migrant “other” as well as multicultural EU. The pandemic crisis is performed only to further exacerbate the conflict between the illiberal “self” and the liberal “others”, where supranational EU, promoting multiculturalism, gender ideology or neoliberal policies not only threatens the very existence of traditional-national lifestyles but endangers the people themselves. With each crisis performed, newer and newer conflict lines between various “European self's” and “threatening EU” are identified, each adding to the radicalization of Orbán's discourse. The demonization of the EU and the pretext of saving Europe using these false discursive constructs enables Orbán strengthen his grip of power and drift to authoritarianism.","PeriodicalId":34431,"journal":{"name":"Frontiers in Political Science","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-05-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49316942","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-05-18DOI: 10.3389/fpos.2023.1091997
Agnieszka Kanas, M. Fenger
Non-cognitive skills are increasingly essential in the labor market, especially given technological advances and evolving work environments. Unequal distribution of non-cognitive skills among various groups in the population may contribute to labor market inequalities. This article investigates the significance of non-cognitive skills for immigrant-native inequalities in the European labor market. Specifically, we examine the potential differences in non-cognitive skills between native and immigrant groups and how these differences may affect their income. Additionally, we explore whether equal levels of non-cognitive skills have comparable payoffs for native and immigrant groups in society. We use, comparative survey data from the Programme for the International Assessment of Adult Competencies and OLS regressions with country fixed effects. Our findings show that many immigrants exhibit lower levels of non-cognitive skills than native-born workers, despite differences between origin groups. This difference in non-cognitive skills explains part of the immigrant-native inequality in the labor market for most immigrant-origin groups. Moreover, our results indicate that immigrants, especially those from Central and Eastern European countries, benefit less from exercising comparable non-cognitive skills than native-born workers. Our study highlights the importance of non-cognitive skills in addressing the labor market disadvantage faced by immigrants, and emphasizes that policymakers and educators should recognize the significance of these skills when developing policies targeting immigrants.
{"title":"Non-cognitive skills and immigrant-native inequalities in the labor market in Europe","authors":"Agnieszka Kanas, M. Fenger","doi":"10.3389/fpos.2023.1091997","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3389/fpos.2023.1091997","url":null,"abstract":"Non-cognitive skills are increasingly essential in the labor market, especially given technological advances and evolving work environments. Unequal distribution of non-cognitive skills among various groups in the population may contribute to labor market inequalities. This article investigates the significance of non-cognitive skills for immigrant-native inequalities in the European labor market. Specifically, we examine the potential differences in non-cognitive skills between native and immigrant groups and how these differences may affect their income. Additionally, we explore whether equal levels of non-cognitive skills have comparable payoffs for native and immigrant groups in society. We use, comparative survey data from the Programme for the International Assessment of Adult Competencies and OLS regressions with country fixed effects. Our findings show that many immigrants exhibit lower levels of non-cognitive skills than native-born workers, despite differences between origin groups. This difference in non-cognitive skills explains part of the immigrant-native inequality in the labor market for most immigrant-origin groups. Moreover, our results indicate that immigrants, especially those from Central and Eastern European countries, benefit less from exercising comparable non-cognitive skills than native-born workers. Our study highlights the importance of non-cognitive skills in addressing the labor market disadvantage faced by immigrants, and emphasizes that policymakers and educators should recognize the significance of these skills when developing policies targeting immigrants.","PeriodicalId":34431,"journal":{"name":"Frontiers in Political Science","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-05-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44975493","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-05-18DOI: 10.3389/fpos.2023.1148522
K. Zimmermann, Ana Lia Leonel, Marcio A. Kontopp
This study discusses the evolvement of metropolitan governance in Brazil and uses greater São Paulo as an in-depth case study to demonstrate how metropolitan governance is organized in a megacity region in the Global South. This is of interest as many publications in this specific academic field focus on European or North American city regions that are, on average, smaller in size and part of multi-level governance systems. Hence, many theoretical positions that are established in the scholarly debate do not work well in the context of megacities. The study will describe how the metropolitan governance arrangement in greater São Paulo evolved and reflected on the setbacks and success of metropolitan planning and policies in the context of uncertain state support. Metropolitan regions have been established in Brazil by the military regime in the mid-1970s for industrialization and comprehensive top-down planning. After the fall of the regime in the 1980s, the question of metropolitan regions was delegated to the states which created a sort of institutional vacuum and a lack of dedicated policies. In 2018, however, Brazil had 76 institutionalized metropolitan regions but these differ in size and institutional strength. The metropolitan region of São Paulo is the biggest as it comprises 39 municipalities with approximately 20 million inhabitants. However, given the dynamic of expansion, the question of establishing an appropriate scale emerged. Attempts to create a governance arrangement for regional development and strategic planning for the so-called São Paulo Macrometropolis with 172 municipalities and roughly 32 million inhabitants failed. However, in a separate process, over decades, seven metropolitan regions emerged on a smaller scale (the São Paulo Metropolitan Region being one of them). The study is based on a literature review, document analysis (laws in particular), and workshops with Brazilian colleagues that happened within the context of a research project on environmental planning and water governance in the greater São Paulo Metropolitan Region.
{"title":"Metropolitan governance in the context of dynamic urbanization: the case of Brazil","authors":"K. Zimmermann, Ana Lia Leonel, Marcio A. Kontopp","doi":"10.3389/fpos.2023.1148522","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3389/fpos.2023.1148522","url":null,"abstract":"This study discusses the evolvement of metropolitan governance in Brazil and uses greater São Paulo as an in-depth case study to demonstrate how metropolitan governance is organized in a megacity region in the Global South. This is of interest as many publications in this specific academic field focus on European or North American city regions that are, on average, smaller in size and part of multi-level governance systems. Hence, many theoretical positions that are established in the scholarly debate do not work well in the context of megacities. The study will describe how the metropolitan governance arrangement in greater São Paulo evolved and reflected on the setbacks and success of metropolitan planning and policies in the context of uncertain state support. Metropolitan regions have been established in Brazil by the military regime in the mid-1970s for industrialization and comprehensive top-down planning. After the fall of the regime in the 1980s, the question of metropolitan regions was delegated to the states which created a sort of institutional vacuum and a lack of dedicated policies. In 2018, however, Brazil had 76 institutionalized metropolitan regions but these differ in size and institutional strength. The metropolitan region of São Paulo is the biggest as it comprises 39 municipalities with approximately 20 million inhabitants. However, given the dynamic of expansion, the question of establishing an appropriate scale emerged. Attempts to create a governance arrangement for regional development and strategic planning for the so-called São Paulo Macrometropolis with 172 municipalities and roughly 32 million inhabitants failed. However, in a separate process, over decades, seven metropolitan regions emerged on a smaller scale (the São Paulo Metropolitan Region being one of them). The study is based on a literature review, document analysis (laws in particular), and workshops with Brazilian colleagues that happened within the context of a research project on environmental planning and water governance in the greater São Paulo Metropolitan Region.","PeriodicalId":34431,"journal":{"name":"Frontiers in Political Science","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-05-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49091729","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-05-17DOI: 10.3389/fpos.2023.982558
I. Borucki, Florian Hartleb
Techno-optimists with a more cosmopolitan focus agree that E-voting lies at the heart of implementing e-government and digitalization into democratic structures. The example of the “e-state” Estonia proves the relevance: E-voting has been in (legal) practice since 2005, and research can take much empirical evidence from this laboratory for digital innovation. The fact that Estonia is an exception to the rule within the European Union (EU) member states explains the comparative approach to the (possible) legal framework for eparticipation. With focusing on liberal democracies' constitutional predefinitions, voting procedures in the virtual age have not been compared yet. However, we have yet to learn much about the extent to which E-voting exists in European constitutions, even after one generation of intense debate about its possible implementation. Perceptions of E-voting matter because of the omnipresent digital transformation and discussions about how democracies (could) digitalize. E-voting represents a bottom-up part of top-down e-government and, through this, digital transformation. This research explores whether party policies, legal frameworks, and citizens' perceptions resemble E-voting on the national and European levels. To explore this question, several mixed-methods approaches are used. The question of “legalistic opportunity structures” is approached by relying on legal frameworks of European member states, parties' policies derived from their manifestos, and survey data from three Eurobarometer waves. Using a dictionary approach, the research design analyses the constitutions, electoral laws and manifestos of parties running for the European elections, combined with a classic analysis of surveys. Therefore, these sources are analyzed using several mixed methods approaches. The results have broader implications that we need to study in more detail what the digital transformation and the constitutionalization of electronic decision-making entail to develop a digital democracy and link it to a public sphere throughout Europe. Ultimately, it is analyzed whether the EU will push its member states to E-voting and implement E-voting for European elections. This would question the normative basing of democracy and how responsivity is brought into place.
{"title":"Debating E-voting throughout Europe: constitutional structures, parties' concepts and Europeans' perceptions","authors":"I. Borucki, Florian Hartleb","doi":"10.3389/fpos.2023.982558","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3389/fpos.2023.982558","url":null,"abstract":"Techno-optimists with a more cosmopolitan focus agree that E-voting lies at the heart of implementing e-government and digitalization into democratic structures. The example of the “e-state” Estonia proves the relevance: E-voting has been in (legal) practice since 2005, and research can take much empirical evidence from this laboratory for digital innovation. The fact that Estonia is an exception to the rule within the European Union (EU) member states explains the comparative approach to the (possible) legal framework for eparticipation. With focusing on liberal democracies' constitutional predefinitions, voting procedures in the virtual age have not been compared yet. However, we have yet to learn much about the extent to which E-voting exists in European constitutions, even after one generation of intense debate about its possible implementation. Perceptions of E-voting matter because of the omnipresent digital transformation and discussions about how democracies (could) digitalize. E-voting represents a bottom-up part of top-down e-government and, through this, digital transformation. This research explores whether party policies, legal frameworks, and citizens' perceptions resemble E-voting on the national and European levels. To explore this question, several mixed-methods approaches are used. The question of “legalistic opportunity structures” is approached by relying on legal frameworks of European member states, parties' policies derived from their manifestos, and survey data from three Eurobarometer waves. Using a dictionary approach, the research design analyses the constitutions, electoral laws and manifestos of parties running for the European elections, combined with a classic analysis of surveys. Therefore, these sources are analyzed using several mixed methods approaches. The results have broader implications that we need to study in more detail what the digital transformation and the constitutionalization of electronic decision-making entail to develop a digital democracy and link it to a public sphere throughout Europe. Ultimately, it is analyzed whether the EU will push its member states to E-voting and implement E-voting for European elections. This would question the normative basing of democracy and how responsivity is brought into place.","PeriodicalId":34431,"journal":{"name":"Frontiers in Political Science","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-05-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42542618","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-05-16DOI: 10.3389/fpos.2023.1100446
Kamal Kassam, Maria Becker
Syrian nationals are not only the largest refugee group in Germany but also the third largest group of foreigners living in Germany. The naturalization trend among this group has been very pronounced in the last two years and is expected to increase sharply in the coming years. However, little is known about their political interest in German politics.1 Given the importance of “political interest” as an indicator of social integration and future active citizenship, this paper examines the extent to which Syrian refugees are interested in German politics and how local conditions at the time of arrival influence refugees' interest in German politics. We focus on three dimensions of the neighborhood context theory (social networks, economic situation, and political environment) in combination with traditional political participation theory. The empirical strategy relies on the exogenous allocation of refugees across federal states, which can be used to identify the effect of local characteristics on refugees' political interest. We use in our analysis a nationally representative sample in Germany (IAB-BAMF-SOEP-Refugee-Sample). Our findings suggest that ethnic social networks play a significant role in boosting newly arrived refugees' interest in German politics. Moreover, a higher unemployment rate among the foreign population is associated with an increase in political interest among Syrian refugees. We also confirm that a high political interest among the native population in Germany leads to a higher political interest among Syrian refugees. These results show that more attention needs to be paid to the integration of Syrian refugees and underline the need to reassess the efficiency of the distribution policy for Syrian refugees.
{"title":"Syrians of today, Germans of tomorrow: the effect of initial placement on the political interest of Syrian refugees in Germany","authors":"Kamal Kassam, Maria Becker","doi":"10.3389/fpos.2023.1100446","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3389/fpos.2023.1100446","url":null,"abstract":"Syrian nationals are not only the largest refugee group in Germany but also the third largest group of foreigners living in Germany. The naturalization trend among this group has been very pronounced in the last two years and is expected to increase sharply in the coming years. However, little is known about their political interest in German politics.1 Given the importance of “political interest” as an indicator of social integration and future active citizenship, this paper examines the extent to which Syrian refugees are interested in German politics and how local conditions at the time of arrival influence refugees' interest in German politics. We focus on three dimensions of the neighborhood context theory (social networks, economic situation, and political environment) in combination with traditional political participation theory. The empirical strategy relies on the exogenous allocation of refugees across federal states, which can be used to identify the effect of local characteristics on refugees' political interest. We use in our analysis a nationally representative sample in Germany (IAB-BAMF-SOEP-Refugee-Sample). Our findings suggest that ethnic social networks play a significant role in boosting newly arrived refugees' interest in German politics. Moreover, a higher unemployment rate among the foreign population is associated with an increase in political interest among Syrian refugees. We also confirm that a high political interest among the native population in Germany leads to a higher political interest among Syrian refugees. These results show that more attention needs to be paid to the integration of Syrian refugees and underline the need to reassess the efficiency of the distribution policy for Syrian refugees.","PeriodicalId":34431,"journal":{"name":"Frontiers in Political Science","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-05-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44881373","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-05-16DOI: 10.3389/fpos.2023.1038659
H. Coffé, Marta Fraile, Amy C. Alexander, Jessica Fortin-Rittberger, S. Banducci
Introduction The gender gap in populist radical right voting—with women being less likely to support populist radical right parties than men—is well-established. Much less is known about the interplay between gender, masculinity and populist radical right voting. This study investigates the extent to which masculinity affects women and men's likelihood of supporting populist radical right parties. Focusing on sexism as a link between masculinity and populist radical right support, we put forward two mechanisms that operate at once: a mediating effect of sexism (sexism explains the association between masculinity and populist radical right voting) and a moderating effect of sexism (the impact of masculinity is stronger among citizens scoring high on sexism compared with citizens with low levels of sexist attitudes). Methods We draw on an original dataset collected in Spain at the end of 2020 to investigate support for the Spanish populist radical right party VOX. Results We find support for hypothesized mechanisms, mediation and moderation, chiefly among men. First, sexism explains about half of the link between masculinity and populist radical right support for this group, confirming the hypothesized mediation effect. Second, masculinity has a significantly stronger impact on the likelihood of supporting VOX among men scoring high on sexism, which in turn substantiates the presence of a moderation effect. Discussion Existing research so far has examined the empirical connections between how individuals perceive their levels of masculinity, sexism, and PRR voting separately. Our study offers a first step in unpacking the relationship between masculinity and PRR support by focusing specifically on how sexism relates to both these variables.
{"title":"Masculinity, sexism and populist radical right support","authors":"H. Coffé, Marta Fraile, Amy C. Alexander, Jessica Fortin-Rittberger, S. Banducci","doi":"10.3389/fpos.2023.1038659","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3389/fpos.2023.1038659","url":null,"abstract":"Introduction The gender gap in populist radical right voting—with women being less likely to support populist radical right parties than men—is well-established. Much less is known about the interplay between gender, masculinity and populist radical right voting. This study investigates the extent to which masculinity affects women and men's likelihood of supporting populist radical right parties. Focusing on sexism as a link between masculinity and populist radical right support, we put forward two mechanisms that operate at once: a mediating effect of sexism (sexism explains the association between masculinity and populist radical right voting) and a moderating effect of sexism (the impact of masculinity is stronger among citizens scoring high on sexism compared with citizens with low levels of sexist attitudes). Methods We draw on an original dataset collected in Spain at the end of 2020 to investigate support for the Spanish populist radical right party VOX. Results We find support for hypothesized mechanisms, mediation and moderation, chiefly among men. First, sexism explains about half of the link between masculinity and populist radical right support for this group, confirming the hypothesized mediation effect. Second, masculinity has a significantly stronger impact on the likelihood of supporting VOX among men scoring high on sexism, which in turn substantiates the presence of a moderation effect. Discussion Existing research so far has examined the empirical connections between how individuals perceive their levels of masculinity, sexism, and PRR voting separately. Our study offers a first step in unpacking the relationship between masculinity and PRR support by focusing specifically on how sexism relates to both these variables.","PeriodicalId":34431,"journal":{"name":"Frontiers in Political Science","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-05-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46927906","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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