Pub Date : 2022-12-01DOI: 10.46553/prudentia.94.2022.pp.363-375
M. Didier
{"title":"Dobbs vs. Jackson: un giro copernicano en la jurisprudencia de la Corte Suprema de Estados Unidos","authors":"M. Didier","doi":"10.46553/prudentia.94.2022.pp.363-375","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.46553/prudentia.94.2022.pp.363-375","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":36086,"journal":{"name":"Prudentia Iuris","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43049924","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-12-01DOI: 10.46553/prudentia.94.2022.pp.161-189
Franco D’acunto
{"title":"Reflexiones acerca del problema teológico-jurídico sobre el origen del poder político en Dante Alighieri y Marsilio de Padua","authors":"Franco D’acunto","doi":"10.46553/prudentia.94.2022.pp.161-189","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.46553/prudentia.94.2022.pp.161-189","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":36086,"journal":{"name":"Prudentia Iuris","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43096413","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-12-01DOI: 10.46553/prudentia.94.2022.pp.69-108
Max Silva Abbott
{"title":"Ius Constitutionale Commune para América Latina (ICCAL) y activismo judicial: ¿Hacia el gobierno de los jueces?","authors":"Max Silva Abbott","doi":"10.46553/prudentia.94.2022.pp.69-108","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.46553/prudentia.94.2022.pp.69-108","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":36086,"journal":{"name":"Prudentia Iuris","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46772596","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-12-01DOI: 10.46553/prudentia.94.2022.pp.309-344
P. Zambrano
{"title":"La dignidad como concepto gozne entre el discurso moral y el discurso jurídico. Apuntes para el uso válido, conveniente y transparente del concepto de dignidad en la argumentación judicial.","authors":"P. Zambrano","doi":"10.46553/prudentia.94.2022.pp.309-344","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.46553/prudentia.94.2022.pp.309-344","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":36086,"journal":{"name":"Prudentia Iuris","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49338792","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-06-01DOI: 10.46553/prudentia.93.2022.pp.139-178
Enrique Varsi Raspigliosi
7(1) the Abstract: Good faith is one the matters that divides Civil Law from Common Law systems and is a starting point to discuss on the underlying philosophy found behind the pro-good faith and anti-good faith approaches. Taking this context into consideration, the CISG adopted a restrictive model of good faith (Common Law-friendly, in principle) and so it was expressed in its text, being article 7(1) the only provision that makes reference to good faith and regarding the interpretation of the CISG. However, since it was a false consensus, the story did not end there, and the ghost of civilian good faith continues to haunt the CISG facilities, and thus, even if it is not physically present, its presence could be felt through the lex mercatoria pursuant to article 9 CISG.
{"title":"Falso consenso: el fantasma de la buena fe en el artículo 7(1) de la CISG","authors":"Enrique Varsi Raspigliosi","doi":"10.46553/prudentia.93.2022.pp.139-178","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.46553/prudentia.93.2022.pp.139-178","url":null,"abstract":"7(1) the Abstract: Good faith is one the matters that divides Civil Law from Common Law systems and is a starting point to discuss on the underlying philosophy found behind the pro-good faith and anti-good faith approaches. Taking this context into consideration, the CISG adopted a restrictive model of good faith (Common Law-friendly, in principle) and so it was expressed in its text, being article 7(1) the only provision that makes reference to good faith and regarding the interpretation of the CISG. However, since it was a false consensus, the story did not end there, and the ghost of civilian good faith continues to haunt the CISG facilities, and thus, even if it is not physically present, its presence could be felt through the lex mercatoria pursuant to article 9 CISG.","PeriodicalId":36086,"journal":{"name":"Prudentia Iuris","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47190316","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-06-01DOI: 10.46553/prudentia.93.2022.pp.27-43
D. A. Herrera
: According to Aristotle, principle is that from which something comes, both in the order of being, of knowing and of doing or acting. In this sense, in the order of knowing, principle refers to the starting point on which a whole series of notions that constitute a science or knowledge is structured. Just as the first principles of speculative reason (principle of non-contradiction, etc.) are common and constitute the basis of all subsequent knowledge, the first principles of practical reason (natural law) would also be common and are the basis of all practical knowledge. Also through dialectics, a defense of the classical theory of natural law will be made against objections from modern thought. Finally, the notions of natural law and natural law will be distinguished within the framework of the analogical conception of both.
{"title":"En defensa de los principios de Derecho Natural (segunda parte)","authors":"D. A. Herrera","doi":"10.46553/prudentia.93.2022.pp.27-43","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.46553/prudentia.93.2022.pp.27-43","url":null,"abstract":": According to Aristotle, principle is that from which something comes, both in the order of being, of knowing and of doing or acting. In this sense, in the order of knowing, principle refers to the starting point on which a whole series of notions that constitute a science or knowledge is structured. Just as the first principles of speculative reason (principle of non-contradiction, etc.) are common and constitute the basis of all subsequent knowledge, the first principles of practical reason (natural law) would also be common and are the basis of all practical knowledge. Also through dialectics, a defense of the classical theory of natural law will be made against objections from modern thought. Finally, the notions of natural law and natural law will be distinguished within the framework of the analogical conception of both.","PeriodicalId":36086,"journal":{"name":"Prudentia Iuris","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"70562859","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-06-01DOI: 10.46553/prudentia.93.2022.pp.231-248
Miguel Juan Ramón De Lezica
: Detractors of the notion of crimes of action by omission affirm that it is a prohibited analogy that is harmful to the principle of legality. The solution, a specific type, or an equivalence clause. On the contrary, the location of the omission as a typical structure, or the doctrine of the action as the material assumption to be valued by the norm in the type, lead to an aporia that we understand is not resolved. If the omission must be located in the type; if, at the same time, we characterize the crime as a typical, unlawful and guilty action; the omission is not an action, therefore it is not a crime. Here an alternative is proposed from the doctrine of voluntariness as a formal cause of the human act. If voluntariness matters mastery of the act, we are as masters of acting and wanting as of not acting and not wanting.
{"title":"¿Hay delitos de omisión? Un malentendido pendiente","authors":"Miguel Juan Ramón De Lezica","doi":"10.46553/prudentia.93.2022.pp.231-248","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.46553/prudentia.93.2022.pp.231-248","url":null,"abstract":": Detractors of the notion of crimes of action by omission affirm that it is a prohibited analogy that is harmful to the principle of legality. The solution, a specific type, or an equivalence clause. On the contrary, the location of the omission as a typical structure, or the doctrine of the action as the material assumption to be valued by the norm in the type, lead to an aporia that we understand is not resolved. If the omission must be located in the type; if, at the same time, we characterize the crime as a typical, unlawful and guilty action; the omission is not an action, therefore it is not a crime. Here an alternative is proposed from the doctrine of voluntariness as a formal cause of the human act. If voluntariness matters mastery of the act, we are as masters of acting and wanting as of not acting and not wanting.","PeriodicalId":36086,"journal":{"name":"Prudentia Iuris","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43123058","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-06-01DOI: 10.46553/prudentia.93.2022.pp.249-267
L. A. Bossini
: This research aims to deal with the intelligible of the law and other legal phe-nomena taking into account that the finality of the law works as a principle. It shows the main alignments of the classical thinking and contrasts them with the modern thinking, which challenges the finality as a principle. When analyzing the essence of the law, which is materialized in the human behavior, the order at least appears within the notion of law, in its different dimensions.
{"title":"El sentido del Derecho. La finalidad del mundo jurídico","authors":"L. A. Bossini","doi":"10.46553/prudentia.93.2022.pp.249-267","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.46553/prudentia.93.2022.pp.249-267","url":null,"abstract":": This research aims to deal with the intelligible of the law and other legal phe-nomena taking into account that the finality of the law works as a principle. It shows the main alignments of the classical thinking and contrasts them with the modern thinking, which challenges the finality as a principle. When analyzing the essence of the law, which is materialized in the human behavior, the order at least appears within the notion of law, in its different dimensions.","PeriodicalId":36086,"journal":{"name":"Prudentia Iuris","volume":"156 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"70562792","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-06-01DOI: 10.46553/prudentia.93.2022.pp.47-75
Juana Ocantos Bernárdez
: Antonio’s ships have been wrecked and his insolvency enables Shylock to execute the contract, where it was agreed that in the event of non-compliance, he would be the creditor of a pound of meat from his debtor. It seems that there is no escape from this absurd clause, the parties have freely agreed on that penalty and the Dux is forced to comply with the deed. Shakespeare portrays an absurd conflict whose ironic solu-tion leads the reader to question the following: Is fairness equal to what is agreed? And therefore: what makes a contract fair? What is its source of validity?
{"title":"El pacto y la justicia. Reflexiones a partir del mercader de Venecia","authors":"Juana Ocantos Bernárdez","doi":"10.46553/prudentia.93.2022.pp.47-75","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.46553/prudentia.93.2022.pp.47-75","url":null,"abstract":": Antonio’s ships have been wrecked and his insolvency enables Shylock to execute the contract, where it was agreed that in the event of non-compliance, he would be the creditor of a pound of meat from his debtor. It seems that there is no escape from this absurd clause, the parties have freely agreed on that penalty and the Dux is forced to comply with the deed. Shakespeare portrays an absurd conflict whose ironic solu-tion leads the reader to question the following: Is fairness equal to what is agreed? And therefore: what makes a contract fair? What is its source of validity?","PeriodicalId":36086,"journal":{"name":"Prudentia Iuris","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46471016","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-06-01DOI: 10.46553/prudentia.93.2022.pp.205-230
Felipe Westermeyer Hernández
: This paper investigates how the Chilean Constitution of 1818 dealt with conflicts between the provisions of the Constitution and the legal system in force at that time, through the use of the concepts of repeal and legal continuity. This fundamental charter regulated both categories by means of clauses of continuity of existing law: colonial law, the application of which by these legislative bodies is analysed in this article. Beforehand, it explains the transactional nature of this fundamental rule, within the framework of the relationship between Law and Revolution that will mark the 19th century.
{"title":"Derogación y continuidad: dos problemas de teoría jurídica resueltos en la constitución chilena de 1818","authors":"Felipe Westermeyer Hernández","doi":"10.46553/prudentia.93.2022.pp.205-230","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.46553/prudentia.93.2022.pp.205-230","url":null,"abstract":": This paper investigates how the Chilean Constitution of 1818 dealt with conflicts between the provisions of the Constitution and the legal system in force at that time, through the use of the concepts of repeal and legal continuity. This fundamental charter regulated both categories by means of clauses of continuity of existing law: colonial law, the application of which by these legislative bodies is analysed in this article. Beforehand, it explains the transactional nature of this fundamental rule, within the framework of the relationship between Law and Revolution that will mark the 19th century.","PeriodicalId":36086,"journal":{"name":"Prudentia Iuris","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48031414","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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