Pub Date : 2022-03-14DOI: 10.1177/18681026221079841
Jonathan Sullivan, Weixiang Wang
For all the popular interest in “wolf warrior diplomacy,” scant attention has been paid to the internal logics and mechanics of representative communications, notably the intersection with grassroots cyber-nationalism. Centring the connections between official and unofficial actors, we situate Chinese diplomatic communications within the domestic nationalist cyberspace cultures that demand and nourish the “dare to fight” orientation of formal Chinese diplomacy on the international stage. We argue that there is a synergistic interaction between officials and popular nationalism that creates bottom-up incentives to adopt a “wolf warrior” posture, distinct from simultaneous top-down pressures from the central leadership under Xi Jinping to appropriately represent China's “confident rise.” We show through case studies involving MoFA spokesperson and archetypal “wolf warrior” Zhao Lijian, that this interaction extends to sharing unofficial content and ideas in a mutually reinforcing cycle that facilitates a harder edge to diplomatic communications.
{"title":"China's “Wolf Warrior Diplomacy”: The Interaction of Formal Diplomacy and Cyber-Nationalism","authors":"Jonathan Sullivan, Weixiang Wang","doi":"10.1177/18681026221079841","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/18681026221079841","url":null,"abstract":"For all the popular interest in “wolf warrior diplomacy,” scant attention has been paid to the internal logics and mechanics of representative communications, notably the intersection with grassroots cyber-nationalism. Centring the connections between official and unofficial actors, we situate Chinese diplomatic communications within the domestic nationalist cyberspace cultures that demand and nourish the “dare to fight” orientation of formal Chinese diplomacy on the international stage. We argue that there is a synergistic interaction between officials and popular nationalism that creates bottom-up incentives to adopt a “wolf warrior” posture, distinct from simultaneous top-down pressures from the central leadership under Xi Jinping to appropriately represent China's “confident rise.” We show through case studies involving MoFA spokesperson and archetypal “wolf warrior” Zhao Lijian, that this interaction extends to sharing unofficial content and ideas in a mutually reinforcing cycle that facilitates a harder edge to diplomatic communications.","PeriodicalId":37907,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Current Chinese Affairs","volume":"12 1","pages":"68 - 88"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-03-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79923057","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-12-23DOI: 10.1177/18681026211047871
R. Jenkins
When China invited the Latin American countries to participate in the Belt and Road Initiative, it fuelled expectations of a much closer and more productive relationship with the region. In practice, however, there is little evidence that this was happening even before the coronavirus disease 2019 pandemic. The article shows that neither the policy statements by China nor the trends in economic relations indicate a substantive change in Sino–Latin American relations and that the Belt and Road Initiative represents a repackaging of existing relations and the continuation of trends that have been underway since the global financial crisis.
{"title":"China's Belt and Road Initiative in Latin America: What has Changed?","authors":"R. Jenkins","doi":"10.1177/18681026211047871","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/18681026211047871","url":null,"abstract":"When China invited the Latin American countries to participate in the Belt and Road Initiative, it fuelled expectations of a much closer and more productive relationship with the region. In practice, however, there is little evidence that this was happening even before the coronavirus disease 2019 pandemic. The article shows that neither the policy statements by China nor the trends in economic relations indicate a substantive change in Sino–Latin American relations and that the Belt and Road Initiative represents a repackaging of existing relations and the continuation of trends that have been underway since the global financial crisis.","PeriodicalId":37907,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Current Chinese Affairs","volume":"31 1","pages":"13 - 39"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-12-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74646246","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Reza Hasmath, T. Hildebrandt, Jessica C. Teets, Jennifer Y. J. Hsu, Carolyn L. Hsu
Chinese citizens are relatively happy with the state's management of national disasters and emergencies. However, they are increasingly concluding that the state alone cannot manage them. Leveraging the 2018 and 2020 Civic Participation in China Surveys, we find that more educated citizens conclude that the government has a leading role in crisis management, but there is ample room for civil society organisations (CSOs) to act in a complementary fashion. On a slightly diverging path, volunteers who have meaningfully interacted with CSOs are more skeptical than non-volunteers about CSOs’ organisational ability to fulfill this crisis management function. These findings imply that the political legitimacy of the Communist Party of China is not challenged by allowing CSOs a greater role in crisis management.
{"title":"Citizens’ Expectations for Crisis Management and the Involvement of Civil Society Organisations in China","authors":"Reza Hasmath, T. Hildebrandt, Jessica C. Teets, Jennifer Y. J. Hsu, Carolyn L. Hsu","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3615101","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3615101","url":null,"abstract":"Chinese citizens are relatively happy with the state's management of national disasters and emergencies. However, they are increasingly concluding that the state alone cannot manage them. Leveraging the 2018 and 2020 Civic Participation in China Surveys, we find that more educated citizens conclude that the government has a leading role in crisis management, but there is ample room for civil society organisations (CSOs) to act in a complementary fashion. On a slightly diverging path, volunteers who have meaningfully interacted with CSOs are more skeptical than non-volunteers about CSOs’ organisational ability to fulfill this crisis management function. These findings imply that the political legitimacy of the Communist Party of China is not challenged by allowing CSOs a greater role in crisis management.","PeriodicalId":37907,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Current Chinese Affairs","volume":"4 1","pages":"292 - 312"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-12-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74387465","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-12-01DOI: 10.1177/18681026211057134
Pedro Henrique Batista Barbosa
Over the last years, Brazil and China's oil-related finance activities have expanded substantially. Between 2007 and 2019, Brazilian companies received approximately one-fourth of Chinese policy banks overseas oil-related loans, and Chinese financial institutions became Brazil's biggest oil company Petrobras’ main creditor. A deep analysis of these loans highlights their usage as economic statecraft tools, with impacts on the bilateral crude trade and investments. Loan-for-oil mechanisms, content purchase requirements, and a countercyclical lending pattern have helped to influence Brazilian players to behave in a manner conducive to the Chinese state's energy security objectives and strategic goals, namely increase of imports, diversification of sources, and internationalisation of firms. With these loans, China has satisfactorily guaranteed a stable oil supply over time and has helped Chinese equipment makers and service providers to expand their footage in Brazil.
{"title":"Chinese Economic Statecraft and China's Oil Development Finance in Brazil","authors":"Pedro Henrique Batista Barbosa","doi":"10.1177/18681026211057134","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/18681026211057134","url":null,"abstract":"Over the last years, Brazil and China's oil-related finance activities have expanded substantially. Between 2007 and 2019, Brazilian companies received approximately one-fourth of Chinese policy banks overseas oil-related loans, and Chinese financial institutions became Brazil's biggest oil company Petrobras’ main creditor. A deep analysis of these loans highlights their usage as economic statecraft tools, with impacts on the bilateral crude trade and investments. Loan-for-oil mechanisms, content purchase requirements, and a countercyclical lending pattern have helped to influence Brazilian players to behave in a manner conducive to the Chinese state's energy security objectives and strategic goals, namely increase of imports, diversification of sources, and internationalisation of firms. With these loans, China has satisfactorily guaranteed a stable oil supply over time and has helped Chinese equipment makers and service providers to expand their footage in Brazil.","PeriodicalId":37907,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Current Chinese Affairs","volume":"74 1","pages":"366 - 390"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76161459","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-12-01DOI: 10.1177/18681026211058186
William J. Norris
This article focuses on one of the most fascinating features of contemporary Chinese foreign policy, namely the use of economics as a tool of national power. This article seeks to provide a foundational context for the study of China's economic statecraft. The first portion of this article builds upon existing work to frame the phenomenon of China's post-Cold War economic statecraft. I then offer a rough periodization of this post-Cold War era highlighting key events and strategic turning points for China. I distinguish three major periods: integration into the global economic system following the post-Tiananmen isolation (1989–1997), a decade of win-win diplomacy (1998–2008), and emerging great power economic statecraft (2008–2017). The piece concludes with a proposition that we may be witnessing the early stages of a fourth phase as well as some considerations for the future study of Chinese economic statecraft.
{"title":"China's Post-Cold War Economic Statecraft: A Periodization","authors":"William J. Norris","doi":"10.1177/18681026211058186","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/18681026211058186","url":null,"abstract":"This article focuses on one of the most fascinating features of contemporary Chinese foreign policy, namely the use of economics as a tool of national power. This article seeks to provide a foundational context for the study of China's economic statecraft. The first portion of this article builds upon existing work to frame the phenomenon of China's post-Cold War economic statecraft. I then offer a rough periodization of this post-Cold War era highlighting key events and strategic turning points for China. I distinguish three major periods: integration into the global economic system following the post-Tiananmen isolation (1989–1997), a decade of win-win diplomacy (1998–2008), and emerging great power economic statecraft (2008–2017). The piece concludes with a proposition that we may be witnessing the early stages of a fourth phase as well as some considerations for the future study of Chinese economic statecraft.","PeriodicalId":37907,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Current Chinese Affairs","volume":"75 1","pages":"294 - 316"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84014246","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-12-01DOI: 10.1177/18681026211041630
S. G. Zhang, N. Chen
This study adopts an institutional approach in the case analysis of China's economic statecraft towards Brazil. In light of institutionalisation theory, it examines the institutional arrangements between Beijing and Brasilia for the purpose of facilitating bilateral economic cooperation and advancing strategic partnership. As a descriptive effort, it yields some preliminary findings: first, the institutionalisation of China's economic statecraft towards Brazil is incremental, driven largely by the desire for and belief in long-term planning; second, a set of norms, values, and principles is instituted alongside designated agencies, point persons, operational protocols, and exchange mechanisms, creating a form of institutional governance based on a multi-actor, multilevel, and network-based steering mode; third, governance remains so centralised that it falls short in empowering strategic participation; and, fourth and finally, Beijing's institution-building proves useful in the management of relations with Brazil, suggesting that economic statecraft may benefit from institutionalisation.
{"title":"Beijing’s Institutionalised Economic Statecraft Towards Brazil: A Case Study","authors":"S. G. Zhang, N. Chen","doi":"10.1177/18681026211041630","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/18681026211041630","url":null,"abstract":"This study adopts an institutional approach in the case analysis of China's economic statecraft towards Brazil. In light of institutionalisation theory, it examines the institutional arrangements between Beijing and Brasilia for the purpose of facilitating bilateral economic cooperation and advancing strategic partnership. As a descriptive effort, it yields some preliminary findings: first, the institutionalisation of China's economic statecraft towards Brazil is incremental, driven largely by the desire for and belief in long-term planning; second, a set of norms, values, and principles is instituted alongside designated agencies, point persons, operational protocols, and exchange mechanisms, creating a form of institutional governance based on a multi-actor, multilevel, and network-based steering mode; third, governance remains so centralised that it falls short in empowering strategic participation; and, fourth and finally, Beijing's institution-building proves useful in the management of relations with Brazil, suggesting that economic statecraft may benefit from institutionalisation.","PeriodicalId":37907,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Current Chinese Affairs","volume":"74 1","pages":"339 - 365"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75078838","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-12-01DOI: 10.1177/18681026211061750
P. Roberts
The term “economic statecraft” is increasingly employed to describe China's use of economic resources to pursue objectives spanning the political, economic, and strategic spheres. One recent study suggests that “China's sophisticated use of economics in its foreign policy is still a fairly recent phenomenon.” Yet close scrutiny of how since at least the early 1900s Chinese leaders sought to use economic leverage as a foreign policy instrument suggests that the antecedents of contemporary Chinese economic statecraft date back to the founding of the People's Republic of China and even before. This special issue represents an effort to explore in some depth in what ways post-Cold War Chinese economic statecraft does indeed represent a novel phenomenon, as opposed to the simple continuation of earlier trends; to identify its most important features and follow its evolution over time; and to investigate in detail several specific recent case studies.
{"title":"Economic Statecraft with Chinese Characteristics: Strange, New, and Different, or Old Wine in New Bottles?","authors":"P. Roberts","doi":"10.1177/18681026211061750","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/18681026211061750","url":null,"abstract":"The term “economic statecraft” is increasingly employed to describe China's use of economic resources to pursue objectives spanning the political, economic, and strategic spheres. One recent study suggests that “China's sophisticated use of economics in its foreign policy is still a fairly recent phenomenon.” Yet close scrutiny of how since at least the early 1900s Chinese leaders sought to use economic leverage as a foreign policy instrument suggests that the antecedents of contemporary Chinese economic statecraft date back to the founding of the People's Republic of China and even before. This special issue represents an effort to explore in some depth in what ways post-Cold War Chinese economic statecraft does indeed represent a novel phenomenon, as opposed to the simple continuation of earlier trends; to identify its most important features and follow its evolution over time; and to investigate in detail several specific recent case studies.","PeriodicalId":37907,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Current Chinese Affairs","volume":"16 1","pages":"267 - 293"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75359993","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-11-10DOI: 10.1177/18681026211024667
Enrique Dussel Peters
During 2000–2019, the autoparts-automobile global value chain (AAGVC) underwent significant structural changes from a number of perspectives: micro, meso, or inter-firm relations, macroeconomic, and territorial shifts. This document will focus on recent trade debates on the “new triangular relationship” between the US–China and Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), and Mexico, and specifically on trade in the AAGVC during 2000–2019. In addition to the discussion on global value chains (GVCs) and its implications, the document analyses in detail qualitative and quantitative global changes in the AAGVC and specifically in US imports during 2000–2019, highlighting the performance of Mexico and China in trade, tariffs, and transportation costs. Conclusions include a set of future research topics.
{"title":"The New Triangular Relationship between the US, China, and Latin America: The Case of Trade in the Autoparts-Automobile Global Value Chain (2000–2019)","authors":"Enrique Dussel Peters","doi":"10.1177/18681026211024667","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/18681026211024667","url":null,"abstract":"During 2000–2019, the autoparts-automobile global value chain (AAGVC) underwent significant structural changes from a number of perspectives: micro, meso, or inter-firm relations, macroeconomic, and territorial shifts. This document will focus on recent trade debates on the “new triangular relationship” between the US–China and Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), and Mexico, and specifically on trade in the AAGVC during 2000–2019. In addition to the discussion on global value chains (GVCs) and its implications, the document analyses in detail qualitative and quantitative global changes in the AAGVC and specifically in US imports during 2000–2019, highlighting the performance of Mexico and China in trade, tariffs, and transportation costs. Conclusions include a set of future research topics.","PeriodicalId":37907,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Current Chinese Affairs","volume":"34 1","pages":"60 - 82"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-11-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90387906","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-10-29DOI: 10.1177/18681026211028248
Xiaoyu Pu, M. Myers
This article examines how the Chinese elites are interpreting China’s growing presence in the Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) region and the various ways in which the United States is responding to China’s expanding activity in the region. Some of China’s elites caution that China’s international posturing could be overly assertive. Regarding China’s growing role in the LAC, they have made a note of US sensitivities, in addition to China’s challenges and limitations in various Latin American countries. Regarding the US response, some US concerns may be legitimate, and others are less valid. Looking ahead, even though US–China interactions in the LAC will remain competitive, the US and China could potentially avoid counterproductive policies while also pursuing pragmatic co-operation. While China does not yet face a serious problem of strategic overstretching in the LAC, China’s domestic debate on the topic will provide feedback to China’s policymakers and promote fruitful China–LAC relations.
{"title":"Overstretching or Overreaction? China’s Rise in Latin America and the US Response","authors":"Xiaoyu Pu, M. Myers","doi":"10.1177/18681026211028248","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/18681026211028248","url":null,"abstract":"This article examines how the Chinese elites are interpreting China’s growing presence in the Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) region and the various ways in which the United States is responding to China’s expanding activity in the region. Some of China’s elites caution that China’s international posturing could be overly assertive. Regarding China’s growing role in the LAC, they have made a note of US sensitivities, in addition to China’s challenges and limitations in various Latin American countries. Regarding the US response, some US concerns may be legitimate, and others are less valid. Looking ahead, even though US–China interactions in the LAC will remain competitive, the US and China could potentially avoid counterproductive policies while also pursuing pragmatic co-operation. While China does not yet face a serious problem of strategic overstretching in the LAC, China’s domestic debate on the topic will provide feedback to China’s policymakers and promote fruitful China–LAC relations.","PeriodicalId":37907,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Current Chinese Affairs","volume":"PP 1","pages":"40 - 59"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84341061","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-10-04DOI: 10.1177/18681026211038339
Juan Carlos Gachúz Maya
The Mexico–China economic relationship is highly asymmetric, although the amount of total trade between the two countries has grown rapidly in the last ten years. Chinese exports to Mexico have grown exponentially and have diversified into different economic sectors. In contrast, Mexican exports to China have also grown but at a much slower pace and the pattern shows more concentration in fewer products. Paradoxically, in the context of the United States–China trade war, the Mexican economy has benefitted from the increase in tariffs that the United States has imposed on Chinese products. In 2019, for the first time, Mexico displaced China as a main trade partner of the United States. In this context, this article analyses the current economic relationship of Mexico with China and the United States in a triangular scheme, the impact of the United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement on the China–Mexico relationship, and Mexico's trade relationship with both economies in the context of the trade war.
{"title":"Mexico’s Trade Relationship with China in the Context of the United States–China Trade war","authors":"Juan Carlos Gachúz Maya","doi":"10.1177/18681026211038339","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/18681026211038339","url":null,"abstract":"The Mexico–China economic relationship is highly asymmetric, although the amount of total trade between the two countries has grown rapidly in the last ten years. Chinese exports to Mexico have grown exponentially and have diversified into different economic sectors. In contrast, Mexican exports to China have also grown but at a much slower pace and the pattern shows more concentration in fewer products. Paradoxically, in the context of the United States–China trade war, the Mexican economy has benefitted from the increase in tariffs that the United States has imposed on Chinese products. In 2019, for the first time, Mexico displaced China as a main trade partner of the United States. In this context, this article analyses the current economic relationship of Mexico with China and the United States in a triangular scheme, the impact of the United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement on the China–Mexico relationship, and Mexico's trade relationship with both economies in the context of the trade war.","PeriodicalId":37907,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Current Chinese Affairs","volume":"83 1","pages":"83 - 107"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79449947","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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