Pub Date : 2021-01-01DOI: 10.1080/04597222.2021.1868798
The conflict in Ethiopia also highlighted the growth in certain military and security capabilities sourced from China. China launched a remote-sensing satellite for Ethiopia in 2019 and has supplied military equipment to Addis Ababa. Indeed, the seizure of heavy equipment by Tigray People’s Liberation Front rebels in late 2020 included what was believed to be at least one Chinese-manufactured PHL-03 multiple rocket launcher formerly in Ethiopian service.
{"title":"Chapter Nine: Sub-Saharan Africa","authors":"","doi":"10.1080/04597222.2021.1868798","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/04597222.2021.1868798","url":null,"abstract":"The conflict in Ethiopia also highlighted the growth in certain military and security capabilities sourced from China. China launched a remote-sensing satellite for Ethiopia in 2019 and has supplied military equipment to Addis Ababa. Indeed, the seizure of heavy equipment by Tigray People’s Liberation Front rebels in late 2020 included what was believed to be at least one Chinese-manufactured PHL-03 multiple rocket launcher formerly in Ethiopian service.","PeriodicalId":35165,"journal":{"name":"The Military Balance","volume":"54 1","pages":"436 - 502"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/04597222.2021.1868798","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"72406721","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-01-01DOI: 10.1080/04597222.2021.1868804
{"title":"Index of countries and territories","authors":"","doi":"10.1080/04597222.2021.1868804","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/04597222.2021.1868804","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":35165,"journal":{"name":"The Military Balance","volume":"15 1","pages":"524 - 524"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83535976","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-01-01DOI: 10.1080/04597222.2021.1868794
{"title":"Chapter Five: Russia and Eurasia","authors":"","doi":"10.1080/04597222.2021.1868794","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/04597222.2021.1868794","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":35165,"journal":{"name":"The Military Balance","volume":"1 1","pages":"164 - 217"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90467068","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-01-01DOI: 10.1080/04597222.2021.1868789
The coronavirus pandemic will have a significant effect on public and therefore defence spending, but not immediately. While several countries in Asia and in the Middle East moved quickly to adjust public spending, it will likely take until 2022–23 for the full economic effects of governments’ financial responses to the pandemic to translate into defence budget cuts elsewhere. A similar lag was seen after the 2008 financial crisis. Perhaps paradoxically, the immediate effect of the pandemic seems to have been that some Western governments – for example France and Germany – accelerated spending to support local suppliers, while sharper threat perceptions also led to increased spending.
{"title":"Domain trends","authors":"","doi":"10.1080/04597222.2021.1868789","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/04597222.2021.1868789","url":null,"abstract":" The coronavirus pandemic will have a significant effect on public and therefore defence spending, but not immediately. While several countries in Asia and in the Middle East moved quickly to adjust public spending, it will likely take until 2022–23 for the full economic effects of governments’ financial responses to the pandemic to translate into defence budget cuts elsewhere. A similar lag was seen after the 2008 financial crisis. Perhaps paradoxically, the immediate effect of the pandemic seems to have been that some Western governments – for example France and Germany – accelerated spending to support local suppliers, while sharper threat perceptions also led to increased spending.","PeriodicalId":35165,"journal":{"name":"The Military Balance","volume":"88 1","pages":"7 - 8"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85636187","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-01-01DOI: 10.1080/04597222.2021.1868796
Turkey’s armed forces continued operations in Syria, conducting airstrikes and ground operations in early 2020 to halt government advances in Idlib province. Turkey’s military capabilities were also deployed in Libya, supporting the Tripoli-based recognised government. Meanwhile, General Khalifa Haftar’s forces obtained support from Egypt, Russia and the UAE. External actors helped improve the military potential of warring parties, and their sustained involvement indicated growing operational capacity.
{"title":"Chapter Seven: Middle East and North Africa","authors":"","doi":"10.1080/04597222.2021.1868796","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/04597222.2021.1868796","url":null,"abstract":"Turkey’s armed forces continued operations in Syria, conducting airstrikes and ground operations in early 2020 to halt government advances in Idlib province. Turkey’s military capabilities were also deployed in Libya, supporting the Tripoli-based recognised government. Meanwhile, General Khalifa Haftar’s forces obtained support from Egypt, Russia and the UAE. External actors helped improve the military potential of warring parties, and their sustained involvement indicated growing operational capacity.","PeriodicalId":35165,"journal":{"name":"The Military Balance","volume":"1 1","pages":"314 - 377"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90623274","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-01-01DOI: 10.1080/04597222.2021.1868797
Mexico’s naval modernisation continues, with the entry into service of the Benito Juárez-class (formerly Reformador) light frigate. Construction plans for 2020–24 include two 1,680-ton Oaxaca-class Offshore Patrol Vessels (OPVs), four Teotihuacan-class (Damen Stan Patrol 4207) coastal-patrol vessels, five Polaris IIclass interceptor craft and an Isla Maria Madre-class (Damen Fast Crew Supplier 5009) logistics supply vessel.
随着贝尼托Juárez-class(原改革家)轻型护卫舰的服役，墨西哥的海军现代化仍在继续。2020 - 2024年的建造计划包括2艘1680吨的oaxaca级近海巡逻艇(opv)， 4艘teotihuacan级(Damen Stan Patrol 4207)海岸巡逻艇，5艘Polaris ii级拦截艇和1艘Isla Maria madre级(Damen Fast Crew Supplier 5009)后勤补给船。
{"title":"Chapter Eight: Latin America and the Caribbean","authors":"","doi":"10.1080/04597222.2021.1868797","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/04597222.2021.1868797","url":null,"abstract":"Mexico’s naval modernisation continues, with the entry into service of the Benito Juárez-class (formerly Reformador) light frigate. Construction plans for 2020–24 include two 1,680-ton Oaxaca-class Offshore Patrol Vessels (OPVs), four Teotihuacan-class (Damen Stan Patrol 4207) coastal-patrol vessels, five Polaris IIclass interceptor craft and an Isla Maria Madre-class (Damen Fast Crew Supplier 5009) logistics supply vessel.","PeriodicalId":35165,"journal":{"name":"The Military Balance","volume":"108 1","pages":"378 - 435"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74785811","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-01-01DOI: 10.1080/04597222.2021.1868790
No contest at sea After the end of the Cold War, the maritime domain seemed an almost benign conduit for the projection of (essentially Western) power. Operational focus shifted from traditional blue-water operations to encompass the ability not only to project power from the sea but also to operate in the littoral zone, which was becoming the main contested maritime space. The military and diplomatic power of the carrier strike group seemed clear: six US aircraft-carrier groups took part in Operation Desert Storm against Iraq in 1991; and in 1996, Washington ostentatiously deployed two carriers to the waters off Taiwan in response to pressure from Beijing on Taipei. Though this may have had a deterrent effect at the time, it is now widely viewed as having spurred Beijing’s subsequent push to develop an area-denial capability. Now that they were not facing any major statebased threat, European navies switched investment from sea-control missions to power-projection and presence missions. While many retained a core of high-end platforms, such as the Franco-Italian Horizon and British Type-45 air-defence destroyers, fleet inventories dwindled and procurement shifted more towards amphibious and general maritime-security capabilities. Examples include the French Mistralclass amphibious assault ships and latterly the large German F125 Baden-Württemberg-class frigates aimed particularly at littoral and peace-support missions. At the same time, the US Navy developed the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS). Although the programme became mired in controversy over both capabilities and cost, the LCS was intended to be a relatively simple and inexpensive small combatant that would operate in the littoral zone but also potentially carry out maritime-security and presence missions. In some cases, a cooperative approach developed to tackle the challenge of countering mainly nonstate-based threats to maritime security. This was perhaps most evident in the various multinational groupings that coalesced around the threat of piracy New dynamics of maritime competition are emerging. The contemporary maritime domain continues to become more congested, contested and complex, while the centre of gravity of maritime power appears to be shifting further away from Western states. This will change the way operations are conducted at sea and the types of naval capabilities that states seek to procure. Rapid technological change and the proliferation of advanced weaponry are only accelerating this transformation.
{"title":"Chapter One: The future of maritime competition","authors":"","doi":"10.1080/04597222.2021.1868790","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/04597222.2021.1868790","url":null,"abstract":"No contest at sea After the end of the Cold War, the maritime domain seemed an almost benign conduit for the projection of (essentially Western) power. Operational focus shifted from traditional blue-water operations to encompass the ability not only to project power from the sea but also to operate in the littoral zone, which was becoming the main contested maritime space. The military and diplomatic power of the carrier strike group seemed clear: six US aircraft-carrier groups took part in Operation Desert Storm against Iraq in 1991; and in 1996, Washington ostentatiously deployed two carriers to the waters off Taiwan in response to pressure from Beijing on Taipei. Though this may have had a deterrent effect at the time, it is now widely viewed as having spurred Beijing’s subsequent push to develop an area-denial capability. Now that they were not facing any major statebased threat, European navies switched investment from sea-control missions to power-projection and presence missions. While many retained a core of high-end platforms, such as the Franco-Italian Horizon and British Type-45 air-defence destroyers, fleet inventories dwindled and procurement shifted more towards amphibious and general maritime-security capabilities. Examples include the French Mistralclass amphibious assault ships and latterly the large German F125 Baden-Württemberg-class frigates aimed particularly at littoral and peace-support missions. At the same time, the US Navy developed the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS). Although the programme became mired in controversy over both capabilities and cost, the LCS was intended to be a relatively simple and inexpensive small combatant that would operate in the littoral zone but also potentially carry out maritime-security and presence missions. In some cases, a cooperative approach developed to tackle the challenge of countering mainly nonstate-based threats to maritime security. This was perhaps most evident in the various multinational groupings that coalesced around the threat of piracy New dynamics of maritime competition are emerging. The contemporary maritime domain continues to become more congested, contested and complex, while the centre of gravity of maritime power appears to be shifting further away from Western states. This will change the way operations are conducted at sea and the types of naval capabilities that states seek to procure. Rapid technological change and the proliferation of advanced weaponry are only accelerating this transformation.","PeriodicalId":35165,"journal":{"name":"The Military Balance","volume":"23 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76647992","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-01-01DOI: 10.1080/04597222.2020.1707967
In the run-up to the 2020 Taiwanese presidential election, the current government signed a number of foreign military sales agreements with the United States for new platforms and weapon systems in an attempt to keep up with the modernisation efforts of the People’s Liberation Army. Most notable were deals for F-16V combat aircraft and M1A2 Abrams main battle tanks, both long sought by the Taiwanese military.
最引人注目的是F-16V战斗机和M1A2艾布拉姆斯主战坦克的交易，这两者都是台湾军方长期寻求的。
{"title":"Chapter Six: Asia","authors":"","doi":"10.1080/04597222.2020.1707967","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/04597222.2020.1707967","url":null,"abstract":"In the run-up to the 2020 Taiwanese presidential election, the current government signed a number of foreign military sales agreements with the United States for new platforms and weapon systems in an attempt to keep up with the modernisation efforts of the People’s Liberation Army. Most notable were deals for F-16V combat aircraft and M1A2 Abrams main battle tanks, both long sought by the Taiwanese military.","PeriodicalId":35165,"journal":{"name":"The Military Balance","volume":"17 1","pages":"220 - 323"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81898373","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-01-01DOI: 10.1080/04597222.2020.1707966
The year 2020 was meant to end a decade in which the Russian Army had started to field a significant number of T-14 Armata main battle tanks in front-line units. However, by the end of 2019 none had entered operational service. Development and production challenges are contributory factors, as is cost, and instead the army has resumed upgrades to armour already in service, in particular the T-72B3 mod. and the T-80BVM.
{"title":"Chapter Five: Russia and Eurasia","authors":"","doi":"10.1080/04597222.2020.1707966","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/04597222.2020.1707966","url":null,"abstract":"The year 2020 was meant to end a decade in which the Russian Army had started to field a significant number of T-14 Armata main battle tanks in front-line units. However, by the end of 2019 none had entered operational service. Development and production challenges are contributory factors, as is cost, and instead the army has resumed upgrades to armour already in service, in particular the T-72B3 mod. and the T-80BVM.","PeriodicalId":35165,"journal":{"name":"The Military Balance","volume":"63 1","pages":"166 - 219"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73718907","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-01-01DOI: 10.1080/04597222.2020.1707968
Egypt, Oman, Qatar and Saudi Arabia are all recapitalising elements of their combat-aircraft fleets. Egypt and Qatar are introducing the Dassault Rafale into service, Oman has bought the Eurofighter Typhoon and Saudi Arabia continues to take delivery of its Boeing F-15SA. Qatar and Kuwait are also Eurofighter customers, although deliveries have yet to begin, while the former country is also purchasing the F-15.
{"title":"Chapter Seven: Middle East and North Africa","authors":"","doi":"10.1080/04597222.2020.1707968","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/04597222.2020.1707968","url":null,"abstract":"Egypt, Oman, Qatar and Saudi Arabia are all recapitalising elements of their combat-aircraft fleets. Egypt and Qatar are introducing the Dassault Rafale into service, Oman has bought the Eurofighter Typhoon and Saudi Arabia continues to take delivery of its Boeing F-15SA. Qatar and Kuwait are also Eurofighter customers, although deliveries have yet to begin, while the former country is also purchasing the F-15.","PeriodicalId":35165,"journal":{"name":"The Military Balance","volume":"48 1","pages":"324 - 387"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74240431","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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