Pub Date : 2022-04-01DOI: 10.1177/20531680221096049
Amber Wichowsky, Meghan Condon
Political polarization has dominated news coverage of Americans’ responses to the COVID-19 pandemic. In this research note, we report findings from two experimental studies, in which we present respondents with news stories about COVID-19 mitigation measures that emphasize partisan difference or accord. The stories present the same numeric facts about public opinion, but highlight either the partisan gap that existed at the time of the study, or the fact that large majorities of both Republicans and Democrats supported the measures at the time. Results from our first study, conducted late April 2020, show that a media frame drawing attention to shared concern across party lines produced a less polarized response to social-distancing restrictions than a frame that drew attention to partisan difference. Our findings suggest that the extensive media coverage about the red-blue divide in COVID-19 opinions reinforced partisan polarization. These results, however, did not replicate in a second study conducted much later in the pandemic. Qualitative data collected across the two studies demonstrate the degree to which polarization had rapidly become a dominant narrative in Americans’ thinking about COVID-19.
{"title":"The effects of partisan framing on COVID-19 attitudes: Experimental evidence from early and late pandemic","authors":"Amber Wichowsky, Meghan Condon","doi":"10.1177/20531680221096049","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/20531680221096049","url":null,"abstract":"Political polarization has dominated news coverage of Americans’ responses to the COVID-19 pandemic. In this research note, we report findings from two experimental studies, in which we present respondents with news stories about COVID-19 mitigation measures that emphasize partisan difference or accord. The stories present the same numeric facts about public opinion, but highlight either the partisan gap that existed at the time of the study, or the fact that large majorities of both Republicans and Democrats supported the measures at the time. Results from our first study, conducted late April 2020, show that a media frame drawing attention to shared concern across party lines produced a less polarized response to social-distancing restrictions than a frame that drew attention to partisan difference. Our findings suggest that the extensive media coverage about the red-blue divide in COVID-19 opinions reinforced partisan polarization. These results, however, did not replicate in a second study conducted much later in the pandemic. Qualitative data collected across the two studies demonstrate the degree to which polarization had rapidly become a dominant narrative in Americans’ thinking about COVID-19.","PeriodicalId":37327,"journal":{"name":"Research and Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.7,"publicationDate":"2022-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42001043","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-04-01DOI: 10.1177/20531680221103809
K. Reuning, Anne Whitesell, A. Hannah
In this research note we document changes to the rate of comments, shares, and reactions on local Republican Facebook pages. Near the end of 2018, local Republican parties started to see a much higher degree of interactions on their posts compared to local Democratic parties. We show how this increase in engagement was unique to Facebook and happened across a range of over a thousand local parties. In addition, we use a changepoint model to identify when the change happened and find it lines up with reported information about the change in Facebook’s algorithm in 2018. We conclude that it seems possible that changes in how Facebook rated content led to a doubling of the total shares of local Republican party posts compared to local Democratic party posts in the first half of 2019 even though Democratic parties posted more often during this period. Regardless of Facebook’s motivations, their decision to change the algorithm might have given local Republican parties greater reach to connect with citizens and shape political realities for Americans. The fact that private companies can so easily control the political information flow for millions of Americans raises clear questions for the state of democracy.
{"title":"Facebook algorithm changes may have amplified local republican parties","authors":"K. Reuning, Anne Whitesell, A. Hannah","doi":"10.1177/20531680221103809","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/20531680221103809","url":null,"abstract":"In this research note we document changes to the rate of comments, shares, and reactions on local Republican Facebook pages. Near the end of 2018, local Republican parties started to see a much higher degree of interactions on their posts compared to local Democratic parties. We show how this increase in engagement was unique to Facebook and happened across a range of over a thousand local parties. In addition, we use a changepoint model to identify when the change happened and find it lines up with reported information about the change in Facebook’s algorithm in 2018. We conclude that it seems possible that changes in how Facebook rated content led to a doubling of the total shares of local Republican party posts compared to local Democratic party posts in the first half of 2019 even though Democratic parties posted more often during this period. Regardless of Facebook’s motivations, their decision to change the algorithm might have given local Republican parties greater reach to connect with citizens and shape political realities for Americans. The fact that private companies can so easily control the political information flow for millions of Americans raises clear questions for the state of democracy.","PeriodicalId":37327,"journal":{"name":"Research and Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.7,"publicationDate":"2022-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"65485845","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-01DOI: 10.1177/20531680221083802
Evan Crawford
To what extent does the public prefer local government officials to be selected via nonpartisan, as opposed to partisan, elections? Do preferences vary across different types of local offices? Do Democrats and Republicans systematically differ in their preference for nonpartisan versus partisan local elections? Using a novel dataset based on the 2018 and 2020 CES, I find that while nonpartisan elections are the modal preference for local offices, the proportion of voters favoring this model varies with office-type, party ID, and whether respondents live in counties with a majority of their co-partisans. Specifically, Democrats are more likely to prefer nonpartisan elections for local offices than are Republicans, but there is only evidence for these inter-party differences in Republican-leaning counties. County partisanship also has a significant effect on intra-party variation in preference for nonpartisan elections to certain local offices.
{"title":"Who prefers nonpartisan elections? The role of individual party ID and county partisanship","authors":"Evan Crawford","doi":"10.1177/20531680221083802","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/20531680221083802","url":null,"abstract":"To what extent does the public prefer local government officials to be selected via nonpartisan, as opposed to partisan, elections? Do preferences vary across different types of local offices? Do Democrats and Republicans systematically differ in their preference for nonpartisan versus partisan local elections? Using a novel dataset based on the 2018 and 2020 CES, I find that while nonpartisan elections are the modal preference for local offices, the proportion of voters favoring this model varies with office-type, party ID, and whether respondents live in counties with a majority of their co-partisans. Specifically, Democrats are more likely to prefer nonpartisan elections for local offices than are Republicans, but there is only evidence for these inter-party differences in Republican-leaning counties. County partisanship also has a significant effect on intra-party variation in preference for nonpartisan elections to certain local offices.","PeriodicalId":37327,"journal":{"name":"Research and Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.7,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44455523","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-01DOI: 10.1177/20531680221076901
A. Coppock, D. Green, Ethan Porter
Despite the increasing sums devoted to online political advertising, our understanding of the persuasive effects of such advertising is limited. We report the results of a ZIP code level randomized field experiment conducted over Facebook and Instagram during the 2018 U.S. midterm elections in Florida. The ads, produced by a Democratic-leaning political action committee, were designed to spur Democratic vote share and were seen more than 1.1 million times with over 100,000 full views. This wide saturation notwithstanding, we find that these advertisements had very small estimated effects on Democratic vote share at the precinct level (−0.04 percentage points, SE: 0.85 points). Our results underline the challenges of political persuasion via digital advertisements, particularly in competitive electoral contexts.
{"title":"Does digital advertising affect vote choice? Evidence from a randomized field experiment","authors":"A. Coppock, D. Green, Ethan Porter","doi":"10.1177/20531680221076901","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/20531680221076901","url":null,"abstract":"Despite the increasing sums devoted to online political advertising, our understanding of the persuasive effects of such advertising is limited. We report the results of a ZIP code level randomized field experiment conducted over Facebook and Instagram during the 2018 U.S. midterm elections in Florida. The ads, produced by a Democratic-leaning political action committee, were designed to spur Democratic vote share and were seen more than 1.1 million times with over 100,000 full views. This wide saturation notwithstanding, we find that these advertisements had very small estimated effects on Democratic vote share at the precinct level (−0.04 percentage points, SE: 0.85 points). Our results underline the challenges of political persuasion via digital advertisements, particularly in competitive electoral contexts.","PeriodicalId":37327,"journal":{"name":"Research and Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.7,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46459504","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-01DOI: 10.1177/20531680221076246
H. Choi, Jiyoun Park
Why do some aid projects in conflict environments improve the welfare of local communities and reduce insurgent violence, whereas other projects place them in greater danger? This study investigates this question by testing the effects of aid projects on the intensity of civil war using subnational data on violence and service provision in Myanmar (2012–2020). We find that small-scale, cash-based aid projects significantly reduce battlefield violence at the township level, and the effects of such projects are larger than those of other projects aimed at reducing violence (e.g., peacebuilding). These results provide support for recent counterinsurgency theories, which argue that smaller projects can reduce violence by motivating civilians to share information about rebels with the government (or pro-government) forces. This analysis offers a unique insight into the way cash-based services, though small and relatively inexpensive, can foster stability in conflict zones and save more lives.
{"title":"Cash-based aid and civil war violence: New evidence from Myanmar (2012–2020)","authors":"H. Choi, Jiyoun Park","doi":"10.1177/20531680221076246","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/20531680221076246","url":null,"abstract":"Why do some aid projects in conflict environments improve the welfare of local communities and reduce insurgent violence, whereas other projects place them in greater danger? This study investigates this question by testing the effects of aid projects on the intensity of civil war using subnational data on violence and service provision in Myanmar (2012–2020). We find that small-scale, cash-based aid projects significantly reduce battlefield violence at the township level, and the effects of such projects are larger than those of other projects aimed at reducing violence (e.g., peacebuilding). These results provide support for recent counterinsurgency theories, which argue that smaller projects can reduce violence by motivating civilians to share information about rebels with the government (or pro-government) forces. This analysis offers a unique insight into the way cash-based services, though small and relatively inexpensive, can foster stability in conflict zones and save more lives.","PeriodicalId":37327,"journal":{"name":"Research and Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.7,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41270254","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-01DOI: 10.1177/20531680211062772
Sabine C. Carey, Neil J. Mitchell, Katrin Paula
This article presents version 2.0 of the Pro-Government Militias Database (PGMD). It is increasingly clear that it is untenable to assume a unified security sector, as states often rely on militias to carry out security tasks. The PGMD 2.0 provides new opportunities for studying questions such as when states rely on militias, how they chose among different types and the consequences for stability and peace. We detail how the PGMD 2.0 provides new information on the characteristics, behaviour, life cycle and organization of 504 pro-government militias across the globe between 1981 and 2014.
{"title":"The life, death and diversity of pro-government militias: The fully revised pro-government militias database version 2.0","authors":"Sabine C. Carey, Neil J. Mitchell, Katrin Paula","doi":"10.1177/20531680211062772","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/20531680211062772","url":null,"abstract":"This article presents version 2.0 of the Pro-Government Militias Database (PGMD). It is increasingly clear that it is untenable to assume a unified security sector, as states often rely on militias to carry out security tasks. The PGMD 2.0 provides new opportunities for studying questions such as when states rely on militias, how they chose among different types and the consequences for stability and peace. We detail how the PGMD 2.0 provides new information on the characteristics, behaviour, life cycle and organization of 504 pro-government militias across the globe between 1981 and 2014.","PeriodicalId":37327,"journal":{"name":"Research and Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.7,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42928297","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-01DOI: 10.1177/20531680221083535
J. Cortina, Brandon Rottinghaus
Political knowledge is the cornerstone of a functional representative democracy, but belief in conspiracy theories disrupts that connection and may be dangerous with consequences for democracy. Pundits and politicians have speculated about the cause and effect of misinformation and conspiracy theories, but no work has examined what causes beliefs in conspiracy theories or misinformation among Latinos specifically. In a unique survey of Texas Latinos prior to the 2020 election, we find belief in conspiracy theories is most related to support for Donald Trump and greater reliance on Spanish-language media and social media. The results highlight how conspiratorial thinking manifests in specific ethnic groups and the need to counter those beliefs in Spanish-language media.
{"title":"Conspiratorial thinking in the Latino community on the 2020 election","authors":"J. Cortina, Brandon Rottinghaus","doi":"10.1177/20531680221083535","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/20531680221083535","url":null,"abstract":"Political knowledge is the cornerstone of a functional representative democracy, but belief in conspiracy theories disrupts that connection and may be dangerous with consequences for democracy. Pundits and politicians have speculated about the cause and effect of misinformation and conspiracy theories, but no work has examined what causes beliefs in conspiracy theories or misinformation among Latinos specifically. In a unique survey of Texas Latinos prior to the 2020 election, we find belief in conspiracy theories is most related to support for Donald Trump and greater reliance on Spanish-language media and social media. The results highlight how conspiratorial thinking manifests in specific ethnic groups and the need to counter those beliefs in Spanish-language media.","PeriodicalId":37327,"journal":{"name":"Research and Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.7,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47991145","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-01DOI: 10.1177/20531680221075455
Adam L. Ozer, Jamie M. Wright
The pervasiveness of partisan media and the 24/7 news cycle allow ample opportunity for partisan-motivated reasoning and selective exposure. Nonetheless, individuals still frequently encounter out-party media outlets and expert pundits through mainstream news and social media. We seek to examine the effects of cross-cutting partisan outlet cues (e.g. Fox News, MSNBC) and direct party cues (e.g. Republican, Democrat) on citizens’ perceptions of ideology, source credibility, and news consumption. Using an experiment that pits outlet cues against direct party cues, we find that cross-cutting outlet and direct party cues lead citizens to perceive pundits as more ideologically moderate. As a result, respondents find out-party pundits on in-party outlets to be less biased, increasing interest in the pundits’ perspectives. However, while cross-cutting pundits gain among the out-party, they lose among the in-party. This trade-off holds important normative implications for individual news consumption and the ability of outlets and pundits to appear unbiased while garnering the largest possible audience.
{"title":"Partisan news versus party cues: The effect of cross-cutting party and partisan network cues on polarization and persuasion","authors":"Adam L. Ozer, Jamie M. Wright","doi":"10.1177/20531680221075455","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/20531680221075455","url":null,"abstract":"The pervasiveness of partisan media and the 24/7 news cycle allow ample opportunity for partisan-motivated reasoning and selective exposure. Nonetheless, individuals still frequently encounter out-party media outlets and expert pundits through mainstream news and social media. We seek to examine the effects of cross-cutting partisan outlet cues (e.g. Fox News, MSNBC) and direct party cues (e.g. Republican, Democrat) on citizens’ perceptions of ideology, source credibility, and news consumption. Using an experiment that pits outlet cues against direct party cues, we find that cross-cutting outlet and direct party cues lead citizens to perceive pundits as more ideologically moderate. As a result, respondents find out-party pundits on in-party outlets to be less biased, increasing interest in the pundits’ perspectives. However, while cross-cutting pundits gain among the out-party, they lose among the in-party. This trade-off holds important normative implications for individual news consumption and the ability of outlets and pundits to appear unbiased while garnering the largest possible audience.","PeriodicalId":37327,"journal":{"name":"Research and Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.7,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48194948","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-01DOI: 10.1177/20531680211070344
Omer Zarpli, Hüseyin Zengin
Naming and shaming has been widely used by governments and non-governmental organizations to address human rights violations. Yet despite the prevalence of this foreign policy instrument, the question of when states publicly denounce norm-violators received relatively little scholarly attention. We examine this question in the context of China’s repression of its Uyghur minority. This case offers a unique opportunity to study not only when countries engage in naming and shaming but also when they explicitly defend or endorse rights violations. We analyze the official positions of 174 countries between 2019 and 2021. We find that while geopolitical alignment is a significant predictor of both shaming and defending, a nation’s strong trade links with China has a less straightforward effect. Similarly, while democracies are significantly less likely to defend China’s Uyghur policy, they are not more likely to denounce it. We also find that identity-related factors have a muted effect. The paper advances our understanding of a broader spectrum of government behavior vis-a-vis human rights violations in other countries, and has implications for the role of identity in inter-state shaming.
{"title":"Shame, endorse, or remain silent?: State response to human rights violations in other countries","authors":"Omer Zarpli, Hüseyin Zengin","doi":"10.1177/20531680211070344","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/20531680211070344","url":null,"abstract":"Naming and shaming has been widely used by governments and non-governmental organizations to address human rights violations. Yet despite the prevalence of this foreign policy instrument, the question of when states publicly denounce norm-violators received relatively little scholarly attention. We examine this question in the context of China’s repression of its Uyghur minority. This case offers a unique opportunity to study not only when countries engage in naming and shaming but also when they explicitly defend or endorse rights violations. We analyze the official positions of 174 countries between 2019 and 2021. We find that while geopolitical alignment is a significant predictor of both shaming and defending, a nation’s strong trade links with China has a less straightforward effect. Similarly, while democracies are significantly less likely to defend China’s Uyghur policy, they are not more likely to denounce it. We also find that identity-related factors have a muted effect. The paper advances our understanding of a broader spectrum of government behavior vis-a-vis human rights violations in other countries, and has implications for the role of identity in inter-state shaming.","PeriodicalId":37327,"journal":{"name":"Research and Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.7,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43731482","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-01DOI: 10.1177/20531680221083798
J. Ryan
The extent to which the policymaking process is majoritarian, rather than controlled by the majority party, is a fundamental question in U.S. congressional politics, and in collective choice institutions broadly. Previous research has examined whether some House rules empower the minority party to propose alternative legislation to the floor and circumvent the majority party’s agenda power. I argue the motion to instruct conferees allows the minority to influence policy during the conference process. Motions to instruct are the prerogative of the minority party, are frequently offered, and are frequently passed by the chamber. They substantially moderate conference bills as compared to those bills without a motion to instruct, suggesting that the procedure weakens majority party agenda power. Further, the minority may offer a motion to instruct intended to fail as a way of demonstrating policy extremity to voters, consistent with blame-game bargaining models.
{"title":"Motions to instruct conferees as a majoritarian tool in the U.S. house","authors":"J. Ryan","doi":"10.1177/20531680221083798","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/20531680221083798","url":null,"abstract":"The extent to which the policymaking process is majoritarian, rather than controlled by the majority party, is a fundamental question in U.S. congressional politics, and in collective choice institutions broadly. Previous research has examined whether some House rules empower the minority party to propose alternative legislation to the floor and circumvent the majority party’s agenda power. I argue the motion to instruct conferees allows the minority to influence policy during the conference process. Motions to instruct are the prerogative of the minority party, are frequently offered, and are frequently passed by the chamber. They substantially moderate conference bills as compared to those bills without a motion to instruct, suggesting that the procedure weakens majority party agenda power. Further, the minority may offer a motion to instruct intended to fail as a way of demonstrating policy extremity to voters, consistent with blame-game bargaining models.","PeriodicalId":37327,"journal":{"name":"Research and Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.7,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45965289","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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