Pub Date : 2019-01-02DOI: 10.1080/24761028.2019.1630052
Masato Kamikubo
ABSTRACT Recently, students’ political movements are emerging in the world. In countries other than Japan, students often play important roles as political actors. On the other hand, in Japan student movements are failed, and it is often argued that the reason lies in young people’s low political awareness. However, this article argues that the political awareness of young people in Japan is not low, and that the problem lies in the difficulty of access to politics for the young. This article investigates student movements around the world focusing on age of eligibility to run for election. In countries and regions where university students reach the age of eligibility to run for election during their school years, student movements to develop into political parties, and core members can become politicians while they are still university students. On the other hand, in Japan, the late age of eligibility to run for election means that students cannot enter politics during their time in university. In addition, given the Japanese traditional employment system, there is a significant risk involved in stopping regular employment to become a politician, which is not permanent employment, as it is dependent on election results. Thus, Japanese university students who are interested in politics are less likely to sustain that interest and become politicians after graduating from university.
{"title":"Age of eligibility to run for election in Japan: a barrier to political careers?","authors":"Masato Kamikubo","doi":"10.1080/24761028.2019.1630052","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/24761028.2019.1630052","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Recently, students’ political movements are emerging in the world. In countries other than Japan, students often play important roles as political actors. On the other hand, in Japan student movements are failed, and it is often argued that the reason lies in young people’s low political awareness. However, this article argues that the political awareness of young people in Japan is not low, and that the problem lies in the difficulty of access to politics for the young. This article investigates student movements around the world focusing on age of eligibility to run for election. In countries and regions where university students reach the age of eligibility to run for election during their school years, student movements to develop into political parties, and core members can become politicians while they are still university students. On the other hand, in Japan, the late age of eligibility to run for election means that students cannot enter politics during their time in university. In addition, given the Japanese traditional employment system, there is a significant risk involved in stopping regular employment to become a politician, which is not permanent employment, as it is dependent on election results. Thus, Japanese university students who are interested in politics are less likely to sustain that interest and become politicians after graduating from university.","PeriodicalId":37218,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Contemporary East Asia Studies","volume":"8 1","pages":"14 - 29"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/24761028.2019.1630052","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44857865","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-07-03DOI: 10.1080/24761028.2018.1553226
Assel G. Bitabarova
ABSTRACT Background. Although China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has received increasing attention at the global level, there is, however, little information about how and with what implications it is being enacted on the ground. This is partly because existing scholarship has primarily focused on Chinese interests and motives behind the grand proposal, while perspectives of other countries participating in the BRI remain understudied.Purpose. The study seeks to bridge this gap by contextualizing the land-based component of the BRI, Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB), in Central Asia. Its purpose is two-fold: (1) to discuss how Beijing perceives the role of Central Asia in general and Kazakhstan in particular in advancing its New Silk Road proposal; (2) to explore how the SREB is being implemented and perceived in Kazakhstan, where it was first announced in September 2013. In particular, it offers a detailed account of how Kazakhstan is trying to integrate its infrastructure development program “Nurly Zhol” for 2015-2019 into the SREB, which is missing from the current scholarly literature. Main Argument. The paper argues that, notwithstanding power asymmetries, the BRI participant/recipient countries do have the agency to develop their own agenda and relevant policies for interactions with Beijing. Conclusion. The case study analysis suggests that there is little evidence that China unilaterally imposes its agenda upon Kazakhstan. Moreover, a shared understanding between the two states about the complementarity of mutual interests provides a solid foundation for overall Kazakh-Chinese cooperation. Yet, the strengthening of relations between the two neighbors, especially in the economic domain, has not led to an improvement of Kazakh popular perceptions of China, whose image is further worsened by the ongoing securitization of ethnic minorities in Xinjiang, including Kazakhs.
{"title":"Unpacking Sino-Central Asian engagement along the New Silk Road: a case study of Kazakhstan","authors":"Assel G. Bitabarova","doi":"10.1080/24761028.2018.1553226","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/24761028.2018.1553226","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Background. Although China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has received increasing attention at the global level, there is, however, little information about how and with what implications it is being enacted on the ground. This is partly because existing scholarship has primarily focused on Chinese interests and motives behind the grand proposal, while perspectives of other countries participating in the BRI remain understudied.Purpose. The study seeks to bridge this gap by contextualizing the land-based component of the BRI, Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB), in Central Asia. Its purpose is two-fold: (1) to discuss how Beijing perceives the role of Central Asia in general and Kazakhstan in particular in advancing its New Silk Road proposal; (2) to explore how the SREB is being implemented and perceived in Kazakhstan, where it was first announced in September 2013. In particular, it offers a detailed account of how Kazakhstan is trying to integrate its infrastructure development program “Nurly Zhol” for 2015-2019 into the SREB, which is missing from the current scholarly literature. Main Argument. The paper argues that, notwithstanding power asymmetries, the BRI participant/recipient countries do have the agency to develop their own agenda and relevant policies for interactions with Beijing. Conclusion. The case study analysis suggests that there is little evidence that China unilaterally imposes its agenda upon Kazakhstan. Moreover, a shared understanding between the two states about the complementarity of mutual interests provides a solid foundation for overall Kazakh-Chinese cooperation. Yet, the strengthening of relations between the two neighbors, especially in the economic domain, has not led to an improvement of Kazakh popular perceptions of China, whose image is further worsened by the ongoing securitization of ethnic minorities in Xinjiang, including Kazakhs.","PeriodicalId":37218,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Contemporary East Asia Studies","volume":"7 1","pages":"149 - 173"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/24761028.2018.1553226","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42180567","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-07-03DOI: 10.1080/24761028.2019.1583005
Eiichi Shiozawa
disarmament.” However, the above similarity between North Korea and China will be dismissed by the “illicit nuclear aspirant” theory, because China’s nuclear development eventually became lawful under the NPT. Other nuclear proliferators such as Israel, which never signed the NPT, would also be excluded from comparative analysis based on this book’s view because the authors stressed that the North Korea and Iran commonly signed the NPT as the reason for selecting their cases for comparison. Nevertheless, why do the compared countries that are proliferating nuclear weapons have to be at least onetime signatories of the NPT? The frequent combination of “North Korea and Iran in US strategic thinking” (pages 2–7) also does not constitute enough of a reason to classify the two nuclear proliferators into one category, excluding others. The concept of categorizing proliferators should depend on objective analysis rather than political discourse, even if the relevance of such an objective could be defined based on a tendency of “U.S. strategic thinking.”
{"title":"Taiwan wo meguru Anzen Hosho [Taiwan’s security: issues and prospects]","authors":"Eiichi Shiozawa","doi":"10.1080/24761028.2019.1583005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/24761028.2019.1583005","url":null,"abstract":"disarmament.” However, the above similarity between North Korea and China will be dismissed by the “illicit nuclear aspirant” theory, because China’s nuclear development eventually became lawful under the NPT. Other nuclear proliferators such as Israel, which never signed the NPT, would also be excluded from comparative analysis based on this book’s view because the authors stressed that the North Korea and Iran commonly signed the NPT as the reason for selecting their cases for comparison. Nevertheless, why do the compared countries that are proliferating nuclear weapons have to be at least onetime signatories of the NPT? The frequent combination of “North Korea and Iran in US strategic thinking” (pages 2–7) also does not constitute enough of a reason to classify the two nuclear proliferators into one category, excluding others. The concept of categorizing proliferators should depend on objective analysis rather than political discourse, even if the relevance of such an objective could be defined based on a tendency of “U.S. strategic thinking.”","PeriodicalId":37218,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Contemporary East Asia Studies","volume":"7 1","pages":"212 - 215"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/24761028.2019.1583005","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49514339","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-07-03DOI: 10.1080/24761028.2019.1580407
Man Hung Thomas Chan
ABSTRACT Despite the prosperity and long continuity in history, the ancient Silk Road was weakened in recent centuries. Only with the end of the Cold War, there come the chances for its revival. The launch of the Belt and Road Initiative in 2013 by the Chinese coincided with the development strategy change of China, but the Initiative has just still been an initiative open to be substantiated by future policies and changes in China and overseas. The early focus has been on infrastructure investments. On the basis of existing railways, China has developed with European and Central Asian cities an ever-intensifying network of scheduled freight trains to carry out and promote long-distance trade along the old Silk Road routes. Lately, the overland routes have developed intermodal services to revive the traditional linkages between overland Silk Road and maritime Silk Road. Also, a new transport connectivity facilitated by China-funded railway investments has evolved, for example, in Eastern Europe and East Africa and China investment agreements on the development of economic corridors in Pakistan and Myanmar. There have been and could be criticisms and skepticisms about the Belt and Road Initiative. The infrastructure facilities built under the Initiative would definitely enhance local and regional connectivity of the host countries, and when combined with attempts at local industrialization, facilitated by the new opportunities of trade and exchanges, and funded by China or otherwise, it would offer the best chance for lifting the local populations out of the trap of isolation, poverty, and marginalization.
{"title":"The Belt and Road Initiative – the New Silk Road: a research agenda","authors":"Man Hung Thomas Chan","doi":"10.1080/24761028.2019.1580407","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/24761028.2019.1580407","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Despite the prosperity and long continuity in history, the ancient Silk Road was weakened in recent centuries. Only with the end of the Cold War, there come the chances for its revival. The launch of the Belt and Road Initiative in 2013 by the Chinese coincided with the development strategy change of China, but the Initiative has just still been an initiative open to be substantiated by future policies and changes in China and overseas. The early focus has been on infrastructure investments. On the basis of existing railways, China has developed with European and Central Asian cities an ever-intensifying network of scheduled freight trains to carry out and promote long-distance trade along the old Silk Road routes. Lately, the overland routes have developed intermodal services to revive the traditional linkages between overland Silk Road and maritime Silk Road. Also, a new transport connectivity facilitated by China-funded railway investments has evolved, for example, in Eastern Europe and East Africa and China investment agreements on the development of economic corridors in Pakistan and Myanmar. There have been and could be criticisms and skepticisms about the Belt and Road Initiative. The infrastructure facilities built under the Initiative would definitely enhance local and regional connectivity of the host countries, and when combined with attempts at local industrialization, facilitated by the new opportunities of trade and exchanges, and funded by China or otherwise, it would offer the best chance for lifting the local populations out of the trap of isolation, poverty, and marginalization.","PeriodicalId":37218,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Contemporary East Asia Studies","volume":"7 1","pages":"104 - 123"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/24761028.2019.1580407","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45110130","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-07-03DOI: 10.1080/24761028.2018.1535295
K. Ng
{"title":"Decoding the rise of China: Taiwanese and Japanese perspectives","authors":"K. Ng","doi":"10.1080/24761028.2018.1535295","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/24761028.2018.1535295","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":37218,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Contemporary East Asia Studies","volume":"7 1","pages":"207 - 209"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/24761028.2018.1535295","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46496503","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-07-03DOI: 10.1080/24761028.2018.1537091
Tamás Matura
ABSTRACT Central and Eastern European countries, like Hungary and Slovakia, are located along the Western section of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and serve as a gateway to the European Union. Thus, the participation of the CEE region is inevitable in the BRI, and the attitude of national governments and the public opinion may have an impact on the future of EU-China relations in the framework of the new “Silk Road” connecting the East to the West. The following paper offers an introduction to the so-called 16 + 1 cooperation of China and its 16 partners in the CEE region, and analyzes the political environment, public support, and media discourse of the BRI in two selected countries of Central and Eastern Europe.
{"title":"The Belt and Road Initiative depicted in Hungary and Slovakia","authors":"Tamás Matura","doi":"10.1080/24761028.2018.1537091","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/24761028.2018.1537091","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Central and Eastern European countries, like Hungary and Slovakia, are located along the Western section of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and serve as a gateway to the European Union. Thus, the participation of the CEE region is inevitable in the BRI, and the attitude of national governments and the public opinion may have an impact on the future of EU-China relations in the framework of the new “Silk Road” connecting the East to the West. The following paper offers an introduction to the so-called 16 + 1 cooperation of China and its 16 partners in the CEE region, and analyzes the political environment, public support, and media discourse of the BRI in two selected countries of Central and Eastern Europe.","PeriodicalId":37218,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Contemporary East Asia Studies","volume":"7 1","pages":"174 - 189"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/24761028.2018.1537091","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42145719","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-07-03DOI: 10.1080/24761028.2018.1558717
Takeshi Watanabe
{"title":"North Korea, Iran, and the challenge to international order: a comparative perspective","authors":"Takeshi Watanabe","doi":"10.1080/24761028.2018.1558717","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/24761028.2018.1558717","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":37218,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Contemporary East Asia Studies","volume":"7 1","pages":"209 - 212"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/24761028.2018.1558717","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45550797","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-07-03DOI: 10.1080/24761028.2018.1553227
Motoko Shutō
ABSTRACT China’s public diplomacy in ASEAN countries started as part of strategic partnership both at the regional and bilateral levels since the mid-2000s. Focusing on Confucius Institute (CI) as one of the earliest means of China’s public diplomacy, this article aims to make a comparative review of establishing processes of CIs and examines features of the CI program, functions of the CI networking, and perceptions of the youth of host universities and local societies. Based on the empirical surveys, this article argues that China’s public diplomacy through CIs in the ASEAN countries is an institutional building process to develop young human resources with Mandarin proficiency, to promote business relations, and to disseminate China’s official ideas through CIs’ public forums to the extent that the CIs’ network has been utilized to promote the conceptual synergy of “One Belt One Road” “Maritime Silk Road in the 21st Century” with ASEAN Connectivity. In conclusion, this article argues that due to a wide gap particularly in terms of social pluralism and open access to multiple sources of information in the region, the rapid growth of China’s public diplomacy through CIs will have a double-edged effect, conducive to promoting relations with China and a centrifugal force to the ASEAN Centrality in the decade to come.
{"title":"Patterns and views of China’s public diplomacy in ASEAN countries: focusing on Confucius Institutes","authors":"Motoko Shutō","doi":"10.1080/24761028.2018.1553227","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/24761028.2018.1553227","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT China’s public diplomacy in ASEAN countries started as part of strategic partnership both at the regional and bilateral levels since the mid-2000s. Focusing on Confucius Institute (CI) as one of the earliest means of China’s public diplomacy, this article aims to make a comparative review of establishing processes of CIs and examines features of the CI program, functions of the CI networking, and perceptions of the youth of host universities and local societies. Based on the empirical surveys, this article argues that China’s public diplomacy through CIs in the ASEAN countries is an institutional building process to develop young human resources with Mandarin proficiency, to promote business relations, and to disseminate China’s official ideas through CIs’ public forums to the extent that the CIs’ network has been utilized to promote the conceptual synergy of “One Belt One Road” “Maritime Silk Road in the 21st Century” with ASEAN Connectivity. In conclusion, this article argues that due to a wide gap particularly in terms of social pluralism and open access to multiple sources of information in the region, the rapid growth of China’s public diplomacy through CIs will have a double-edged effect, conducive to promoting relations with China and a centrifugal force to the ASEAN Centrality in the decade to come.","PeriodicalId":37218,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Contemporary East Asia Studies","volume":"7 1","pages":"124 - 148"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/24761028.2018.1553227","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47987298","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-07-03DOI: 10.1080/24761028.2018.1564615
H. Ohashi
ABSTRACT [Background]: China’s economy currently shifts its development pattern from investment/export-led to consumption/domestic demand-led growth. In a new stage of domestic-oriented development, what role is expected of China’s opening-up policy? It is no longer just a means to obtain foreign currency and technology but for China as an economic superpower to enhance its role in global governance. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) proposed by General Secretary Xi Jinping in 2013 is regarded as a new grand strategy in a new stage of China’s opening-up policy. [Purpose]: This article attempts to position the BRI in China’s opening-up policy focusing on its growing role in global governance of major international economic regimes. [Main Argument]: This article consists of three parts. The first part deals with China’s responses to major international economic regimes. The second part considers the purpose and development of the BRI from a viewpoint of China’s opening-up policy. The third part investigates into China’s development aid/finance in the BRI as a case study of its attitude toward an international regime of this kind. [Conclusions]: As far as the development aid/finance in the BRI is concerned, China’s behavior to form an economic area led by it is a new challenge to existing international economic regimes. As the largest beneficiary of free trade system, however, China does not seek for fundamental restructuring of current international economic regimes. It must be the most favorable scenario for China to taste the fruits of free trade system and to form its dominant economic area in the backyard.
{"title":"The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in the context of China’s opening-up policy","authors":"H. Ohashi","doi":"10.1080/24761028.2018.1564615","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/24761028.2018.1564615","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT [Background]: China’s economy currently shifts its development pattern from investment/export-led to consumption/domestic demand-led growth. In a new stage of domestic-oriented development, what role is expected of China’s opening-up policy? It is no longer just a means to obtain foreign currency and technology but for China as an economic superpower to enhance its role in global governance. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) proposed by General Secretary Xi Jinping in 2013 is regarded as a new grand strategy in a new stage of China’s opening-up policy. [Purpose]: This article attempts to position the BRI in China’s opening-up policy focusing on its growing role in global governance of major international economic regimes. [Main Argument]: This article consists of three parts. The first part deals with China’s responses to major international economic regimes. The second part considers the purpose and development of the BRI from a viewpoint of China’s opening-up policy. The third part investigates into China’s development aid/finance in the BRI as a case study of its attitude toward an international regime of this kind. [Conclusions]: As far as the development aid/finance in the BRI is concerned, China’s behavior to form an economic area led by it is a new challenge to existing international economic regimes. As the largest beneficiary of free trade system, however, China does not seek for fundamental restructuring of current international economic regimes. It must be the most favorable scenario for China to taste the fruits of free trade system and to form its dominant economic area in the backyard.","PeriodicalId":37218,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Contemporary East Asia Studies","volume":"7 1","pages":"103 - 85"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/24761028.2018.1564615","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45612764","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-07-03DOI: 10.1080/24761028.2018.1552491
Patrycja Pendrakowska
ABSTRACT The idea of Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) became a central project for Chinese foreign policy and a crucial tool shaping China’s global external policies. Since president Xi Jinping announced this initiative in autumn 2013 in Astana, BRI has gained international attention and remarkably influenced the international discourse on China’s policy. In Poland, this Chinese-born initiative was predominantly interpreted as an economic and political program based on infrastructural projects that mostly include new railway connections and maritime routes. Secondly, it was perceived as an initiative dealing with production surplus of China, as well as Beijing’s plan to open its doors wider toward the world. Thirdly, it was regarded as a geopolitical concept aiming at changing the global order. There is no clear answer to the question regarding how Poland perceives the BRI and what the state government plans to achieve with participating in the project. Part of the political scene regards BRI as a threat, the other part as an opportunity. Optimism has reached peak during president’s Xi Jinping visit to Poland in June 2016 and turned into skepticism in January 2017, when previous Polish Minister of National Defense Antoni Macierewicz decided to block the sale of a parcel for a logistic hub that meant to be part of BRI. In the end, it seems that Poland is guided by a strategy of wait-and-see, especially when presenting BRI as a global challenge, rather than elaborating a comprehensive participatory program in the initiative.
{"title":"Poland’s perspective on the Belt and Road Initiative","authors":"Patrycja Pendrakowska","doi":"10.1080/24761028.2018.1552491","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/24761028.2018.1552491","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The idea of Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) became a central project for Chinese foreign policy and a crucial tool shaping China’s global external policies. Since president Xi Jinping announced this initiative in autumn 2013 in Astana, BRI has gained international attention and remarkably influenced the international discourse on China’s policy. In Poland, this Chinese-born initiative was predominantly interpreted as an economic and political program based on infrastructural projects that mostly include new railway connections and maritime routes. Secondly, it was perceived as an initiative dealing with production surplus of China, as well as Beijing’s plan to open its doors wider toward the world. Thirdly, it was regarded as a geopolitical concept aiming at changing the global order. There is no clear answer to the question regarding how Poland perceives the BRI and what the state government plans to achieve with participating in the project. Part of the political scene regards BRI as a threat, the other part as an opportunity. Optimism has reached peak during president’s Xi Jinping visit to Poland in June 2016 and turned into skepticism in January 2017, when previous Polish Minister of National Defense Antoni Macierewicz decided to block the sale of a parcel for a logistic hub that meant to be part of BRI. In the end, it seems that Poland is guided by a strategy of wait-and-see, especially when presenting BRI as a global challenge, rather than elaborating a comprehensive participatory program in the initiative.","PeriodicalId":37218,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Contemporary East Asia Studies","volume":"7 1","pages":"190 - 206"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/24761028.2018.1552491","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47059608","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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