Pub Date : 2022-08-12DOI: 10.17990/rpf/2022_78_3_1029
Rebecca Pawloski, A. Lind
In the face of the reality of myriad abuses that place the Church today in a deep moral and credibility crisis, we are not focused on what John Paul II may have done, by action or omission, in the exercise of the power he carried out in his ecclesiastical functions as a bishop, or even as pope. In this article, we focus only on Wojtyła, as a philosopher. We will examine how his phenomenology—if we can call it that—provides an ethics capable of making an important contribution to understanding that which constitutes abuse of a person, thus helping to define and prevent forms of exploitation and abuse. Taking Wojtyła’s notion of the person seriously will ground preventative practices in an approach which more fully corresponds to human maturation.
面对让今天的教会陷入深刻道德和信誉危机的无数滥用行为的现实，我们没有关注约翰·保罗二世(John Paul II)在行使他作为主教甚至教皇的教会职能时，可能通过行动或不作为做了什么。在本文中，我们只关注Wojtyła，作为一个哲学家。我们将研究他的现象学——如果我们可以称之为现象学的话——如何提供一种伦理学，能够对理解什么构成了对人的虐待做出重要贡献，从而帮助定义和防止各种形式的剥削和虐待。认真对待Wojtyła关于人的概念，将使预防性实践以一种更完全符合人类成熟的方法为基础。
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Pub Date : 2022-08-12DOI: 10.17990/rpf/2022_78_3_0851
Jimmy Hernández Marcelo
The phenomenological origins of the historian and epistemologist Alexandre Koyré are not entirely evident or sufficiently recognized by scholars interested in his thinking. The main aim of this paper is therefore to highlight the belonging of Koyré to the phenomenological movement and to establish lines of continuity between the investigations of Husserl and Koyré, namely mathematics and philosophy. The proposal is divided into two parts. First, on a biographical level, we reconstruct the formation of the young Koyré at the phenomenological school of Göttingen. Secondly, at the thematic level, we present some notions of continuity between Phenomenology and Koyré’s historical studies.
{"title":"Koyré y Husserl: De las matemáticas a la fenomenología","authors":"Jimmy Hernández Marcelo","doi":"10.17990/rpf/2022_78_3_0851","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17990/rpf/2022_78_3_0851","url":null,"abstract":"The phenomenological origins of the historian and epistemologist Alexandre Koyré are not entirely evident or sufficiently recognized by scholars interested in his thinking. The main aim of this paper is therefore to highlight the belonging of Koyré to the phenomenological movement and to establish lines of continuity between the investigations of Husserl and Koyré, namely mathematics and philosophy. The proposal is divided into two parts. First, on a biographical level, we reconstruct the formation of the young Koyré at the phenomenological school of Göttingen. Secondly, at the thematic level, we present some notions of continuity between Phenomenology and Koyré’s historical studies.","PeriodicalId":36725,"journal":{"name":"Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-08-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42046440","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-08-12DOI: 10.17990/rpf/2022_78_3_0797
Eugénio Lopes
Today, more than ever, we talk constantly about a crisis of values. However, this crisis is also associated with the lack or rather the bad conception of models, the great promoters of values in societies. Thus, in this article, I intend to analyze the conception of a model, using, in particular, the thought of the realist phenomenologist, Dietrich von Hildebrand, and how it is important to guarantee human flourishing and social development. For this, I will initially distinguish two types of experiences in the human person. After that, I will analyze the values and primary vocation of every human person. Subsequently, I will approach the conception of the model and his influence on his follower. Then I’ll analyze the love relationship between the model and his follower. Finally, I will focus on the connection between religion and models.
{"title":"A Importância dos Modelos para o Florescimento Humano. O Contributo de Dietrich von Hildebrand","authors":"Eugénio Lopes","doi":"10.17990/rpf/2022_78_3_0797","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17990/rpf/2022_78_3_0797","url":null,"abstract":"Today, more than ever, we talk constantly about a crisis of values. However, this crisis is also associated with the lack or rather the bad conception of models, the great promoters of values in societies. Thus, in this article, I intend to analyze the conception of a model, using, in particular, the thought of the realist phenomenologist, Dietrich von Hildebrand, and how it is important to guarantee human flourishing and social development. For this, I will initially distinguish two types of experiences in the human person. After that, I will analyze the values and primary vocation of every human person. Subsequently, I will approach the conception of the model and his influence on his follower. Then I’ll analyze the love relationship between the model and his follower. Finally, I will focus on the connection between religion and models.","PeriodicalId":36725,"journal":{"name":"Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-08-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43180725","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-08-12DOI: 10.17990/rpf/2022_78_3_0917
Ángel Viñas Vera
Shestov is at the beginning of the French reception of Husserl. The first criticism of his approach was made by the Russian thinker. He considered his master Husserl the greatest philosopher of his time and, paradoxically, claimed that he was wrong in his theory of truth. This research shows the relationship between Shestov and Husserl, the dialogues they had and the ideas they shared. In doing so, we show an atypical and heterodox Husserlian, an original philosopher who opened up lines of thought for those of us today who want to continue the dialogue with Husserl beyond Husserl. The idea of philosophy will be at the root of their encounters and disagreements. In it are concentrated capital themes of Husserlian thought such as truth, intuition and evidence. This research exposes the critical arguments of Shestov’s thought to Husserlian thought while recognising the audacity of the founder of phenomenology. Shestov’s dialogue with Husserl, or at least with what he considers to be Husserlian thought, enriches current debates on the relation between the real and the ideal, the genetic, intersubjectivity and the relation between the particular and the universal.
{"title":"Shestov, anti-discípulo de Husserl","authors":"Ángel Viñas Vera","doi":"10.17990/rpf/2022_78_3_0917","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17990/rpf/2022_78_3_0917","url":null,"abstract":"Shestov is at the beginning of the French reception of Husserl. The first criticism of his approach was made by the Russian thinker. He considered his master Husserl the greatest philosopher of his time and, paradoxically, claimed that he was wrong in his theory of truth. This research shows the relationship between Shestov and Husserl, the dialogues they had and the ideas they shared. In doing so, we show an atypical and heterodox Husserlian, an original philosopher who opened up lines of thought for those of us today who want to continue the dialogue with Husserl beyond Husserl. The idea of philosophy will be at the root of their encounters and disagreements. In it are concentrated capital themes of Husserlian thought such as truth, intuition and evidence. This research exposes the critical arguments of Shestov’s thought to Husserlian thought while recognising the audacity of the founder of phenomenology. Shestov’s dialogue with Husserl, or at least with what he considers to be Husserlian thought, enriches current debates on the relation between the real and the ideal, the genetic, intersubjectivity and the relation between the particular and the universal.","PeriodicalId":36725,"journal":{"name":"Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-08-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44612070","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-08-12DOI: 10.17990/rpf/2022_78_3_0647
Claude Romano
In this article, Claude Romano challenges one of the more widespread assumptions in the phenomenological school, and especially in Husserl and his disciples, that of the intentional character of perception. Not denying that perception could have some aspects that are intentional (it is linked to attention, it encapsulates sometimes beliefs that are intentional attitudes), he claims that perception is not an intentional relation to the world. Indeed, intentionality is a basic feature of mind that remains connected to a form of representationalism. Now, as Heidegger has suggested with his concept of In-der-Welt-sein, and as Erwin Straus and Maurice Merleau-Ponty also emphasized, perception is rather an innerently bodily relation to world itself, that is, to the world as it exists independently of the mind and beyond all representations. Only such an approach can do justice to our ordinary and philosophical intuitions about the perceived world, and lead us to a genuine variety of phenomenological realism.
{"title":"La perception est-elle intentionnelle ?","authors":"Claude Romano","doi":"10.17990/rpf/2022_78_3_0647","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17990/rpf/2022_78_3_0647","url":null,"abstract":"In this article, Claude Romano challenges one of the more widespread assumptions in the phenomenological school, and especially in Husserl and his disciples, that of the intentional character of perception. Not denying that perception could have some aspects that are intentional (it is linked to attention, it encapsulates sometimes beliefs that are intentional attitudes), he claims that perception is not an intentional relation to the world. Indeed, intentionality is a basic feature of mind that remains connected to a form of representationalism. Now, as Heidegger has suggested with his concept of In-der-Welt-sein, and as Erwin Straus and Maurice Merleau-Ponty also emphasized, perception is rather an innerently bodily relation to world itself, that is, to the world as it exists independently of the mind and beyond all representations. Only such an approach can do justice to our ordinary and philosophical intuitions about the perceived world, and lead us to a genuine variety of phenomenological realism.","PeriodicalId":36725,"journal":{"name":"Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-08-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44301417","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-08-12DOI: 10.17990/rpf/2022_78_3_1133
Trujillo Bilbao Felipe
This paper discusses from what role a dialectical understanding can play for analyzing the case of “scientific developments in the cold war”, following Gabrielle Hecht’s book on the “technologies of empire” and how that narrative appealed to different situations in Latin America during the cold war (with the aeronautical development in Brasilia, for example). I will focus on the mechanisms that the text has to recognize the historical processes that accompany the production of that scientific knowledge, framed in a historical process that has the characteristics of a more complex historical event, such as the cold war. Afterwards, I Will focous on the philosophical implications of this matter. Specifically, I will first summarize some of the proposals for the relationship between the collective and the individual that exist in the different thinkers that we have reviewed. With this, I hope to generate a small framework of analysis to review how the case study I have selected is positioned in the historical explanation. The theoretical problem that underlies this reflection is in the diagnosis made by Emilia Viotti in her negative dialectic, and we take elements mainly from the historiographical proposal of E. P. Thompson and from the considerations on the method of Jean-Paul Sartre who marks history as the discipline in the best conditions to face the problem of totalization.
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Pub Date : 2022-08-12DOI: 10.17990/rpf/2022_78_3_0673
E. Falque
“The final task of phenomenology as a philosophy of consciousness,” Merleau-Ponty wrote, “is to understand its relationship with non-phenomenology. That which resists phenomenology in us – natural being, the ‘barbaric principle’ of which Schelling spoke – cannot remain extra-phenomenal and must have its place within it.” The barbaric principle (Schelling read by Merleau-Ponty), and the there is (the il y a of Levinas) – such is the confrontation that must be attempted here. Far from remaining simply pre-reflexive or presupposing the signified, the Nietzschean ‘abyss’ (Abgrund), even more radical than the Schellingian ‘groundless ground’ (Urgrund), is an invitation for us today to probe what could also stand ‘outside the phenomenon’ (hors-phénomène).
{"title":"« Principe barbare » et « Il y a ». Lecture croisée : Merleau-Ponty et Levinas","authors":"E. Falque","doi":"10.17990/rpf/2022_78_3_0673","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17990/rpf/2022_78_3_0673","url":null,"abstract":"“The final task of phenomenology as a philosophy of consciousness,” Merleau-Ponty wrote, “is to understand its relationship with non-phenomenology. That which resists phenomenology in us – natural being, the ‘barbaric principle’ of which Schelling spoke – cannot remain extra-phenomenal and must have its place within it.” The barbaric principle (Schelling read by Merleau-Ponty), and the there is (the il y a of Levinas) – such is the confrontation that must be attempted here. Far from remaining simply pre-reflexive or presupposing the signified, the Nietzschean ‘abyss’ (Abgrund), even more radical than the Schellingian ‘groundless ground’ (Urgrund), is an invitation for us today to probe what could also stand ‘outside the phenomenon’ (hors-phénomène).","PeriodicalId":36725,"journal":{"name":"Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-08-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44466919","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-08-12DOI: 10.17990/rpf/2022_78_3_0985
P. Dias
This study approach the critique of the transcendental ego in phenomenology in La transcendance de l’Ego, where Sartre confronts the “consistency” of a psychic and psychophysical ego. The research is directed towards understanding how a consciousness that does not have, a priori, any egological structure ends up, as “artificial functionality” and “in interiority”, constituting it as an “object”, to then identify with him, affirming himself as being him, in a sui generis relationship of «identity and indistinction». Therefore, throughout the reflection, as he reveals what he claims to be a «pre-personal» character of consciousness, the philosopher questions the reason for this movement by which it ends up «reifying», identifying itself with the psychic ego which it itself constitutes as a transcendent object. The aim here is to approach the existential inferences – not subscribed by the reasoning that is developed –, of Sartre when he concludes that this ego is a «product» of the conscience itself, which constitutes it, projects itself and identifies with it as a subterfuge to escape its full spontaneity and freedom that are a reason for her anguish. In this context, it is thought that, due to the “doxic character” they contain, all existential positions cannot be confirmed in the light of transcendental phenomenology. The egological approach to subjectivity in Husserl’s phenomenology is considered to be a continuous process of self-appropriating unfolding. However, this does not imply an undue multiplication of “I’s”, but refers, above all, to “modalities” of a consciousness that unfolds in a multiplicity of acts and subjects.
{"title":"Ego na fenomenologia. Crítica de Sartre ao Ego transcendental de Husserl","authors":"P. Dias","doi":"10.17990/rpf/2022_78_3_0985","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17990/rpf/2022_78_3_0985","url":null,"abstract":"This study approach the critique of the transcendental ego in phenomenology in La transcendance de l’Ego, where Sartre confronts the “consistency” of a psychic and psychophysical ego. The research is directed towards understanding how a consciousness that does not have, a priori, any egological structure ends up, as “artificial functionality” and “in interiority”, constituting it as an “object”, to then identify with him, affirming himself as being him, in a sui generis relationship of «identity and indistinction». Therefore, throughout the reflection, as he reveals what he claims to be a «pre-personal» character of consciousness, the philosopher questions the reason for this movement by which it ends up «reifying», identifying itself with the psychic ego which it itself constitutes as a transcendent object. The aim here is to approach the existential inferences – not subscribed by the reasoning that is developed –, of Sartre when he concludes that this ego is a «product» of the conscience itself, which constitutes it, projects itself and identifies with it as a subterfuge to escape its full spontaneity and freedom that are a reason for her anguish. In this context, it is thought that, due to the “doxic character” they contain, all existential positions cannot be confirmed in the light of transcendental phenomenology. The egological approach to subjectivity in Husserl’s phenomenology is considered to be a continuous process of self-appropriating unfolding. However, this does not imply an undue multiplication of “I’s”, but refers, above all, to “modalities” of a consciousness that unfolds in a multiplicity of acts and subjects.","PeriodicalId":36725,"journal":{"name":"Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-08-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43253276","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-08-12DOI: 10.17990/rpf/2022_78_3_0771
Pedro M. S. Alves
In this article, I start with an analysis of Husserl’s description of the intentional structure of communicative intentions in the Logical Investigations, pointing to some obvious shortcomings of it. Then, I stress some important criticisms of Husserl’s approach, namely by Pfänder, and I endeavor to show that Husserl was very close to a full-fledged theory of communicative intentions in the years around 1910. I then turn to Reinach’s theory of social acts, without deciding whether Reinach’s approach was dependent or not on Husserl’s new views concerning the intentionality of communicative acts. Regarding Reinach’s theory of the Vernehmung, I criticize a widespread trend to construe (and translate) it as something like a perception (Wahrnehmung), showing that it expresses what I call the “vocative element” of the communicative acts. Then, I point to some complements that Reinach’s description is in need, and I finish with an outline of a phenomenologically oriented concept of communication, based on Husserl’s and Reinach’s insights.
{"title":"Revisiting Reinach and the Early Husserl For a Phenomenology of Communication","authors":"Pedro M. S. Alves","doi":"10.17990/rpf/2022_78_3_0771","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17990/rpf/2022_78_3_0771","url":null,"abstract":"In this article, I start with an analysis of Husserl’s description of the intentional structure of communicative intentions in the Logical Investigations, pointing to some obvious shortcomings of it. Then, I stress some important criticisms of Husserl’s approach, namely by Pfänder, and I endeavor to show that Husserl was very close to a full-fledged theory of communicative intentions in the years around 1910. I then turn to Reinach’s theory of social acts, without deciding whether Reinach’s approach was dependent or not on Husserl’s new views concerning the intentionality of communicative acts. Regarding Reinach’s theory of the Vernehmung, I criticize a widespread trend to construe (and translate) it as something like a perception (Wahrnehmung), showing that it expresses what I call the “vocative element” of the communicative acts. Then, I point to some complements that Reinach’s description is in need, and I finish with an outline of a phenomenologically oriented concept of communication, based on Husserl’s and Reinach’s insights.","PeriodicalId":36725,"journal":{"name":"Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-08-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48961798","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-08-12DOI: 10.17990/rpf/2022_78_3_0757
E. Dourado
{"title":"Como Husserl chegou ao idealismo transcendental? Uma leitura de Roman Ingarden","authors":"E. Dourado","doi":"10.17990/rpf/2022_78_3_0757","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17990/rpf/2022_78_3_0757","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":36725,"journal":{"name":"Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-08-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67539561","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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