Pub Date : 2018-01-01DOI: 10.1080/04597222.2018.1416980
ro pe larly its deteriorating relations with several other European states (not least Germany) and renewed interest in a closer relationship with Russia, exacerbated the uncertainty. By the end of 2017, there was still little clarity on how the UK’s exit from the EU would affect security and defence. With ‘Brexit’ due to take effect in March 2019, government officials across EU member states were keen to ensure that it would not negatively affect security and defence cooperation: threat assessments across the continent consistently stressed the need for cooperation to tackle contemporary challenges and risks. The inauguration of Donald Trump as president of the United States left many European leaders uncertain about the durability of the transatlantic bond underpinning European security. Initially vague about NATO’s collective-defence guarantee (enshrined in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty), President Trump appeared to make US commitment contingent on increased European defence spending, notably chiding other leaders on this topic when he opened NATO’s new headquarters in May 2017. Nonetheless, Trump used a speech in Warsaw on 6 July to declare that the US stood ‘firmly behind Article 5’, both in terms of words and actions. Indeed, in its FY2018 budget, the US Department of Defense increased the funding allocated to its European Reassurance Initiative, and continued rotational troop deployments in NATO’s eastern member states. Even so, Trump’s rhetoric gave NATO members pause for thought. Following a meeting of NATO heads of state and government in Brussels, German Chancellor Angela Merkel had concluded on 28 May, with reference to the new US administration and Brexit, that ‘the times in which we could completely rely on others are, to a certain extent, over’ and that ‘we Europeans truly have to take our fate into our own hands’. While her comments were expressed during an election rally and were therefore mostly intended for domestic consumption, they resonated throughout the Alliance, indicating that cohesion remained fragile, despite efforts to galvanise NATO into tackling the challenges posed by a deteriorating security environment on its eastern and southern flanks. Chapter Four Europe
{"title":"Chapter Four: Europe","authors":"","doi":"10.1080/04597222.2018.1416980","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/04597222.2018.1416980","url":null,"abstract":"ro pe larly its deteriorating relations with several other European states (not least Germany) and renewed interest in a closer relationship with Russia, exacerbated the uncertainty. By the end of 2017, there was still little clarity on how the UK’s exit from the EU would affect security and defence. With ‘Brexit’ due to take effect in March 2019, government officials across EU member states were keen to ensure that it would not negatively affect security and defence cooperation: threat assessments across the continent consistently stressed the need for cooperation to tackle contemporary challenges and risks. The inauguration of Donald Trump as president of the United States left many European leaders uncertain about the durability of the transatlantic bond underpinning European security. Initially vague about NATO’s collective-defence guarantee (enshrined in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty), President Trump appeared to make US commitment contingent on increased European defence spending, notably chiding other leaders on this topic when he opened NATO’s new headquarters in May 2017. Nonetheless, Trump used a speech in Warsaw on 6 July to declare that the US stood ‘firmly behind Article 5’, both in terms of words and actions. Indeed, in its FY2018 budget, the US Department of Defense increased the funding allocated to its European Reassurance Initiative, and continued rotational troop deployments in NATO’s eastern member states. Even so, Trump’s rhetoric gave NATO members pause for thought. Following a meeting of NATO heads of state and government in Brussels, German Chancellor Angela Merkel had concluded on 28 May, with reference to the new US administration and Brexit, that ‘the times in which we could completely rely on others are, to a certain extent, over’ and that ‘we Europeans truly have to take our fate into our own hands’. While her comments were expressed during an election rally and were therefore mostly intended for domestic consumption, they resonated throughout the Alliance, indicating that cohesion remained fragile, despite efforts to galvanise NATO into tackling the challenges posed by a deteriorating security environment on its eastern and southern flanks. Chapter Four Europe","PeriodicalId":35165,"journal":{"name":"The Military Balance","volume":"19 1","pages":"168 - 65"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82522962","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-01-01DOI: 10.1080/04597222.2018.1416991
{"title":"Index of country/territory abbreviations","authors":"","doi":"10.1080/04597222.2018.1416991","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/04597222.2018.1416991","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":35165,"journal":{"name":"The Military Balance","volume":"262 1","pages":"519 - 520"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79674274","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-01-01DOI: 10.1080/04597222.2018.1416981
ss ia a nd E ur as ia with precision-guided, non-nuclear and nuclear weapons, funding for the navy will almost certainly be reduced in the new State Armament Programme (GPV) 2018–27. This makes no provision to build large surface combatants, such as a new aircraft carrier, cruisers and destroyers, before 2025. Despite this, the navy should still achieve some significant, if more limited, ability to pose major challenges to potential adversaries, at least close to home waters. Overall, total spending under the period of the GPV 2018–27 is planned fall from 20 to 17 trillion roubles (US$318 billion to US$270bn) (see pp. 177–8). During this time, the aerospace forces and land forces will be prioritised. The need to upgrade equipment has led to a significant rise in costs for the land forces and the airborne troops (VDV), but it is expected that the pace of rearmament will slow and there will be greater focus on modernisation at the expense of new weapons purchases. The merger of the Interior Troops and various law-enforcement agencies into the National Guard (Rosgvardiya) was completed in 2017, bringing the organisation’s overall personnel strength to around 340,000. The new National Guard structure is intended to tackle internal threats, but has not received any additional heavy weapons except what had been issued to the Interior Troops (although this in itself is significant in terms of capability). Under existing legislation, the National Guard can be used abroad for peacekeeping operations and to train foreign law-enforcement agencies. In Syria, however, Russia has instead used the military police for work with the civilian population. New legislation, which gave the military police additional functions, was adopted in 2015 with this purpose in mind. The civilian Federal Agency for Special Construction (Spetsstroy) was disbanded by September 2017. Spetsstroy was responsible for the construction of military infrastructure; however, this function and some of the agency’s personnel have now been transferred to the defence ministry.
{"title":"Chapter Five: Russia and Eurasia","authors":"","doi":"10.1080/04597222.2018.1416981","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/04597222.2018.1416981","url":null,"abstract":"ss ia a nd E ur as ia with precision-guided, non-nuclear and nuclear weapons, funding for the navy will almost certainly be reduced in the new State Armament Programme (GPV) 2018–27. This makes no provision to build large surface combatants, such as a new aircraft carrier, cruisers and destroyers, before 2025. Despite this, the navy should still achieve some significant, if more limited, ability to pose major challenges to potential adversaries, at least close to home waters. Overall, total spending under the period of the GPV 2018–27 is planned fall from 20 to 17 trillion roubles (US$318 billion to US$270bn) (see pp. 177–8). During this time, the aerospace forces and land forces will be prioritised. The need to upgrade equipment has led to a significant rise in costs for the land forces and the airborne troops (VDV), but it is expected that the pace of rearmament will slow and there will be greater focus on modernisation at the expense of new weapons purchases. The merger of the Interior Troops and various law-enforcement agencies into the National Guard (Rosgvardiya) was completed in 2017, bringing the organisation’s overall personnel strength to around 340,000. The new National Guard structure is intended to tackle internal threats, but has not received any additional heavy weapons except what had been issued to the Interior Troops (although this in itself is significant in terms of capability). Under existing legislation, the National Guard can be used abroad for peacekeeping operations and to train foreign law-enforcement agencies. In Syria, however, Russia has instead used the military police for work with the civilian population. New legislation, which gave the military police additional functions, was adopted in 2015 with this purpose in mind. The civilian Federal Agency for Special Construction (Spetsstroy) was disbanded by September 2017. Spetsstroy was responsible for the construction of military infrastructure; however, this function and some of the agency’s personnel have now been transferred to the defence ministry.","PeriodicalId":35165,"journal":{"name":"The Military Balance","volume":"11 1","pages":"169 - 218"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90700165","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-01-01DOI: 10.1080/04597222.2018.1416984
{"title":"Chapter Eight: Latin America and the Caribbean","authors":"","doi":"10.1080/04597222.2018.1416984","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/04597222.2018.1416984","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":35165,"journal":{"name":"The Military Balance","volume":"325 1","pages":"375 - 428"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75125316","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-01-01DOI: 10.1080/04597222.2018.1416963
Defence policymakers worldwide remain challenged by a complex and fractured security environment, marked by increased uncertainty in relations between states and the proliferation of advanced military capabilities. Attacks in 2017 highlighted the continuing threat from transnational terrorists. Persistent conflicts and insecurity in parts of Africa meant that the continent still demanded the deployment of significant combat forces by African and external powers. In the Middle East, the war against ISIS, the civil war in Syria, the destructive conflict in Yemen and Iran’s destabilising activities dominated the regional security environment. In Europe, low-level conflict persisted in eastern Ukraine, with Russia reinforcing its military posture across the border and its military capabilities preoccupying European NATO states. In Asia, North Korea tested its first intercontinental ballistic missile. Pyongyang’s provocations may be an immediate threat, but there was also an increasingly pervasive concern over China’s military programmes and activities. In 2017 Beijing introduced yet more advanced military systems, and deployed elements of its armed forces further afield.
{"title":"Editor’s Introduction: Western technology edge erodes further","authors":"","doi":"10.1080/04597222.2018.1416963","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/04597222.2018.1416963","url":null,"abstract":"Defence policymakers worldwide remain challenged by a complex and fractured security environment, marked by increased uncertainty in relations between states and the proliferation of advanced military capabilities. Attacks in 2017 highlighted the continuing threat from transnational terrorists. Persistent conflicts and insecurity in parts of Africa meant that the continent still demanded the deployment of significant combat forces by African and external powers. In the Middle East, the war against ISIS, the civil war in Syria, the destructive conflict in Yemen and Iran’s destabilising activities dominated the regional security environment. In Europe, low-level conflict persisted in eastern Ukraine, with Russia reinforcing its military posture across the border and its military capabilities preoccupying European NATO states. In Asia, North Korea tested its first intercontinental ballistic missile. Pyongyang’s provocations may be an immediate threat, but there was also an increasingly pervasive concern over China’s military programmes and activities. In 2017 Beijing introduced yet more advanced military systems, and deployed elements of its armed forces further afield.","PeriodicalId":35165,"journal":{"name":"The Military Balance","volume":"26 1","pages":"5 - 6"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90517645","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2017-03-31DOI: 10.1080/04597222.2020.1868788
Philip C. Kolin
{"title":"Editor’s Introduction","authors":"Philip C. Kolin","doi":"10.1080/04597222.2020.1868788","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/04597222.2020.1868788","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":35165,"journal":{"name":"The Military Balance","volume":"51 1","pages":"5 - 6"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-03-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87243070","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2017-01-01DOI: 10.1080/04597222.2017.1271217
{"title":"Chapter Ten: Country comparisons and defence data","authors":"","doi":"10.1080/04597222.2017.1271217","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/04597222.2017.1271217","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":35165,"journal":{"name":"The Military Balance","volume":"130 1","pages":"549 - 564"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90540917","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2017-01-01DOI: 10.1080/04597222.2017.1271206
non-defence and aerospace business. Russia, China and India have also had concerns over their defence-industrial base, although their efforts have largely focused on attempting to improve efficiency. Efforts to recapitalise Russia’s ageing defenceindustrial infrastructure in the air, land and maritime sectors have shown limited and varying degrees of progress against a backdrop of increasing pressure on spending. India’s policy goal of growing its national production capacity has resulted in continuing efforts to increase private-sector involvement in what has long been a bastion of state-owned industry. China, meanwhile, has also been trying to improve the performance and efficiency of its defence sector; this effort has led to the emergence of some privately owned firms. If anything, recent M&A activity serves as a reminder of the dynamic nature of the defence-industrial landscape. For democratic governments, it is a landscape that they can influence, but not fully direct. State-procurement choices offer one means of shaping the sector, although policymakers will often go to considerable lengths to stress that equipment selections have been or will be made on performance and price, and without consideration of broader industrial or political factors. Autocratic states, on the other hand, enjoy a greater degree of control in their ability to shape the sector, although this brings its own problems, not least of all the risk of overt political interference in the defence industry.
{"title":"Chapter One: Defence and military analysis","authors":"","doi":"10.1080/04597222.2017.1271206","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/04597222.2017.1271206","url":null,"abstract":"non-defence and aerospace business. Russia, China and India have also had concerns over their defence-industrial base, although their efforts have largely focused on attempting to improve efficiency. Efforts to recapitalise Russia’s ageing defenceindustrial infrastructure in the air, land and maritime sectors have shown limited and varying degrees of progress against a backdrop of increasing pressure on spending. India’s policy goal of growing its national production capacity has resulted in continuing efforts to increase private-sector involvement in what has long been a bastion of state-owned industry. China, meanwhile, has also been trying to improve the performance and efficiency of its defence sector; this effort has led to the emergence of some privately owned firms. If anything, recent M&A activity serves as a reminder of the dynamic nature of the defence-industrial landscape. For democratic governments, it is a landscape that they can influence, but not fully direct. State-procurement choices offer one means of shaping the sector, although policymakers will often go to considerable lengths to stress that equipment selections have been or will be made on performance and price, and without consideration of broader industrial or political factors. Autocratic states, on the other hand, enjoy a greater degree of control in their ability to shape the sector, although this brings its own problems, not least of all the risk of overt political interference in the defence industry.","PeriodicalId":35165,"journal":{"name":"The Military Balance","volume":"56 1","pages":"18 - 7"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78055655","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2017-01-01DOI: 10.1080/04597222.2017.1271212
are affecting defence planning and procurement, as well as deployments. Bolstering China’s position in the South China Sea has in recent years emerged as a priority for the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). This has been pursued in order to reinforce Beijing’s extensive territorial claims, as well as to protect its Jin-class (Type-094) nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarines (SSBNs). These boats will become an important element of China’s nuclear deterrent and are due to carry the CSS-NX-14 (JL-2) submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM). It has been reported that the boats commenced operational patrols in 2015. The Pentagon’s latest annual report to Congress on China’s military power spoke of four boats of the class being ‘operational’, without giving details, and anticipated a first Chinese SSBN deterrent patrol ‘sometime in 2016’. The previous report, however, anticipated the same in 2015. Strengthening China’s capacity to project military power into the Western Pacific and Indian Ocean has also been an objective of the PLA. Speaking in November 2015, Commander of US Pacific Command Admiral Harry Harris Jr said that China was ‘building runways and ... facilities to support possible militarization of an area vital to the global economy’. By early 2016, there had been significant construction activity on seven Chinese-occupied features in the Spratly Islands, with military facilities established on six of them. Mischief Reef and Fiery Cross Reef each had a 3km runway that could be used by combat aircraft, and a similar airstrip was under construction on Subi Reef. Moreover, in February 2016 China deployed two batteries of the HQ-9 surface-to-air missile system on Woody Island in the Paracels; in the following weeks, J-11 and JH-7 combat aircraft were also reported on the island. China’s increasingly assertive role in the South China Sea was also demonstrated by the interception of fishing and supply vessels from other claimant states (the Philippines and Vietnam) in both the Paracel and the Spratly islands. One important consequence of China’s activities in the South China Sea was that they led the United States Navy to undertake freedom-of-navigation operational patrols (FONOPs), designed to assert the right of the US (and others) to fly and sail wherever Regional military roles Armed forces in the Asia-Pacific region typically undertake a broader range of roles than their Western equivalents. This is particularly true in Southeast Asia, where armed forces – and armies in particular – sometimes remain central players in national politics (notably in Myanmar and Thailand) and retain significant internal-security responsibilities (as is the case in Indonesia, Myanmar, the Philippines and Thailand). In the region’s single-party states – China, Laos, North Korea and Vietnam – the institutional nature of civil–military relations and military doctrine means that the preservation of domestic stability and party rule are vital concerns of the arm
{"title":"Chapter Six: Asia","authors":"","doi":"10.1080/04597222.2017.1271212","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/04597222.2017.1271212","url":null,"abstract":"are affecting defence planning and procurement, as well as deployments. Bolstering China’s position in the South China Sea has in recent years emerged as a priority for the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). This has been pursued in order to reinforce Beijing’s extensive territorial claims, as well as to protect its Jin-class (Type-094) nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarines (SSBNs). These boats will become an important element of China’s nuclear deterrent and are due to carry the CSS-NX-14 (JL-2) submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM). It has been reported that the boats commenced operational patrols in 2015. The Pentagon’s latest annual report to Congress on China’s military power spoke of four boats of the class being ‘operational’, without giving details, and anticipated a first Chinese SSBN deterrent patrol ‘sometime in 2016’. The previous report, however, anticipated the same in 2015. Strengthening China’s capacity to project military power into the Western Pacific and Indian Ocean has also been an objective of the PLA. Speaking in November 2015, Commander of US Pacific Command Admiral Harry Harris Jr said that China was ‘building runways and ... facilities to support possible militarization of an area vital to the global economy’. By early 2016, there had been significant construction activity on seven Chinese-occupied features in the Spratly Islands, with military facilities established on six of them. Mischief Reef and Fiery Cross Reef each had a 3km runway that could be used by combat aircraft, and a similar airstrip was under construction on Subi Reef. Moreover, in February 2016 China deployed two batteries of the HQ-9 surface-to-air missile system on Woody Island in the Paracels; in the following weeks, J-11 and JH-7 combat aircraft were also reported on the island. China’s increasingly assertive role in the South China Sea was also demonstrated by the interception of fishing and supply vessels from other claimant states (the Philippines and Vietnam) in both the Paracel and the Spratly islands. One important consequence of China’s activities in the South China Sea was that they led the United States Navy to undertake freedom-of-navigation operational patrols (FONOPs), designed to assert the right of the US (and others) to fly and sail wherever Regional military roles Armed forces in the Asia-Pacific region typically undertake a broader range of roles than their Western equivalents. This is particularly true in Southeast Asia, where armed forces – and armies in particular – sometimes remain central players in national politics (notably in Myanmar and Thailand) and retain significant internal-security responsibilities (as is the case in Indonesia, Myanmar, the Philippines and Thailand). In the region’s single-party states – China, Laos, North Korea and Vietnam – the institutional nature of civil–military relations and military doctrine means that the preservation of domestic stability and party rule are vital concerns of the arm","PeriodicalId":35165,"journal":{"name":"The Military Balance","volume":"46 1","pages":"237 - 350"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81646618","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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