Pub Date : 2022-04-12DOI: 10.30965/22142290-12340014
R. Turaeva
This article contributes to the growing field of social media and internet research, focusing on questions of securitization and examining the internet politics of Central Asia with a specific focus on Turkmenistan. The article extends the brief analysis introduced by Tucker and Turaeva (2016) concerning Turkmen nationals joining IS (Islamic State). Here, I have contextualized those reported discussions into a wider geopolitical and sociological positioning of the participants (both individual and states) with the aim of uncovering the methods and principles that state and non-state actors use to construct discourses of threat and danger on social media and elsewhere on the internet. I argue that social media and the internet have moved beyond being a means for open communication and exchange; they have also come to be used by authoritarian states to suppress, control, and manipulate certain discourses. In the case of Turkmenistan, social media helps to control security discourse about the ISIS threat and the presence of Turkmenistani nationals in the group, even as it grants open access to information.
{"title":"Online Discourses in Post-Soviet Media: The Threat of the Islamic State in Central Asia","authors":"R. Turaeva","doi":"10.30965/22142290-12340014","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.30965/22142290-12340014","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000This article contributes to the growing field of social media and internet research, focusing on questions of securitization and examining the internet politics of Central Asia with a specific focus on Turkmenistan. The article extends the brief analysis introduced by Tucker and Turaeva (2016) concerning Turkmen nationals joining IS (Islamic State). Here, I have contextualized those reported discussions into a wider geopolitical and sociological positioning of the participants (both individual and states) with the aim of uncovering the methods and principles that state and non-state actors use to construct discourses of threat and danger on social media and elsewhere on the internet. I argue that social media and the internet have moved beyond being a means for open communication and exchange; they have also come to be used by authoritarian states to suppress, control, and manipulate certain discourses. In the case of Turkmenistan, social media helps to control security discourse about the ISIS threat and the presence of Turkmenistani nationals in the group, even as it grants open access to information.","PeriodicalId":351033,"journal":{"name":"Central Asian Affairs","volume":"80 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-04-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122312604","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-04-12DOI: 10.30965/22142290-12340018
Jasmin Dall’ Agnola
Instagram is the world’s most popular social media tool among people under 29, including Central Asian youth. Despite the growing authoritarian grip on print and online media, more and more Tajik women are opening up on Instagram to counter the pernicious narrative that blames victims of sexual harassment and violence for speaking out against their harassers and abusers. So far, there is little research exploring the extent to which women Instagram bloggers are successful in influencing the wider female public’s perception of sexual harassment and violence. I seek to fill this gap by analyzing whether Tajik women’s exposure to information on social networks influences their awareness of sexual harassment and violence. The following article contributes to the growing body of literature discussing the transformative forces of digital activism in Central Asia by exploring empirical data gathered through a nationwide survey in Tajikistan. The results reveal the emancipatory potential of digital activism.
{"title":"“Tell Me Sister” – Social Media, a Tool for Women Activists in Tajikistan","authors":"Jasmin Dall’ Agnola","doi":"10.30965/22142290-12340018","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.30965/22142290-12340018","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000Instagram is the world’s most popular social media tool among people under 29, including Central Asian youth. Despite the growing authoritarian grip on print and online media, more and more Tajik women are opening up on Instagram to counter the pernicious narrative that blames victims of sexual harassment and violence for speaking out against their harassers and abusers. So far, there is little research exploring the extent to which women Instagram bloggers are successful in influencing the wider female public’s perception of sexual harassment and violence. I seek to fill this gap by analyzing whether Tajik women’s exposure to information on social networks influences their awareness of sexual harassment and violence. The following article contributes to the growing body of literature discussing the transformative forces of digital activism in Central Asia by exploring empirical data gathered through a nationwide survey in Tajikistan. The results reveal the emancipatory potential of digital activism.","PeriodicalId":351033,"journal":{"name":"Central Asian Affairs","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-04-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128334823","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-04-12DOI: 10.30965/22142290-12340016
M. Zhir-Lebed
The Russia-Ukraine conflict raised fears that Kazakhstani Russians outside of Russia could be mobilized by the idea of the Russkiĭ mir (Russian world), which has been actively spread on the Russian-speaking segment of social media. Although Russian- speaking social media are popular in Kazakhstan, the example of young Kazakhstani Russians demonstrates that social media usage strengthens the connection to Kazakhstan rather than to the historical “home” country. Being surrounded by visual and textual information related to Kazakhstani urban centers, local Russian youth begin to envisage and create their version of Kazakhstan based upon personal social media feeds. As a result, their civic awareness and sense of belonging to Kazakhstan raise and allow these young people to navigate and portray their national identity in a positive way.
{"title":"Rising Civic Awareness through Local Instagram: Young Kazakhstani Russians and Their Belongingness to Kazakhstan","authors":"M. Zhir-Lebed","doi":"10.30965/22142290-12340016","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.30965/22142290-12340016","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000The Russia-Ukraine conflict raised fears that Kazakhstani Russians outside of Russia could be mobilized by the idea of the Russkiĭ mir (Russian world), which has been actively spread on the Russian-speaking segment of social media. Although Russian- speaking social media are popular in Kazakhstan, the example of young Kazakhstani Russians demonstrates that social media usage strengthens the connection to Kazakhstan rather than to the historical “home” country. Being surrounded by visual and textual information related to Kazakhstani urban centers, local Russian youth begin to envisage and create their version of Kazakhstan based upon personal social media feeds. As a result, their civic awareness and sense of belonging to Kazakhstan raise and allow these young people to navigate and portray their national identity in a positive way.","PeriodicalId":351033,"journal":{"name":"Central Asian Affairs","volume":"189 3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-04-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134222226","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-12-22DOI: 10.30965/22142290-12340010
B. Eschment, B. De Cordier
Thirty years after its independence by-fait-accompli, Kazakhstan, both as a polity and as a society, is still trying to manage the formation of its national and civic identity. Kazakhstan and the Central Asian region in general have somehow always been subject to clichés involving a ‘hotbed of ethnic tensions.’ During the period between 1985–1995, it was often assumed that the ethnic hyper-diversity that characterized the Kazakh Soviet republic and the deep societal crises caused by the decline and demise of the Soviet Union would inevitably result in open ethnic conflict, if not in the breakup of the country. Despite a series of local incidents, such a scenario did not materialize. This suggests the existence of a viable level of both state legitimacy and societal cohesion. The tragic events in Yugoslavia, the Caucasus, and Tajikistan in the 1990s might also have dissuaded Kazakhstan from large-scale unrest. To this day, however, the definition and practice of an identity—offered by the state and state-affiliated civil society—which all citizens, regardless of their ethnicity, are able to identify with is crucial, not only for the country’s aspired international reputation, but also for internal cohesion and stability. The official statements about the success thus far of the multi-ethnic civic model of Kazakhstan, developed under its first president, Nursultan Nazarbayev, are open for interpretation. However, the contributions in this article cluster suggest that the majority of the population somehow assesses this development as positive, or at least agrees that things could have been worse. There is no doubt that society and the state have become ethnically ‘more Kazakh’ in the years since independence. This is demonstrated by the composition of its population and the share of the titular Kazakh population, going from 40% in 1989 (a minority in their own titular republic) to 68.5% in 2020. This shift is also noticeable at the local level. Kazakhs now form majorities in cities and provinces that had clear non-Kazakh majorities or ethnically diverse populations dating back to 1989, the year of the last Soviet census. For example, if ethnic Kazakhs formed less than one-quarter of Almaty’s population in 1989 (when it was still Alma-Ata, the capital of the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic), their share is now likely closer to two-thirds. In Atyrau on
{"title":"Introduction: Ethnic, Civic, or Both? The Ethnicities of Kazakhstan in Search of an Identity and Homeland","authors":"B. Eschment, B. De Cordier","doi":"10.30965/22142290-12340010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.30965/22142290-12340010","url":null,"abstract":"Thirty years after its independence by-fait-accompli, Kazakhstan, both as a polity and as a society, is still trying to manage the formation of its national and civic identity. Kazakhstan and the Central Asian region in general have somehow always been subject to clichés involving a ‘hotbed of ethnic tensions.’ During the period between 1985–1995, it was often assumed that the ethnic hyper-diversity that characterized the Kazakh Soviet republic and the deep societal crises caused by the decline and demise of the Soviet Union would inevitably result in open ethnic conflict, if not in the breakup of the country. Despite a series of local incidents, such a scenario did not materialize. This suggests the existence of a viable level of both state legitimacy and societal cohesion. The tragic events in Yugoslavia, the Caucasus, and Tajikistan in the 1990s might also have dissuaded Kazakhstan from large-scale unrest. To this day, however, the definition and practice of an identity—offered by the state and state-affiliated civil society—which all citizens, regardless of their ethnicity, are able to identify with is crucial, not only for the country’s aspired international reputation, but also for internal cohesion and stability. The official statements about the success thus far of the multi-ethnic civic model of Kazakhstan, developed under its first president, Nursultan Nazarbayev, are open for interpretation. However, the contributions in this article cluster suggest that the majority of the population somehow assesses this development as positive, or at least agrees that things could have been worse. There is no doubt that society and the state have become ethnically ‘more Kazakh’ in the years since independence. This is demonstrated by the composition of its population and the share of the titular Kazakh population, going from 40% in 1989 (a minority in their own titular republic) to 68.5% in 2020. This shift is also noticeable at the local level. Kazakhs now form majorities in cities and provinces that had clear non-Kazakh majorities or ethnically diverse populations dating back to 1989, the year of the last Soviet census. For example, if ethnic Kazakhs formed less than one-quarter of Almaty’s population in 1989 (when it was still Alma-Ata, the capital of the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic), their share is now likely closer to two-thirds. In Atyrau on","PeriodicalId":351033,"journal":{"name":"Central Asian Affairs","volume":"24 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-12-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129258054","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-12-22DOI: 10.30965/22142290-12340004
Berikbol Dukeyev
The paper examines the production of secondary-school textbooks published between 1992 and 2019 that address the Soviet history of Kazakhstan. It argues that textbook authors exercise agency when discussing Kazakhstan’s participation in the Second World War. While some authors focus squarely on the heroism of Kazakhs and the Kazakh nation’s contribution to the final victory, others build upon this narrative by discussing the human losses incurred and the experiences of ordinary people. This article contributes to studies looking at portrayals of World War II in post-Soviet countries’ history textbooks.
{"title":"Kazakhstan in World War II: Authors and Publishers of Post-1991 History Textbooks","authors":"Berikbol Dukeyev","doi":"10.30965/22142290-12340004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.30965/22142290-12340004","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000The paper examines the production of secondary-school textbooks published between 1992 and 2019 that address the Soviet history of Kazakhstan. It argues that textbook authors exercise agency when discussing Kazakhstan’s participation in the Second World War. While some authors focus squarely on the heroism of Kazakhs and the Kazakh nation’s contribution to the final victory, others build upon this narrative by discussing the human losses incurred and the experiences of ordinary people. This article contributes to studies looking at portrayals of World War II in post-Soviet countries’ history textbooks.","PeriodicalId":351033,"journal":{"name":"Central Asian Affairs","volume":"106 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-12-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131581968","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-12-22DOI: 10.30965/22142290-12340003
Sabiha Yeasmin Rosy, Fatemeh Nejati
This study investigates the impact of male labor migration upon wives living among their husbands’ extended families in Tajikistan. It studies the risks and choices available to such wives in bargaining for remittances, with a particular focus on the risks that daughters-in-law (kelin in Tajik) undertake when negotiating remittances with their mothers-in-law. This paper explores age and gender-specific norms in Tajik transnational families and their minimal opportunities for kelins to bargain and negotiate the risks associated with making “claims” on remittances by using Deniz Kandiyoti’s “patriarchal bargain” and Bina Agarwal’s household bargain framework, as well as extensive fieldwork conducted in Tajikistan. The study concludes that international migration and remittances have had a complex impact on gender norms in Tajikistan, with emerging new forms of passive negotiation by kelins unlikely to undermine patriarchal gender norms in their favor.
{"title":"Bargaining over Remittances in Tajik Extended Families","authors":"Sabiha Yeasmin Rosy, Fatemeh Nejati","doi":"10.30965/22142290-12340003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.30965/22142290-12340003","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000This study investigates the impact of male labor migration upon wives living among their husbands’ extended families in Tajikistan. It studies the risks and choices available to such wives in bargaining for remittances, with a particular focus on the risks that daughters-in-law (kelin in Tajik) undertake when negotiating remittances with their mothers-in-law. This paper explores age and gender-specific norms in Tajik transnational families and their minimal opportunities for kelins to bargain and negotiate the risks associated with making “claims” on remittances by using Deniz Kandiyoti’s “patriarchal bargain” and Bina Agarwal’s household bargain framework, as well as extensive fieldwork conducted in Tajikistan. The study concludes that international migration and remittances have had a complex impact on gender norms in Tajikistan, with emerging new forms of passive negotiation by kelins unlikely to undermine patriarchal gender norms in their favor.","PeriodicalId":351033,"journal":{"name":"Central Asian Affairs","volume":"42 20","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-12-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"120813168","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-12-22DOI: 10.30965/22142290-12340012
B. Eschment
Almost all minority ethnic groups in Kazakhstan are immigrants. This means that in addition to their current place of residence, Kazakhstan (their “Second Homeland”), they also have a place of origin (their “Historical Homeland”). The leadership of the country has approached this situation, which offers opportunities as well as dangers, by explicitly exhorting the official ethnic representations of minorities to nurture contacts with their Historical Homelands. In this article the examples of the Chechens and Kurds will be used to show how the representations of both ethnicities actively and politically pursued this task. For both groups, representing a nation without an independent state, a fourth actor must be added to the “triangle nexus” familiar from diaspora studies, respectively Russia and Turkey, whose positions the Kazakhstani government cannot simply disregard. What emerges from the study is the strong emotional link of both minorities’ representatives with Kazakhstan as their Second Homeland.
{"title":"The Chechens and Kurds of Kazakhstan between Historical and Second Homelands","authors":"B. Eschment","doi":"10.30965/22142290-12340012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.30965/22142290-12340012","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000Almost all minority ethnic groups in Kazakhstan are immigrants. This means that in addition to their current place of residence, Kazakhstan (their “Second Homeland”), they also have a place of origin (their “Historical Homeland”). The leadership of the country has approached this situation, which offers opportunities as well as dangers, by explicitly exhorting the official ethnic representations of minorities to nurture contacts with their Historical Homelands. In this article the examples of the Chechens and Kurds will be used to show how the representations of both ethnicities actively and politically pursued this task. For both groups, representing a nation without an independent state, a fourth actor must be added to the “triangle nexus” familiar from diaspora studies, respectively Russia and Turkey, whose positions the Kazakhstani government cannot simply disregard. What emerges from the study is the strong emotional link of both minorities’ representatives with Kazakhstan as their Second Homeland.","PeriodicalId":351033,"journal":{"name":"Central Asian Affairs","volume":"55 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-12-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128449550","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-12-22DOI: 10.30965/22142290-12340011
A. Kamalov
This article examines the ethno-national identity of Uyghurs in Kazakhstan, which, during the period of independence, has been undergoing a complex process of transformation from ‘Sovietness’ to ‘Kazakhstanness.’ This transformation is shaped by the ethnic policy of Kazakhstan, aiming for the consolidation of society and formation of a united Kazakhstani nation. Post-Soviet development not only produces threats to the Uyghur ethnic identity, but also creates new perspectives for it. The article focuses on some dimensions of the Uyghur identity determined by cross-border migration from the Xinjiang-Uyghur autonomous region of the neighboring People’s Republic of China and Soviet national policy, such as language, cultural institutions, and existence of the Uyghur district in the Almaty province. Analysis of the discourse of vätän (motherland) shows a shift to a perception of Kazakhstan as a homeland.
{"title":"Identity of Kazakhstan’s Uyghurs: Migration, Homeland, and Language","authors":"A. Kamalov","doi":"10.30965/22142290-12340011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.30965/22142290-12340011","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000This article examines the ethno-national identity of Uyghurs in Kazakhstan, which, during the period of independence, has been undergoing a complex process of transformation from ‘Sovietness’ to ‘Kazakhstanness.’ This transformation is shaped by the ethnic policy of Kazakhstan, aiming for the consolidation of society and formation of a united Kazakhstani nation. Post-Soviet development not only produces threats to the Uyghur ethnic identity, but also creates new perspectives for it. The article focuses on some dimensions of the Uyghur identity determined by cross-border migration from the Xinjiang-Uyghur autonomous region of the neighboring People’s Republic of China and Soviet national policy, such as language, cultural institutions, and existence of the Uyghur district in the Almaty province. Analysis of the discourse of vätän (motherland) shows a shift to a perception of Kazakhstan as a homeland.","PeriodicalId":351033,"journal":{"name":"Central Asian Affairs","volume":"17 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-12-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126369798","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-12-22DOI: 10.30965/22142290-12340005
B. Zakirov
This paper investigates the nature of Uzbekistan’s political system under President Islam Karimov through the lenses of patronal presidentialism to explain the factors conducive to the durability of the current regime. The paper argues that the longevity of the authoritarian regime in Uzbekistan can be best understood by a methodology that reconciles the propositions of institutional analysis of authoritarian rule with conventional methods of maintaining power such as coercion and patronage. Revealing the limitation of mainstream literature that overemphasizes neopatrimonialism and informality to understand domestic politics, the paper asserts that patronal president Islam Karimov assumed multiple instruments of power at the intersection of state and economy, which ensured regime stability in Uzbekistan until his death in 2016.
{"title":"Authoritarian Regime Stability in Uzbekistan under Patronal President Islam Karimov","authors":"B. Zakirov","doi":"10.30965/22142290-12340005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.30965/22142290-12340005","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000This paper investigates the nature of Uzbekistan’s political system under President Islam Karimov through the lenses of patronal presidentialism to explain the factors conducive to the durability of the current regime. The paper argues that the longevity of the authoritarian regime in Uzbekistan can be best understood by a methodology that reconciles the propositions of institutional analysis of authoritarian rule with conventional methods of maintaining power such as coercion and patronage. Revealing the limitation of mainstream literature that overemphasizes neopatrimonialism and informality to understand domestic politics, the paper asserts that patronal president Islam Karimov assumed multiple instruments of power at the intersection of state and economy, which ensured regime stability in Uzbekistan until his death in 2016.","PeriodicalId":351033,"journal":{"name":"Central Asian Affairs","volume":"32 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-12-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123345466","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}