Pub Date : 2023-01-01DOI: 10.1177/20531680231153080
Li Zheng, Weiwen Yin
In this paper, we introduce the causal forests method (Athey et al., 2019) and illustrate how to apply it in social sciences to addressing treatment effect heterogeneity. Compared with existing parametric methods such as the multiplicative interaction model and traditional semi-/non-parametric estimation, causal forests are more flexible for complex data generating processes. Specifically, causal forests allow for nonparametric estimation and inference on heterogeneous treatment effects in the presence of many moderators. To reveal its usefulness, we revisit existing studies in political science and economics. We uncover new information hidden by original estimation strategies while producing findings that are consistent with conventional methods. Through these replication efforts, we provide a step-by-step practice guide for applying causal forests in evaluating treatment effect heterogeneity.
在本文中，我们介绍了因果森林方法(Athey et al.， 2019)，并说明了如何将其应用于社会科学，以解决治疗效果的异质性。与现有的参数方法(如乘法交互模型和传统的半/非参数估计)相比，因果森林在复杂的数据生成过程中具有更大的灵活性。具体来说，因果森林允许在存在许多调节因子的情况下对异质性治疗效果进行非参数估计和推断。为了揭示它的有用性，我们回顾了政治学和经济学的现有研究。我们发现了隐藏在原始估计策略中的新信息，同时产生了与传统方法一致的发现。通过这些复制工作，我们为应用因果森林评估治疗效果异质性提供了一步一步的实践指南。
{"title":"Estimating and evaluating treatment effect heterogeneity: A causal forests approach","authors":"Li Zheng, Weiwen Yin","doi":"10.1177/20531680231153080","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/20531680231153080","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, we introduce the causal forests method (Athey et al., 2019) and illustrate how to apply it in social sciences to addressing treatment effect heterogeneity. Compared with existing parametric methods such as the multiplicative interaction model and traditional semi-/non-parametric estimation, causal forests are more flexible for complex data generating processes. Specifically, causal forests allow for nonparametric estimation and inference on heterogeneous treatment effects in the presence of many moderators. To reveal its usefulness, we revisit existing studies in political science and economics. We uncover new information hidden by original estimation strategies while producing findings that are consistent with conventional methods. Through these replication efforts, we provide a step-by-step practice guide for applying causal forests in evaluating treatment effect heterogeneity.","PeriodicalId":37327,"journal":{"name":"Research and Politics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.7,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47033551","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-01DOI: 10.1177/20531680231159074
William Minozzi, Jonathan Woon
“Electability” received considerable attention during the 2020 Democratic primary campaign, with some critics claiming that the term was code for sexism. From a rational choice perspective, “electability” could affect voting in multiple ways, including via expected utility; previous scholarship suggests that many voters consider it as such. Yet this scholarship ignores the role that salience plays in decision making, and is silent on which sorts of candidate might benefit from the effects of priming electability. To address these issues, we conducted a survey experiment during the 2020 primary season, measuring Democratic primary voters’ preferences for candidates, electability estimates, and candidate rankings. Our experiment manipulated salience by randomizing the order in which preferences and electability were elicited. We show that electability salience caused a substantial increase in the probability that a respondent made decisions based only on electability.
{"title":"Electability salience can bias voting decisions","authors":"William Minozzi, Jonathan Woon","doi":"10.1177/20531680231159074","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/20531680231159074","url":null,"abstract":"“Electability” received considerable attention during the 2020 Democratic primary campaign, with some critics claiming that the term was code for sexism. From a rational choice perspective, “electability” could affect voting in multiple ways, including via expected utility; previous scholarship suggests that many voters consider it as such. Yet this scholarship ignores the role that salience plays in decision making, and is silent on which sorts of candidate might benefit from the effects of priming electability. To address these issues, we conducted a survey experiment during the 2020 primary season, measuring Democratic primary voters’ preferences for candidates, electability estimates, and candidate rankings. Our experiment manipulated salience by randomizing the order in which preferences and electability were elicited. We show that electability salience caused a substantial increase in the probability that a respondent made decisions based only on electability.","PeriodicalId":37327,"journal":{"name":"Research and Politics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.7,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48356737","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-01DOI: 10.1177/20531680221150389
D. Freire, David B. Skarbek
Why do people support extrajudicial violence? In two survey experiments with respondents in Brazil, we examine which characteristics of lynching scenarios garner greater support for lynching and whether providing different types of information about lynching reduces support for it. We find that people often do support community members to take vengeance. In particular, our analysis finds that people strongly support the use of extrajudicial violence by families of victims against men who sexually assault and murder women and children. We also find that criminal punishment and the threat of vendettas reduce support, but appeals to the human rights of victims have zero effect on support for lynchings. Unlike the U.S. experience with lynchings, race was not observed to play an important role in how respondents answered the survey.
{"title":"Vigilantism and Institutions: Understanding Attitudes toward Lynching in Brazil","authors":"D. Freire, David B. Skarbek","doi":"10.1177/20531680221150389","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/20531680221150389","url":null,"abstract":"Why do people support extrajudicial violence? In two survey experiments with respondents in Brazil, we examine which characteristics of lynching scenarios garner greater support for lynching and whether providing different types of information about lynching reduces support for it. We find that people often do support community members to take vengeance. In particular, our analysis finds that people strongly support the use of extrajudicial violence by families of victims against men who sexually assault and murder women and children. We also find that criminal punishment and the threat of vendettas reduce support, but appeals to the human rights of victims have zero effect on support for lynchings. Unlike the U.S. experience with lynchings, race was not observed to play an important role in how respondents answered the survey.","PeriodicalId":37327,"journal":{"name":"Research and Politics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.7,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44531886","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-01DOI: 10.1177/20531680231152424
J. Hardy
The resurgence of Right-Wing Extremism (RWE) has become a cause for concern in Western countries during the 21st century. An increase in white nationalist sentiment in recent years has provided impetus to understand the contemporary drivers of far-right ideology. This study examines in-group and out-group debates on Stormfront.org, which is the largest and oldest online community dedicated to white nationalism and extreme right-wing political views. It used a dataset of approximately 1m posts collected from the open Opposing Views forum on Stormfront from the period 2001 to 2020 to create a corpus of over 195m words for thematic analysis. A Natural Language Processing (NLP) model was used to analyze the corpus, and a supervised phrase mining algorithm was used to identify key topics in the debate. The study finds that key issues being debated between in-group and out-group members of the Stormfront online community relate to perceptions of white identity, African American identity, racial issues, conservative political issues, and the history and politics of the United States. These findings highlight the issues of mutual importance to in-group and out-group members and identify opportunities for further research into the ideology of online RWE communities.
{"title":"Thematic analysis of in-group and out-group debates in an online right-wing extremist community","authors":"J. Hardy","doi":"10.1177/20531680231152424","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/20531680231152424","url":null,"abstract":"The resurgence of Right-Wing Extremism (RWE) has become a cause for concern in Western countries during the 21st century. An increase in white nationalist sentiment in recent years has provided impetus to understand the contemporary drivers of far-right ideology. This study examines in-group and out-group debates on Stormfront.org, which is the largest and oldest online community dedicated to white nationalism and extreme right-wing political views. It used a dataset of approximately 1m posts collected from the open Opposing Views forum on Stormfront from the period 2001 to 2020 to create a corpus of over 195m words for thematic analysis. A Natural Language Processing (NLP) model was used to analyze the corpus, and a supervised phrase mining algorithm was used to identify key topics in the debate. The study finds that key issues being debated between in-group and out-group members of the Stormfront online community relate to perceptions of white identity, African American identity, racial issues, conservative political issues, and the history and politics of the United States. These findings highlight the issues of mutual importance to in-group and out-group members and identify opportunities for further research into the ideology of online RWE communities.","PeriodicalId":37327,"journal":{"name":"Research and Politics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.7,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41784271","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-01DOI: 10.1177/20531680231155615
Camilo Nieto-Matiz, Natán Skigin
Extensive research suggests that electoral competition and power alternations increase violence in weakly institutionalized democracies. Yet, little is known about how political parties affect violence and security. We theorize that the type of party strengthened in elections shapes security outcomes and argue that the rise of programmatic parties, at the expense of clientelistic parties, can significantly reduce violence. In contexts of large-scale criminal violence, programmatic parties are less likely to establish alliances with coercive actors because they possess fewer incentives and greater coordination capacity. Focusing on Brazil, we use a regression discontinuity design that leverages the as-if random assignment of election winners across three rounds of mayoral races. We find that violent crime decreased in municipalities where programmatic parties won coin-flip elections, while it increased in those where clientelistic parties triumphed. Our findings suggest that whether electoral competition increases violence depends on the type of party that wins elections.
{"title":"Why programmatic parties reduce criminal violence: Theory and evidence from Brazil","authors":"Camilo Nieto-Matiz, Natán Skigin","doi":"10.1177/20531680231155615","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/20531680231155615","url":null,"abstract":"Extensive research suggests that electoral competition and power alternations increase violence in weakly institutionalized democracies. Yet, little is known about how political parties affect violence and security. We theorize that the type of party strengthened in elections shapes security outcomes and argue that the rise of programmatic parties, at the expense of clientelistic parties, can significantly reduce violence. In contexts of large-scale criminal violence, programmatic parties are less likely to establish alliances with coercive actors because they possess fewer incentives and greater coordination capacity. Focusing on Brazil, we use a regression discontinuity design that leverages the as-if random assignment of election winners across three rounds of mayoral races. We find that violent crime decreased in municipalities where programmatic parties won coin-flip elections, while it increased in those where clientelistic parties triumphed. Our findings suggest that whether electoral competition increases violence depends on the type of party that wins elections.","PeriodicalId":37327,"journal":{"name":"Research and Politics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.7,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42990789","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-01DOI: 10.1177/20531680221134200
Y. Horiuchi, Yoshikuni Ono
Previous studies have shown that people oppose refugee resettlement more strongly after being exposed to frames that depict refugees as threatening. However, all people may not perceive such threats the same way. Based on contact theory, we hypothesize that the treatment effects of threatening frames on people’s opposition to refugee resettlement are conditional on their contact experience with foreign-national residents. The results of our pre-registered experiment in Japan indicate that exposure to threatening information does not change attitudes toward refugee resettlement among those living in municipalities where the number of foreign-national residents is rapidly increasing. Combined with the analyses of other subjective measures of contact with foreigners, some suggestive patterns emerge that natives with conscious and positive interactions with outgroup members may be unaffected by anti-refugee rhetoric and threatening frames.
{"title":"Social contact and attitudes toward outsiders: The case of Japan","authors":"Y. Horiuchi, Yoshikuni Ono","doi":"10.1177/20531680221134200","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/20531680221134200","url":null,"abstract":"Previous studies have shown that people oppose refugee resettlement more strongly after being exposed to frames that depict refugees as threatening. However, all people may not perceive such threats the same way. Based on contact theory, we hypothesize that the treatment effects of threatening frames on people’s opposition to refugee resettlement are conditional on their contact experience with foreign-national residents. The results of our pre-registered experiment in Japan indicate that exposure to threatening information does not change attitudes toward refugee resettlement among those living in municipalities where the number of foreign-national residents is rapidly increasing. Combined with the analyses of other subjective measures of contact with foreigners, some suggestive patterns emerge that natives with conscious and positive interactions with outgroup members may be unaffected by anti-refugee rhetoric and threatening frames.","PeriodicalId":37327,"journal":{"name":"Research and Politics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.7,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45950388","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-01DOI: 10.1177/20531680221144237
P. Bauer, Alejandro Ecker, Michael Imre, Camille Landesvatter, Sonja Malich
Twitter has become one of the primary platforms for politicians to interact with the public. Consequently, research into politicians’ Twitter usage has proliferated with attempts at measuring increasingly complex concepts such as ideology or policy attitudes. So far, many of these studies either implicitly or explicitly assume that politicians’ Twitter accounts are operated by politicians themselves and that politicians are free to present their “true” attitudes and positions. We conducted an elite survey in Germany and present evidence that these assumptions only partially hold true. In our sample, only around a third of Twitter accounts are operated by the corresponding politician alone. In our view, this is a conservative estimate and should further decrease as political elites’ social media strategies professionalize over the coming years. We also find that most politicians state that there are no party guidelines regarding Twitter and that their tweets are not checked by a central authority in the party. We discuss the implications of our findings for research on social media in general.
{"title":"Who tweets, and how freely? Evidence from an elite survey among German politicians","authors":"P. Bauer, Alejandro Ecker, Michael Imre, Camille Landesvatter, Sonja Malich","doi":"10.1177/20531680221144237","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/20531680221144237","url":null,"abstract":"Twitter has become one of the primary platforms for politicians to interact with the public. Consequently, research into politicians’ Twitter usage has proliferated with attempts at measuring increasingly complex concepts such as ideology or policy attitudes. So far, many of these studies either implicitly or explicitly assume that politicians’ Twitter accounts are operated by politicians themselves and that politicians are free to present their “true” attitudes and positions. We conducted an elite survey in Germany and present evidence that these assumptions only partially hold true. In our sample, only around a third of Twitter accounts are operated by the corresponding politician alone. In our view, this is a conservative estimate and should further decrease as political elites’ social media strategies professionalize over the coming years. We also find that most politicians state that there are no party guidelines regarding Twitter and that their tweets are not checked by a central authority in the party. We discuss the implications of our findings for research on social media in general.","PeriodicalId":37327,"journal":{"name":"Research and Politics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.7,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43768583","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-01DOI: 10.1177/20531680231161161
Sarah Brierley, Miguel M. Pereira
More women in public institutions are correlated with lower levels of corruption. However, this relationship is thought to be context specific, and the mechanisms that underlie it remain unclear. We conduct two survey experiments to investigate whether and why end-users expect women bureaucrats to be less corrupt in Ghana. Our results show that citizens do not expect women bureaucrats to be less likely to solicit bribes than men. This result holds across bureaucrats with different levels of experience in the public sector and respondents who have and have not paid a bribe. Our second experiment shows that citizens expect men and women bureaucrats to distribute equal shares of their salaries with their extended families. We argue that equality in financial pressures explains why bribe-taking rates may be similar across genders. Our results cast doubt on the idea that women bureaucrats will reduce petty corruption in countries where corruption is pervasive.
{"title":"Women bureaucrats and petty corruption. Experimental evidence from Ghana","authors":"Sarah Brierley, Miguel M. Pereira","doi":"10.1177/20531680231161161","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/20531680231161161","url":null,"abstract":"More women in public institutions are correlated with lower levels of corruption. However, this relationship is thought to be context specific, and the mechanisms that underlie it remain unclear. We conduct two survey experiments to investigate whether and why end-users expect women bureaucrats to be less corrupt in Ghana. Our results show that citizens do not expect women bureaucrats to be less likely to solicit bribes than men. This result holds across bureaucrats with different levels of experience in the public sector and respondents who have and have not paid a bribe. Our second experiment shows that citizens expect men and women bureaucrats to distribute equal shares of their salaries with their extended families. We argue that equality in financial pressures explains why bribe-taking rates may be similar across genders. Our results cast doubt on the idea that women bureaucrats will reduce petty corruption in countries where corruption is pervasive.","PeriodicalId":37327,"journal":{"name":"Research and Politics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.7,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46633545","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-01DOI: 10.1177/20531680221148967
Katherine Clayton, Robb Willer
Since the 2020 U.S. presidential election, perceptions of the validity of the outcome and broader trust in the American electoral process have reached historically low levels among Republicans. While this trend has potentially harmful consequences for democratic stability, there is little research on how beliefs that an election was fair—and trust in the electoral process more generally—can be restored. In a preregistered survey experiment (n = 2101), we find that viewing real messages from Republican politicians defending the legitimacy of the 2020 election increased faith in the election’s outcome and in the broader electoral process among Republican voters, compared to either a neutral control condition or to comparable messages from Democratic politicians. These effects are statistically mediated by shifts in voters’ perceptions of elite Republican opinion about the 2020 election, highlighting a potentially useful intervention for efforts to restore faith in elections going forward. Notably, exposure to messages from Republican politicians affirming the election’s legitimacy did not significantly decrease support for the Republican Party, suggesting that Republican politicians who endorse the 2020 election results might not face backlash from voters.
{"title":"Endorsements from Republican politicians can increase confidence in U.S. elections","authors":"Katherine Clayton, Robb Willer","doi":"10.1177/20531680221148967","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/20531680221148967","url":null,"abstract":"Since the 2020 U.S. presidential election, perceptions of the validity of the outcome and broader trust in the American electoral process have reached historically low levels among Republicans. While this trend has potentially harmful consequences for democratic stability, there is little research on how beliefs that an election was fair—and trust in the electoral process more generally—can be restored. In a preregistered survey experiment (n = 2101), we find that viewing real messages from Republican politicians defending the legitimacy of the 2020 election increased faith in the election’s outcome and in the broader electoral process among Republican voters, compared to either a neutral control condition or to comparable messages from Democratic politicians. These effects are statistically mediated by shifts in voters’ perceptions of elite Republican opinion about the 2020 election, highlighting a potentially useful intervention for efforts to restore faith in elections going forward. Notably, exposure to messages from Republican politicians affirming the election’s legitimacy did not significantly decrease support for the Republican Party, suggesting that Republican politicians who endorse the 2020 election results might not face backlash from voters.","PeriodicalId":37327,"journal":{"name":"Research and Politics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.7,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47248513","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-01DOI: 10.1177/20531680231152421
Joshua Hochberg, Eitan Hersh
Who do people think are influential in their own community? This question is important for understanding topics such as social networks, political party networks, civic engagement, and local politics. At the same time as research on these topics has grown, measurement of public perceptions of local influence has dried up. Years ago, researchers took active interest in the question of community influence. They found that most ordinary Americans could identify a person who they thought had influence in their community. Respondents usually named business leaders. Where does the public stand today? In three different ways, we ask respondents who has local influence. The vast majority of respondents today cannot think of anyone. Those who do identify someone as influential rarely choose a businessperson. This article aims to reintroduce the public opinion of community influence and situate findings in related scholarship.
{"title":"Public perceptions of local influence","authors":"Joshua Hochberg, Eitan Hersh","doi":"10.1177/20531680231152421","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/20531680231152421","url":null,"abstract":"Who do people think are influential in their own community? This question is important for understanding topics such as social networks, political party networks, civic engagement, and local politics. At the same time as research on these topics has grown, measurement of public perceptions of local influence has dried up. Years ago, researchers took active interest in the question of community influence. They found that most ordinary Americans could identify a person who they thought had influence in their community. Respondents usually named business leaders. Where does the public stand today? In three different ways, we ask respondents who has local influence. The vast majority of respondents today cannot think of anyone. Those who do identify someone as influential rarely choose a businessperson. This article aims to reintroduce the public opinion of community influence and situate findings in related scholarship.","PeriodicalId":37327,"journal":{"name":"Research and Politics","volume":"10 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.7,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"65485899","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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