Pub Date : 2022-04-01DOI: 10.1177/20531680221091439
A. Igarashi, Hirofumi Miwa, Yoshikuni Ono
Why do citizens prefer high-skilled immigrants to low-skilled immigrants? To understand the causal mechanism behind this tendency among citizens, we conducted a vignette survey experiment that enables us to clarify the role of multiple mediators. We specifically focused on three key factors that have been proposed in existing research as those that could lead citizens to welcome high-skilled immigrants: expectations of economic contribution, welfare contribution, and small crime potential. We found that the skill premium was fully eliminated when natives were informed that immigrants would be engaged in low-skill jobs in the host country, which underscores the essential role that post-migration work plays in the acceptance of immigrants by natives. Our findings provide suggestive evidence that natives welcome high-skilled immigrants simply because they expect economic benefits from high-skilled immigrants, not because they expect them to contribute to welfare or be less likely to commit crimes.
{"title":"Why do citizens prefer high-skilled immigrants to low-skilled immigrants? Identifying causal mechanisms of immigration preferences with a survey experiment","authors":"A. Igarashi, Hirofumi Miwa, Yoshikuni Ono","doi":"10.1177/20531680221091439","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/20531680221091439","url":null,"abstract":"Why do citizens prefer high-skilled immigrants to low-skilled immigrants? To understand the causal mechanism behind this tendency among citizens, we conducted a vignette survey experiment that enables us to clarify the role of multiple mediators. We specifically focused on three key factors that have been proposed in existing research as those that could lead citizens to welcome high-skilled immigrants: expectations of economic contribution, welfare contribution, and small crime potential. We found that the skill premium was fully eliminated when natives were informed that immigrants would be engaged in low-skill jobs in the host country, which underscores the essential role that post-migration work plays in the acceptance of immigrants by natives. Our findings provide suggestive evidence that natives welcome high-skilled immigrants simply because they expect economic benefits from high-skilled immigrants, not because they expect them to contribute to welfare or be less likely to commit crimes.","PeriodicalId":37327,"journal":{"name":"Research and Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.7,"publicationDate":"2022-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41268152","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-04-01DOI: 10.1177/20531680221107869
Ian G. Anson
Does epistemic confidence affect Americans’ willingness to defend misperceptions in the face of correction? Individuals with excessive confidence in their political knowledge are expected to resist the effects of corrective cues against political misperceptions. In this study, I assess the effects of confidence on skepticism towards five common political misperceptions in observational and experimental settings. In Study 1, I observationally assess the effects of epistemic confidence on resistance to corrective cues. In Study 2, I temper excessive confidence among a random subset of respondents using a specialized experimental treatment, before exposing them to a corrective cue. Together, the results show that corrections can reduce support for misperceptions among those with modest confidence. However, in the presence of excessive epistemic confidence, these treatments are ineffective. The present findings suggest that epistemic confidence complicates the work of fact-checkers and science communicators in modern democratic politics.
{"title":"Epistemic confidence conditions the effectiveness of corrective cues against political misperceptions","authors":"Ian G. Anson","doi":"10.1177/20531680221107869","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/20531680221107869","url":null,"abstract":"Does epistemic confidence affect Americans’ willingness to defend misperceptions in the face of correction? Individuals with excessive confidence in their political knowledge are expected to resist the effects of corrective cues against political misperceptions. In this study, I assess the effects of confidence on skepticism towards five common political misperceptions in observational and experimental settings. In Study 1, I observationally assess the effects of epistemic confidence on resistance to corrective cues. In Study 2, I temper excessive confidence among a random subset of respondents using a specialized experimental treatment, before exposing them to a corrective cue. Together, the results show that corrections can reduce support for misperceptions among those with modest confidence. However, in the presence of excessive epistemic confidence, these treatments are ineffective. The present findings suggest that epistemic confidence complicates the work of fact-checkers and science communicators in modern democratic politics.","PeriodicalId":37327,"journal":{"name":"Research and Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.7,"publicationDate":"2022-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49593440","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-04-01DOI: 10.1177/20531680221093440
Seth H. Werfel, C. Witko, Tobias Heinrich
Technology is expected to displace many workers in the future. The public generally supports government assistance for workers viewed as less responsible for their unemployment; thus, we ask whether individuals who lose their jobs to technology are perceived as less at fault and more deserving of government benefits, compared to those who lose their jobs to other workers. We conducted a survey experiment on a nationally representative sample in the United States, randomizing whether a hypothetical worker was replaced by technology, a foreign worker, or domestic worker, and asked questions about fault perception and support for unemployment benefits. We find that workers who lose jobs to technology (or foreign workers) are viewed as less at fault than those who lose jobs to domestic workers, and that fault attribution mediated support for unemployment benefits.
{"title":"Public support for assistance for workers displaced by technology","authors":"Seth H. Werfel, C. Witko, Tobias Heinrich","doi":"10.1177/20531680221093440","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/20531680221093440","url":null,"abstract":"Technology is expected to displace many workers in the future. The public generally supports government assistance for workers viewed as less responsible for their unemployment; thus, we ask whether individuals who lose their jobs to technology are perceived as less at fault and more deserving of government benefits, compared to those who lose their jobs to other workers. We conducted a survey experiment on a nationally representative sample in the United States, randomizing whether a hypothetical worker was replaced by technology, a foreign worker, or domestic worker, and asked questions about fault perception and support for unemployment benefits. We find that workers who lose jobs to technology (or foreign workers) are viewed as less at fault than those who lose jobs to domestic workers, and that fault attribution mediated support for unemployment benefits.","PeriodicalId":37327,"journal":{"name":"Research and Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.7,"publicationDate":"2022-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48635228","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-04-01DOI: 10.1177/20531680221100440
Rebecca Strauch, Nils B. Weidmann
Autocratic governments routinely interfere in digital communication technology for political purposes. However, citizens can use different technologies to bypass government interference. This article examines how political protest influences the use of anonymity-preserving digital services in autocracies. Citizens should be more likely to use these tools during high political tension because they fear governmental surveillance or censorship. The analysis combining data on the Tor anonymization network with protest event data demonstrates noticeable increases in Tor usage after days with many protest events but not days with single protest events.
{"title":"Protest and digital adaptation","authors":"Rebecca Strauch, Nils B. Weidmann","doi":"10.1177/20531680221100440","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/20531680221100440","url":null,"abstract":"Autocratic governments routinely interfere in digital communication technology for political purposes. However, citizens can use different technologies to bypass government interference. This article examines how political protest influences the use of anonymity-preserving digital services in autocracies. Citizens should be more likely to use these tools during high political tension because they fear governmental surveillance or censorship. The analysis combining data on the Tor anonymization network with protest event data demonstrates noticeable increases in Tor usage after days with many protest events but not days with single protest events.","PeriodicalId":37327,"journal":{"name":"Research and Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.7,"publicationDate":"2022-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41936352","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-04-01DOI: 10.1177/20531680221108328
P. Chapkovski, Max Schaub
Do individuals reveal their true preferences when asked for their support for an ongoing war? This research note presents the results of a list experiment implemented in the midst of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Our experiment allows us to estimate the extent of preference falsification with regard to support for the war by comparing the experimental results with a direct question. Our data comes from an online sample of 3000 Russians. Results show high levels of support for the war and significant levels of preference falsification: when asked directly, 71% of respondents support the war, while this share drops to 61% when using the list experiment. Preference falsification is particularly pronounced among individuals using TV as a main source of news. Our results imply that war leaders can pursue peace without fearing a large popular backlash, but also show that high levels of support for war can be sustained even once the brutality of the war has become clear.
{"title":"Solid support or secret dissent? A list experiment on preference falsification during the Russian war against Ukraine","authors":"P. Chapkovski, Max Schaub","doi":"10.1177/20531680221108328","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/20531680221108328","url":null,"abstract":"Do individuals reveal their true preferences when asked for their support for an ongoing war? This research note presents the results of a list experiment implemented in the midst of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Our experiment allows us to estimate the extent of preference falsification with regard to support for the war by comparing the experimental results with a direct question. Our data comes from an online sample of 3000 Russians. Results show high levels of support for the war and significant levels of preference falsification: when asked directly, 71% of respondents support the war, while this share drops to 61% when using the list experiment. Preference falsification is particularly pronounced among individuals using TV as a main source of news. Our results imply that war leaders can pursue peace without fearing a large popular backlash, but also show that high levels of support for war can be sustained even once the brutality of the war has become clear.","PeriodicalId":37327,"journal":{"name":"Research and Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.7,"publicationDate":"2022-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48748856","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-04-01DOI: 10.1177/20531680221093433
Paul Lushenko, Shyam Raman, S. Kreps
The use of armed drones has emerged as a principal counterterrorism tool for western militaries, especially France and the United States. While France submits its strikes to the United Nations for approval, the United States typically does not. Does this difference matter for public support and perceptions of legitimacy? To better understand these dynamics, we fielded original survey experiments across nationally representative samples in France and the United States totaling in over 1800 respondents. Our results reflect that international approval is associated with both higher public support and greater perceived legitimacy for a strike. Further, we find that respondents emphasize international law as the basis for support and legitimacy, suggesting a cross-national belief in multilateralism for normative rather than strictly instrumental reasons. These relationships are moderated by the identity of the country conducting a hypothetical strike, implying both an “othering” effect and the emergence of distinct models of strikes across countries that deserve more study amid the ongoing proliferation of armed drones. Video Abstract: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YevyaKThae0
{"title":"Multilateralism and public support for drone strikes","authors":"Paul Lushenko, Shyam Raman, S. Kreps","doi":"10.1177/20531680221093433","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/20531680221093433","url":null,"abstract":"The use of armed drones has emerged as a principal counterterrorism tool for western militaries, especially France and the United States. While France submits its strikes to the United Nations for approval, the United States typically does not. Does this difference matter for public support and perceptions of legitimacy? To better understand these dynamics, we fielded original survey experiments across nationally representative samples in France and the United States totaling in over 1800 respondents. Our results reflect that international approval is associated with both higher public support and greater perceived legitimacy for a strike. Further, we find that respondents emphasize international law as the basis for support and legitimacy, suggesting a cross-national belief in multilateralism for normative rather than strictly instrumental reasons. These relationships are moderated by the identity of the country conducting a hypothetical strike, implying both an “othering” effect and the emergence of distinct models of strikes across countries that deserve more study amid the ongoing proliferation of armed drones. Video Abstract: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YevyaKThae0","PeriodicalId":37327,"journal":{"name":"Research and Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.7,"publicationDate":"2022-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46217825","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-04-01DOI: 10.1177/20531680221091436
Iris Malone
A prominent debate in the civil war literature asks whether commodity price shocks incentivize fighting, but existing analyses find inconsistent results. This paper shows these results arise, in part, because research conflates the decision to form a militant campaign with the start of civil conflict. Using original data on 973 militant groups, I sequentially disaggregate between civil conflict onset and the earlier stage of militant mobilization. I use fixed effect regression methods to test for indirect and interaction effects that could obscure the shock-civil conflict relationship. First, I estimate the effect of export commodity price shocks on mobilization onset. Second, I re-examine the shock-civil conflict relationship conditioning on the number of militant groups mobilizing at the time of the shock. The results show economic shocks indirectly increase the risk of civil conflict by driving militant formation. Disaggregating these stages of militant activity advances research about two-stage conflict processes as well as the indirect causes of violence.
{"title":"Economic shocks and militant formation","authors":"Iris Malone","doi":"10.1177/20531680221091436","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/20531680221091436","url":null,"abstract":"A prominent debate in the civil war literature asks whether commodity price shocks incentivize fighting, but existing analyses find inconsistent results. This paper shows these results arise, in part, because research conflates the decision to form a militant campaign with the start of civil conflict. Using original data on 973 militant groups, I sequentially disaggregate between civil conflict onset and the earlier stage of militant mobilization. I use fixed effect regression methods to test for indirect and interaction effects that could obscure the shock-civil conflict relationship. First, I estimate the effect of export commodity price shocks on mobilization onset. Second, I re-examine the shock-civil conflict relationship conditioning on the number of militant groups mobilizing at the time of the shock. The results show economic shocks indirectly increase the risk of civil conflict by driving militant formation. Disaggregating these stages of militant activity advances research about two-stage conflict processes as well as the indirect causes of violence.","PeriodicalId":37327,"journal":{"name":"Research and Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.7,"publicationDate":"2022-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45548408","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-04-01DOI: 10.1177/20531680221093241
Jonas Larsson Taghizadeh
Discriminatory behavior is often assumed to partly be a result of implicit or unconscious biases. However, to my knowledge, no published experimental studies exist on the presence of such attitudes among public officials such as teachers or police officers and the related effects on real-life client discrimination. This study attempts to fill this research gap by combining a field experiment that captures ethnic discrimination among principals with an implicit attitude test (IAT) capturing their implicit attitudes toward Arab parents. The results suggest that Swedish elementary school principals have a moderately negative implicit bias toward Arabs according to the IAT. However, their implicit associations do not appear to drive the differential treatment of clients to a significant degree. Hence, implicit biases as captured by the IAT may possibly not be the most significant drivers of ethnic discrimination today among public officials.
{"title":"The effects of implicit biases on real-life client discrimination among public officials","authors":"Jonas Larsson Taghizadeh","doi":"10.1177/20531680221093241","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/20531680221093241","url":null,"abstract":"Discriminatory behavior is often assumed to partly be a result of implicit or unconscious biases. However, to my knowledge, no published experimental studies exist on the presence of such attitudes among public officials such as teachers or police officers and the related effects on real-life client discrimination. This study attempts to fill this research gap by combining a field experiment that captures ethnic discrimination among principals with an implicit attitude test (IAT) capturing their implicit attitudes toward Arab parents. The results suggest that Swedish elementary school principals have a moderately negative implicit bias toward Arabs according to the IAT. However, their implicit associations do not appear to drive the differential treatment of clients to a significant degree. Hence, implicit biases as captured by the IAT may possibly not be the most significant drivers of ethnic discrimination today among public officials.","PeriodicalId":37327,"journal":{"name":"Research and Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.7,"publicationDate":"2022-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42920140","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-04-01DOI: 10.1177/20531680221098337
Peyman Asadzade, Roya Izadi
Large-scale military aggression is argued to damage the international image of the aggressor and mobilize global public opinion against it. Previous cross-country research also finds that negative views of the aggressor are usually limited to the government and do not extend to the citizens of the invading country. Our article provides micro-level evidence on attitude change toward Russia as a country, the Russian people, and the Russian government after its invasion of Ukraine. We use data from a survey conducted between the morning of 21 February 2022 (3 days before the Russian invasion of Ukraine) and the night of 28 February 2022 (5 days after the invasion) in the United States to evaluate how the Russian invasion of Ukraine affected attitudes toward the country, its people, and the government. We also conduct a subgroup analysis to explore the magnitude of attitude change across sociodemographic and political subgroups after the invasion. Our findings show fairly significant damage to the image of Russia as a country as well as the Russian government. However, the reputational damage of the Russian people is minimal. The results also suggest that Republican and religious subgroups had the largest attitude change on Russia and the Russian government.
{"title":"The reputational cost of military aggression: Evidence from the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine","authors":"Peyman Asadzade, Roya Izadi","doi":"10.1177/20531680221098337","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/20531680221098337","url":null,"abstract":"Large-scale military aggression is argued to damage the international image of the aggressor and mobilize global public opinion against it. Previous cross-country research also finds that negative views of the aggressor are usually limited to the government and do not extend to the citizens of the invading country. Our article provides micro-level evidence on attitude change toward Russia as a country, the Russian people, and the Russian government after its invasion of Ukraine. We use data from a survey conducted between the morning of 21 February 2022 (3 days before the Russian invasion of Ukraine) and the night of 28 February 2022 (5 days after the invasion) in the United States to evaluate how the Russian invasion of Ukraine affected attitudes toward the country, its people, and the government. We also conduct a subgroup analysis to explore the magnitude of attitude change across sociodemographic and political subgroups after the invasion. Our findings show fairly significant damage to the image of Russia as a country as well as the Russian government. However, the reputational damage of the Russian people is minimal. The results also suggest that Republican and religious subgroups had the largest attitude change on Russia and the Russian government.","PeriodicalId":37327,"journal":{"name":"Research and Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.7,"publicationDate":"2022-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48953527","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-04-01DOI: 10.1177/20531680221093435
Myunghoon Kang
Congress’s power of the purse is effective enough to block the implementation of a policy Congress disagrees with, especially in the case of foreign policies initiated by presidents. However, it is puzzling that congressional deference to presidents, instead of defiance, has been common. Conventionally, presidents’ informational advantages over Congress have been presented as the main account for congressional deference. This account connotes that congressional deference is Congress’s surrender to presidents because Congress wants a successful outcome and presidents’ policies are more likely to succeed. However, I present a model demonstrating that congressional deference occurs even if there is no such asymmetric information. The result is that the deference can be Congress’s gambling on presidents’ failure. Congress may defer to presidents not because Congress wants the success of presidents’ policies but because Congress wants to show presidents’ failure to convince voters that Congress’s policy is better than those of presidents.
{"title":"Let presidents fail: Congressional deference to presidents as gambling on failure","authors":"Myunghoon Kang","doi":"10.1177/20531680221093435","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/20531680221093435","url":null,"abstract":"Congress’s power of the purse is effective enough to block the implementation of a policy Congress disagrees with, especially in the case of foreign policies initiated by presidents. However, it is puzzling that congressional deference to presidents, instead of defiance, has been common. Conventionally, presidents’ informational advantages over Congress have been presented as the main account for congressional deference. This account connotes that congressional deference is Congress’s surrender to presidents because Congress wants a successful outcome and presidents’ policies are more likely to succeed. However, I present a model demonstrating that congressional deference occurs even if there is no such asymmetric information. The result is that the deference can be Congress’s gambling on presidents’ failure. Congress may defer to presidents not because Congress wants the success of presidents’ policies but because Congress wants to show presidents’ failure to convince voters that Congress’s policy is better than those of presidents.","PeriodicalId":37327,"journal":{"name":"Research and Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.7,"publicationDate":"2022-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45768519","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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