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‘Idleness’ and a new approach to employment policy “失业”与就业政策新思路
Q4 Social Sciences Pub Date : 2022-12-14 DOI: 10.1111/newe.12327
Katy Jones

It is 80 years since Beveridge took on what he called the ‘five giants’ of want, disease, ignorance, squalor and idleness. His report has shaped British politics and society ever since its publication. As part of a project to assess where we stand today, Ashwin Kumar and I were commissioned to explore ‘idleness’.1 Is it a problem today? And if so, what should be done about it?

For Beveridge, who was writing after two decades of high unemployment, the problem was one of worklessness and a lack of jobs for male breadwinners. Today our labour market is very different: rates of employment are historically high, many more women are in paid work, but alongside this we have record levels of in-work poverty and endemic labour market inequalities along the lines of gender, ethnicity and disability. The UK is stuck in a low-pay, low-productivity rut, but the political rhetoric on both sides has not caught up.

A key factor underlying our underperforming labour market is power. It's something that unemployed people and low-paid workers are sorely lacking. The balance of power between workers and employers has also shifted decisively towards the latter. People are forced into taking jobs that don't match their skills and needs, trapped by both a lack of progression opportunities within their current workplace, but also a lack of alternative jobs that offer a better future. Employers have no incentive to improve job quality if they know their workers have few alternatives.

The state should play a key role in redressing this power imbalance. Being pro-economy isn't necessarily being pro-business, and government should be backing and investing in the unemployed and low paid, rather than treating them as a problem to be managed. But in our book we show that time and again, in policy areas as diverse as unemployment, childcare, transport, skills and regulation, the state conspires to constrain the labour supply of low-paid workers and reduces their power to reject poor quality work.

Our employment service needs urgent reform. For a long time, it has been unashamedly characterized as a “great big nagging service”,2 enforced through punitive sanctions and designed to make unemployment more uncomfortable than it already is.

Reform of this problematic approach has been needed for a long time. But at this juncture, when the DWP is beginning to think about engaging with people in work (an unprecedented shift made possible through universal credit's merging of in- and out-of-work benefits), policymakers need to recognise that we’ve reached the end of the road.

More of the same: a ‘work first, then work more’ approach, which simply requires workers to take on more work, while at the same time doing nothing about the quality of jobs available, just places more pressure on precarious workers. Employers don't welcome this approach either, voicing concerns about the adverse impact this could have on staff wellbeing and performance. 6

80年前,贝弗里奇(Beveridge)对他所称的匮乏、疾病、无知、肮脏和懒惰的“五大巨人”进行了抨击。自他的报告发表以来,一直影响着英国的政治和社会。作为评估我们现状的一个项目的一部分,Ashwin Kumar和我被委托去探索“懒惰”这在今天是个问题吗?如果是这样,我们应该做些什么呢?贝弗里奇是在经历了20年的高失业率之后写这篇文章的。他认为,问题是失业和缺乏养家糊口的男性工作。如今,我们的劳动力市场已大不相同:就业率处于历史高位,从事有偿工作的女性人数大幅增加,但与此同时,我们的在职贫困率也达到了创纪录水平,劳动力市场普遍存在性别、种族和残疾方面的不平等。英国陷入了低工资、低生产率的泥潭,但双方的政治言论都没有跟上。导致我们劳动力市场表现不佳的一个关键因素是权力。这是失业人员和低收入工人极度缺乏的东西。工人和雇主之间的权力平衡也果断地向后者倾斜。人们被迫从事与他们的技能和需求不匹配的工作,既因为在目前的工作场所缺乏晋升机会,也因为缺乏能提供更好未来的替代工作。如果雇主知道自己的员工别无选择,他们就没有动力提高工作质量。国家应该在纠正这种权力不平衡方面发挥关键作用。支持经济并不一定支持商业,政府应该支持和投资失业者和低收入者,而不是把他们当作一个需要管理的问题。但在我们的书中,我们一次又一次地表明,在失业、儿童保育、交通、技能和监管等多种政策领域,国家合谋限制低薪工人的劳动力供应,并削弱他们拒绝低质量工作的权力。我们的就业服务急需改革。长期以来,它一直被毫不掩饰地描述为“巨大的唠叨服务”,2通过惩罚性制裁强制执行,旨在使失业状况比现在更令人不安。长期以来,这种有问题的做法一直需要改革。但在这个关键时刻,当DWP开始考虑与在职人员接触时(这是一种前所未有的转变,通过通用信贷将在职和失业福利合并在一起而成为可能),政策制定者需要认识到,我们已经走到了尽头。更多的是千篇一律:“先工作,再工作”的方法,只是要求工人承担更多的工作,同时对现有工作的质量毫无作为,只会给不稳定的工人带来更大的压力。雇主们也不欢迎这种做法,担心这会对员工的健康和绩效产生不利影响。我们迫切需要转向一个以支持为基础的系统,使人们能够获得高质量的机会,并支持真正的进步前景。关键目标不应是让人们从事任何工作,而应确保在适当的工作中,支持人们从事体面和富有成效的工作,使他们的技能和能力得到发展和有效利用,并使他们能够最大限度地发挥潜力。这就是人力资本的方法:帮助人们建立一个令人满意和富有成效的职业生涯,而不是不惜一切代价接受任何工作。这在一定程度上意味着确保就业和技能系统有效地协同工作。成人的学习参与率急剧下降,在过去十年中几乎减半雇主们在逃避他们的责任,然而国家在支持人们获得培训机会以帮助他们进步方面也发挥着作用。但包括培训在内的福利项目所占比例已经稳定在略高于6%的水平,而且在之前的6个月里,只有6%的开始学徒生涯的人申请了福利,低于2013/14年度的14%。这些统计数据令人费解,因为这两个系统都有一个共同的核心目标,即支持人们进入工作岗位并在工作中取得进步。然而,他们进一步暴露了“工作第一”方法的短视:花在学习和发展新技能上的时间不是花在申请和工作上的时间。尽管国际证据表明,这种人力资本开发方法具有更好的长期就业结果。很明显,政策制定者必须将他们的优先事项从短期削减福利账单转移到致力于世界领先的就业和技能服务,以满足未来劳动力市场的需求。“但是这要花钱啊!”,通常是对这类建议的直接反应。 的确,在短期内,它可能会很好地发挥作用,但从长期来看,对个人、企业和经济都有更高的回报。政策制定者需要意识到这一点。对人的投资是值得的,也是早就应该进行的。如果政策制定者真的想让我们摆脱低工资、低生产率的困境,他们就需要开始在一系列政策领域采取实际行动来支持这些情绪,这些政策领域目前正在削弱(而不是增强)工人的能力,并帮助他们在英国劳动力市场上茁壮成长。
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引用次数: 0
Is history repeating itself? 历史会重演吗?
Q4 Social Sciences Pub Date : 2022-12-13 DOI: 10.1111/newe.12316
John Curtice

There is much that is remarkably similar about the circumstances in which the Labour Party in the UK finds itself now, and where it stood on the brink of its landslide success in 1997. The party has seemingly made itself more electable in the eyes of the electorate following a tack back towards the ideological centre of British politics. Then, in an imitation of what happened after Black Wednesday in September 1992, it has been propelled into a large polling lead after the incumbent government's reputation for economic competence was severely damaged as a result of losing the confidence of the financial markets. Although the next general election could still be nearly two years away, it would seem as though history could well repeat itself.

To illustrate how the pattern of party support has changed, we use here the data collected by the 1996 BSA survey, conducted a year before Labour's landslide victory the following year, and that obtained by the most recent survey undertaken towards the end of 2021.

Peter Pulzer famously wrote in the 1960s that ‘class is the basis of British politics, all else is embellishment and detail’.6 Thirty years later, the picture was no longer that simple. Even so, as the lower half of table 1 shows, support for the Conservatives was still rather higher among those in managerial and more junior non-manual occupations than it was among those in semi-routine and routine – that is, working-class – manual occupations. The opposite was true of Labour who, despite wanting to improve its support among middle-class voters, in fact enjoyed the support of a little over half of those in working-class jobs.

Now, after a general election in 2019 in which Labour lost a number of working-class ‘Red Wall’ seats (and with the party at the time of our survey still much less popular overall than it was in 1996), the Conservatives are only marginally more popular among those in managerial and professional jobs than among those employed in working-class jobs. Equally, Labour is only a little more popular among the former than the latter. So far at least, Labour's attempts under Sir Keir Starmer to reverse the especially heavy loss of support the party has suffered at recent elections among ‘traditional’ working-class voters appears have borne only limited fruit. In fact, the only group whose pattern of support remains as distinctive now as it was in 1996 is the self-employed who remain more inclined than any other group to support the Conservatives.

The point emerges clearly from table 2. In this table we use the BSA's value dimensions to divide the public in both 1996 and 2021 into: (i) the one-third most left-wing, the one-third most right-wing and the one-third in the centre; and (ii) the one-third most liberal, the one-third most authoritarian and the one-third in between. For each group it shows the level of both Conservative and Labour support. As we might anticipate, although the relationship is far from p

英国工党现在所处的环境与1997年几近压倒性胜利的情况有很多惊人的相似之处。在选民的眼中,该党似乎在向英国政治的意识形态中心回归后,更有可能当选。然后,就像1992年9月黑色星期三之后发生的事情一样,由于金融市场失去信心,现任政府在经济能力方面的声誉受到严重损害,民主党在民意调查中大幅领先。尽管离下一次大选还有近两年的时间,但历史似乎很可能会重演。为了说明政党支持的模式是如何变化的,我们在这里使用了1996年BSA调查收集的数据,该调查是在工党第二年取得压倒性胜利的前一年进行的,也是在2021年底进行的最新调查获得的。彼得·普尔泽在20世纪60年代曾写过一句名言:“阶级是英国政治的基础,其他一切都是点缀和细节。三十年后,情况不再那么简单了。即便如此,正如表1的下半部分所示,在管理类和较低级的非体力职业中,保守党的支持率仍然比在半常规和常规(即工人阶级)体力职业中高得多。与之相反的是工党,尽管工党想要提高其在中产阶级选民中的支持率,但实际上它得到了一半多一点的工人阶级的支持。现在,在2019年的大选中,工党失去了一些工人阶级的“红墙”席位(而且在我们进行调查时,该党的总体受欢迎程度仍远低于1996年),保守党在管理和专业工作人员中的受欢迎程度仅略高于工人阶级工作人员。同样,工党在前者中只比后者受欢迎一点。至少到目前为止,在Keir Starmer爵士的领导下,工党试图扭转该党在最近的选举中在“传统”工人阶级选民中遭受的严重损失,但似乎收效甚微。事实上,唯一一个支持保守党的模式与1996年一样独特的群体是个体经营者,他们比其他任何群体都更倾向于支持保守党。从表2中可以清楚地看出这一点。在这个表格中,我们使用BSA的价值维度将1996年和2021年的公众分为:(i)三分之一的最左翼,三分之一的最右翼和三分之一的中间;(二)三分之一最自由,三分之一最专制,三分之一介于两者之间。对于每个群体,它都显示了保守党和工党的支持水平。正如我们所预料的那样,尽管这种关系远非完美,但更关注不平等的左翼人士更有可能支持工党,而右翼人士更倾向于支持保守党。此外,就保守党而言,这种分歧现在和1996年一样重要,尽管工党在现在和那时之间的支持差异在左翼中显得更为明显(我们将在下面回到这一点)。长期以来,自由主义者和威权主义者在政治偏好上也倾向于有所不同1996年,保守党在威权主义者中更受欢迎,工党在自由主义者中更受欢迎。但这种差异没有左右两派之间的差异那么大。相比之下,如今自由主义者和威权主义者的政党政治分歧明显加大。事实上,他们之间的差别并不比左派和右派之间的差距差多少。而在20世纪90年代,英国的选举政治主要是左翼和右翼之间的一维斗争,现在它似乎是一个更复杂的二维竞争,其中更自由和更专制的观点之间的区别也很重要。然而,人们可能会认为这两个维度不过是同一枚硬币的两面,也就是说,许多左翼人士倾向于自由主义,而右翼人士倾向于威权主义。事实并非如此。在1996年,人们在一个维度上的立场与他们在另一个维度上的立场是完全无关的,即使是现在,这种联系也只是很小的正相关迎合选民的价值观不再仅仅是在不平等问题上采取适当立场的问题,而是在社会凝聚力和多样性问题上采取立场的问题。不管选民站在左右的哪个立场上,现在自由主义者对工党的支持远远高于威权主义者。与此同时,工党也发现自己在争取左派和社会自由主义者的支持方面面临着更大的竞争。 总的来说,绿党和苏格兰民族党(SNP)现在比1996年更受欢迎,他们在左翼和社会自由主义者中获得的支持最大。如今,多达18%的左翼人士和20%的社会自由派人士支持绿党或一个民族主义政党,而在右翼人士和威权主义者中,这一比例仅为7%。无论从哪个角度来看,任何向中间靠拢的决定现在都需要平衡可能获得的选票和可能失去左派或自由派支持的权衡,后者可能会觉得他们确实有别的地方可去。当然,人们可能会认为,自从最近一次BSA调查以来,情况已经发生了变化。毕竟,在2021年10月底,就在BSA 2021的数据收集即将结束时,保守党在民意调查中领先于工党,就像他们自2019年大选以来的大部分时间一样。相比之下,一年过去了,在经历了“党派门”和金融市场动荡之后,两位保守党首相的起落之后,工党领先了25个百分点。这肯定意味着政党的支持模式也发生了变化吧?然而,在实践中,情况似乎并非如此。平均而言,2021年10月至2022年10月,支持工党(投票的意图)享年65岁和13分,从22%降至35%。但它几乎一样——增加了12分(从50%到62%),其中18岁- 24.12,而工党支持增加更主要是手工C2DE的选民(19分)比主要是白领他们的选民(14分)在“C2DE”选民中,该党的平均支持率为53%,与在“ABC1”职业中登记的50%的支持率相差不大尽管其支持率急剧上升,但工党在吸引工薪阶层选民方面并不像以前那样成功,而该党确实仍然特别依赖年轻选民的支持。该调查不包括每年在BSA调查中出现的旨在衡量人们价值观的问题。然而,鉴于人们在2016年欧盟公投中投票的方式与人们在自由-威权维度上的立场密切相关(与他们是左派还是右派无关),我们可以利用人们在欧盟公投中投票的方式与他们当前的投票意愿之间的关系,作为人们在自由-威权维度上的立场与政党支持之间关系的代理。这表明工党对社会自由主义的留欧派比威权主义的脱欧派更有吸引力。虽然在2021年10月至2022年10月期间,脱欧派对工党的支持率平均上升了15个百分点(从20%升至35%),但留欧派的支持率也上升了15个百分点(从45%升至60%)。
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引用次数: 0
Preparing for progressive change from opposition 准备从反对走向进步
Q4 Social Sciences Pub Date : 2022-12-13 DOI: 10.1111/newe.12322
Wes Ball, Alan Wager

In this paper, drawing on the examples of 1997 and 2015, we will look at the task of preparing for government that Sir Keir Starmer must wrestle with over the period until the next general election, which is due to be held no later than January 2025.

One factor distinguishes Keir Starmer's preparations from the case studies of Ed Miliband and Tony Blair, which is that the next general election may be even sooner than scheduled. Indeed, at various points in the past few months it has looked possible that an election would be imminent. In contrast, the Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011 ensured that the coalition government could endure.

For Miliband's Labour, this meant that thoughts turned in earnest to what governing would involve. In 2013. Lord Falconer was put in charge of leading Miliband's transition to government along with a steering committee, comprised of party aides, shadow ministers, outside experts and old hands like Andrew Adonis, which had limited input. Falconer, trusted across factions and seen as competent, was crucial to ensuring this process was given status within the leader of the opposition's office.

Going back to events surrounding 1997, Jonathan Powell – tasked with creating a greater sense of order and structure at the top of New Labour – began, from early 1996 onwards, to meet monthly with Charles Clarke (who had been Neil Kinnock's chief of staff), Patricia Hewitt and the recently retired former permanent secretary, Sir Nicholas Monck, to discuss preparation for power.2

A decade and a half later, Miliband and Falconer took this work as their point of departure.

The first lesson they took from 1997 was to use management consultants to conduct an ‘outside in’ analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the major delivery departments, aiming to give the party an honest assessment of the capacity of government departments they would inherit after five years of austerity. This echoed the accountancy firm Arthur Anderson's work for Labour in 1997.

The second lesson they took was the need to give potential new ministers the skills and knowledge required for the job of secretary of state. Much has been made of the level of experience within the current shadow cabinet, only two of whom have been secretaries of state, and a further six have junior ministerial experience. But back in 1997, the Labour frontbench was significantly more inexperienced – in the shadow cabinet, only Margaret Beckett and Jack Cunningham, both junior ministers in the Wilson government, had any experience at all. During 1996, ‘summer schools’ were held at Templeton College, Oxford. Driven by Patricia Hewitt, future ministers looked at lessons from the world of big business and the management of large organisations; another session, based around the themes of Gerald Kaufman's book, How to be a Minister, was led by the Fabian Society. These sessions often suffer from a lack of engagement by senior figures – in 1997,

在本文中,我们将以1997年和2015年的例子为例,探讨在下届大选(不迟于2025年1月举行)之前,基尔•斯塔默爵士(Sir Keir Starmer)必须努力应对的组建政府的任务。将Keir Starmer的准备工作与Ed Miliband和Tony Blair的案例研究区别开来的一个因素是,下届大选可能比预定的还要早。事实上,在过去几个月的不同时间点上,选举似乎即将到来。相比之下,2011年的《固定任期议会法案》(Fixed-term parliament Act 2011)确保了联合政府能够持续下去。对于米利班德的工党来说,这意味着人们开始认真思考执政的内容。在2013年。法尔科纳勋爵与一个指导委员会一起负责领导米利班德向政府的过渡,该委员会由政党助手、影子部长、外部专家和安德鲁·阿多尼斯(Andrew Adonis)等老手组成,他们的投入有限。法尔科纳受到各派系的信任,被视为有能力的人,他对确保这一进程在反对派办公室获得领导地位至关重要。回到1997年前后的事件,乔纳森·鲍威尔——他的任务是在新工党高层建立更大的秩序和结构感——从1996年初开始,每月与查尔斯·克拉克(他曾是尼尔·金诺克的幕僚长)、帕特里夏·休伊特和最近退休的前常任秘书尼古拉斯·蒙克爵士会面,讨论权力的准备工作。15年后,米利班德和法尔科纳把这项工作作为他们的出发点。他们从1997年吸取的第一个教训是,利用管理顾问对主要交付部门的优势和劣势进行“由外而内”的分析,目的是让党对政府部门在五年的紧缩之后的能力做出诚实的评估。这与1997年会计师事务所Arthur Anderson为工党所做的工作相呼应。他们学到的第二课是,有必要为潜在的新部长提供担任国务卿所需的技能和知识。目前的影子内阁中,只有两人担任过国务卿,另有六人有初级部长的经验,这一点已经引起了很大的关注。但回到1997年,工党的前座议员显然更缺乏经验——在影子内阁中,只有威尔逊政府的两位初级部长玛格丽特•贝克特和杰克•坎宁安有任何经验。1996年,牛津大学邓普顿学院举办了“暑期学校”。在帕特里夏·休伊特(Patricia Hewitt)的推动下,未来的大臣们从大企业和大型组织的管理中吸取了教训;另一场会议由费边社主持,以杰拉尔德·考夫曼(Gerald Kaufman)的著作《如何成为牧师》(How to be a Minister)为主题。这些会议往往缺乏高层人士的参与——1997年,布莱尔和戈登•布朗都没有出席。最后,在反对派制定的政策受到现实的考验之前,重要的是要博弈一下这些政策将如何在与下议院的接触中幸存下来。这包括为议会可能出现的所有结果做准备,并为跨党派谈判的可能性做准备。1997年,布莱尔和帕迪•阿什当进行了广泛的战略讨论。有一些政策立场的分享和匹配,以找出共生的领域——档案显示,工党政策主管戴维·米利班德(David Miliband)特别鄙视自由民主党的政策立场,将其描述为“压力集团时尚和长期政党图腾的结合”但是,至关重要的是,新工党内部相信“渐进式重组”理念的派系——虽然米利班德不是其中的一个——没有弄清楚如果a计划——工党的压倒性优势——实现了,这个项目如何才能继续下去。
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引用次数: 0
The relationship between British foreign policy and national identity 英国外交政策与国家认同的关系
Q4 Social Sciences Pub Date : 2022-12-11 DOI: 10.1111/newe.12315
Lord William Wallace, interviewed by Isabel Muttreja
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引用次数: 0
After Covid Covid后
Q4 Social Sciences Pub Date : 2022-12-07 DOI: 10.1111/newe.12319
Stephen Reicher

The second implication is that the very possibility of democratic debate also depends on viewing each other as being part of the same community and, even if we disagree about the means of doing so, equally oriented to progressing the cause of that community. In this context, robust debate can be tolerated, or even embraced as a means of testing our ideas without degenerating into hostility and conflict. However, once those who disagree with us are cast as outgroup members, whose interventions are designed to advance alien interests and undermine our own, debate becomes impossible.10 Disagreement then constitutes an assault on us rather than an asset for us. Tolerance gives way to repression.

This relationship between group inclusion and democratic debate – or rather, between exclusion and threats to democracy – has been powerfully illustrated in recent years by the rise of right-wing movements which fuse a populist distinction between ‘people’ and ‘elite’ with the practice of ‘enemyship’ by which political competitors are cast as the witting or unwitting dupes of external foes. This has long been exemplified by Donald Trump who, in the run-up to the 2016 US presidential election, asserted that “Hilary Clinton and her friends in global finance want to scare America into thinking small”.11

By January 2021, Trump had radicalised his position to the point where not only were those who opposed him ‘unAmerican’ (and therefore an election defeat was necessarily a coup) but also even those Republicans who refused to actively support him in overturning the election were enemies of the nation. As he put it in his infamous speech to a rally on 6 January: “If you don't fight like hell, you're not going to have a country anymore.”12 The result was an insurrectionary attack on the institutions of American democracy and the increasing difficulty of democratic debate within the country and also within the Republican party.

On 9 March 2020 – the day that Italy became the first European country to lock down, when Covid infections were starting to rise rapidly in Britain and people were beginning to die – England's chief medical officer, Chris Whitty, spoke to the nation in a televised address. He explained that:

“Anything we do, we have got to be able to sustain. Once we have started these things we have to continue them through the peak, and there is a risk that, if we go too early, people will understandably get fatigued and it will be difficult to sustain this over time.”13

This notion, which became known as ‘behavioural fatigue’, assumed that people lacked the ability to abide by the measures needed to suppress Covid transmission for any length of time. It justified a reluctance to act early for fear that measures would become ineffective by the time they were really needed. It was taken as fact by government ministers and played a part in delaying the UK lockdown for two more weeks until 23 March.14

‘Behavioural fatigue’

第二个含义是,民主辩论的可能性也取决于将彼此视为同一社区的一部分,并且即使我们在这样做的手段上存在分歧,也同样以推动该社区的事业为目标。在这种情况下,激烈的辩论是可以容忍的,甚至是可以接受的,作为检验我们思想的一种手段,而不会退化为敌意和冲突。然而,一旦那些与我们意见不同的人被视为群体外的成员,他们的干预旨在促进异己的利益,损害我们自己的利益,辩论就变得不可能了于是,分歧就构成了对我们的攻击,而不是对我们的财富。宽容让位于压制。群体包容与民主辩论之间的关系——或者更确切地说,排斥与民主威胁之间的关系——近年来右翼运动的兴起有力地说明了这一点,右翼运动将“人民”和“精英”之间的民粹主义区别与“敌人”的实践融合在一起,政治竞争对手被塑造成有意或无意的外部敌人的欺骗对象。唐纳德•特朗普(Donald Trump)长期以来就是例证,他在2016年美国总统大选前夕断言,“希拉里•克林顿(hillary Clinton)和她在全球金融界的朋友们想吓唬美国,让美国从小事着眼”。到2021年1月,特朗普的立场已经极端化,不仅那些反对他的人是“非美国人”(因此选举失败必然是一场政变),就连那些拒绝积极支持他推翻选举的共和党人也成了国家的敌人。正如他在1月6日的一次集会上发表的臭名昭著的演讲中所说:“如果你不拼命战斗,你就不会再有一个国家了。”其结果是对美国民主制度的一次叛乱式攻击,使美国国内以及共和党内部的民主辩论越来越困难。2020年3月9日,也就是意大利成为第一个封锁的欧洲国家的那一天,英国的Covid感染开始迅速上升,人们开始死亡,英格兰首席医疗官克里斯·惠蒂在电视讲话中向全国发表讲话。他解释说:“无论我们做什么,我们都必须能够维持下去。一旦我们开始做这些事情,我们就必须在高峰期继续做下去,如果我们做得太早,人们就会感到疲劳,这是可以理解的,而且很难长期维持下去。这一概念后来被称为“行为疲劳”,它假设人们没有能力在任何时间内遵守抑制新冠病毒传播所需的措施。这证明了不愿尽早采取行动是合理的,因为担心在真正需要的时候,这些措施会变得无效。政府部长们认为这是事实,并在一定程度上将英国的封锁推迟了两周,直到3月23日。“行为疲劳”并不是行为科学家普遍认可的概念,其中681人写信给政府要求证据支持这一观点它不是来自政府自己的行为科学咨询小组SPI-B(我是其中一员)。事实上,它被一些SPI-B的参与者公开斥为“不科学”这与最近关于危机和紧急情况下行为的文献不一致。最后,这些“实践社区”的发展得到了一种新兴的心理社区意识的支持——我一直提到的“我们”或群体认同然而,共同身份的影响并不局限于互助。一系列研究表明,遵循抗疫措施同样至关重要。人们更多的是出于社会联系、社会关心和社会责任——我们希望一起走出困境——而不是出于个人的关心。27 .世界卫生组织(世卫组织)Covid-19问题特使戴维·纳巴罗(david Nabarro)强烈主张采取“以人为本”的大流行战略,即“人是解决方案;他们不是问题所在。不要剥夺他们的权力,要赋予他们权力。把它们看作是你回应的主要力量。“我已经详细说明了当人们被构成一个心理群体时,他们确实是一个解决方案的一些方面:就个人的坚持而言,以及就向他人提供支持使他们有可能坚持而言。然而,由于参与失败而导致反应失败的最引人注目的例子可能来自政府炫耀其家长式成就的一个领域:疫苗规划,而参与失败又源于对群体过程的误解。官方的说法是,约翰逊政府在资助、开发和推出新的Covid疫苗方面非常成功,这些疫苗保护了公众,改变了大流行的进程。 这种说法有一定的道理,但除非人们接种疫苗,否则疫苗什么作用也没有。虽然总体而言,到2021年秋季,疫苗接种率很高(约90%),但在一系列贫困和边缘化群体中,疫苗接种率要低得多,尤其是黑人英国人(约60%)。大约四年前,我写了一篇关于群体与民主之间关系的文章,关于群体心理学的本质如何一直被误解和歪曲,以及共同的群体成员意识对民主参与如何至关重要。
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引用次数: 0
A cautionary tale of assuming your rights are won 这是一个警世故事,提醒你不要以为自己赢得了权利
Q4 Social Sciences Pub Date : 2022-11-30 DOI: 10.1111/newe.12317
Christine Burns
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引用次数: 0
A citizen-serving media 为公民服务的媒体
Q4 Social Sciences Pub Date : 2022-09-28 DOI: 10.1111/newe.12312
Krishnan Guru-Murthy
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引用次数: 0
The normalisation of welfare chauvinism 福利沙文主义的正常化
Q4 Social Sciences Pub Date : 2022-09-28 DOI: 10.1111/newe.12314
Mette Wiggen

This piece discusses the normalisation of welfare chauvinism. It argues welfare chauvinism was introduced through pressure from the far-right but has since become mainstream in most European countries, including the UK. Welfare chauvinism has had and continues to have a devastating impact on poverty and inequality, human rights, dignity, and the right to life. Denmark is used as a core example because of the long-established dualistic welfare state.

‘Welfare state chauvinism’ is a term that was first coined by Jørgen Goul Andersen and Tor Bjørklund in 1990 in a pioneering article where they discussed the breakthrough of the most successful far-right parties in Europe. The forerunners of the Progress parties in Denmark (and later Danish People´s Party) and Norway were founded in 1972 and 1973 respectively. These parties have by most academics been classified as far-right or extreme right and been put in the same party family as the Front National in France or the Freedom Party in Austria. The Scandinavian parties have always resisted that comparison, but, even if they have never been as extreme, they have benefited from support from similar demographics.

The parties have played important roles in changing welfare policy and access to welfare in the two countries whose welfare regimes have long been characterised by relative generosity with universal systems where everyone benefited at certain phases of life. They grew out of liberal anti-taxation movements and soon gained support from small business owners and liberals. Their core following then translated, a couple of years later, into a broad base of male, working class support. They initially called for privatisation of welfare and for the attachment of conditions to eligibility criteria, based on ideas of deservingness. By the 1990s, they promoted, to varying degrees, dualistic or two-track welfare states, with a focus on excluding immigrants from access to welfare state support, and on stopping immigration all together.

Many parties in other European countries drew inspiration from their strategies and successes and the terminology ‘welfare chauvinism’ has since been used widely. There are several different uses and interpretations of welfare chauvinism. Here it will be used how it was intended originally by Andersen and Bjørklund, to refer to preferential access to welfare to ‘our own’.

Immigrants were portrayed through this lens by the far right and the media, they were less deserving of welfare services than citizens or native inhabitants who could prove strong connections to the nation and the land through family and identity. A history of contributing to the state through taxation was an increasingly important criteria to be seen as deserving of welfare services. In several countries, far-right parties were the first to put the need to curb immigration in their programmes in the late 1980s.They wanted to keep the welfare state but advocated reducing immigrants´

这篇文章讨论了福利沙文主义的正常化。报告认为,福利沙文主义是在极右翼的压力下引入的,但在包括英国在内的大多数欧洲国家已成为主流。福利沙文主义已经并将继续对贫穷和不平等、人权、尊严和生命权产生破坏性影响。丹麦作为一个核心例子,因为它是一个长期建立的二元福利国家。“福利国家沙文主义”这个词最早是由约翰•格尔•安德森和托尔•比约•rklund于1990年在一篇开创性的文章中提出的,他们在文章中讨论了欧洲最成功的极右翼政党的突破。丹麦(后来是丹麦人民党)和挪威的进步党分别成立于1972年和1973年。这些政党被大多数学者归类为极右翼或极右翼,并与法国的国民阵线或奥地利的自由党属于同一党派。斯堪的纳维亚政党一直抵制这种比较,但是,即使他们从未如此极端,他们也受益于类似人口结构的支持。两党在改变两国的福利政策和获得福利方面发挥了重要作用,这两个国家的福利制度长期以来的特点是相对慷慨,实行普遍制度,每个人都在生命的某些阶段受益。他们起源于自由主义的反税收运动,并很快得到了小企业主和自由主义者的支持。几年后,他们的核心追随者转化为广泛的男性工人阶级支持基础。他们最初呼吁将福利私有化,并在资格标准上附加条件,这是基于应得的观念。到20世纪90年代,他们在不同程度上推动了二元或双轨福利国家,重点是不让移民获得福利国家的支持,并全面阻止移民。其他欧洲国家的许多政党从他们的战略和成功中汲取灵感,“福利沙文主义”一词从此被广泛使用。福利沙文主义有几种不同的用法和解释。在这里,它将按照安徒生和Bjørklund最初的意图使用,指的是优先获得“我们自己的”福利。极右翼和媒体通过这种视角来描绘移民,他们比公民或本土居民更不值得享受福利服务,后者可以通过家庭和身份证明与国家和土地的紧密联系。通过税收为国家做贡献的历史日益成为获得福利服务的重要标准。在一些国家,极右翼政党在20世纪80年代末首先将限制移民的必要性纳入其计划。他们想要保持福利国家,但在20世纪90年代开始远离自由主义时,他们主张减少移民的进入。减少或终止移民的呼吁主要是基于成本和移民是福利国家的“消耗”的想法。主流的新自由主义政治家更加谨慎,但大多数人在移民和福利问题上采纳了极右翼政策。极右翼被欢迎加入几个政府联盟,并成为少数派政府的支持政党。在丹麦,极右翼和丹麦人民党(Danish People’s Party)分别支持2001-2011年和2015-2019年的少数党联合政府。通过这种方式,它们能够影响与获得福利福利有关的标准和条件日益严格的立法。他们的重点是“应得”,而不是“权利”。他们声称,移民不应该在他们没有做出贡献的福利国家享有任何权利。极右翼还担心移民会对丹麦文化产生负面影响。他们反对多元文化主义,不希望丹麦成为一个移民国家,但强调应该欢迎真正的难民。极右翼政党小心翼翼地避免表现出种族主义,并通过提到文化混合的潜在问题来警告移民。例如,他们希望防止大家庭的移民获得过多的儿童福利。极右翼声称,慷慨的福利国家是吸引难民的“拉动因素”。对福利国家的支持在不同的福利制度中有所不同。Gösta Esping- Andersen确定了不同的福利制度集群,并强调福利国家的阶级特征在决定公众支持水平方面的重要性。斯堪的纳维亚半岛的中产阶级普遍福利国家和德国等社团主义制度的支持率最高。在美国、加拿大和英国等自由福利国家,公众支持率较低。 虽然我们可能期望看到三种不同类型的福利沙文主义来反映埃斯平-安德森的三种福利制度,但2013年的一项研究考虑了几个欧洲国家对移民的福利支持,结果发现只有两种福利沙文主义第一个阶段的特点是,自由和保守福利国家的本土人口不愿支持移民的福利;第二个阶段的特点是,社会民主主义国家对移民的支持程度更高。丹麦已经从欧洲最开放、最宽容的国家转变为对移民和移民最不宽容的国家。这是由于极右翼在2001年至2011年以及2015年至2019年期间作为少数派联盟的支持党所产生的影响。事实证明,极右翼的丹麦人民党(DPP)在福利沙文主义谈判中非常成功,以换取少数自由派联盟的支持。从2019年开始,社民党继续推行福利沙文主义,并以福利改革为纲领赢得2019年大选,其中改善养老金是首要议程。值得注意的是,尽管公众对欧洲各地移民的态度越来越积极,但很大一部分公众和民粹主义政治家都支持和促进福利沙文主义。这表明,尽管对移民的乐观看法和对多元文化主义的积极体验正在增加,但公众对成本问题、福利暴利以及健康和福利的市场化的关注是如何内部化的尽管人们的态度发生了这些更为积极的转变,但跨国研究表明:“在福利沙文主义时代精神的影响下,福利制度正在以多种复杂的方式发生变化。政党似乎不回应“人民”的要求,而是从高层强加意识形态议程。即使在需要一定程度的福利沙文主义与对多元文化主义的积极态度相结合的地方,福利沙文主义也更有可能脱颖而出,更有可能在政党的要求中占据突出地位。这反映了政治家和政党的共同优先考虑,他们认为平衡预算比保障所有人的粮食安全和尊严更重要——即使在世界上最富裕的国家也是如此。对难民和其他移民的人身保护在富裕国家政府的优先事项列表中排名较低,并已被经济需求所取代。经济上的争论和对福利国家的压力是全球移民政策的首要议题。移民证券化早已成为欧盟的政策,极右翼正在推动反对多元文化主义,这被视为对本土文化的威胁。自2019年上次欧洲议会选举以来,极右翼占据了欧洲议会议员(MEPs)的10%;但即使是欧洲议会议员、国会议员或极右翼政党的地方政客的数量可能也不再那么重要了,因为主流在福利和移民问题上与他们基本一致。但令人鼓舞的是,工会正在吸引寻求替代极右主义、新自由主义福利暴利和福利沙文主义的新成员。当政党无法反击福利沙文主义时,可以通过联合其他社会运动和工会之间的力量来动员反对派。
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引用次数: 0
The false promise of ‘equal opportunities’ counter-extremism 反极端主义的“机会平等”的虚假承诺
Q4 Social Sciences Pub Date : 2022-09-08 DOI: 10.1111/newe.12311
Azfar Shafi
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引用次数: 0
Anti-migrant hate 反移民恨
Q4 Social Sciences Pub Date : 2022-09-07 DOI: 10.1111/newe.12310
Safya Khan-Ruf, Joe Mulhall
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引用次数: 0
期刊
IPPR Progressive Review
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