Sakura Arai, Motoki Watabe, K. Kanari, Qiulu Shou, F. Krueger, Haruto Takagishi
Oxytocin has been proposed to regulate human trust. Previous experiments supported this claim by demonstrating that exogenous and endogenous oxytocin is associated with trust (how much trust people place in strangers) and reciprocity (how much people reciprocate when trusted). However, recent replication attempts have been unsuccessful in demonstrating the trust-enhancing effect of oxytocin, and there is limited evidence on whether oxytocin is associated with reciprocity. This study aimed to replicate the previously found nonlinear relationships between the endogenous oxytocin concentration and both trust and reciprocity by utilizing a monetarily incentivized trust game. In a college sample, we found that salivary oxytocin levels showed (i) an inverted U-shaped relationship with trust in men and (ii) a U-shaped relationship with reciprocity in women. The current results confirm the previous finding that endogenous oxytocin levels have nonlinear relationships with trust and reciprocity. Further research on the role of oxytocin secretion in trust and reciprocity is warranted.
{"title":"Salivary Oxytocin Has Nonlinear Relationships with Trust and Reciprocity","authors":"Sakura Arai, Motoki Watabe, K. Kanari, Qiulu Shou, F. Krueger, Haruto Takagishi","doi":"10.3390/g14010017","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3390/g14010017","url":null,"abstract":"Oxytocin has been proposed to regulate human trust. Previous experiments supported this claim by demonstrating that exogenous and endogenous oxytocin is associated with trust (how much trust people place in strangers) and reciprocity (how much people reciprocate when trusted). However, recent replication attempts have been unsuccessful in demonstrating the trust-enhancing effect of oxytocin, and there is limited evidence on whether oxytocin is associated with reciprocity. This study aimed to replicate the previously found nonlinear relationships between the endogenous oxytocin concentration and both trust and reciprocity by utilizing a monetarily incentivized trust game. In a college sample, we found that salivary oxytocin levels showed (i) an inverted U-shaped relationship with trust in men and (ii) a U-shaped relationship with reciprocity in women. The current results confirm the previous finding that endogenous oxytocin levels have nonlinear relationships with trust and reciprocity. Further research on the role of oxytocin secretion in trust and reciprocity is warranted.","PeriodicalId":35065,"journal":{"name":"Games","volume":"14 1","pages":"17"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-02-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44011854","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The purpose of this study was to determine whether attitudes toward risk and altruism are affected by being in a group or being alone. In contrast to previous economic research on group decision-making, we excluded the effects of group informal discussions, which are thought to be a “black box” when individuals make decisions in a group. In this regard, the subjects in our experiment were only requested to show their faces to the other members, without further communication. Moreover, we adopted two collective decision rules, i.e., the median rule and the random rule, which provide the truth-telling mechanism. In the experiments of both anonymous investment and donation, we found that the subjects who made decisions in a group offered significantly lower amounts than those who made decisions alone, after controlling for individuals’ risk and altruistic preferences. The findings imply that people are more risk-averse and self-interested when they are in a group, regardless of which collective decision rules are adopted.
{"title":"Risk-Averse and Self-Interested Shifts in Groups in Both Median and Random Rules","authors":"Yoshio Kamijo, Teruyuki Tamura","doi":"10.3390/g14010016","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3390/g14010016","url":null,"abstract":"The purpose of this study was to determine whether attitudes toward risk and altruism are affected by being in a group or being alone. In contrast to previous economic research on group decision-making, we excluded the effects of group informal discussions, which are thought to be a “black box” when individuals make decisions in a group. In this regard, the subjects in our experiment were only requested to show their faces to the other members, without further communication. Moreover, we adopted two collective decision rules, i.e., the median rule and the random rule, which provide the truth-telling mechanism. In the experiments of both anonymous investment and donation, we found that the subjects who made decisions in a group offered significantly lower amounts than those who made decisions alone, after controlling for individuals’ risk and altruistic preferences. The findings imply that people are more risk-averse and self-interested when they are in a group, regardless of which collective decision rules are adopted.","PeriodicalId":35065,"journal":{"name":"Games","volume":"14 1","pages":"16"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-02-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46591144","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Motivated reasoning refers to the idea that people hold certain beliefs about themselves or the world due to their desire to do so, rather than striving for accuracy. This type of belief formation can lead to overconfidence and polarization, as well as facilitate immoral behavior at both the individual and collective levels. One of the supply-side mechanisms for motivated reasoning is motivated memory, or the selective retrieval of past experiences or information based on self-serving criteria. In this article, we review the still young economics literature on motivated memory. Summarizing both theoretical and empirical work, we highlight the key results this literature has produced. We also discuss open questions and potentially exciting avenues for future research in this area.
{"title":"Motivated Memory in Economics - A Review","authors":"Andrea Amelio, Florian Zimmermann","doi":"10.3390/g14010015","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3390/g14010015","url":null,"abstract":"Motivated reasoning refers to the idea that people hold certain beliefs about themselves or the world due to their desire to do so, rather than striving for accuracy. This type of belief formation can lead to overconfidence and polarization, as well as facilitate immoral behavior at both the individual and collective levels. One of the supply-side mechanisms for motivated reasoning is motivated memory, or the selective retrieval of past experiences or information based on self-serving criteria. In this article, we review the still young economics literature on motivated memory. Summarizing both theoretical and empirical work, we highlight the key results this literature has produced. We also discuss open questions and potentially exciting avenues for future research in this area.","PeriodicalId":35065,"journal":{"name":"Games","volume":"14 1","pages":"15"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-01-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49142634","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We built and investigated analytically and numerically a differential game model of Cournot oligopoly with consideration of pollution for the general case and the case of symmetrical agents. We conducted a comparative analysis of selfish agents’ behavior (a differential game in normal form), their hierarchical organization (differential Stackelberg games), and cooperation (optimal control problem) using individual and collective indices of relative efficiency. The same analysis wasperformed for the models with the green effect when players chose both output volumes and environmental protection efforts. We used the Pontryagin maximum principle for analytical investigation and the method of qualitatively representative scenarios in simulation modeling for numerical calculations. This method allows for reducing the number of computer simulations, providing sufficient precision. As a result of the comparative analysis, systems of collective and individual preferences were obtained.
{"title":"Differential Game-Theoretic Models of Cournot Oligopoly with Consideration of the Green Effect","authors":"G. Ougolnitsky, A. Usov","doi":"10.3390/g14010014","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3390/g14010014","url":null,"abstract":"We built and investigated analytically and numerically a differential game model of Cournot oligopoly with consideration of pollution for the general case and the case of symmetrical agents. We conducted a comparative analysis of selfish agents’ behavior (a differential game in normal form), their hierarchical organization (differential Stackelberg games), and cooperation (optimal control problem) using individual and collective indices of relative efficiency. The same analysis wasperformed for the models with the green effect when players chose both output volumes and environmental protection efforts. We used the Pontryagin maximum principle for analytical investigation and the method of qualitatively representative scenarios in simulation modeling for numerical calculations. This method allows for reducing the number of computer simulations, providing sufficient precision. As a result of the comparative analysis, systems of collective and individual preferences were obtained.","PeriodicalId":35065,"journal":{"name":"Games","volume":"14 1","pages":"14"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-01-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49269984","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Chenghan Zhou, Andrew Spivey, Haifeng Xu, T. Nguyen
This paper studies the problem of information design in a general security game setting in which multiple self-interested defenders attempt to provide protection simultaneously for the same set of important targets against an unknown attacker. A principal, who can be one of the defenders, has access to certain private information (i.e., attacker type), whereas other defenders do not. We investigate the question of how that principal, with additional private information, can influence the decisions of the defenders by partially and strategically revealing her information. In particular, we develop a polynomial time ellipsoid algorithm to compute an optimal private signaling scheme. Our key finding is that the separation oracle in the ellipsoid approach can be carefully reduced to bipartite matching. Furthermore, we introduce a compact representation of any ex ante persuasive signaling schemes by exploiting intrinsic security resource allocation structures, enabling us to compute an optimal scheme significantly faster. Our experiment results show that by strategically revealing private information, the principal can significantly enhance the protection effectiveness for the targets.
{"title":"Information Design for Multiple Interdependent Defenders: Work Less, Pay Off More","authors":"Chenghan Zhou, Andrew Spivey, Haifeng Xu, T. Nguyen","doi":"10.3390/g14010012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3390/g14010012","url":null,"abstract":"This paper studies the problem of information design in a general security game setting in which multiple self-interested defenders attempt to provide protection simultaneously for the same set of important targets against an unknown attacker. A principal, who can be one of the defenders, has access to certain private information (i.e., attacker type), whereas other defenders do not. We investigate the question of how that principal, with additional private information, can influence the decisions of the defenders by partially and strategically revealing her information. In particular, we develop a polynomial time ellipsoid algorithm to compute an optimal private signaling scheme. Our key finding is that the separation oracle in the ellipsoid approach can be carefully reduced to bipartite matching. Furthermore, we introduce a compact representation of any ex ante persuasive signaling schemes by exploiting intrinsic security resource allocation structures, enabling us to compute an optimal scheme significantly faster. Our experiment results show that by strategically revealing private information, the principal can significantly enhance the protection effectiveness for the targets.","PeriodicalId":35065,"journal":{"name":"Games","volume":"14 1","pages":"12"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-01-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42153842","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
How to sample training/validation data is an important question for machine learning models, especially when the dataset is heterogeneous and skewed. In this paper, we propose a data sampling method that robustly selects training/validation data. We formulate the training/validation data sampling process as a two-player game: a trainer aims to sample training data so as to minimize the test error, while a validator adversarially samples validation data that can increase the test error. Robust sampling is achieved at the game equilibrium. To accelerate the searching process, we adopt reinforcement learning aided Monte Carlo trees search (MCTS). We apply our method to a car-following modeling problem, a complicated scenario with heterogeneous and random human driving behavior. Real-world data, the Next Generation SIMulation (NGSIM), is used to validate this method, and experiment results demonstrate the sampling robustness and thereby the model out-of-sample performance.
{"title":"Robust Data Sampling in Machine Learning: A Game-Theoretic Framework for Training and Validation Data Selection","authors":"Zhaobin Mo, Xuan Di, Rongye Shi","doi":"10.3390/g14010013","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3390/g14010013","url":null,"abstract":"How to sample training/validation data is an important question for machine learning models, especially when the dataset is heterogeneous and skewed. In this paper, we propose a data sampling method that robustly selects training/validation data. We formulate the training/validation data sampling process as a two-player game: a trainer aims to sample training data so as to minimize the test error, while a validator adversarially samples validation data that can increase the test error. Robust sampling is achieved at the game equilibrium. To accelerate the searching process, we adopt reinforcement learning aided Monte Carlo trees search (MCTS). We apply our method to a car-following modeling problem, a complicated scenario with heterogeneous and random human driving behavior. Real-world data, the Next Generation SIMulation (NGSIM), is used to validate this method, and experiment results demonstrate the sampling robustness and thereby the model out-of-sample performance.","PeriodicalId":35065,"journal":{"name":"Games","volume":"14 1","pages":"13"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-01-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43141858","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
High-quality academic publishing is built on a rigorous peer review process, and Games is no exception, upholding its high standards for published papers due to the outstanding efforts of our reviewers [...]
{"title":"Acknowledgment to the Reviewers of Games in 2022","authors":"G. Office","doi":"10.3390/g14010011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3390/g14010011","url":null,"abstract":"High-quality academic publishing is built on a rigorous peer review process, and Games is no exception, upholding its high standards for published papers due to the outstanding efforts of our reviewers [...]","PeriodicalId":35065,"journal":{"name":"Games","volume":"14 1","pages":"11"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-01-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45620160","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Due to the challenge of global warming, the European Union (EU) signed the Paris Agreement (2015) to diminish total Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emissions. This paper addresses the conflict that EU member states face when they want to follow the target of the Paris Agreement for the period 2021–2030 which is a 55% GHG emission reduction by 2030 (compared with GHG emission in 1990). EU member states have to emit at a level that is lower than their emission needs. To solve this problem, we implement the claims problems approach as a method for distributing insufficient resources among parties with greater demands. We use several well-known division rules to divide the emission budget among EU member states. We define a set of principles that should be satisfied by division rules to select the most optimal allocation method. To diminish the effect of countries’ preferences on the allocation we use equity and stability criteria to examine the fairness of the rules. Moreover, we allocate the emission budget in two ways: First, we apply division rules to allocate the total emission budget for 2021–2030 among countries. Second, we allocate the emission budget annually from 2021 to 2030. We propose that Constrained Equal Awards (CEA) is an appropriate division rule to meet the target of 2030.
{"title":"The Allocation of Greenhouse Gas Emission in European Union through Applying the Claims Problems Approach","authors":"Foroogh Salekpay","doi":"10.3390/g14010009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3390/g14010009","url":null,"abstract":"Due to the challenge of global warming, the European Union (EU) signed the Paris Agreement (2015) to diminish total Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emissions. This paper addresses the conflict that EU member states face when they want to follow the target of the Paris Agreement for the period 2021–2030 which is a 55% GHG emission reduction by 2030 (compared with GHG emission in 1990). EU member states have to emit at a level that is lower than their emission needs. To solve this problem, we implement the claims problems approach as a method for distributing insufficient resources among parties with greater demands. We use several well-known division rules to divide the emission budget among EU member states. We define a set of principles that should be satisfied by division rules to select the most optimal allocation method. To diminish the effect of countries’ preferences on the allocation we use equity and stability criteria to examine the fairness of the rules. Moreover, we allocate the emission budget in two ways: First, we apply division rules to allocate the total emission budget for 2021–2030 among countries. Second, we allocate the emission budget annually from 2021 to 2030. We propose that Constrained Equal Awards (CEA) is an appropriate division rule to meet the target of 2030.","PeriodicalId":35065,"journal":{"name":"Games","volume":"14 1","pages":"9"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-01-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42774186","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
H. Sijtsma, N. Lee, J. Buczny, M. Hollarek, R. Walsh, M. Buuren, L. Krabbendam
Adolescence is an important developmental period for both trust behavior and personality maturation, and individual differences in trust decisions may be related to different personality traits. In the current study, a group of adolescents (n = 483, Mage = 13.5, SDage = 0.4) played two counterbalanced conditions of a multi-round trust game. In one condition, the partner displayed trustworthy behavior (the trustworthy condition), while the partner in the other condition played untrustworthy behavior (the untrustworthy condition). Three types of trust behavior were examined: initial trust behavior, the adaptation of trust behavior (trustworthy condition), and the adaptation of trust behavior (untrustworthy condition). Personality was measured using the Brief HEXACO Inventory. We expected the HEXACO personality dimensions of honesty–humility and agreeableness to be positively associated with initial trust behavior, but conscientiousness to be negatively related to initial trust behavior. The examination of the relationship between these dimensions and the adaptation of trust behavior were conducted on an exploratory basis. The investigation of the relationship between the remaining dimensions (emotionality, extraversion, and openness to experience) and the three types of trust behavior were also carried out on an exploratory basis. For each type of trust behavior, a hierarchical multiple regression analysis was undertaken to examine whether the HEXACO personality dimensions were related to trust behavior. Using frequentist analyses, no evidence was found that supported the HEXACO dimensions as significant predictors of the three types of trust behavior. Moreover, additional Bayesian analyses showed evidence that the hypothesized HEXACO dimensions (honesty–humility, agreeableness, and conscientiousness) did not outperform the non-hypothesized HEXACO dimensions (emotionality, extraversion, and openness to experience). The association between personality traits and trust might be less pronounced during adolescence as personality maturates across an individual’s lifespan. Additionally, due to a heightened sensitivity to the environment, contextual cues may affect adolescent decision-making processes, leaving less room for personality-driven behaviors.
{"title":"HEXACO Personality Dimensions Do Not Predict Individual Differences in Adolescent Trust Behavior","authors":"H. Sijtsma, N. Lee, J. Buczny, M. Hollarek, R. Walsh, M. Buuren, L. Krabbendam","doi":"10.3390/g14010010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3390/g14010010","url":null,"abstract":"Adolescence is an important developmental period for both trust behavior and personality maturation, and individual differences in trust decisions may be related to different personality traits. In the current study, a group of adolescents (n = 483, Mage = 13.5, SDage = 0.4) played two counterbalanced conditions of a multi-round trust game. In one condition, the partner displayed trustworthy behavior (the trustworthy condition), while the partner in the other condition played untrustworthy behavior (the untrustworthy condition). Three types of trust behavior were examined: initial trust behavior, the adaptation of trust behavior (trustworthy condition), and the adaptation of trust behavior (untrustworthy condition). Personality was measured using the Brief HEXACO Inventory. We expected the HEXACO personality dimensions of honesty–humility and agreeableness to be positively associated with initial trust behavior, but conscientiousness to be negatively related to initial trust behavior. The examination of the relationship between these dimensions and the adaptation of trust behavior were conducted on an exploratory basis. The investigation of the relationship between the remaining dimensions (emotionality, extraversion, and openness to experience) and the three types of trust behavior were also carried out on an exploratory basis. For each type of trust behavior, a hierarchical multiple regression analysis was undertaken to examine whether the HEXACO personality dimensions were related to trust behavior. Using frequentist analyses, no evidence was found that supported the HEXACO dimensions as significant predictors of the three types of trust behavior. Moreover, additional Bayesian analyses showed evidence that the hypothesized HEXACO dimensions (honesty–humility, agreeableness, and conscientiousness) did not outperform the non-hypothesized HEXACO dimensions (emotionality, extraversion, and openness to experience). The association between personality traits and trust might be less pronounced during adolescence as personality maturates across an individual’s lifespan. Additionally, due to a heightened sensitivity to the environment, contextual cues may affect adolescent decision-making processes, leaving less room for personality-driven behaviors.","PeriodicalId":35065,"journal":{"name":"Games","volume":"14 1","pages":"10"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-01-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45533588","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Trust and reciprocity promote cooperation and are key elements of a successful social life. This study investigated the framing effects on trust and reciprocity behaviors. Using an iterated one-shot within-subjects design, this study explored how trust and reciprocity decisions changed when the game was framed in terms of a give (i.e., using a standard trust game with a default of no trust) and a take (e.g., using a distrust game with a default of full trust) frame. Participants of both genders first completed the scenario version of the game (Session 1), and then played the roles of trustors (Session 2) and trustees (Session 3) with human and computer-mediated human partners either in the give or take frame. Our results showed increased trust in the give than in the take frame, but only pronounced in direct interaction with human (vs. indirect computer-mediated) partners. Participants also showed higher expectations of return in the give than in the take frame. The actual reciprocity was higher in the give than in the take frame when interacting both with human and computer-mediated human partners. The results contribute to our understanding of the factors that shape trust and reciprocity and emphasize the impact of framing the default.
{"title":"Default Matters in Trust and Reciprocity","authors":"Yao Zhang, Yushu Zhang, Yan Wu, F. Krueger","doi":"10.3390/g14010008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3390/g14010008","url":null,"abstract":"Trust and reciprocity promote cooperation and are key elements of a successful social life. This study investigated the framing effects on trust and reciprocity behaviors. Using an iterated one-shot within-subjects design, this study explored how trust and reciprocity decisions changed when the game was framed in terms of a give (i.e., using a standard trust game with a default of no trust) and a take (e.g., using a distrust game with a default of full trust) frame. Participants of both genders first completed the scenario version of the game (Session 1), and then played the roles of trustors (Session 2) and trustees (Session 3) with human and computer-mediated human partners either in the give or take frame. Our results showed increased trust in the give than in the take frame, but only pronounced in direct interaction with human (vs. indirect computer-mediated) partners. Participants also showed higher expectations of return in the give than in the take frame. The actual reciprocity was higher in the give than in the take frame when interacting both with human and computer-mediated human partners. The results contribute to our understanding of the factors that shape trust and reciprocity and emphasize the impact of framing the default.","PeriodicalId":35065,"journal":{"name":"Games","volume":"14 1","pages":"8"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-01-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47982874","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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