{"title":"Nataliya I. Kuznetsova","authors":"","doi":"10.5840/eps202259468","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/eps202259468","url":null,"abstract":"<jats:p />","PeriodicalId":369041,"journal":{"name":"Epistemology & Philosophy of Science","volume":"115 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130754317","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper was motivated by reflections on what makes our argument convincing and persuasive. The substantive answer in my view suggests the examination of the cognitive grounds of argumentation. In the introductory section, I consider various approaches to identifying the cognitive component in argumentation. That way, I briefly observe recent relevant publications, which I classify into two groups: those directly addressing cognitive grounds of argumentation; and papers on formal models of argumentation that take cognitive nature of persuasion as a premise. In the second section, I argue for phenomenologicaly inspired approach to cognitive activity as one which provides an adequate cognitive interpretation of the latter. In so doing, I touch upon key some phenomenological concepts and focuses on an analogizing apperception (appresentation). The third section accumulates all the above. I proceed from the interpretation of the argumentation as discursive activity aimed at a deliberate change in an opposite party’s position, which may not be explicitly presented in the course of arguing. It makes us turn to cognitive procedure of appresentation as it was presented by Husserl for an adequate interpretation of transfer and grasping of argumentative message’s meaning.
{"title":"Argumentation from a Cognitive Perspective","authors":"N. Zaitseva","doi":"10.5840/eps202360111","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/eps202360111","url":null,"abstract":"This paper was motivated by reflections on what makes our argument convincing and persuasive. The substantive answer in my view suggests the examination of the cognitive grounds of argumentation. In the introductory section, I consider various approaches to identifying the cognitive component in argumentation. That way, I briefly observe recent relevant publications, which I classify into two groups: those directly addressing cognitive grounds of argumentation; and papers on formal models of argumentation that take cognitive nature of persuasion as a premise. In the second section, I argue for phenomenologicaly inspired approach to cognitive activity as one which provides an adequate cognitive interpretation of the latter. In so doing, I touch upon key some phenomenological concepts and focuses on an analogizing apperception (appresentation). The third section accumulates all the above. I proceed from the interpretation of the argumentation as discursive activity aimed at a deliberate change in an opposite party’s position, which may not be explicitly presented in the course of arguing. It makes us turn to cognitive procedure of appresentation as it was presented by Husserl for an adequate interpretation of transfer and grasping of argumentative message’s meaning.","PeriodicalId":369041,"journal":{"name":"Epistemology & Philosophy of Science","volume":"106 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124883996","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
В статье рассматривается понятие «эпистемология незнания», определяемое авторами как оксюморон. Применение данного термина в философской литературе в первую очередь связано с исследованиями дистрибуции информации в межгрупповом взаимодействии (Л. Алькофф, Э. Малевски, Н. Джарамилло, Ч. Миллс). Однако, на взгляд авторов данной статьи, подобная трактовка сужает эпистемологический характер проблемы незнания. Одной из целей работы является попытка придания отмеченному словосочетанию понятийной нагрузки. Для этого, прежде всего, рассматривается вопрос о смысле понятия незнания, а затем приведено обоснование возможности гармоничного сочетания понятий «незнание» и «эпистемология». В статье рассмотрены четыре тезиса, показывающие тесную взаимосвязь незнания и знания. На взгляд авторов, именно это является первичным обоснованием эпистемологического характера проблемы. Первый тезис широко известен в истории философии и науки и гласит, что незнание может выступать условием знания. Второй тезис защищает обратную связь: незнание реализуется через знание. Третий и четвертый тезисы обращены к состояниям, сочетающим в себе свойства знания и незнания: первое может иметь признаки второго, а второе – признаки первого. Это указывает на необходимость придания хорошо известному понятию «эпистемология» некоторых дополнительных аспектов, необходимых при такой взаимосвязи: ведь нужно признать, что такая форма, как оксюморон, нечасто встречается в гносеологических исследованиях. На основании этого делается вывод о том, каким образом эпистемологический анализ может быть осуществлен. Авторы видят здесь две возможные исследовательские задачи, а именно – анализ непроизводства знания и анализ производства незнания.
{"title":"Незнание как эпистемологическая проблема","authors":"Александр Михайлович Дорожкин, А В Голубинская","doi":"10.5840/eps202360343","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/eps202360343","url":null,"abstract":"В статье рассматривается понятие «эпистемология незнания», определяемое авторами как оксюморон. Применение данного термина в философской литературе в первую очередь связано с исследованиями дистрибуции информации в межгрупповом взаимодействии (Л. Алькофф, Э. Малевски, Н. Джарамилло, Ч. Миллс). Однако, на взгляд авторов данной статьи, подобная трактовка сужает эпистемологический характер проблемы незнания. Одной из целей работы является попытка придания отмеченному словосочетанию понятийной нагрузки. Для этого, прежде всего, рассматривается вопрос о смысле понятия незнания, а затем приведено обоснование возможности гармоничного сочетания понятий «незнание» и «эпистемология». В статье рассмотрены четыре тезиса, показывающие тесную взаимосвязь незнания и знания. На взгляд авторов, именно это является первичным обоснованием эпистемологического характера проблемы. Первый тезис широко известен в истории философии и науки и гласит, что незнание может выступать условием знания. Второй тезис защищает обратную связь: незнание реализуется через знание. Третий и четвертый тезисы обращены к состояниям, сочетающим в себе свойства знания и незнания: первое может иметь признаки второго, а второе – признаки первого. Это указывает на необходимость придания хорошо известному понятию «эпистемология» некоторых дополнительных аспектов, необходимых при такой взаимосвязи: ведь нужно признать, что такая форма, как оксюморон, нечасто встречается в гносеологических исследованиях. На основании этого делается вывод о том, каким образом эпистемологический анализ может быть осуществлен. Авторы видят здесь две возможные исследовательские задачи, а именно – анализ непроизводства знания и анализ производства незнания.","PeriodicalId":369041,"journal":{"name":"Epistemology & Philosophy of Science","volume":"90 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116571952","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
В работе исследуется вариант такой современной теории восприятия, как дизъюнктивизм. Данная теория является версией прямого реализма. Ее суть заключается в том, что перцептивные состояния, обычно относимые к одному виду, предлагается рассматривать как дизъюнкцию двух видов опыта: достоверного и иллюзорного (галлюцинаторного). В случае достоверного восприятия содержанием перцептивного состояния является положение дел, на которое оно направлено. Иллюзорное восприятие не обладает подобным содержанием. Существуют две версии дизъюнктивизма – метафизический и эпистемологический. В статье анализируется эпистемологический дизъюнктивизм, прежде всего тезис Д. Притчарда о том, что данная теория позволяет разрешить спор интерналистов и экстерналистов относительно обоснования знания. Именно поэтому Притчард называет этот подход Святым Граалем эпистемологии. Для того чтобы принять эпистемологический дизъюнктивизм в качестве теории, позволяющей разрешить этот спор, необходимо ответить на возражения скептика и решить проблему отличия достоверного опыта восприятия от иллюзорного. В первой части работы анализируется вариант эпистемологического дизъюнктивизма, предложенный Дж. Макдауэлом, и отмечается, что квиетистский подход, используемый философом, хотя и позволяет преодолеть картезианский скептицизм, тем не менее не предлагает конструктивного решения проблемы отличия. Во второй части статьи реконструируется решение данной проблемы, предложенное Притчардом, которое заключается в сохранении принципа эпистемического замыкания, отказе от стратегии релевантных альтернатив и замене при обосновании перцептивного знания принципа различения на принцип предпочтения. Свой подход Притчард обозначает как неомуреанизм. В заключительной части исследования анализируется опровержение скептицизма, предложенное Дж. Муром, и витгенштейновская критика стратегии Мура, а также отмечается, что эта критика может быть направлена против решения проблемы отличия, разрабатываемого Притчардом.
{"title":"Является ли эпистемологический дизъюнктивизм Святым Граалем эпистемологии?","authors":"Дмитрий Валерьевич Иванов","doi":"10.5840/eps202360348","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/eps202360348","url":null,"abstract":"В работе исследуется вариант такой современной теории восприятия, как дизъюнктивизм. Данная теория является версией прямого реализма. Ее суть заключается в том, что перцептивные состояния, обычно относимые к одному виду, предлагается рассматривать как дизъюнкцию двух видов опыта: достоверного и иллюзорного (галлюцинаторного). В случае достоверного восприятия содержанием перцептивного состояния является положение дел, на которое оно направлено. Иллюзорное восприятие не обладает подобным содержанием. Существуют две версии дизъюнктивизма – метафизический и эпистемологический. В статье анализируется эпистемологический дизъюнктивизм, прежде всего тезис Д. Притчарда о том, что данная теория позволяет разрешить спор интерналистов и экстерналистов относительно обоснования знания. Именно поэтому Притчард называет этот подход Святым Граалем эпистемологии. Для того чтобы принять эпистемологический дизъюнктивизм в качестве теории, позволяющей разрешить этот спор, необходимо ответить на возражения скептика и решить проблему отличия достоверного опыта восприятия от иллюзорного. В первой части работы анализируется вариант эпистемологического дизъюнктивизма, предложенный Дж. Макдауэлом, и отмечается, что квиетистский подход, используемый философом, хотя и позволяет преодолеть картезианский скептицизм, тем не менее не предлагает конструктивного решения проблемы отличия. Во второй части статьи реконструируется решение данной проблемы, предложенное Притчардом, которое заключается в сохранении принципа эпистемического замыкания, отказе от стратегии релевантных альтернатив и замене при обосновании перцептивного знания принципа различения на принцип предпочтения. Свой подход Притчард обозначает как неомуреанизм. В заключительной части исследования анализируется опровержение скептицизма, предложенное Дж. Муром, и витгенштейновская критика стратегии Мура, а также отмечается, что эта критика может быть направлена против решения проблемы отличия, разрабатываемого Притчардом.","PeriodicalId":369041,"journal":{"name":"Epistemology & Philosophy of Science","volume":"6 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125188018","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Статья представляет критический анализ философско-языковой составляющей концепции философа А.В. Смирнова, сформулированной в книге «Логика смысла как философия сознания: приглашение к размышлению» (М., 2021) как одной из концепций, опирающихся на идею лингвистической относительности. Предложены аргументы, демонстрирующие, что концепция основана на ложном утверждении об отсутствии связки в классическом арабском языке, а аргументы автора не отвечают критериям научной аргументации.
这篇文章对哲学家a . w . smirnov概念的哲学和语言组成进行了批判性分析。提出的论点表明，这个概念是基于对经典阿拉伯语中缺乏联系的虚假陈述，提交人的论点不符合科学论据的标准。
{"title":"Роковая связка: об одной попытке обосновать лингвистическую относительность","authors":"Петр Сергеевич Куслий","doi":"10.5840/eps202360349","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/eps202360349","url":null,"abstract":"Статья представляет критический анализ философско-языковой составляющей концепции философа А.В. Смирнова, сформулированной в книге «Логика смысла как философия сознания: приглашение к размышлению» (М., 2021) как одной из концепций, опирающихся на идею лингвистической относительности. Предложены аргументы, демонстрирующие, что концепция основана на ложном утверждении об отсутствии связки в классическом арабском языке, а аргументы автора не отвечают критериям научной аргументации.","PeriodicalId":369041,"journal":{"name":"Epistemology & Philosophy of Science","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132668677","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Mandelstam’s criticism of the Rayleigh theory of the blue color of the sky (1907) and his polemic with M. Planck (1907–1908) did not become notable events in the history of physics. However, the method of their coverage in the Soviet and in the post-Soviet physics literature is remarkable. Most of Soviet physicists and historians of physics supported Mandelstam's point of view in his criticism of both Raleigh and Planck. The situation changed only at the beginning of the 21st century: in the Russian literature the publications appeared emphasizing that in the Raleigh–Mandelstam and Planck–Mandelstam controversies Mandelstam was not right, Raleigh and Planck were closer to the truth. Which presumptions of this trend can be noted? This was patriotism of the scientific school peculiar to Mandelstam’s graduate students and the former graduate students, the patriotism connected with solidarity which helped Mandelstam’s community to survive in the Soviet totalitarian regime and in the totalitarian organization of science. This was also progressionism which was popular among academics and among men in the street. The phenomenon of common knowledge, mutual knowledge among the members of a scientific community should be taken under consideration. Common knowledge is connected with the non-thematized anonymous inclusion of the ideological terminology into scientific discourse.
{"title":"The History of Science in the Context of the State Ideology","authors":"A. Pechenkin","doi":"10.5840/eps202360231","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/eps202360231","url":null,"abstract":"Mandelstam’s criticism of the Rayleigh theory of the blue color of the sky (1907) and his polemic with M. Planck (1907–1908) did not become notable events in the history of physics. However, the method of their coverage in the Soviet and in the post-Soviet physics literature is remarkable. Most of Soviet physicists and historians of physics supported Mandelstam's point of view in his criticism of both Raleigh and Planck. The situation changed only at the beginning of the 21st century: in the Russian literature the publications appeared emphasizing that in the Raleigh–Mandelstam and Planck–Mandelstam controversies Mandelstam was not right, Raleigh and Planck were closer to the truth. Which presumptions of this trend can be noted? This was patriotism of the scientific school peculiar to Mandelstam’s graduate students and the former graduate students, the patriotism connected with solidarity which helped Mandelstam’s community to survive in the Soviet totalitarian regime and in the totalitarian organization of science. This was also progressionism which was popular among academics and among men in the street. The phenomenon of common knowledge, mutual knowledge among the members of a scientific community should be taken under consideration. Common knowledge is connected with the non-thematized anonymous inclusion of the ideological terminology into scientific discourse.","PeriodicalId":369041,"journal":{"name":"Epistemology & Philosophy of Science","volume":"157 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114675534","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Vladislav A. Lektorskiy","authors":"","doi":"10.5840/eps202259469","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/eps202259469","url":null,"abstract":"<jats:p />","PeriodicalId":369041,"journal":{"name":"Epistemology & Philosophy of Science","volume":"77 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121657941","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this reply to the article by I.T. Kasavin “Creativity as a social phenomenon” the authors discuss the possibilities of the scientific precariat as a free creative class, which having entered the scientific community, will give it a new creative potential. The authors express some doubts that such a merger will preserve precariat's special creative spirit. The article draws attention to the diversity in understanding the nature, goals and values of creativity. The specificity of understanding creativity in the scientific community is due to its rational and methodological guidelines, while the precariat is part of postmodern society, and its creative potential stems from a break with traditional rationalistic methodology. However, as long as peer review remains in the hands of the exclusively institutionalized scientific community, there is a high probability that the creativity of the precariat will be marginalized, and becoming part of the scientific community, the precariat will be forced to accept its epistemic values and lose the creative potential that is expected from them. The authors refer to P. Feyerabend’s theory of creativity, in which he rejects the subject-centered model of scientific creativity. According to Feyerabend, creativity is intersubjective in nature and grows organically from the sociocultural environment of the subject. The scientist creates following a cultural instinct, but the subject does not disappear from the creative process, since the cultural instinct is refracted through his individual style. If creativity is a reflection of the spirit of times, the precariat is the best way to embody it. In conclusion, a way for overcoming the social is outlined and, in a broad sense, the methodological problematic nature of the unification of the scientific community and the precariat, which the authors see in the general democratization and pluralism of society.
{"title":"Towards Open Science: The Precariat as a Subject of Scientific Creativity","authors":"N. Voronina, Artem M. Feigelman","doi":"10.5840/eps202259339","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/eps202259339","url":null,"abstract":"In this reply to the article by I.T. Kasavin “Creativity as a social phenomenon” the authors discuss the possibilities of the scientific precariat as a free creative class, which having entered the scientific community, will give it a new creative potential. The authors express some doubts that such a merger will preserve precariat's special creative spirit. The article draws attention to the diversity in understanding the nature, goals and values of creativity. The specificity of understanding creativity in the scientific community is due to its rational and methodological guidelines, while the precariat is part of postmodern society, and its creative potential stems from a break with traditional rationalistic methodology. However, as long as peer review remains in the hands of the exclusively institutionalized scientific community, there is a high probability that the creativity of the precariat will be marginalized, and becoming part of the scientific community, the precariat will be forced to accept its epistemic values and lose the creative potential that is expected from them. The authors refer to P. Feyerabend’s theory of creativity, in which he rejects the subject-centered model of scientific creativity. According to Feyerabend, creativity is intersubjective in nature and grows organically from the sociocultural environment of the subject. The scientist creates following a cultural instinct, but the subject does not disappear from the creative process, since the cultural instinct is refracted through his individual style. If creativity is a reflection of the spirit of times, the precariat is the best way to embody it. In conclusion, a way for overcoming the social is outlined and, in a broad sense, the methodological problematic nature of the unification of the scientific community and the precariat, which the authors see in the general democratization and pluralism of society.","PeriodicalId":369041,"journal":{"name":"Epistemology & Philosophy of Science","volume":"63 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121708929","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper is a part of the discussion about creativity and the scientific precariat, initiated by I.T. Kasavin’s article. Proceeding from his proposal to revise the ideology of creativity in science through the desire of certain precariat groups for independence and freedom, the author questions the nowadays perspectives for the scientific precariat. This paper discusses the varieties of the precariat (or related to it phenomena), such as freelancing and digital nomadism. The author considers a number of advantages (independence, freedom) and disadvantages of precarization (lack of stability, uncertainty, lack of social guarantees, etc.). The author questions whether scientists can be seriously considered as candidates for the precariat and how widespread the scientific precariat is in contemporary society. It is pointed out that the collective nature of modern science and its institutionalization impose certain obligations on scientists, which sometimes confront their individual internal aspirations, including the desire for freedom. The tension between the institutional conditions for the existence of science and the personal motives of scientists, noted once by M. Weber, lead to a decrease in personal autonomy, the emergence of a “world of specialists” and make it difficult to realize scientists’ aspirations for independence and freedom. On the one hand, a number of current trends (such as academic mobility) can be viewed as a kind of precarization in science. On the other hand, the status of an independent researcher without research and educational affiliation hinders scientists’ social recognition and financial returns. The author admits that representatives of “garage science”, some public intellectuals, science, communicators, etc. can be attributed to the scientific precariat; however, in general, the scientific precariat is not a common trend. At the same time, modern postscience and post-normal science potentially make this phenomenon quite legitimate.
{"title":"On the Perspectives of the Scientific Precariat","authors":"S. Shibarshina","doi":"10.5840/eps202259340","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/eps202259340","url":null,"abstract":"This paper is a part of the discussion about creativity and the scientific precariat, initiated by I.T. Kasavin’s article. Proceeding from his proposal to revise the ideology of creativity in science through the desire of certain precariat groups for independence and freedom, the author questions the nowadays perspectives for the scientific precariat. This paper discusses the varieties of the precariat (or related to it phenomena), such as freelancing and digital nomadism. The author considers a number of advantages (independence, freedom) and disadvantages of precarization (lack of stability, uncertainty, lack of social guarantees, etc.). The author questions whether scientists can be seriously considered as candidates for the precariat and how widespread the scientific precariat is in contemporary society. It is pointed out that the collective nature of modern science and its institutionalization impose certain obligations on scientists, which sometimes confront their individual internal aspirations, including the desire for freedom. The tension between the institutional conditions for the existence of science and the personal motives of scientists, noted once by M. Weber, lead to a decrease in personal autonomy, the emergence of a “world of specialists” and make it difficult to realize scientists’ aspirations for independence and freedom. On the one hand, a number of current trends (such as academic mobility) can be viewed as a kind of precarization in science. On the other hand, the status of an independent researcher without research and educational affiliation hinders scientists’ social recognition and financial returns. The author admits that representatives of “garage science”, some public intellectuals, science, communicators, etc. can be attributed to the scientific precariat; however, in general, the scientific precariat is not a common trend. At the same time, modern postscience and post-normal science potentially make this phenomenon quite legitimate.","PeriodicalId":369041,"journal":{"name":"Epistemology & Philosophy of Science","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123815316","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Theory of reference is a mainstream theory of meanings of certain types of linguistic expressions (primarily proper names, indexicals, demonstratives, and definite descriptions) in contemporary philosophy of language. It assigns corresponding expressions capability to refer to what people are talking or thinking about by using them. Meanwhile it is widely recognized that there are two kinds of reference. One is conceived as a relation between an agent and an entity which he or she applies the term to in particular communicative act (or act of thought); this is roughly called “speaker’s reference”. Another one characterizes linguistic terms as referring to particular entities relative to particular languages. This is normally identified as semantic reference. The popular hypothesis based on this distinction assumes that if a name is used in communication (or thought) in a right way (i.e. in accord with particular set of conventions) then it refers to its semantic referent even when the speaker uses it to refer to something else. On the other hand, some belief that the reference of a particular use of a proper name (its token) is fully determined by the speaker’s communicative intentions. In the proposed study both these hypotheses are criticized. Different senses of such words as “designate” or “refer to” in their application to the functioning of linguistic expressions in communication are analyzed, and it is shown that linguistic conventions allegedly responsible for names’ semantic references cannot make names refer to their semantic referents independently on what particular participants of communication are believing or doing. On the other hand, the reduction of the reference of a token of a proper name to its speaker’s reference fails to explain this phenomenon as well. Neither theory explains how tokens of proper names (and supposedly other types of designators) could refer to particular entities (have referents). From this at least two conclusions may be made: the radical one would claim that any talk about tokens’ references is most likely meaningless. And the moderate one is that explanations of this phenomenon based on the distinction between semantic and speaker’s references don’t work. The author favors the first conclusion, but does not insist on it.
{"title":"On Semantic Reference and Speaker’s Reference","authors":"A. Chernyak","doi":"10.5840/eps202259228","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/eps202259228","url":null,"abstract":"Theory of reference is a mainstream theory of meanings of certain types of linguistic expressions (primarily proper names, indexicals, demonstratives, and definite descriptions) in contemporary philosophy of language. It assigns corresponding expressions capability to refer to what people are talking or thinking about by using them. Meanwhile it is widely recognized that there are two kinds of reference. One is conceived as a relation between an agent and an entity which he or she applies the term to in particular communicative act (or act of thought); this is roughly called “speaker’s reference”. Another one characterizes linguistic terms as referring to particular entities relative to particular languages. This is normally identified as semantic reference. The popular hypothesis based on this distinction assumes that if a name is used in communication (or thought) in a right way (i.e. in accord with particular set of conventions) then it refers to its semantic referent even when the speaker uses it to refer to something else. On the other hand, some belief that the reference of a particular use of a proper name (its token) is fully determined by the speaker’s communicative intentions. In the proposed study both these hypotheses are criticized. Different senses of such words as “designate” or “refer to” in their application to the functioning of linguistic expressions in communication are analyzed, and it is shown that linguistic conventions allegedly responsible for names’ semantic references cannot make names refer to their semantic referents independently on what particular participants of communication are believing or doing. On the other hand, the reduction of the reference of a token of a proper name to its speaker’s reference fails to explain this phenomenon as well. Neither theory explains how tokens of proper names (and supposedly other types of designators) could refer to particular entities (have referents). From this at least two conclusions may be made: the radical one would claim that any talk about tokens’ references is most likely meaningless. And the moderate one is that explanations of this phenomenon based on the distinction between semantic and speaker’s references don’t work. The author favors the first conclusion, but does not insist on it.","PeriodicalId":369041,"journal":{"name":"Epistemology & Philosophy of Science","volume":"31 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123990494","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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