Pub Date : 2020-02-03DOI: 10.1080/14799855.2020.1724099
A. Waterman
ABSTRACT Recent works have highlighted deeply political variations in Indian counterinsurgency across space and time, leading to the emergence of a diversity of “armed orders” ranging from outright clashes to openly cooperative state-insurgent relationships. However, we know little about how variations in counterinsurgency strategy, particularly in the levels of force employed, shape the functioning of these armed orders. Drawing on original case study evidence from the Naga insurgency, this article builds on existing works on state-insurgent orders by developing a typology of variations in the use of force, accounting for counterinsurgents’ use of force to undermine, modify and uphold a patchwork of complex and fragile state-insurgent orders across space and time in India’s Naga conflict. In doing so, it contributes to debates on the use of force in counterinsurgency and the study of order in conflict in India’s Northeast.
{"title":"Counterinsurgents’ use of force and “armed orders” in Naga Northeast India","authors":"A. Waterman","doi":"10.1080/14799855.2020.1724099","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14799855.2020.1724099","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Recent works have highlighted deeply political variations in Indian counterinsurgency across space and time, leading to the emergence of a diversity of “armed orders” ranging from outright clashes to openly cooperative state-insurgent relationships. However, we know little about how variations in counterinsurgency strategy, particularly in the levels of force employed, shape the functioning of these armed orders. Drawing on original case study evidence from the Naga insurgency, this article builds on existing works on state-insurgent orders by developing a typology of variations in the use of force, accounting for counterinsurgents’ use of force to undermine, modify and uphold a patchwork of complex and fragile state-insurgent orders across space and time in India’s Naga conflict. In doing so, it contributes to debates on the use of force in counterinsurgency and the study of order in conflict in India’s Northeast.","PeriodicalId":35162,"journal":{"name":"Asian Security","volume":"24 1","pages":"119 - 137"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-02-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79028333","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-01-26DOI: 10.1080/14799855.2020.1721469
Y. Lim
ABSTRACT China’s naval footprint in the Indian Ocean has expanded considerably over the last decade. This growing presence has led to significant debates about China’s goals and capabilities in the region. This article argues that China’s trajectory over the last ten years reflects an alignment of ends, ways and means in the Indian Ocean. The main driver behind China’s ambitions in the region is the need for Beijing to secure pivotal maritime lines of communications that carry a large share of Chinese oil imports and a sizable part of Chinese exports. Fulfilling this mission has required a significant adjustment of China’s naval strategy, and the addition of ‘open seas protection’ to the core missions of the PLA Navy. This strategy has, in turn, been supported by the development of a navy with increased sea control capabilities and overseas basing plans that have started to materialize in Djibouti.
{"title":"China’s rising naval ambitions in the Indian Ocean: aligning ends, ways and means","authors":"Y. Lim","doi":"10.1080/14799855.2020.1721469","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14799855.2020.1721469","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT China’s naval footprint in the Indian Ocean has expanded considerably over the last decade. This growing presence has led to significant debates about China’s goals and capabilities in the region. This article argues that China’s trajectory over the last ten years reflects an alignment of ends, ways and means in the Indian Ocean. The main driver behind China’s ambitions in the region is the need for Beijing to secure pivotal maritime lines of communications that carry a large share of Chinese oil imports and a sizable part of Chinese exports. Fulfilling this mission has required a significant adjustment of China’s naval strategy, and the addition of ‘open seas protection’ to the core missions of the PLA Navy. This strategy has, in turn, been supported by the development of a navy with increased sea control capabilities and overseas basing plans that have started to materialize in Djibouti.","PeriodicalId":35162,"journal":{"name":"Asian Security","volume":"17 1","pages":"396 - 412"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84411898","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-01-18DOI: 10.1080/14799855.2020.1713104
Peter G. Thompson
ABSTRACT World War I has become the “go-to” analogy for understanding the contemporary security dynamic in East Asia, especially as it concerns US-China relations and the possibility of war. However, this analogy fails to account for the fundamental changes in economic flows in the current environment, specifically the growth and proliferation of foreign direct investment (FDI). Capital flows were primarily portfolio investments in 1914, while FDI flowed from great powers to secondary, allied states. This is not representative of East Asia today, where FDI flows between possible belligerents in any future conflict and global value chains link states within and across regions. Ultimately, World War I may no longer provide a satisfactory analogy for understanding the impact economic interdependence has on modern war given FDI’s importance in the global economic system.
{"title":"Getting the economic context right: the WWI analogy and contemporary East Asia","authors":"Peter G. Thompson","doi":"10.1080/14799855.2020.1713104","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14799855.2020.1713104","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT World War I has become the “go-to” analogy for understanding the contemporary security dynamic in East Asia, especially as it concerns US-China relations and the possibility of war. However, this analogy fails to account for the fundamental changes in economic flows in the current environment, specifically the growth and proliferation of foreign direct investment (FDI). Capital flows were primarily portfolio investments in 1914, while FDI flowed from great powers to secondary, allied states. This is not representative of East Asia today, where FDI flows between possible belligerents in any future conflict and global value chains link states within and across regions. Ultimately, World War I may no longer provide a satisfactory analogy for understanding the impact economic interdependence has on modern war given FDI’s importance in the global economic system.","PeriodicalId":35162,"journal":{"name":"Asian Security","volume":"92 1","pages":"379 - 395"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83171947","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-01-02DOI: 10.1080/14799855.2018.1471466
J. Bertrand, Alexandre Pelletier, A. Thawnghmung
ABSTRACT The article argues that “first movers” and the bandwagoning effect they trigger can undermine the dynamics that perpetuate civil war and enable a multiparty cease-fire agreement. It looks at the unprecedented “nationwide” cease-fire in Myanmar reached between the government and several ethnic armed organizations in 2015. It shows that democratization and unilateral concessions by the Myanmar government were instrumental in overcoming the commitment problem and provided the necessary incentives for “first movers” to set the stage for a broad cease-fire agreement.
{"title":"First Movers, Democratization and Unilateral Concessions: Overcoming Commitment Problems and Negotiating a “Nationwide Cease-Fire” in Myanmar","authors":"J. Bertrand, Alexandre Pelletier, A. Thawnghmung","doi":"10.1080/14799855.2018.1471466","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14799855.2018.1471466","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The article argues that “first movers” and the bandwagoning effect they trigger can undermine the dynamics that perpetuate civil war and enable a multiparty cease-fire agreement. It looks at the unprecedented “nationwide” cease-fire in Myanmar reached between the government and several ethnic armed organizations in 2015. It shows that democratization and unilateral concessions by the Myanmar government were instrumental in overcoming the commitment problem and provided the necessary incentives for “first movers” to set the stage for a broad cease-fire agreement.","PeriodicalId":35162,"journal":{"name":"Asian Security","volume":"34 1","pages":"15 - 34"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90367971","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-01-02DOI: 10.1080/14799855.2018.1472581
S. Haynes
ABSTRACT The majority of the nuclear proliferation literature is dedicated to understanding why states acquire nuclear weapons. While this question remains important, it is also advantageous to push beyond this inquiry to ask what motivates a state’s nuclear decisions after acquisition. Recent research indicates that a state’s nuclear force structure is heavily influenced by its threat environment. But what explains decisions relating to specific nuclear weapon systems? If security is a sufficient explanatory variable, then why would a state pursue nuclear weapons with high development and production costs but relatively low security gains? Using China as a case study, this article explores the power of prestige in explaining such decisions.
{"title":"The Power of Prestige: Explaining China’s Nuclear Weapons Decisions","authors":"S. Haynes","doi":"10.1080/14799855.2018.1472581","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14799855.2018.1472581","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The majority of the nuclear proliferation literature is dedicated to understanding why states acquire nuclear weapons. While this question remains important, it is also advantageous to push beyond this inquiry to ask what motivates a state’s nuclear decisions after acquisition. Recent research indicates that a state’s nuclear force structure is heavily influenced by its threat environment. But what explains decisions relating to specific nuclear weapon systems? If security is a sufficient explanatory variable, then why would a state pursue nuclear weapons with high development and production costs but relatively low security gains? Using China as a case study, this article explores the power of prestige in explaining such decisions.","PeriodicalId":35162,"journal":{"name":"Asian Security","volume":"69 1","pages":"35 - 52"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88321047","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-09-16DOI: 10.1080/14799855.2019.1665515
Avinash Paliwal
ABSTRACT The US president Donald Trump pitched India’s participation as being central to his Afghanistan policy in 2017. Yet, as the US has sought a negotiated settlement with the Afghan Taliban, there is little clarity on how India seeks to deal with its increasing isolation in Afghanistan. This article focuses on India’s response toward the peace talks of 2015 and 2018/19 and investigates why its position changed. In 2015, New Delhi viewed Kabul’s outreach to Pakistan as a “tilt” harmful to India’s strategic interests; in 2018/19, India sought international support for Kabul to enter dialog without preconditions. The article argues that India seeks to ensure an ongoing strategic balance between Afghanistan and Pakistan. The source of such contrasting responses to the two peace talks, then, lies in India’s perception of and confidence in the US’ approach toward Afghanistan, and the changing landscape of Afghan domestic politics.
{"title":"A cautious balance – explaining India’s approach toward Afghanistan’s peace process","authors":"Avinash Paliwal","doi":"10.1080/14799855.2019.1665515","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14799855.2019.1665515","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The US president Donald Trump pitched India’s participation as being central to his Afghanistan policy in 2017. Yet, as the US has sought a negotiated settlement with the Afghan Taliban, there is little clarity on how India seeks to deal with its increasing isolation in Afghanistan. This article focuses on India’s response toward the peace talks of 2015 and 2018/19 and investigates why its position changed. In 2015, New Delhi viewed Kabul’s outreach to Pakistan as a “tilt” harmful to India’s strategic interests; in 2018/19, India sought international support for Kabul to enter dialog without preconditions. The article argues that India seeks to ensure an ongoing strategic balance between Afghanistan and Pakistan. The source of such contrasting responses to the two peace talks, then, lies in India’s perception of and confidence in the US’ approach toward Afghanistan, and the changing landscape of Afghan domestic politics.","PeriodicalId":35162,"journal":{"name":"Asian Security","volume":"225 1","pages":"263 - 280"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80100336","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-09-16DOI: 10.1080/14799855.2019.1665516
Dinshaw J. Mistry
ABSTRACT This article examines the alignment between Pakistan’s policies and U.S. security interests in six areas. While political rhetoric in the 2010s suggested that there was substantial divergence across all areas, the actual record was a mixed. There was considerable divergence on the war in Afghanistan and on India; manageable divergence on China; convergence with limitations on nuclear security; and convergence on the Middle East and on multinational soft security issues (peacekeeping and counterpiracy). Looking ahead, some cases could change from divergence to convergence or vice-versa, and the degree of convergence or divergence within each case may also change, though the overall mixed picture of convergence and divergence may persist. Washington may then adopt a tailored approach toward Islamabad. It could pursue a combination of pressure and engagement to reduce differences in the areas of divergence, while maintaining engagement to consolidate shared interests in the areas of convergence.
{"title":"Divergence and convergence in U.S.-Pakistan security relations","authors":"Dinshaw J. Mistry","doi":"10.1080/14799855.2019.1665516","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14799855.2019.1665516","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This article examines the alignment between Pakistan’s policies and U.S. security interests in six areas. While political rhetoric in the 2010s suggested that there was substantial divergence across all areas, the actual record was a mixed. There was considerable divergence on the war in Afghanistan and on India; manageable divergence on China; convergence with limitations on nuclear security; and convergence on the Middle East and on multinational soft security issues (peacekeeping and counterpiracy). Looking ahead, some cases could change from divergence to convergence or vice-versa, and the degree of convergence or divergence within each case may also change, though the overall mixed picture of convergence and divergence may persist. Washington may then adopt a tailored approach toward Islamabad. It could pursue a combination of pressure and engagement to reduce differences in the areas of divergence, while maintaining engagement to consolidate shared interests in the areas of convergence.","PeriodicalId":35162,"journal":{"name":"Asian Security","volume":"68 1","pages":"243 - 262"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88437874","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-09-02DOI: 10.1080/14799855.2018.1463990
Emilian Kavalski
ABSTRACT India’s relations with Afghanistan and the post-Soviet countries of Central Asia have contributed to the growing interest in the country’s rise. By treating them together as “Central Eurasia,” the discourses of Indian foreign policy invoke a contiguous geopolitical locale bound to India by a shared past. Yet, despite the strategic articulation of a manifest Central Eurasian region, the article uncovers a puzzle of bifurcation in India’s foreign policy reflecting distinct operationalizations of India’s cultural capital in its relations with Afghanistan and the Central Asia republics. The comparative analysis indicates that prior historical experience becomes a compelling strategic context for the continuous framing and reframing of the country’s foreign policy space, which reveals India’s shifting perceptions of international order, self-identity, and global roles. India’s interactions in Central Eurasia offer a good illustration of the crossroads that New Delhi’s foreign policy is facing – either keep on proliferating discourses that spin yarns of the international influence of its historical capital or develop proactive diplomatic strategies that deliver the international status that India desires.
{"title":"The Puzzle of India’s Relations with “Central Eurasia”","authors":"Emilian Kavalski","doi":"10.1080/14799855.2018.1463990","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14799855.2018.1463990","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT India’s relations with Afghanistan and the post-Soviet countries of Central Asia have contributed to the growing interest in the country’s rise. By treating them together as “Central Eurasia,” the discourses of Indian foreign policy invoke a contiguous geopolitical locale bound to India by a shared past. Yet, despite the strategic articulation of a manifest Central Eurasian region, the article uncovers a puzzle of bifurcation in India’s foreign policy reflecting distinct operationalizations of India’s cultural capital in its relations with Afghanistan and the Central Asia republics. The comparative analysis indicates that prior historical experience becomes a compelling strategic context for the continuous framing and reframing of the country’s foreign policy space, which reveals India’s shifting perceptions of international order, self-identity, and global roles. India’s interactions in Central Eurasia offer a good illustration of the crossroads that New Delhi’s foreign policy is facing – either keep on proliferating discourses that spin yarns of the international influence of its historical capital or develop proactive diplomatic strategies that deliver the international status that India desires.","PeriodicalId":35162,"journal":{"name":"Asian Security","volume":"33 1","pages":"304 - 322"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78348218","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-09-02DOI: 10.1080/14799855.2018.1471060
M. Pardesi
ABSTRACT Sino-Indian interactions after the mid-19th century had a causal influence on Chinese and Indian elite perceptions. Modern China encountered modern India as an agent of British imperialism. China perceived India as an “imperial” power in the late 1940s by resorting to the availability heuristic while doubting India’s intentions in Tibet/Southeast Asia. By contrast, India viewed China as a fellow victim of colonialism that had sought India’s help during World War II. Consequently, India perceived China as a “partner” in postwar/postcolonial Asia. This interpretation was based on confirmation bias after 1947, despite contradictory Chinese signals. India’s image of China changed only after the 1950–51 invasion/annexation of Tibet. India then ascribed the image of an “expansionist/hegemonic” power to China based on historical analogy. Nevertheless, they carefully calibrated their strategies towards each other in consonance with these images until the 1959 Lhasa Uprising, thereby preventing their relationship from descending into militarized hostilities.
{"title":"The Initiation of the Sino-Indian rivalry","authors":"M. Pardesi","doi":"10.1080/14799855.2018.1471060","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14799855.2018.1471060","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Sino-Indian interactions after the mid-19th century had a causal influence on Chinese and Indian elite perceptions. Modern China encountered modern India as an agent of British imperialism. China perceived India as an “imperial” power in the late 1940s by resorting to the availability heuristic while doubting India’s intentions in Tibet/Southeast Asia. By contrast, India viewed China as a fellow victim of colonialism that had sought India’s help during World War II. Consequently, India perceived China as a “partner” in postwar/postcolonial Asia. This interpretation was based on confirmation bias after 1947, despite contradictory Chinese signals. India’s image of China changed only after the 1950–51 invasion/annexation of Tibet. India then ascribed the image of an “expansionist/hegemonic” power to China based on historical analogy. Nevertheless, they carefully calibrated their strategies towards each other in consonance with these images until the 1959 Lhasa Uprising, thereby preventing their relationship from descending into militarized hostilities.","PeriodicalId":35162,"journal":{"name":"Asian Security","volume":"18 1","pages":"253 - 284"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87897576","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-09-02DOI: 10.1080/14799855.2018.1445895
Petter Y. Lindgren
ABSTRACT In this article, I further develop the Copenhagen School’s securitization theory in a causal direction, by emphasizing the explanatory family of mechanisms, mediators and moderators. In the first half of this article, I present two models for conceptualizing the causal maps that securitization is part of. Next, I define five epistemological and methodological dimensions that are important for modelling securitization with causal power. The proposed approach is then put into practice by two most-similar case studies in the second half of the article: securitization attempts in Japan in 2006-07 and in 2012-15. By comparing his securitization efforts in 2006 and in 2012-15 respectively, I identify why PM Abe was successful in his securitization attempt in the latter period. Furthermore, I propose an explanatory set that together with securitization enabled certain effects to take place in Japan, namely the introduction of collective self-defense in 2014/15.
{"title":"Advancing the Role of Social Mechanisms, Mediators, and Moderators in Securitization Theory: Explaining Security Policy Change in Japan","authors":"Petter Y. Lindgren","doi":"10.1080/14799855.2018.1445895","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14799855.2018.1445895","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT In this article, I further develop the Copenhagen School’s securitization theory in a causal direction, by emphasizing the explanatory family of mechanisms, mediators and moderators. In the first half of this article, I present two models for conceptualizing the causal maps that securitization is part of. Next, I define five epistemological and methodological dimensions that are important for modelling securitization with causal power. The proposed approach is then put into practice by two most-similar case studies in the second half of the article: securitization attempts in Japan in 2006-07 and in 2012-15. By comparing his securitization efforts in 2006 and in 2012-15 respectively, I identify why PM Abe was successful in his securitization attempt in the latter period. Furthermore, I propose an explanatory set that together with securitization enabled certain effects to take place in Japan, namely the introduction of collective self-defense in 2014/15.","PeriodicalId":35162,"journal":{"name":"Asian Security","volume":"17 1","pages":"343 - 364"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79282784","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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