Pub Date : 2022-11-24DOI: 10.1177/18681026221121828
M. Brown, David O’Brien
In this article, we explore how tourism in Xinjiang is politically weaponised. Commodifying Uyghur cultural heritage for tourism allows the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to insist it is not committing cultural genocide, but actually “conserving” Uyghur culture. This directly bears on the CCP’s internment of Muslim minorities in “re-education” camps, ostensibly to target Islamic “extremism.” We explore how tourism to Xinjiang is presented as a “success” of the camps and conscripted into the “Sinicisation” of the region and the secularising of minorities’ cultures. Places and practices are deconstructed as cultural heritage, and reconstructed to provide tourists with “exotic” experiences of “wonderful Xinjiang.” This transforms the “tourist gaze” into a “testimonial” one: tourists to Xinjiang are made into witnesses that “Xinjiang is beautiful” and Uyghurs are “happy.” In this, touristic development and tourists themselves are key agents in the CCP’s territorialisation of Xinjiang, the sinicisation of Uyghur culture, and the legitimation of the violence of the camps.
{"title":"“Making the Past Serve the Present”: The Testimonial Tourist Gaze and Infrastructures of Memory in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR), China","authors":"M. Brown, David O’Brien","doi":"10.1177/18681026221121828","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/18681026221121828","url":null,"abstract":"In this article, we explore how tourism in Xinjiang is politically weaponised. Commodifying Uyghur cultural heritage for tourism allows the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to insist it is not committing cultural genocide, but actually “conserving” Uyghur culture. This directly bears on the CCP’s internment of Muslim minorities in “re-education” camps, ostensibly to target Islamic “extremism.” We explore how tourism to Xinjiang is presented as a “success” of the camps and conscripted into the “Sinicisation” of the region and the secularising of minorities’ cultures. Places and practices are deconstructed as cultural heritage, and reconstructed to provide tourists with “exotic” experiences of “wonderful Xinjiang.” This transforms the “tourist gaze” into a “testimonial” one: tourists to Xinjiang are made into witnesses that “Xinjiang is beautiful” and Uyghurs are “happy.” In this, touristic development and tourists themselves are key agents in the CCP’s territorialisation of Xinjiang, the sinicisation of Uyghur culture, and the legitimation of the violence of the camps.","PeriodicalId":37907,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Current Chinese Affairs","volume":"8 1","pages":"256 - 286"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-11-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84225877","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-11-24DOI: 10.1177/18681026221129294
F. Pieke
The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is currently in the throes of redefining itself as not just China's ruling party, but also as the dominant political force of global China. Following the path of Chinese globalisation, this project overlaps with – but is different from – China's much maligned strategy of influencing and interfering in the society and politics of other countries. The principal aim of the CCP's global extension is not to meddle in the affairs of other countries, but tying Chinese people, goods, money, business, and institutions that have ventured abroad back into the strategy and domestic system of China and the CCP. The article shows that China's emerging superpower is informed both by China's unique pattern of globalisation and the CCP's own understanding of the nature, aims, and modalities of its rule, which can only partially be compared to those of earlier superpowers.
{"title":"The Chinese Communist Party as a Global Force","authors":"F. Pieke","doi":"10.1177/18681026221129294","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/18681026221129294","url":null,"abstract":"The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is currently in the throes of redefining itself as not just China's ruling party, but also as the dominant political force of global China. Following the path of Chinese globalisation, this project overlaps with – but is different from – China's much maligned strategy of influencing and interfering in the society and politics of other countries. The principal aim of the CCP's global extension is not to meddle in the affairs of other countries, but tying Chinese people, goods, money, business, and institutions that have ventured abroad back into the strategy and domestic system of China and the CCP. The article shows that China's emerging superpower is informed both by China's unique pattern of globalisation and the CCP's own understanding of the nature, aims, and modalities of its rule, which can only partially be compared to those of earlier superpowers.","PeriodicalId":37907,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Current Chinese Affairs","volume":"15 1","pages":"456 - 475"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-11-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"72534631","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-11-17DOI: 10.1177/18681026221130086
Naja Morell Hjortshøj
In recent years, efforts to promote entrepreneurship as a possible career path for Chinese university students have intensified alongside the implementation of the official campaign of “mass entrepreneurship and mass innovation” (大众创业, 万众创新, dazhong chuangye, wanzhong chuangxin). Based on semi-structured interviews and long-term ethnographic fieldwork conducted at two Chinese elite universities, this article examines what motivates young Chinese to become entrepreneurs. It is argued that Chinese students imagine entrepreneurship as an alternative to ceaseless striving for high-paying jobs. They believe that becoming entrepreneurs will enable them to pursue their own interests, engage in meaningful projects, experience a life of excitement and variation, and become masters of their own time. This notion of the good life ties in with broader discourses of well-being that are currently proliferating among youth in urban China.
{"title":"New Visions of the Good Life: Entrepreneurial Pursuits of Chinese Elite University Students","authors":"Naja Morell Hjortshøj","doi":"10.1177/18681026221130086","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/18681026221130086","url":null,"abstract":"In recent years, efforts to promote entrepreneurship as a possible career path for Chinese university students have intensified alongside the implementation of the official campaign of “mass entrepreneurship and mass innovation” (大众创业, 万众创新, dazhong chuangye, wanzhong chuangxin). Based on semi-structured interviews and long-term ethnographic fieldwork conducted at two Chinese elite universities, this article examines what motivates young Chinese to become entrepreneurs. It is argued that Chinese students imagine entrepreneurship as an alternative to ceaseless striving for high-paying jobs. They believe that becoming entrepreneurs will enable them to pursue their own interests, engage in meaningful projects, experience a life of excitement and variation, and become masters of their own time. This notion of the good life ties in with broader discourses of well-being that are currently proliferating among youth in urban China.","PeriodicalId":37907,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Current Chinese Affairs","volume":"45 3 1","pages":"50 - 67"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-11-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85029358","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-11-17DOI: 10.1177/18681026221135082
A. Law, Qianqian Qin
In recent years, a small but growing body of scholarly work has emerged on the Hanfu movement in China. Researchers have drawn attention to globalisation, westernisation, national lifestyles, and development, the renaissance of Chinese culture, Han racism, Han ethnocentrism and xenophobia as drivers for the movement. In this article, we suggest that of all the extant literature that currently exists on the movement, the ethnography conducted by Kevin Carrico is the most accurate portrayal of the movement as it stands. However, and drawing upon visual and interview-based fieldwork with members of the movement in 2013 and 2015, our main argument is that existing scholarship has not attended to several nuances in the movement that problematise ideas of race, the way the movement views the recent past and the othering of Manchurian subjects. Unpacking these problematics, this study advances upon existing scholarship: 1) by drawing attention to the way Hanfu enthusiasts demonstrate a great deal of reflexivity around the notion of race; 2) by focusing on the approaches by which Hanfuists interpret the Chinese past beyond narratives of Han ethnic decline; 3) by investigating the mode by which Hanfuists indirectly “other” Manchurian subjects; and 4) by exploring the manner in which Hanfuists hold a broad or “mass” societal “other” as responsible for a new era of moral decline in contemporary China.
{"title":"Reflexive Han-Ness, Narratives of Moral Decline, Manchurian Subjects and “Mass” Societal Others: A Study of the Hanfu Movement in the Cities of Beijing, Chengdu, Shanghai, Wuhan, and Xi’an","authors":"A. Law, Qianqian Qin","doi":"10.1177/18681026221135082","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/18681026221135082","url":null,"abstract":"In recent years, a small but growing body of scholarly work has emerged on the Hanfu movement in China. Researchers have drawn attention to globalisation, westernisation, national lifestyles, and development, the renaissance of Chinese culture, Han racism, Han ethnocentrism and xenophobia as drivers for the movement. In this article, we suggest that of all the extant literature that currently exists on the movement, the ethnography conducted by Kevin Carrico is the most accurate portrayal of the movement as it stands. However, and drawing upon visual and interview-based fieldwork with members of the movement in 2013 and 2015, our main argument is that existing scholarship has not attended to several nuances in the movement that problematise ideas of race, the way the movement views the recent past and the othering of Manchurian subjects. Unpacking these problematics, this study advances upon existing scholarship: 1) by drawing attention to the way Hanfu enthusiasts demonstrate a great deal of reflexivity around the notion of race; 2) by focusing on the approaches by which Hanfuists interpret the Chinese past beyond narratives of Han ethnic decline; 3) by investigating the mode by which Hanfuists indirectly “other” Manchurian subjects; and 4) by exploring the manner in which Hanfuists hold a broad or “mass” societal “other” as responsible for a new era of moral decline in contemporary China.","PeriodicalId":37907,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Current Chinese Affairs","volume":"32 1","pages":"230 - 255"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-11-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75781968","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-10-05DOI: 10.1177/18681026221121683
K. Brown
The Xi era can be characterised as an ambitious and nationalistic one. Aims such as rejuvenating the Chinese nation and fulfilling the country's historic mission to be a great, rich country are often referred to in elite leadership discourse and state produced propaganda. “China Dream” is amongst the most important slogans used in this language. In terms of the context in which this phrase occurs and the actual deployment, it is one that carries broad connotations and implications about an era where, in ways similar to politics in the West, issues around identity are key, and the important thing is to feel, not just to believe. “China Dream” is a form of language that speaks into the public's deeper instincts and sentiments.
{"title":"Knowing and Feeling the “China Dream”: Logic and Rhetoric in the Political Language of Xi’s China","authors":"K. Brown","doi":"10.1177/18681026221121683","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/18681026221121683","url":null,"abstract":"The Xi era can be characterised as an ambitious and nationalistic one. Aims such as rejuvenating the Chinese nation and fulfilling the country's historic mission to be a great, rich country are often referred to in elite leadership discourse and state produced propaganda. “China Dream” is amongst the most important slogans used in this language. In terms of the context in which this phrase occurs and the actual deployment, it is one that carries broad connotations and implications about an era where, in ways similar to politics in the West, issues around identity are key, and the important thing is to feel, not just to believe. “China Dream” is a form of language that speaks into the public's deeper instincts and sentiments.","PeriodicalId":37907,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Current Chinese Affairs","volume":"31 1","pages":"437 - 455"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-10-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81310249","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-09-13DOI: 10.1177/18681026221119220
Jérôme Doyon, Long Yang
While changes in Chinese Communist Party (CCP) recruitment are generally described as different phases focused on recruiting either “reds” or “experts,” giving more or less weight to political or technical criteria, we instead stress the importance of changing understandings of political loyalty to examine these evolutions. By tracing these changes throughout the party's 100 years, we show that how the party understands loyalty is largely strategic, detached from a purely ideological approach. The CCP has alternatively approached loyalty in ascriptive terms, based on class background, and behavioural ones, looking at active displays of loyalty or passive obedience. The level and form of activism expected from party members and cadres have also dramatically changed over time. Relying on recruitment data, this article shows that it is paradoxically during periods of party expansion that the CCP becomes more politically demanding with its members.
{"title":"Shades of Red: Changing Understandings of Political Loyalty in the Chinese Communist Party, 1921–2021","authors":"Jérôme Doyon, Long Yang","doi":"10.1177/18681026221119220","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/18681026221119220","url":null,"abstract":"While changes in Chinese Communist Party (CCP) recruitment are generally described as different phases focused on recruiting either “reds” or “experts,” giving more or less weight to political or technical criteria, we instead stress the importance of changing understandings of political loyalty to examine these evolutions. By tracing these changes throughout the party's 100 years, we show that how the party understands loyalty is largely strategic, detached from a purely ideological approach. The CCP has alternatively approached loyalty in ascriptive terms, based on class background, and behavioural ones, looking at active displays of loyalty or passive obedience. The level and form of activism expected from party members and cadres have also dramatically changed over time. Relying on recruitment data, this article shows that it is paradoxically during periods of party expansion that the CCP becomes more politically demanding with its members.","PeriodicalId":37907,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Current Chinese Affairs","volume":"23 3 1","pages":"386 - 410"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-09-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78130525","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-08-24DOI: 10.1177/18681026221117567
Christiane Heidbrink, C. Becker
China’s Digital Belt and Road (DBAR) is sending the offer of a technological upgrade around the world. Foreign perceptions of the DBAR pave the way to success through a cooperative attitude or to failure through resistance and confrontation. The United States of America (USA), in particular, plays a prominent role. The power rivalry between Washington and Beijing also affects foreign initiatives such as the DBAR. However, it remains underresearched, how the DBAR is perceived in the USA. The article fills this gap by analysing documents issued by US state bodies as well as three non-partisan think tanks between 2016 and mid-2021. Since no previous study has examined both securitised and desecuritised DBAR frames, we present a new research framework. The results show that negative perceptions of the DBAR prevail among think tanks and political elites. This suggests hardened fronts in the heated technological competition due to confrontational attitudes.
{"title":"Framing the Digital Silk Road's (De)Securitisation","authors":"Christiane Heidbrink, C. Becker","doi":"10.1177/18681026221117567","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/18681026221117567","url":null,"abstract":"China’s Digital Belt and Road (DBAR) is sending the offer of a technological upgrade around the world. Foreign perceptions of the DBAR pave the way to success through a cooperative attitude or to failure through resistance and confrontation. The United States of America (USA), in particular, plays a prominent role. The power rivalry between Washington and Beijing also affects foreign initiatives such as the DBAR. However, it remains underresearched, how the DBAR is perceived in the USA. The article fills this gap by analysing documents issued by US state bodies as well as three non-partisan think tanks between 2016 and mid-2021. Since no previous study has examined both securitised and desecuritised DBAR frames, we present a new research framework. The results show that negative perceptions of the DBAR prevail among think tanks and political elites. This suggests hardened fronts in the heated technological competition due to confrontational attitudes.","PeriodicalId":37907,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Current Chinese Affairs","volume":"76 1","pages":"311 - 333"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-08-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77401967","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-08-22DOI: 10.1177/18681026221110245
Zhanibek Arynov
This article examines perceptions of China and contributes to the ongoing academic debate on Sinophobia in Central Asia. However, unlike existing studies, it specifically focuses on perceptions of those, who have first-hand China experience – Kazakh students/graduates of Chinese universities. Based on in-depth interviews with them, the article argues that those with first-hand China experience tend to reject the China threat theory, found to be widespread among the general population. Instead, China-educated Kazakh youth perceive China mostly as an economic opportunity for their own country. Yet, this does not necessarily make them Sinophiles in the sense that they still express certain concerns related to their country’s potential over-dependence on China. But more interestingly, they see China as the “civilizational other.” This perceived civilisational abyss even among the more-informed segments of the population appears to be one of the main causes of the alienation of China and the Chinese in Kazakhstan.
{"title":"Educated into Sinophilia? How Kazakh Graduates/Students of Chinese Universities Perceive China","authors":"Zhanibek Arynov","doi":"10.1177/18681026221110245","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/18681026221110245","url":null,"abstract":"This article examines perceptions of China and contributes to the ongoing academic debate on Sinophobia in Central Asia. However, unlike existing studies, it specifically focuses on perceptions of those, who have first-hand China experience – Kazakh students/graduates of Chinese universities. Based on in-depth interviews with them, the article argues that those with first-hand China experience tend to reject the China threat theory, found to be widespread among the general population. Instead, China-educated Kazakh youth perceive China mostly as an economic opportunity for their own country. Yet, this does not necessarily make them Sinophiles in the sense that they still express certain concerns related to their country’s potential over-dependence on China. But more interestingly, they see China as the “civilizational other.” This perceived civilisational abyss even among the more-informed segments of the population appears to be one of the main causes of the alienation of China and the Chinese in Kazakhstan.","PeriodicalId":37907,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Current Chinese Affairs","volume":"79 1","pages":"334 - 353"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-08-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83916850","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-08-01DOI: 10.1177/18681026221085719
Orna Naftali
Schools constitute key sites for legal socialisation, the process whereby youth develop their relationship with the law. Yet, what does legal socialisation entail in the context of an authoritarian party-state such as China? The article examines this question by analysing Chinese citizenship education textbooks of the Xi era. The study finds that China's current textbooks contain elements associated with both a coercive and a consensual approach to legal education. Nonetheless, it is the consensual orientation that receives greater stress, as the books highlight the positive benefits of legal compliance and endorse the idea that youth should advance beyond the external supervisory stage to the self-discipline level of legal consciousness. Reflecting the attempt of the Chinese Communist Party leadership to draw on legality as a key source of legitimacy, this approach is nonetheless undermined by the propagandist tone of the textbooks and their ambiguous messages regarding citizens’ ability to challenge China's existing laws.
{"title":"“Law Does Not Come Down From Heaven”: Youth Legal Socialisation Approaches in Chinese Textbooks of the Xi Jinping Era","authors":"Orna Naftali","doi":"10.1177/18681026221085719","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/18681026221085719","url":null,"abstract":"Schools constitute key sites for legal socialisation, the process whereby youth develop their relationship with the law. Yet, what does legal socialisation entail in the context of an authoritarian party-state such as China? The article examines this question by analysing Chinese citizenship education textbooks of the Xi era. The study finds that China's current textbooks contain elements associated with both a coercive and a consensual approach to legal education. Nonetheless, it is the consensual orientation that receives greater stress, as the books highlight the positive benefits of legal compliance and endorse the idea that youth should advance beyond the external supervisory stage to the self-discipline level of legal consciousness. Reflecting the attempt of the Chinese Communist Party leadership to draw on legality as a key source of legitimacy, this approach is nonetheless undermined by the propagandist tone of the textbooks and their ambiguous messages regarding citizens’ ability to challenge China's existing laws.","PeriodicalId":37907,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Current Chinese Affairs","volume":"148 1","pages":"265 - 291"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88253241","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-11DOI: 10.1177/18681026221110587
Ying Wang
The internationalisation of Chinese non-governmental Organisations (NGOs) is an emerging phenomenon. As new international development actors, how independent are Chinese NGOs from the Chinese state? Based on interviews with eighteen Chinese NGOs and an analysis of secondary sources, the study finds that the internationalisation of Chinese NGOs is variegated rather than solely state-led. The state is not closely involved in much of the internationalisation processes of a majority of Chinese NGOs. However, all Chinese NGOs with overseas operations avoid overstepping a political boundary that is tacitly understood by both NGOs and the state. To explain the duality of both uniformity and diversity among Chinese NGOs, this study develops an embeddedness framework that disaggregates state influences into a primary layer of systemic regulatory guidance that affects all Chinese NGOs, and a secondary layer of influence over NGOs’ operations (initiation, financing, and implementation), within which the varying levels of governmental influence upon different NGOs lie.
{"title":"Embeddedness Beyond Borders: Examining the Autonomy of Chinese NGOs in Their Global Endeavours","authors":"Ying Wang","doi":"10.1177/18681026221110587","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/18681026221110587","url":null,"abstract":"The internationalisation of Chinese non-governmental Organisations (NGOs) is an emerging phenomenon. As new international development actors, how independent are Chinese NGOs from the Chinese state? Based on interviews with eighteen Chinese NGOs and an analysis of secondary sources, the study finds that the internationalisation of Chinese NGOs is variegated rather than solely state-led. The state is not closely involved in much of the internationalisation processes of a majority of Chinese NGOs. However, all Chinese NGOs with overseas operations avoid overstepping a political boundary that is tacitly understood by both NGOs and the state. To explain the duality of both uniformity and diversity among Chinese NGOs, this study develops an embeddedness framework that disaggregates state influences into a primary layer of systemic regulatory guidance that affects all Chinese NGOs, and a secondary layer of influence over NGOs’ operations (initiation, financing, and implementation), within which the varying levels of governmental influence upon different NGOs lie.","PeriodicalId":37907,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Current Chinese Affairs","volume":"39 1","pages":"3 - 24"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-07-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81798281","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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