Pub Date : 2020-08-11DOI: 10.1080/16161262.2020.1805954
Kiran Heer Kaur
Ben Macintyre’s The Spy and the Traitor: The Greatest Espionage Story of the Cold War follows the life and treachery of famed KGB officer-turned traitor, Oleg Gordievsky. Through his unique and met...
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Pub Date : 2020-06-18DOI: 10.1080/16161262.2020.1774234
Ehud Eiran
ABSTRACT The article analyzes the failure of the U.S. intelligence community to foresee the Egyptian-Syrian surprise attack on Israel in 6 October 1973. The paper deconstructs the various elements of the American failure and explores the reasons that led to it. The paper shows that at the heart of the flawed American assessment was a paradigm formulated by U.S. intelligence analysts, one that was influenced by Israeli intelligence analysts. With this conclusion, the paper suggests that alongside the numerous advantages of intelligence liaison between states, the practice can also lead them to make grave errors.
{"title":"Dangerous Liaison: The 1973 American intelligence failure and the limits of intelligence cooperation","authors":"Ehud Eiran","doi":"10.1080/16161262.2020.1774234","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/16161262.2020.1774234","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The article analyzes the failure of the U.S. intelligence community to foresee the Egyptian-Syrian surprise attack on Israel in 6 October 1973. The paper deconstructs the various elements of the American failure and explores the reasons that led to it. The paper shows that at the heart of the flawed American assessment was a paradigm formulated by U.S. intelligence analysts, one that was influenced by Israeli intelligence analysts. With this conclusion, the paper suggests that alongside the numerous advantages of intelligence liaison between states, the practice can also lead them to make grave errors.","PeriodicalId":37890,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Intelligence History","volume":"19 1","pages":"213 - 228"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-06-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/16161262.2020.1774234","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46845455","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-06-16DOI: 10.1080/16161262.2020.1778325
David Sherman
ABSTRACT Barbara Tuchman’s The Zimmermann Telegram, published in 1958, was the first detailed study of a key episode in the story of America’s entry into World War I. Subsequent scholarship demonstrated Tuchman’s analysis was weakened by a veil of misdirection that the British had thrown over the way in which they obtained and decrypted the infamous German diplomatic message, a veil still sufficiently opaque forty years later that she could not peer through it fully. Yet two decades earlier, in the mid-1930 s, American cryptographers William Friedman and Charles Mendelsohn had succeeded in piecing together a more accurate account of one of history’s greatest codebreaking successes. This article examines the sources to which the two gained access, the importance of their unique technical expertise when analyzing them, how the Pentagon in the 1950 s blocked the surviving member of the pair – Friedman – from telling Tuchman what he knew, and how even when accurate information was released from government archives it could fail to shake the erroneous memories of participants and the established interpretations of prominent historians.
{"title":"Barbara Tuchman’s The Zimmermann Telegram: secrecy, memory, and history","authors":"David Sherman","doi":"10.1080/16161262.2020.1778325","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/16161262.2020.1778325","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Barbara Tuchman’s The Zimmermann Telegram, published in 1958, was the first detailed study of a key episode in the story of America’s entry into World War I. Subsequent scholarship demonstrated Tuchman’s analysis was weakened by a veil of misdirection that the British had thrown over the way in which they obtained and decrypted the infamous German diplomatic message, a veil still sufficiently opaque forty years later that she could not peer through it fully. Yet two decades earlier, in the mid-1930 s, American cryptographers William Friedman and Charles Mendelsohn had succeeded in piecing together a more accurate account of one of history’s greatest codebreaking successes. This article examines the sources to which the two gained access, the importance of their unique technical expertise when analyzing them, how the Pentagon in the 1950 s blocked the surviving member of the pair – Friedman – from telling Tuchman what he knew, and how even when accurate information was released from government archives it could fail to shake the erroneous memories of participants and the established interpretations of prominent historians.","PeriodicalId":37890,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Intelligence History","volume":"19 1","pages":"125 - 148"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-06-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/16161262.2020.1778325","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42991730","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-06-16DOI: 10.1080/16161262.2020.1774232
Ulrich van der Heyden
During the period when the ANC operative Nelson Mandela was incarcerated, there were not only verbal calls from other countries for the release of the world’s best-known political prisoner; at the ...
{"title":"A spectacular attempt to release Mandela from prison under the Apartheid regime1","authors":"Ulrich van der Heyden","doi":"10.1080/16161262.2020.1774232","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/16161262.2020.1774232","url":null,"abstract":"During the period when the ANC operative Nelson Mandela was incarcerated, there were not only verbal calls from other countries for the release of the world’s best-known political prisoner; at the ...","PeriodicalId":37890,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Intelligence History","volume":"19 1","pages":"184-196"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-06-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/16161262.2020.1774232","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"60131461","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-06-09DOI: 10.1080/16161262.2020.1774233
Scott A. Moseman
ABSTRACT The National Security Act of 1947 gives insight into the value of intelligence to the proponents of the bill. The formation of the CIA capped two years of change in the existing intelligence agencies. The Office of Strategic Studies (OSS) closed shop after the war, and the Central Intelligence Group (CIG) was destined to fail even from the time of its creation in January 1946. Although President Harry S Truman may have had some interest in the formation of the CIA, there were other factors here. The fact that his administration established the most prominent intelligence agency in U.S. history does not necessarily mean that he was a keen authority on foreign intelligence. Truman had only a marginal role in the formation of the government’s foreign intelligence apparatus and showed only a limited understanding of the gathering and use of foreign intelligence during the first two years of his presidency.
{"title":"Truman and the Formation of the Central Intelligence Agency","authors":"Scott A. Moseman","doi":"10.1080/16161262.2020.1774233","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/16161262.2020.1774233","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The National Security Act of 1947 gives insight into the value of intelligence to the proponents of the bill. The formation of the CIA capped two years of change in the existing intelligence agencies. The Office of Strategic Studies (OSS) closed shop after the war, and the Central Intelligence Group (CIG) was destined to fail even from the time of its creation in January 1946. Although President Harry S Truman may have had some interest in the formation of the CIA, there were other factors here. The fact that his administration established the most prominent intelligence agency in U.S. history does not necessarily mean that he was a keen authority on foreign intelligence. Truman had only a marginal role in the formation of the government’s foreign intelligence apparatus and showed only a limited understanding of the gathering and use of foreign intelligence during the first two years of his presidency.","PeriodicalId":37890,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Intelligence History","volume":"19 1","pages":"149 - 166"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-06-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/16161262.2020.1774233","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48612165","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-06-05DOI: 10.1080/16161262.2020.1774231
A. Pető
ABSTRACT Based on the examination of the positions and activities of women employees from the interwar period until the 1980s in the accessible archival sources of Hungarian intelligence services, this paper claims that since in intelligence women employees have been deployed as “controlling images” of men. It argues that for women, the intelligence service sector is just like any other paid employment: with time, women were gradually integrated in it; and the level of their involvement reflected the level of women's emancipation in the given society. Women working for the intelligence services had to counter workplace discrimination just like any other female employee in more ordinary jobs. However, intelligence work has an additional special feature: sexism and gender-based discrimination are intrinsic parts of it, because the deployment of femininity as “Otherness” is part and parcel of the trade and the result of deliberate methodological decisions.
{"title":"A gender history of Hungarian intelligence services during the Cold War","authors":"A. Pető","doi":"10.1080/16161262.2020.1774231","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/16161262.2020.1774231","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Based on the examination of the positions and activities of women employees from the interwar period until the 1980s in the accessible archival sources of Hungarian intelligence services, this paper claims that since in intelligence women employees have been deployed as “controlling images” of men. It argues that for women, the intelligence service sector is just like any other paid employment: with time, women were gradually integrated in it; and the level of their involvement reflected the level of women's emancipation in the given society. Women working for the intelligence services had to counter workplace discrimination just like any other female employee in more ordinary jobs. However, intelligence work has an additional special feature: sexism and gender-based discrimination are intrinsic parts of it, because the deployment of femininity as “Otherness” is part and parcel of the trade and the result of deliberate methodological decisions.","PeriodicalId":37890,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Intelligence History","volume":"19 1","pages":"197 - 212"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-06-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/16161262.2020.1774231","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48107597","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-06-05DOI: 10.1080/16161262.2020.1774236
Ryan Shaffer
This unique book is an informative study for scholars and the wider public. To the Romanian Securitate, the author was a ‘spy’ working for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and then a Hungarian...
{"title":"My life as a spy: investigations in a secret police file","authors":"Ryan Shaffer","doi":"10.1080/16161262.2020.1774236","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/16161262.2020.1774236","url":null,"abstract":"This unique book is an informative study for scholars and the wider public. To the Romanian Securitate, the author was a ‘spy’ working for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and then a Hungarian...","PeriodicalId":37890,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Intelligence History","volume":"19 1","pages":"229 - 230"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-06-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/16161262.2020.1774236","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41879462","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-06-03DOI: 10.1080/16161262.2020.1774235
Y. Levin
ABSTRACT The article dwells on the development of views of the Federal Bureau of Investigation on the process of decolonization. Certain cases and relations with other counterintelligence agencies are used to see the shaping by the American counterintelligence of their own unique approach to the decay of the colonial system. At the same time, work in the same areas and, often, against the same organizations, the FBI gradually borrowed in direct or indirect ways many of the methods of their British counterparties. The article makes a conclusion on the change of the FBI’s perspective on the problem of decolonization and gives a justified view of the COINTELPRO program as the quintessence of borrowing of the British experience by the American federal agents.
{"title":"US internal security policy with a British accent: the influence of decolonisation on FBI activities","authors":"Y. Levin","doi":"10.1080/16161262.2020.1774235","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/16161262.2020.1774235","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The article dwells on the development of views of the Federal Bureau of Investigation on the process of decolonization. Certain cases and relations with other counterintelligence agencies are used to see the shaping by the American counterintelligence of their own unique approach to the decay of the colonial system. At the same time, work in the same areas and, often, against the same organizations, the FBI gradually borrowed in direct or indirect ways many of the methods of their British counterparties. The article makes a conclusion on the change of the FBI’s perspective on the problem of decolonization and gives a justified view of the COINTELPRO program as the quintessence of borrowing of the British experience by the American federal agents.","PeriodicalId":37890,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Intelligence History","volume":"19 1","pages":"167 - 183"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-06-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/16161262.2020.1774235","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42554939","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-06-01DOI: 10.1080/16161262.2020.1750841
Ben Wheatley
ABSTRACT This article attempts to chart the ultimate fate of each German tank, assault gun and tank destroyer of the SS Panzergrenadier Divisions Leibstandarte and Das Reich that participated in the battle of Prokhorovka on 12.7.43 against the Soviet Union’s 5th Guards Tank Army. The central question of the article being; If large numbers of German Armoured Fighting Vehicles (AFV) did not meet disaster on the ‘tank fields’ southwest of Prokhorovka (as was claimed for many decades by both Soviet and Western historiography), then when exactly did those participating German AFV of the Leibstandarte and Das Reich finally succumb to the Red Army? How long did they survive on the Eastern Front against an ever more sophisticated and skilled opponent? By determining the ultimate fate of these German AFVs in the autumn and winter of 1943/44, it is possible to get a fuller understanding of the battle of Prokhorovka itself.
{"title":"Surviving Prokhorovka: German armoured longevity on the Eastern Front in 1943–1944","authors":"Ben Wheatley","doi":"10.1080/16161262.2020.1750841","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/16161262.2020.1750841","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This article attempts to chart the ultimate fate of each German tank, assault gun and tank destroyer of the SS Panzergrenadier Divisions Leibstandarte and Das Reich that participated in the battle of Prokhorovka on 12.7.43 against the Soviet Union’s 5th Guards Tank Army. The central question of the article being; If large numbers of German Armoured Fighting Vehicles (AFV) did not meet disaster on the ‘tank fields’ southwest of Prokhorovka (as was claimed for many decades by both Soviet and Western historiography), then when exactly did those participating German AFV of the Leibstandarte and Das Reich finally succumb to the Red Army? How long did they survive on the Eastern Front against an ever more sophisticated and skilled opponent? By determining the ultimate fate of these German AFVs in the autumn and winter of 1943/44, it is possible to get a fuller understanding of the battle of Prokhorovka itself.","PeriodicalId":37890,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Intelligence History","volume":"21 1","pages":"1 - 87"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/16161262.2020.1750841","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49619548","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-04-17DOI: 10.1080/16161262.2020.1751512
R. Aldrich, Rory Cormac
ABSTRACT We argue that British intelligence was transformed during the eleven years that Winston Churchill and Clement Attlee were in power. This change focused on the relationship between intelligence and Downing Street. Previous premiers were uninterested, naïve and inexperienced in their approach. When Churchill took office all this changed since he not only harnessed the power of intelligence but also oversaw the development of a central brain in the form of the joint assessment machinery. Yet it required Clement Attlee, with a rather different personality from Churchill, to complete the revolution. Together they not only developed the machinery used by successive prime ministers, they also trained Eden, Macmillan, and Douglas-Home in the transformative power of intelligence – changing the nature of the core executive in the process. Nevertheless, intelligence under each new administration increasingly reflects the character of the premier.
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