Pub Date : 2019-01-02DOI: 10.1080/0731129X.2019.1603875
Douglas Husak
The issue of gun control is among a growing number of polarizing topics that may seem immune frommeaningful compromise and rational debate. Although their intransience may be exaggerated, few citizens are undecided and most have strong opinions that are disappointingly short on accurate information and nuance. Some may believe this state of affairs indicates the utter futility of attempts to grapple seriously with the controversy. On the other hand, a case can be made that clear-minded philosophical input is needed most urgently when the sides are so far apart. At least we philosophers can recommend a sensible and balanced analysis of the issue to anyone who is prepared to listen (including our captured audience of undergraduates). Hugh LaFollette’s Gun Control is an important and eminently readable contribution to the surprisingly sparse philosophical commentary about one of our country’s most pressing concerns. In this review, I will point out four distinct but related ways I believe his effort could have been even more successful. I will contend that he is unclear about his intended audience; could do more to identify the nature of the problem to be solved; spends too little time defending concrete solutions; and fails to wrestle adequately with crucial questions of enforcement. But my critical posture should not be mistaken for a negative assessment of his book. In case there is doubt, I explicitly recommend that anyone who endeavors to cut through the fog and come to terms with the issue of gun control should study LaFollette’s book.
{"title":"Why Gun Control is So Hard","authors":"Douglas Husak","doi":"10.1080/0731129X.2019.1603875","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/0731129X.2019.1603875","url":null,"abstract":"The issue of gun control is among a growing number of polarizing topics that may seem immune frommeaningful compromise and rational debate. Although their intransience may be exaggerated, few citizens are undecided and most have strong opinions that are disappointingly short on accurate information and nuance. Some may believe this state of affairs indicates the utter futility of attempts to grapple seriously with the controversy. On the other hand, a case can be made that clear-minded philosophical input is needed most urgently when the sides are so far apart. At least we philosophers can recommend a sensible and balanced analysis of the issue to anyone who is prepared to listen (including our captured audience of undergraduates). Hugh LaFollette’s Gun Control is an important and eminently readable contribution to the surprisingly sparse philosophical commentary about one of our country’s most pressing concerns. In this review, I will point out four distinct but related ways I believe his effort could have been even more successful. I will contend that he is unclear about his intended audience; could do more to identify the nature of the problem to be solved; spends too little time defending concrete solutions; and fails to wrestle adequately with crucial questions of enforcement. But my critical posture should not be mistaken for a negative assessment of his book. In case there is doubt, I explicitly recommend that anyone who endeavors to cut through the fog and come to terms with the issue of gun control should study LaFollette’s book.","PeriodicalId":35931,"journal":{"name":"Criminal Justice Ethics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/0731129X.2019.1603875","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48551241","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-01-02DOI: 10.1080/0731129X.2019.1600289
Netanel Dagan, Julian V. Roberts
This article advances a censure-based case against sentences of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Our argument justifies a retributive “second look” assessment of long-term prison sentences. The article focuses on the censuring element of long-term prison sentences while reconceptualizing penal censure as a dynamic and responsive concept. By doing so, the article explores the significance of the prisoner’s life after sentencing (largely ignored by retributivists) and promotes a more nuanced approach to censure-based proportionality. Policy-makers may welcome this approach as a way to control excessive prison sentences while remaining within a retributive penal framework. Although we are making a general argument about the need for responsive censure within a retributive sentencing regime, the case for this approach is particularly compelling at the present time. Almost all Western nations, and particularly the US, impose very lengthy, often life sentences of imprisonment for a wide range of offences, thereby affecting large numbers of prisoners.
{"title":"Retributivism, Penal Censure, and Life Imprisonment without Parole","authors":"Netanel Dagan, Julian V. Roberts","doi":"10.1080/0731129X.2019.1600289","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/0731129X.2019.1600289","url":null,"abstract":"This article advances a censure-based case against sentences of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Our argument justifies a retributive “second look” assessment of long-term prison sentences. The article focuses on the censuring element of long-term prison sentences while reconceptualizing penal censure as a dynamic and responsive concept. By doing so, the article explores the significance of the prisoner’s life after sentencing (largely ignored by retributivists) and promotes a more nuanced approach to censure-based proportionality. Policy-makers may welcome this approach as a way to control excessive prison sentences while remaining within a retributive penal framework. Although we are making a general argument about the need for responsive censure within a retributive sentencing regime, the case for this approach is particularly compelling at the present time. Almost all Western nations, and particularly the US, impose very lengthy, often life sentences of imprisonment for a wide range of offences, thereby affecting large numbers of prisoners.","PeriodicalId":35931,"journal":{"name":"Criminal Justice Ethics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/0731129X.2019.1600289","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42291125","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-01-02DOI: 10.1080/0731129X.2019.1586216
Lando Kirchmair
“Committing a crime might render one morally liable to certain forms of medical intervention”, claims Thomas Douglas, who stated in this context that “compulsory uses of medical correctives could in principle be justified.” This article engages critically with his and other arguments on the use of coercive neurocorrectives for criminal offenders. First, the rehabilitation assumption that includes—for coercive neurocorrectives to work as an alternative to incarceration—that rehabilitation is the “only goal” of criminal punishment is criticized. Additionally this article engages with the theoretical difficulty of solely rehabilitative approaches, and discusses why it is unfortunate to design neurocorrectives so as to be particularly harmful in order to imagine administering them as being a punishment. Second, until we know more about specific neurocorrectives, we are well advised not to undermine the most important objection against coercive neurocorrectives, namely offenders’ human rights. This article argues that the use of coercive neurocorrectives would particularly violate Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights which guarantees as an absolute right that “[n]o one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment”, and finally holds that a still weak human right to mental integrity and self-determination should fundamentally come first.
{"title":"Objections to Coercive Neurocorrectives for Criminal Offenders –Why Offenders’ Human Rights Should Fundamentally Come First","authors":"Lando Kirchmair","doi":"10.1080/0731129X.2019.1586216","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/0731129X.2019.1586216","url":null,"abstract":"“Committing a crime might render one morally liable to certain forms of medical intervention”, claims Thomas Douglas, who stated in this context that “compulsory uses of medical correctives could in principle be justified.” This article engages critically with his and other arguments on the use of coercive neurocorrectives for criminal offenders. First, the rehabilitation assumption that includes—for coercive neurocorrectives to work as an alternative to incarceration—that rehabilitation is the “only goal” of criminal punishment is criticized. Additionally this article engages with the theoretical difficulty of solely rehabilitative approaches, and discusses why it is unfortunate to design neurocorrectives so as to be particularly harmful in order to imagine administering them as being a punishment. Second, until we know more about specific neurocorrectives, we are well advised not to undermine the most important objection against coercive neurocorrectives, namely offenders’ human rights. This article argues that the use of coercive neurocorrectives would particularly violate Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights which guarantees as an absolute right that “[n]o one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment”, and finally holds that a still weak human right to mental integrity and self-determination should fundamentally come first.","PeriodicalId":35931,"journal":{"name":"Criminal Justice Ethics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/0731129X.2019.1586216","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47311663","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-01-02DOI: 10.1080/0731129X.2019.1586217
R. Worden, Caitlin J. Dole
Unwarranted, by NYU law professor Barry Friedman, offers a diagnosis of some of the contemporary ills of American policing and a prescribed cure. Between 2014 and 2016, incidents of fatal shootings...
{"title":"The Holy Grail of Democratic Policing","authors":"R. Worden, Caitlin J. Dole","doi":"10.1080/0731129X.2019.1586217","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/0731129X.2019.1586217","url":null,"abstract":"Unwarranted, by NYU law professor Barry Friedman, offers a diagnosis of some of the contemporary ills of American policing and a prescribed cure. Between 2014 and 2016, incidents of fatal shootings...","PeriodicalId":35931,"journal":{"name":"Criminal Justice Ethics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/0731129X.2019.1586217","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45995845","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-09-02DOI: 10.1080/0731129X.2018.1551800
David A. Makin, Andrea M. Walker, Christopher M. Campbell
Over the last 20 years, sex offender policies, specifically in terms of community corrections, have increased in scope. One of the most controversial and pervasive sex offender policies is that of registration. In response to the consumption of already limited resources, jurisdictions have imposed increasingly higher community supervision fees onto the offenders, requiring them to pay for their own re-entry. However, to date no research study has examined the statutory language associated with registration fees collected post release from formal community sanctions. Using a statutory analysis within the United States, this research finds and quantifies the imposition of a registration fee on offenders who are legally compelled to pay these registration costs, regardless of whether they are still currently under community supervision. Results show that more than half of U.S. states (n = 28) incorporate statutory language authorizing registration fees, ranging anywhere from $5 per registration to up to $250 per year. These findings, as well as suggestions for future research and policy recommendations, are discussed.
{"title":"Paying to Be Punished: A Statutory Analysis of Sex Offender Registration Fees","authors":"David A. Makin, Andrea M. Walker, Christopher M. Campbell","doi":"10.1080/0731129X.2018.1551800","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/0731129X.2018.1551800","url":null,"abstract":"Over the last 20 years, sex offender policies, specifically in terms of community corrections, have increased in scope. One of the most controversial and pervasive sex offender policies is that of registration. In response to the consumption of already limited resources, jurisdictions have imposed increasingly higher community supervision fees onto the offenders, requiring them to pay for their own re-entry. However, to date no research study has examined the statutory language associated with registration fees collected post release from formal community sanctions. Using a statutory analysis within the United States, this research finds and quantifies the imposition of a registration fee on offenders who are legally compelled to pay these registration costs, regardless of whether they are still currently under community supervision. Results show that more than half of U.S. states (n = 28) incorporate statutory language authorizing registration fees, ranging anywhere from $5 per registration to up to $250 per year. These findings, as well as suggestions for future research and policy recommendations, are discussed.","PeriodicalId":35931,"journal":{"name":"Criminal Justice Ethics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-09-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/0731129X.2018.1551800","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45825070","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-09-02DOI: 10.1080/0731129X.2018.1552359
Vincent Chiao
A basic principle in sentencing offenders is proportionality. However, proportionality judgments are often left to the discretion of the judge, raising familiar concerns of arbitrariness and bias. This paper considers the case for systematizing judgments of proportionality in sentencing by means of an algorithm. The aim of such an algorithm would be to predict what a judge in that jurisdiction would regard as a proportionate sentence in a particular case. A predictive algorithm of this kind would not necessarily undermine justice in individual cases, is consistent with a particularistic account of moral judgment, and is attractive even in the face of uncertainty as to the legitimate purposes of punishment.
{"title":"Predicting Proportionality: The Case for Algorithmic Sentencing","authors":"Vincent Chiao","doi":"10.1080/0731129X.2018.1552359","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/0731129X.2018.1552359","url":null,"abstract":"A basic principle in sentencing offenders is proportionality. However, proportionality judgments are often left to the discretion of the judge, raising familiar concerns of arbitrariness and bias. This paper considers the case for systematizing judgments of proportionality in sentencing by means of an algorithm. The aim of such an algorithm would be to predict what a judge in that jurisdiction would regard as a proportionate sentence in a particular case. A predictive algorithm of this kind would not necessarily undermine justice in individual cases, is consistent with a particularistic account of moral judgment, and is attractive even in the face of uncertainty as to the legitimate purposes of punishment.","PeriodicalId":35931,"journal":{"name":"Criminal Justice Ethics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-09-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/0731129X.2018.1552359","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48418014","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-09-02DOI: 10.1080/0731129X.2018.1544359
M. Alfano
In Naked, Krista K. Thomason offers a multifaceted account of shame, covering its nature as an emotion, its positive and negative roles in moral life, its association with violence, and its provocation through invitations to shame, public shaming, and stigmatization. Along the way, she reflects on a range of examples drawn from literature, memoirs, journalism, and her own imagination. She also considers alternative views at length, draws a wealth of important distinctions, and articulates many of the most intuitive objections to her own view in order to defend it more thoroughly. For these reasons, the book’s subtitle, The Dark Side of Shame and Moral Life, undersells its scope and ambition. This is an exploration not just of shame’s dark side but a kaleidoscopic appreciation of both the nature and the (dis)value of shame and shaming. Somewhat undercutting this breadth, Thomason relies heavily on Kantian intuitions about equal respect and recognition for persons and their dignity; in several key arguments, she tells us to disregard predictable and systematic consequences of emotions, practices, and institutions, so that we can better focus on their constitutive or internal aspects. Of course, every philosopher inevitably brings theoretical commitments to bear when writing about moral psychology, but nonKantian readers should be forewarned that—despite the fact that Thomason says that she does “not assume any particular moral theory”—her ethical conclusions about shaming and stigmatizing are likely to be plausible only to those who are already snugly tied into a web of “Kantian commitments” (9). Full disclosure: I am not a Kantian, so I was predisposed to disagree with many of Thomason’s arguments. Nevertheless, I found much of value in her book and hope that this review manages to shed some light on it. The book is divided into five chapters, bookended by a brief ∗Mark Alfano is Associate Professor at Ethics & Philosophy of Technology, Delft University of Technology, Delft, The Netherlands, as well as Professor at the Institute for Religion and Critical Inquiry, Australian Catholic University, Melbourne, Australia. Email: mark.alfano@gmail.com. Criminal Justice Ethics, 2018 Vol. 37, No. 3, 275–286, https://doi.org/10.1080/0731129X.2018.1544359
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Pub Date : 2018-09-02DOI: 10.1080/0731129X.2018.1546863
Steve Viner
Seumas Miller’s book Shooting to Kill: The Ethics of Police and Military Use of Lethal Force concerns the moral rules applicable to the use of lethal force over three domains: individuals (personal self-defense), police, and combatants. Throughout his book, Miller compares and contrasts “the use of lethal force by ordinary citizens, police officers and military personnel” (2). This review has five sections. In section 2, I discuss some preliminary matters, and offer brief discussions of three of the book’s chapters. In section 3, I offer some praise for Miller’s teleological, institutional approach and for his “collective end theory” of “joint action.” In section 4, I offer two criticisms. The first is that Miller does not properly address the likely objection from a strong, contemporary alternative approach known as the “individualist reductionists” or the “revisionists” approach (3). Another way to state this criticism is that Miller does not properly support his claim that a state’s police force and military have separate institutional goals generating moral norms that “further specify” the moral norms applicable on the individual level (15). In this book, I found the “why” question unanswered. Why, for Miller, do the institutional goals that attach to each of these domains generate moral duties that have the moral authority to further specify the moral norms applicable between individuals in a noninstitutional framework? The second criticism is related to the first. It is that the procedure by which institutional goals generate moral norms that further specify the moral norms found in a state of nature, as Miller ∗Steve Viner is an Associate Professor of Philosophy at Middlebury College, Middlebury VT, USA. Email: sviner@middlebury. edu Criminal Justice Ethics, 2018 Vol. 37, No. 3, 262–274, https://doi.org/10.1080/0731129X.2018.1546863
Seumas Miller的书《开枪杀人:警察和军队使用致命武力的道德规范》关注了适用于三个领域使用致命武力的道德规则:个人(个人自卫)，警察和战斗人员。在整本书中，米勒对“普通公民、警察和军事人员使用致命武力”进行了比较和对比(2)。在第2节中，我讨论了一些初步问题，并简要讨论了本书的三个章节。在第三部分，我对米勒的目的论、制度方法和他的“共同行动”的“集体目的理论”给予了一些赞扬。在第4部分，我提出了两点批评。首先，米勒没有恰当地解决可能来自一种强大的、当代的替代方法的反对意见，这种方法被称为“个人主义简化论者”或“修正主义者”方法(3)。另一种表述这种批评的方式是，米勒没有恰当地支持他的主张，即一个国家的警察部队和军队有独立的制度目标，产生道德规范，“进一步规定”适用于个人层面的道德规范(15)。在这本书中，我发现“为什么”这个问题没有答案。在米勒看来，为什么附属于这些领域的制度目标产生了道德义务，这些道德义务具有道德权威，能够进一步规定非制度框架中个人之间适用的道德规范?第二种批评与第一种批评有关。正如Miller * Steve Viner是美国米德尔伯里学院的哲学副教授一样，制度目标产生道德规范的过程进一步明确了在自然状态中发现的道德规范。电子邮件:sviner@middlebury。《刑事司法伦理》，2018年第37卷第3期，262-274,https://doi.org/10.1080/0731129X.2018.1546863
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Pub Date : 2018-05-04DOI: 10.1080/0731129X.2018.1500134
William Bülow
Indeterminate sentencing is a sentencing practice where offenders are sentenced to a range of potential imprisonment terms and where the actual release date is determined later, typically by a parole board. Although indeterminate sentencing is often considered morally problematic from a retributivist perspective, Michael O’Hear has provided an interesting attempt to reconcile indeterminate sentencing with the communicative version of retributivism developed by Antony Duff. O’Hear’s core argument is that delayed release, within the parameters of the indeterminate sentence, can be seen as an appropriate retributivist response to the violations of prison rules. This article highlights several problems in O’Hear’s proposal and argues that the communicative theory is not easily reconciled with his proposed model for indeterminate sentencing. In conclusion, it is argued that proponents of the communicative version of retributivism should resist indeterminate prison sentences.
{"title":"Deserved Delayed Release? The Communicative Theory of Punishment and Indeterminate Prison Sentences","authors":"William Bülow","doi":"10.1080/0731129X.2018.1500134","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/0731129X.2018.1500134","url":null,"abstract":"Indeterminate sentencing is a sentencing practice where offenders are sentenced to a range of potential imprisonment terms and where the actual release date is determined later, typically by a parole board. Although indeterminate sentencing is often considered morally problematic from a retributivist perspective, Michael O’Hear has provided an interesting attempt to reconcile indeterminate sentencing with the communicative version of retributivism developed by Antony Duff. O’Hear’s core argument is that delayed release, within the parameters of the indeterminate sentence, can be seen as an appropriate retributivist response to the violations of prison rules. This article highlights several problems in O’Hear’s proposal and argues that the communicative theory is not easily reconciled with his proposed model for indeterminate sentencing. In conclusion, it is argued that proponents of the communicative version of retributivism should resist indeterminate prison sentences.","PeriodicalId":35931,"journal":{"name":"Criminal Justice Ethics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-05-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/0731129X.2018.1500134","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46825458","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-05-04DOI: 10.1080/0731129x.2018.1507961
“Works that explore whether offenders who have been wronged by the state deserve less punishment include Bazelon, “Morality of Criminal Law”; Duff, Punishment, Communication, and Community, chap. 5; Holroyd, “Punishment and Justice”; Matravers, “ ‘Who’s Still Standing?’ ”; Tadros, “Poverty and Criminal Responsibility”; Chau, “Legitimacy of Punishment”; Delgado, “Wretched of the Earth,” 20. In a very recent paper, Christopher Lewis argues that the state’s standing to blame, and accordingly, to punish, an offender would be compromised if his disadvantage was caused by the state, even if the state has not wronged him (say, the disadvantage of the offender was justified under Rawls’ difference principle, which is assumed to be the correct principle of distributive justice): see Lewis, “Inequality,” 174–5. I want to make two points. First, even if Lewis’ argument is accepted, it cannot justify the conclusion that bad upbringing in itself affects deserved punishment because the bad upbringings of some BU offenders may not have been caused by the relevant state at all; as examples, consider an offender who was brought up terribly in one country but migrated to another country as an adult before committing his crime, or an offender who suffered abuse from his parents which the state could not have prevented even with its best efforts. (After submitting to the journal the first version of this article, which included the distinction between BU offenders and offenders who have been wronged by the state drawn at the end of the preceding paragraph, I had the benefit of reading a subsequently published paper that independently came up with a similar distinction, illustrated with examples similar to the two mentioned here. See Ewing, “Recent Work on Punishment and Criminogenic Disadvantage,” 52–53.) Second, I doubt whether Lewis’ argument is sound: while wrongful complicity in an act may, as Victor Tadros argues, compromise one’s standing to blame the principal wrongdoer for the act, it is unclear to me why causal contribution per se would compromise standing. A detailed assessment of Lewis’ argument must, however, await another occasion.”
{"title":"Corrigendum","authors":"","doi":"10.1080/0731129x.2018.1507961","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/0731129x.2018.1507961","url":null,"abstract":"“Works that explore whether offenders who have been wronged by the state deserve less punishment include Bazelon, “Morality of Criminal Law”; Duff, Punishment, Communication, and Community, chap. 5; Holroyd, “Punishment and Justice”; Matravers, “ ‘Who’s Still Standing?’ ”; Tadros, “Poverty and Criminal Responsibility”; Chau, “Legitimacy of Punishment”; Delgado, “Wretched of the Earth,” 20. In a very recent paper, Christopher Lewis argues that the state’s standing to blame, and accordingly, to punish, an offender would be compromised if his disadvantage was caused by the state, even if the state has not wronged him (say, the disadvantage of the offender was justified under Rawls’ difference principle, which is assumed to be the correct principle of distributive justice): see Lewis, “Inequality,” 174–5. I want to make two points. First, even if Lewis’ argument is accepted, it cannot justify the conclusion that bad upbringing in itself affects deserved punishment because the bad upbringings of some BU offenders may not have been caused by the relevant state at all; as examples, consider an offender who was brought up terribly in one country but migrated to another country as an adult before committing his crime, or an offender who suffered abuse from his parents which the state could not have prevented even with its best efforts. (After submitting to the journal the first version of this article, which included the distinction between BU offenders and offenders who have been wronged by the state drawn at the end of the preceding paragraph, I had the benefit of reading a subsequently published paper that independently came up with a similar distinction, illustrated with examples similar to the two mentioned here. See Ewing, “Recent Work on Punishment and Criminogenic Disadvantage,” 52–53.) Second, I doubt whether Lewis’ argument is sound: while wrongful complicity in an act may, as Victor Tadros argues, compromise one’s standing to blame the principal wrongdoer for the act, it is unclear to me why causal contribution per se would compromise standing. A detailed assessment of Lewis’ argument must, however, await another occasion.”","PeriodicalId":35931,"journal":{"name":"Criminal Justice Ethics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-05-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/0731129x.2018.1507961","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48311042","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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